M O D U L U S 2 0

Stewardship of the Land

MODULUS

The Architectural Review at the University of Virginia

Stewardship of the Land

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Front Cover: Photograph by Robert Llewellyn.

Frontispiece: Photograph by Phillip Jones.

Dedicated to
Bruce Abbey

Contents

Frontispiece: Rural Landscape, Madison County, Virginia.

There is an intimate and inextricable relationship between man and earth. The earth is the material source of man and all that sustains him. The extent to which we honor and respect the earth is the extent to which we are aware of our source and of our nature. Conversely, as we have alienated ourselves from the earth, so have we lost our self-awareness.

Building is a manifestation of man's relationship to the earth.

The context within which we build has come to be governed by individual, circumstance-based concerns. The discussion of values which transcend time and place, which address what is basic and essential to man, has become irrelevant to the practice of building. These universal values which sustain man's political and spiritual life have been replaced as determinants of design by economic standards which are quantifiable and therefore seemingly objective. We are unable to conceive of our environment holistically. Designers, along with the public, have become resigned to a system which is destroying our natural heritage. Building has become an act of impositon rather than of completion.

It is the intention of Modulus 20 *to remind its readers not only of the sanctity of the earth and the depth of man's connection to it, but also to celebrate the opportunity that we in the design, planning and building professions have to act as stewards of the earth—to receive from our work the satisfaction of an appropriateness which runs incomparably deeper than the justification of maximum profit. While* Modulus *is a scholarly publication, the purpose of this issue is not so much to understand how we have come to be at odds with our world, as it is to take a stand and find ourselves at home within our world.*

—The Editors

Introduction

Wendy Redfield Lathrop

The business at hand is a tricky one. The very phrase "stewardship of the land" is problematic. It brings to mind images of idyllic green pastures and trees, maybe a barn: the agrarian dream, sentimental and nostalgic (frontispiece). That's not what this issue of *Modulus* is about. It would be absurd and backward to suppose that returning to a strictly agrarian, rural culture—even if it were possible—would solve all our problems, or even make them go away. Neither is it strictly a tirade against pollution (both physical and visual), overdevelopment, and thoughtless design—although you will find anger in some of the following, and rightly so. It is far easier to criticize than to create, but the results of the latter are far more interesting, and lasting.

Further, the long and arduous history of the concept of nature as alternately related to, opposed to, superior to, inferior to, but almost always distinct from man seems to increase the difficulty of attending to the problem simply and directly. Certainly, it complicates it.

The following articles and projects seek to address the quality of settlement. The photograph on the cover depicts the most basic form of settlement: the marking on the land of a cross—the creation of *cardo* and *decumanus*. This timeless act, manifesting itself in a crossroads, or merely an intersection of four fields, is the act which orients man in the universe. Suddenly, there are the four cardinal directions and a relationship between points: man knows where he is.

But this is just the beginning. This marking of the land precedes shelter, building, architecture. Though ultimately profound, because it is timeless, because it is repetitive and symbolic to man: it is simple, even easy. Architecture is not. Architecture develops out of contingency: it is the reconciliation of the contingent and the eternal. The highest aim of architecture is to enhance and complete what has been naturally given. This can only be achieved with much thought and much caring.

Too often, we see the opposite; and too often, architects are responsible—or rather the irresponsible cause. We architects, landscape architects and planners are endowed with a unique and heady trust: to create a built environment which honors the natural one, which fulfills man's practical requirements while it embodies and represents his values, and, above all, which is beautiful. To make good this trust, we must begin to appreciate the landscape as a cultural, as well as an ecological phenomenon, and to view building as the creation of culture, rather than simply the satisfaction of a need for shelter or, worse, for profit. The work which this requires is not insignificant: let us undertake to do it joyfully.

Acknowledgements
On behalf of *Modulus*, I would like to thank Robert Dripps for his tireless support, encouragement and wisdom in advising upon all aspects of this publication. W.G. Clark has also been an invaluable and constant source of inspiration and advice. Additionally, I wish to acknowledge Mason Disosway for his enormous and able contribution to this issue, as well as to *Modulus* in general (good luck with 22!). And thanks to Spencer and Virginia for their many contributions and, always, for their consistent patience and support.

Frontispiece: Byrd Mill, Louisa County, Virginia, 1740.

Replacement

W. G. Clark

Architecture, whether as a town or a building, is the reconciliation of ourselves with the natural land. At the necessary juncture of culture and place, architecture seeks not only the minimal ruin of landscape but something more difficult: a replacement of what was lost with something that atones for the loss. In the best architecture this replacement is through an intensification of the place, where it emerges no worse for human intervention, where culture's shaping of the place to specific use results in a heightening of the beauty of the landscape. In these places we seem worthy of existence.

We don't know why we are here on this Earth. We do know, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated among us, that our presence here is probably harmful, an imposition. That knowledge causes us to want to assuage the fouling and killing aspects of our existence in order to simply be at some ease with our occupation. We want to belong rather than only use. Sick at killing the cow, yet having to eat, we make rules of propriety and economy governing the slaughter. We must eat the whole cow; we may not kill extra cows; we may never take pleasure in the kill. In a bare existence, economy is necessary for survival. But it is also, in any existence, an ethical act that regrets the taking; imposing itself as a respectful, if insufficient, act of atonement.

In terms of settlement, we are only comforted when we see evidence of the necessity to occupy. So we are pleased by a settlement based on cultivation where, at least to our minds, we offer the economy of cultivation as an assuagement of the inevitable destructive result of habitation. We are also pleased by deference to the landscape, in the places we refuse to occupy, the places we save from ourselves. We vacation in those places, where we have either left the Earth alone or have engaged it in a way that is satisfying, where there are the fewest needless and senseless acts to represent our being. In our towns and in our isolated buildings we search for this deference and economy. We want civilization to be a good thing. We want our habitats and artifacts to become part of the place and to substantiate our wish to belong. We want our things, like those of the civilizations we admire, to form an allegiance with the land so strong that our existence is seen as an act of adoration, not an act of ruin. We are only happy where this occurs, where we have managed to make something to replace what we have taken. Always, we must start from that initial, crucial, puzzling recognition: that we are seeking justification through deference—and failing that, through economy and respectful use. That is why farms, barns and silos always seem appropiate and beautiful. That is why we like pig pens and deplore theme parks, because it is not necessary that buildings be beautiful, but it is necessary that they be necessary.

There was a mill near my home town. It was a tall timber structure on a stone and concrete base which held the water wheel and extended to form the dam. One did not regret its being there, because it made more than itself; it made a millpond and a waterfall, creating at once stillness and velocity; it made reflections and sound. There was an unforgettable alliance of land to pond to dam to abutment to building. It was not a building simply imposed on a place; it became the place, and thereby deserved its being, an elegant offering paid for the use of a stream. Its sureness made other buildings look haphazard.

I cannot convince myself that settlement, even the most economical, the most beautiful, is better than wilderness. Even the mill is not better than no mill; but the mill is necessary for our existence, and therefore worthwhile. It is an image that keeps returning, proof that use of the Earth need not be destructive, and that architecture can be the ameliorative act by which, in thoughtfulness and carefulness, we counter the destructive effect of construction. Nothing else is architecture; all the rest is merely building.

The American landscape is being sacrificed to building. The

result is dismal, adding up to nothing satisfactory or even significant except as an accurate self-portrait of our cultural and ethical dissolution. This is an observation neither rare nor subtle. The condition is one that we all see and feel daily, one that we abhor yet perpetuate, a senseless spread of profit-motivated building that has none of the good characteristics of a settlement, and looks remarkably more like a midway, unrooted and designed to be put up anywhere. The comparison becomes more apt with the realization that most of the things built are unnecessary.

Settlement implies a benign and sympathetic occupation, the selection of a specific and favored place, and the engagement of that place to economical use; settlement is the establishment of home. Our growth is the opposite of settlement. We have forgotten the rule, that the use of a place must not be separate from the abiding in it; we are intent on uses so disrespectful and unnecessary that the place becomes unabidable.

And it is not so surprising that a culture such as ours, preoccupied with the notion of a Heaven hereafter, would abuse its landscape. How can Eden be properly cared for if it has already been abandoned for a deferred Paradise for which the Earth is a mere staging area? When a land is removed from worship it is no wonder that conscience regarding the use of that land is profoundly deficient. We have no sacred places. We have no Delphi. Where there was once spirit, in the Serpent Mound, in the kiva, there is only curiosity, the haunting relics of an Earth-bound reverence.

Nor is it surprising that a culture which has traditionally thought of the rural as good and the urban as bad would insist on populating the former until it is no longer there. We fail to recognize that cities and towns by their very conciseness and economy are great acts of conservation and deference, and that they alone offer any hope of protection of the land. We fail to realize that good cities have distinct edges, whether natural or designed, and furthermore that the placement of cities, their allegiance to the natural setting, is as important as that of the built form. Like the mill on the stream, a city must engage its place and replace loss with offering.

The sickness of the heart that I believe we all feel when we see development spreading from every town into the country is the recognition that our settlement represents not only lost nature, but lost settlement. What home have we made? Given a new world, we have let the land degenerate into real estate and architecture into style. The implication is frightening: that we don't belong here, that we are no longer of the place but on it, a lost colony in a lost paradise.

Yet that very sickness of heart and its universality is hopeful; it is what has always spurred atonement and economy. When we build, we ought not to ignore it but let it guide our efforts. We ought to keep before us the images of settlements that have successfully established a reverence for place necessary to the making of a collective home.

I like to read Thoreau, especially his chapter called Economy, because of his terrible, thoughtful struggle with the matter of building. At first he seems to be only carefully constructing a house. His consideration seems failed, doomed, artificially precious out there in the woods on that pond. But gradually I see the care with which he builds, not just a grudging, tight-fisted building, but one imbued with the most luxurious and deep images. He is not a dirt-dauber, locked only in the immutable economy of his genes, but a sentient, worried, thoughtful being, determined to be at one with his place, and not knowing how; drawing profound analogies to nature, to the elements, and to his curious earthly existence with every act of building, looking finally not for a way out of the forest, but for a way to stay there with grace. All of which is simple for the dauber, and not too hard for the primitive human mind, but extraordinarily difficult for Thoreau's great intelligence.

I think it will always be difficult to build; it should be difficult. We cannot always succeed and sometimes will not even recognize our own success or failure. But we want to stay with grace, and therefore do what we can, whether we are making a tiny house in the woods or a great city. Our gradual understanding is that we are not real colonists, with our home elsewhere. Our home is here, and what we build will be its parts. It is worth the effort to try to build well.

Figure Credits
Frontispiece Courtesy of The Virginia State Library and Archives.

Frontispiece: Arbor of the Triumphal Arch, Versailles. Eugene Atget, 1906.

Folly was at work, at the very heart of reason and truth.

—Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*[1]

Nature, Madness and Architecture

Michael Stanton

Not until the Renaissance can the folly, as architectural fact, be said to have existed. The Old Man in the Medici Garden at Pratolino or the fabricated caves at the Boboli Gardens in Florence are clearly mad architectural objects in gardens: follies. Ancient precedents existed for these, in Hadrian's villa, for instance, or in the numerous Classical literary references to grottoes, temples of love, and the like. These, however, are not the focus of this essay. The intention here is not to attempt a definitive archaeology of the folly, but to search elsewhere for the sources of this persistent and peculiar architectural object, in the phenomena society has named "madness" and"nature," and to chart its mercurial existence by these ancient ideas. The folly sits at the cusp between these related concepts, and it gives physical form to their function as societal foils, in comparison with which culture defines its norms. Society has idealized, with shifting associations, the elements of this equation. The forms of this idealization and their actual representation as follies are the subjects of this essay.

Folly comes from the French *folie,* madness, itself derived from Latin *follis,* bellows, empty-head. Madness is a name for subjectively determined behavior beyond the bounds established by a group or society: sane behavior in New Guinea, for instance, would be considered mad in Germany, and vice versa. Insanity stands outside the borders; it is other than that which is sane or conventional. Similarly, "nature" has come to represent that which lies outside our urbanized, controlled landscape. The word derives from the Latin *natus,* born, having come into existence, existing: fact. But the word "nature," and the myriad ideas it has represented, as distinct from the simple fact of trees, rivers, animals, etc., have come to be defined, like madness, by their opposition, their placement beyond the walls, outside our *terra cognita.* Pierre Bourdieu writes, "The house and by extension the village, the precinct peopled with men, are opposed to the fields empty of men which are called lakhla: empty, sterile space."[2] And this space has historically been viewed as the zone of the empty-head, the place of madness.

Nature is to the city what madness is to normalcy. Nature and madness are related antitheses to the thesis that is conventional urban culture. In the construction of follies they were brought back inside the walls. The garden was the controlled representation of nature, and it was within its frame that the folly, the mad architectural object, existed, tamed and contained.

Midway on the path of life
I found myself in a dark forest,
For the right way was lost.

What it was like is painful to tell.
This wild wood, savage and stubborn,
To think of it brings back the fear!

So bitter, death is little more.
But to show the good that I found,
I must tell of other things I saw there.

I cannot say how I entered,
I was so full of sleep then,
When I left the true path.

Dante—*Inferno,* Canto I[3]

Renaissance culture was the product of the collision of contrasting ideologies resulting from a reassessment of Medieval values and institutions. It was a rich synthesis of revived realism and the transcendentalism of Gothic culture, of anthropocentrism and eschatology, of pagan Classicism and Christianity. A resurgence of humanist interest in Classical texts, and their availability to the secular community, combined with somewhat less repressive moral attitudes to create a climate at once ecclesiastical and pagan, a cautious return to some of the

1 Bacchus and Ariadne, *Titian, 1522-23. Reproduced by courtesy of the Trustees, The National Gallery, London.*

1

attitudes of a millennium earlier, always, however, filtered through a veil of Christian piety.

The Renaissance garden and its objects became associated with a licentiousness not suitable to the proper and Christian conduct of the house, where *bella figura* was maintained, while the humanist indulged new appetites for Classical imagery in the garden. The frescoes of Raphael and his protege Giulio Romano in the Villa Farnesina—the hall with its cycle of daring impressions of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and the garden loggia decorated with scenes from the Amor and Psyche myth, replete with pornographic arrangements of vegetables and fruit—can be compared to those artists' idealized and Christian contributions to the Stanze in the Vatican. In gardens, the salacious was tolerated, almost expected. Pope Clement VII asked that images other than those of the Testaments adorn the loggia of the Villa Madama, particularly ones illustrating the decidedly pagan stories of Ovid. In fact, a constant theme in Renaissance art and literature—in Lombard decorative work or the eclogues of the poet Sannazaro—was the metamorphosis, the transformation of man into animal or plant, emphasizing his natural bestiality. While exploring these pagan themes, the Renaissance was not a wholesale revival of Greco-Roman culture, but rather its reinvention, adapted to the complex necessities of different political and artistic values.

The classical period had, indeed, established values that were to reemerge in the Renaissance folly. A fascination with the exotic was an inevitable by-product of ancient trade and military conquest, particularly in the case of Roman military expansion, importing mystery cults and foreign rites. And, more importantly, in Greek literature the countryside was often associated with a wildness that seems to have been viewed as essential to human nature. The concept of sanity was synonymous with that of society[4], but also was understood to embrace participation in the mysteries and rituals performed beyond the city's walls: scenes of intoxication, hysteria, and blood

2 Pan Chasing Goatherd, *Attic Red Figure Krater, The Pan Painter, circa 470 B.C.*

3 A Hunting Scene, *Piero di Cosimo, 1490s, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Robert Gordon, 1875.*

sacrifice. The bacchanals and orgiastic ceremonies set in the forests were depicted in counterpoint to the controlled behavior of urban society. It was understood that normalcy included an element of dementia, of release, and that element was to be indulged beyond the confines of the city. Complete humanity contained an element of untamed animality. The mythic landscape is rich with figures embodying the dichotomy: rational-societal versus wild-natural. Perhaps the most poignant of these is Pan (fig. 2), the satyr-deity, goat and man, from whom comes "panic":

> I have stung them with frenzy,
> hounded them from home,
> Up to the mountains where they wander,
> crazed of mind
> And compelled to wear my orgies' livery.
> Every woman in Thebes—but the women only—
> I drove from home, mad. There they sit,
> Rich and poor alike, even the daughters of Cadmus,
> Beneath the silver firs on the roofless rocks.
> Like it or not, this city must learn its lesson.
>
> Euripides—*The Bacchae*, 413 B.C.[5]

In this passage, a rejected Dionysus takes revenge on Thebes. Images of nature combine with ones of lunacy and release. This combination, in synthesis with the city and its conventional values, formed Greek culture and, to a lesser extent, that of the Romans.

The view of untamed nature, and behavior identified with it, as a foil to controlled urban values was only one of several idealized positions the countryside occupied in the Classical period. A clear distinction must be made between Euripides' ominous view of nature or the country passions of later Roman writers like Ovid, and the controlled countryside of pastoral literature. The pastoral portrayed another nature. It was the urban sophisticate's ideal of a bucolic world, noble, composed, and harmonious: Theocritus's cicada in a cage or Virgil's

2

3

4 The Pleasure Garden, *from* Le Roman de la Rose, *Flanders, circa 1485.*

4

etched tree trunks. Persistently, since the Classical period, a "middle landscape"[6] has been appropriated, domesticated, framed in meter and on the canvases of Giorgione and others, and the influential seventeenth century French painters Poussin and Claude-Lorrain. The pastoral inspired, and came to be inspired by, the garden. It represented a radically different nature, but one by no means more idealized than that of horror and illogic. These two concepts of nature, one wild and one tame, resonate throughout the history of literature and art.

There was also in Classical literature a typical conflation of nature, contained as garden, with a Golden Age of Edenic harmony. Both Hebrew and Greek used the same word for "enclosed garden," from the Persian *pairidaeza* (paradise), with similar transcendent connotations (fig. 4). The Garden of the Hesperides, the Elysian Fields and Islands of the Blessed at the World's End, all represented this benign place. "It would not be unfair to say that Christian poets plundered Elysium to decorate the earthly paradise."[7] Judeo-Christian concepts, sometimes quite close to those of the Classics and occasionally contradictory to them, were the foundations upon which the sophisticated and abstrusely eclectic structures of Renaissance thought, art, and literature were fabricated.

> In the Middle Ages and until the Renaissance, man's dispute with madness was clouded by images of the Fall and the Will of God, of the Beast and the Metamorphosis, and of all the marvelous secrets of Knowledge.[8]

Imagery was profoundly eschatalogical in the Middle Ages. It was not the case that realism, as aspired to during the Renaissance, was impossible due to the crudity of artistic perception during the preceding millennium. It was inconsequential. Nature appeared as symbol in Gothic art, with a double-edged significance deriving from the Eden myth. From their innocent garden, Adam and Eve were sent out into a threatening

5 St. Francis in Ecstasy, *Giovanni Bellini, circa 1485.*

country from which they were forced to shelter and in which they were ashamed. This nature was unknown and fraught with dangers—a jungle, desert, or forest. This was the "primal dystopia,"[9] from which men must protect themselves, gathering together into villages.

In contemporary religious works of art and literature the walled garden and the terrible wilderness form an opposed but enmeshed symbology linked to the City of God. Secular works such as the *Roman de La Rose* employed these associations, proposing the garden as earthly haven.[10] These images were to exert a strong influence on the passions and forms of the Renaissance.

The Middle Ages were characterized by great moral and political repression and the maintenance of ignorance through widespread secular illiteracy. Medieval Christian doctrine could not approve the animal nature of man. The libidinous and orgiastic catharsis associated, in Classical writings, with the countryside was officially condemned. However, prophets and saints entered a domain close to that of dementia during their self-imposed exiles in the wilderness. They heard voices and had visions, returning to the cities no longer normal, burdened by their hallucinations with revolutionary messages. Social doctrine, linked to that of the church, while unable to condone the sensual release associated with nature, institutionalized its spiritual equivalent. Certainly, the Renaissance literary figure of the wise fool, the idiot-philosopher, originated as much with Christian mysticism as with any pagan position.

5

6 The Orsini Gardens at Bomarzo, Italy.

6

I see, in this thoroughfare
A natural, followed by children.
...Consider this unhappy wretch;
Poor mad fool, what will he do...
I have seen such wild lunatics
Shouting insults in the street...
François Colletet[11]

In the Medieval period, nature and madness were again linked. Madmen were set afloat in ships of fools or cast out of cities to roam the countryside with the beasts in a state of nature and transcendence. "It is for the other world that the madman sets sail in his fool's boat: it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks."[12]

By the end of the Middle Ages, the mad began to be installed in leper colonies, the lazar houses on the urban periphery. These had become vacant as the dreaded, though non-contagious, disease disappeared. The deranged, equally feared for the communicability of their malady, replaced the leprous at the edge of the city, beyond the walls, in a ritual of the institutionalization of the *pharmakoi*-scapegoats: those who, by their difference and resulting persecution, define culture.

Foucault reports that, in the Renaissance, madness was viewed almost as critical of culture—in a dialogue with sanity. A similar attitude towards nature was expressed in paintings of the period—of Giovanni Bellini, for example—where the inevitable background landscape was almost always composed of idealized urban and extremely naturalistic elements in counterpoint.

During the worldly Renaissance, the collision of Christian and pagan ideologies was to produce a sublime and troubled sensibility which was given form not just in follies like those at the Orsini Gardens at Bomarzo, or at the villas at Frascati and Tivoli, but also in the tense explosion of sensuality and violence

7 Allegory of the Triumph of Venus, *Bronzino, 1540-1545.*

in Mannerist art: in the paintings of Romano and Bronzino. The word "grotesque," so often applied to Mannerism, derives from grotto, an architectural form that embodied the arcane, ominous, and erotic charge of the art of the time. In fact, the architecture of Romano, Sanmicheli, and even of Michelangelo, in its extraordinary peculiarities and perverse violations of Classical forms, must be seen as embodying the values of the folly if not strictly conforming to its garden locale.

The Renaissance marks the birth of the folly, an architectural construction embodying the multivalent concepts of madness and nature that were inherited from both the Classics and from the Middle Ages. The pagan herms and exotic fountains at the Villa Aldobrandini or the Villa d'Este, and the ghouls and creatures of Bomarzo or the Boboli, all presented these concepts, and provided inspiration, intellectual or carnal, within the safe confines of the garden. It would be simplistic to assume that this was their only function, however. They were also ludic, encouraging fun, whimsy, and fantasy. Trick water jets like those at the Villa Lante were intended to amuse Cardinal Gambara's guests on a warm day before they retired to the great water-table to eat, talk, and drink wine kept cool in the rill flowing down the long table's center. Frivolity and play were essential elements in the sophisticated constructs of Renaissance art, literature, and culture. Follies were their theater, simultaneously expressing primal and often improper impulses.

7

> By a strange act of force, the classical age was to reduce to silence the madness whose voices the Renaissance had just liberated, but whose violence it had already tamed.[13]

It was this same "classical" period (1656-1794) that Foucault calls The Great Confinement that hosted an orgy of folly building. In 1656 the *Hôpital General* was founded in Paris, an act repeated throughout France. For the first time the mad were

8 Monument over the dramatist Congreve, Stowe.

8

systematically contained in penal institutions beside criminals, the poor, and other social misfits. At one point, one in every ten Parisians was incarcerated, out of sight of the tyranny of Reason. For Rationalism, insanity or social aberrance could only be perceived as unreason, to be suppressed. As in the Middle Ages, the mad were viewed as "preyed upon by a natural frenzy," in a "state of nature." They were wild beasts. The madman was "at the zero degree of his own nature. For classicism, madness in its ultimate form is man in immediate relation to his animality, without other reference."[14] Derangement was equated to a superfluity of the passions. The sane went to the hospitals for titillation. For a price they could observe the wanton activities of those beyond the bounds of reasonable behavior.

This confinement of madness was not dissimilar to that of follies in this, the contemporary moment of their apex. They were contained behind the walls of gridded Cartesian gardens. There, nature was controlled and domesticated. They became the loci of license. However, in this era of their great proliferation, the formula that had formed them was inevitably becoming diluted.

> You have nothing to do (says he) but to dress Nature. Her robe is ready made; you have only to caress; to love her, kiss her; and then—descend into the valley. Coming out into the court before the house, he mentioned Clent and Wawton Hill as the two bubbies of Nature: then Mr. L. observed the nipple, and then Thomson the fringe of Uphmore wood; till the double entendre was worked up to a point, and produced a laugh.
> Interview between William Shenstone, poet, and James Thomson, author of *The Seasons*, during a visit, in 1746, to Shenstone's garden, The Leasowes[15]

The folly during the Ages of Rationalism and Enlightenment

9 Gothic Pavilion in the park at Painshill.

was a place for amusement and indulgence, a place where the sane themselves could luxuriate in wanton unreason. This place of dalliance was also a laboratory for architectural experimentation. As the gardens of Europe have provided prototypes for urban development, so follies have for buildings. Of almost purely symbolic function, follies became the armature for mythological and literary reference, often including sculpture and painting or parts of texts within their composition. They formed, as well, the matrix of an historicist interest in "the styles." It was within the contained safety of the garden that the stylistic hegemony of Classicism was initially questioned. "Gothick" chapels, rustic-vernacular retreats, sacred mounts, and abstract and collapsed forms expressed various architectural languages and some pure nonsense in an architectural world where, beyond the garden walls, only one tongue was spoken seriously.

As serious fractures began to form in the ideological structure that had supported unquestioned conventions, architectural and otherwise, before the Enlightenment, history emerged as a rigorous discipline for the first time. It seemed to provide new conventions and answers to questions posed by this ideological flux. With historicist pluralism, and with a persistent ethos of pleasure and novelty, came a strong desire for exoticness, for Chinoiserie, et cetera. This was augmented by the information gathered by explorers: William Chambers actually went to China before designing the pagodas, bridges, and pavilions at Kew. Bizarre changes of scale, gigantic and lilliputian transformations of familiar objects, and constructed ruins served to disorient and excite. M. de Monville's broken column at Desert de Retz, truncated and huge enough to contain his house, used these devices. As soon as follies became established garden features, a lexicon of normative forms, and a set narrative associated with those forms, began to restrict true invention. Almost immediately the irrational became ordered and conventional. Thus, from its inception,the folly was threatened by the impossibility of its own replication without predictability rendering

9

10 Column House, Desert de Monville.

11 View from de Monville's Column.



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

11

it usual, and thus mute.

Follies were representative of the Sublime after Edmund Burke's seminal definition in 1757,[16] and also of The Picturesque and Romantic. The invention of The Sublime marks the closure of the traditionally split concept of nature. Once the idea of beauty could include the fear of nature within it, then the pastoral and awful could become one. In fact, the definition of the term "sublimate" is to express violent or socially unacceptable impulses in a palatable manner. Burke's definition of the Sublime facilitated this. In Enlightenment England gardening embraced wild nature. As Burke had tamed it conceptually, so the English naturalistic garden—Kent's Rousham or Hoare's Stourhead—did materially. Nature appeared pacified and perfected in the picturesque eighteenth century parks of Capability Brown, et al., inspired by French landscape paintings of a century earlier and by the poetry of Pope and his contemporaries. Confined in these sorts of environments, the dementia of earlier follies was necessarily diminished. Burke, and the English garden, pulled their ideological teeth.

> Can Kent design like Nature? Mark where Thames
> Plenty and pleasure pours through Lincoln's meads:
> Can the great artist, though with taste supreme
> Endowed, one beauty to this Eden add?...
> Creative Titian, can thy vivid Strokes,
> Or thine, O graceful Raphael, dare to vie
> With the rich Tints that paint the breathing Mead?
> Joseph Warton, *The Enthusiast*, 1744[17]

That which began with the Great Confinement—the subsumation of folly behind the walls of gardens and hospitals and the gradual defusing of the danger implicit in the concept of nature—was completed during the French Enlightenment in the doctrines of Rousseau and his disciples. Theirs was a reinterpretation of the natural and primitive. Nature was to be

12 Naumachia at Parc Monceau.

13 The Temple of Philosophy, Ermenonville, (deliberately unfinished).

emulated, as was a simple and sublime animality. These ideas were not new. They repeated sentiments of pastoral literature and art since the Greco-Roman period, and presented idealized nature as emblematic of the Golden Age. But Rousseau's notion took a primarily literary and critical attitude and redirected it as a *weltanschauung* that has had surprising impact and staying power. It is the tragedy of great thoughts that their subtlety is lost in the misreadings of their followers. And Rousseau's doctrine, expressed simplistically, has many flaws.[18] Furthermore, the folly had no place within it.

Rousseau's doctrine remains persistent to this day and his disciples many. Architectural and urbanistic thinking was deeply affected. A new model was adopted. Laugier wrote in 1765, "Whoever knows how to design a park will have no difficulty in tracing the plan for the building of a city..." and Milizia paraphrased him, "A city is like a forest, thus the distribution of a city is like that of a park." Tafuri writes of these theories, "This naturalism has a function of its own, which is that of assuring to artistic activity an ideological role in the strictest sense of the term...The crisis of the old system of values was immediately hidden by recourse to new sublimations, rendered artificially objective by means of the call to the Universality of Nature. Thus Reason and Nature now had to be unified."[19]

Laugier's Primitive Hut, the "noble savage" of architecture, was not a folly, though it may have had many characteristics superficially similar to the atavistic rustic cottages, peasant bowers, etc., that adorned most gardens. What distinguished it from them was the fact of its paradigmatic status: this was a thing of neither license nor whimsy. This was instead a canonic object. In fact, follies of the period—for instance the Temple of Philosophy and Rousseau's own tomb, both at Ermenonville—have little claim to the name. They were instead architectural examples—teaching devices.

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14 Anatomie: Seitenansicht eines Skeletts, *from Diderot's* Encyclopedie, *1751.*



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It may be said that the Enlightenment defused the explosive force of the folly, through the appropriation of nature and the hiding of madness. If this was the period of the demise of the institution of the folly, it was simultaneously the period of its greatest proliferation, a fevered orgy of invention and construction. The garden at Versailles was a cornucopia of follies and was itself a giant folly, mad in its scale. It was an exhaustion, like Piranesi's *Campo Marzio*, a meaningless recombination of architectural acts. Versailles was the masque of a febrile aristocracy's last decadent bacchanal. In the end it was the architectural equivalent of the Marquis de Sade's "insane dialogue of love and death in the limitless presumption of appetite."[20] Licentiousness without limits becomes madness. In fact, Rousseau's doctrine, taken to its logical extreme, could become the appetite of the run-amok aristocrat de Sade, all acts and desires natural and indulged to the point of gluttony and disinterest.

Marie Antoinette and her courtiers played at noble savagery, milking cows and romping in the hay of the Hameau, the peasant village that formed one of Versailles's many follies. The angry masses, the urban counterparts of milk-maids and hay-swains, overran Versailles and beheaded Marie, her husband, and their retinue in the first of many European upheavals that would, with finality, upset the hegemony of the aristocracy. Another of Rousseau's powerful doctrines—the sovereignty of the people as expressed in his *Social Contract*—inspired this revolution and its American predecessor, marking the rise of the bourgeoisie, of democratic movements, and eventually of the proletariat—groups without the desire or position to maintain follies.

Plainly, the ideological components represented in the folly were severely questioned by the end of the eighteenth century, not just by the philosophical conditions already discussed, but also by the concurrent breakdown of conventional values and social systems. During the Enlightenment there rose a great

15 Anatomie: Muskulatur des Mannes, *from Diderot's* Encyclopedie, *1751.*

fear of the contagion of insanity. This panic may have been partially due to a growing awareness that cultural norms were dissolving under the pressure of the first surges of industrialization and the simultaneous and connected devaluation of what Meinecke calls Natural Law.[21] Without distinct norms, social or philosophical, the antithetical state of madness and its definition had to have come into question. The hunger for the exotic at this time may also have resulted from uneasiness about the known. The Plates of Diderot's *Encyclopedie* were an attempt to represent and order a world in flux. In fact, in the necessary semantic distance that the framed format imposed, and in the impossibility of the proposed task, Diderot's tableaux tended toward abstaction and disorientation. "The Encyclopedia constantly proceeds to an impious fragmentation of the world."[22]

Revolutionary changes in society, thought, and values, forced the architecture of the period to respond to the undermining of all conventions, particularly Classicism, which had provided an unchallenged normative system since the Rennaissance. Designs became so abstract and extreme as to near the condition of folly themselves, obscuring hermeneutic boundaries. The Radical Classicism of Ledoux and Boulee, and, especially, the truly eccentric compositions of Lequeu, were often pictured in, and seemed more appropriate to, some fanciful and enormous garden. In their fantastic and disengaged vision, these compositions entered the realm of Utopia, and thus of folly.

> This house is situated a mile from York, in the midst of a fertile and smiling countryside; it is not the idea of a prison that it suggests, but rather that of a large farm; it is surrounded by a great, walled garden. No bars, no grilles on the windows.
>
> Charles-Gaspard de la Rive—letter to *Bibliotheque Britannique* concerning a new establishment for the cure of the insane, 1798[23]

15

16 La Folie de Saint-James. *Temple Facade under Rustic Vault.*

17 *Grotto at the Shore of Lake Malaren in the Park at Roserberg.*

16



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Foucault identifies the end of the Great Confinement as the release of the chained inmates of the hospital-prison at Bicetre in 1794 and the birth of asylums like the one visited by de la Rive at York. In the nineteenth century the mad were to receive therapy toward reintroduction into polite society. Responsibility and guilt replaced actual shackles. The misfit was required to imitate the model citizen, and landscape was a friendly and supportive theater for this activity. Much of the edge was gone from the concepts of madness and nature. The definition of madness, already blurred by the lack of norms implicit in this time of confusion and change, was further put into question by the rise of Romanticism and subsequent avant-garde movements. Alienation and eccentricity became attributes, almost essentials, of the artistic personality in the paintings of Goya and Gericault or the writings of Baudelaire and Rimbaud. In all but the most dry of nineteenth century academic art—instability was crucial. This was the age of neurosis.

The Enlightenment belief that naturalism was paradigmatic was strengthened by, and may have resulted from, the first stirrings of industrialization. By the nineteenth century, specters were haunting Europe; at their forefront, the machine. The myth that industry was destroying the harmonious relationship of man and nature led naturally from Rousseau through Romanticism into the Arts and Crafts and the Organic movements. The resulting changes in meaning that an increasingly benign nature had to undergo in order to conform to this nostalgic myth largely resulted from the fear of increasingly industrialized urbanity.

The survival of follies, as distinct forms, became questionable during this period. As has been stated, the nebulousness of the normative in a time of change, together with changing concepts of madness and nature, necessarily made the folly a less precise object. Also, practically, the bourgeoisie, the new dominant class, could not afford, either morally or financially, the luxu-

18 Blue Dome of Creation, *Dreamland Amusement Park, Coney Island, New York. 1904. "The visitor to this illusion glides backwards through sixty centuries in a grotesque craft."*

ries of the astronomically wealthy aristocracy whom they replaced. The bourgeois escapade, if it occurred at all, had to be a more mundane event. Follies were the emblems of a life of idle leisure and contemplation no longer condoned and, indeed, rarely affordable to the new middle class.

The concern for the rights of the public, really a novelty in Rousseau's time but a social doctrine by the nineteenth century, also led to a marked change in the conditions that had fostered follies. They had always been private: capricious secrets shared only by those of a certain class. In the public realm their symbolism altered. Could a pavilion in a public park be a folly, or could a commemorative monument, a train station, or the Crystal Palace, for that matter? The latter extraordinary structure, though set in Hyde Park, was anything but. It was an ark of knowledge, dedicated by Henry Cole to the concept of progress.[24] It was only a folly in the ambition of its concept and scale. This was an era of conspicuous consumption, of the cycle of pleasure and release acted out by the *flaneur* on the public and socially mixed stage of the avenues. Were panoramas and arcades, the toys of the boulevards, the *flaneur*'s follies? Maybe the most obvious of nineteenth century follies of the public realm were the amusement parks, great conglomerations of bizarre devices of pleasure and fear.



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> Certainly weird and occasionally wonderful architectural concoctions called follies were still being built in private gardens during the nineteenth century. There was, however, an emptying of their significance. They were products of the historicist nostalgia, so prevalent in that century, for past rituals no longer vitalized by the recreation of the architectural forms that were believed to have once contained them. They expressed unrequited longings for humanism, aristocracy, pastoral solitude, etc. Meanwhile, the new fantastic constructions of the public realm hosted rituals of progress, if not of revolution. These new rites were predicated upon and orchestrated

19 Merzbau, Hanover, Kurt Schwitters, 1924.



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> extreme transformations of economics, technology, demographics, and new political and artistic values.
> In the serene world of mental illness, the modern man no longer communicates with the madman...the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease.[25]

In 1983 the Leo Castelli Gallery in New York organized an exhibition, inviting *au courant* architects to submit modern follies. What was surprising was that almost all of those who were invited to participate in what may have been a quixotic undertaking, did so. Most of the architects' work was indistinguishable from their normal production. In this, there seemed a tacit recognition that the ideological and social hinterland that had nurtured that odd and critical object, the folly, was now barren.

The last hundred years have witnessed the final dissolution of the folly as a recognizable institution. This age has become so ambiguous in its attitudes toward both madness and nature as to render the folly either universal or totally obscure. It has consumed or has been consumed by modern architectural culture. With the recognition, at the end of the last century, of the arbitrariness of finite truth systems in an inevitable final collapse of Natural Law, and with the Post-Freudian inclusion of "the other" within the dialectical structure of the psyche, the concepts represented by the folly became drastically blurred. They are now abstracted, cliched, and universalized. Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism thrived on this nebulousness. Architecture itself has suffered a breakdown. Insatiable taste drives a frenzied fashion-fed consumerism of objects and buildings. The empty contortions of our profoundly appropriated public architecture—late-Modern, Postmodern and DeCon—seem to suffer from aphasia, amnesia, hysteria, or melancholic nostalgia.

20 Caesar's Palace, Las Vegas, Nevada.

With the increasing dominance of the public realm, the impulses satisfied by follies seem to be played out in the bacchanalian theaters of safe violence, market passion and media-driven fantasy—the giant sports arenas, casinos and rock clubs, or in the magical grottoes of movie palaces and sex shops—always for a profit. As extreme alienation characterizes the involvement of the modern age with all phenomena some attitudes have come full circle. Like female children or undesirables left to die on Greek mountainsides, the insane are cast from the asylum into the hostile jungle of the streets: homeless, exposed, ignored. They roam the public parks which have become again places of menace and fear.

Nature and madness remain dangerously idealized and abstracted. They continue to present an opposition to the condition of urban normalcy. As fascinating and indicative of cultural attitudes as the history of this opposition is, it also depends on an alarming illusion. These simple oppositions, man versus nature, madness versus sanity, rely on a primal separation, a contrived difference that masks the fact that the elements of these oppositions are dependent, if not identical.

We often define nature as that which industrial man has not yet touched, a sacred and perfect realm for some and fodder for exploitation for others. There is, however, nothing less natural about man's productions—telephones, computers, automobiles—than about a bird nest, a beaver dam, or an ant hill. No matter how dominant we feel over this planet or how conveniently and perilously removed we are from its rhythms, we are merely another of its organisms. We and our products are as natural as seaweed. To romanticize the concept of nature may be as dangerous as ignoring it, for, by so doing, the root economic and political factors that continue is destruction are inevitably not confronted.

There is no behavior that is endemically mad, only that which is unacceptable. We form societies and guide ourselves by



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norms and rituals. Mad impulses drive us all, but our need to maintain those societies and our positions in them causes us to forget the strictures and sublimations that bind our behavior. The mad have merely broken these bonds.

We seem to need an outside by which to define ourselves. Follies thrived as a product of that need. Unfortunately, the traditional oppositions that fueled that definition and the ideological fabrications that made those oppositions possible continue to lead to a history of separation and anxiety or of complacency and irresponsibility.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1973), p. 14.
2. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Kabyle House or the World Reversed" *Algeria 1960* (Cambridge, 1979) p. 144.
3. Author's translation.
4. "Idiot" comes from the Greek *idiotes*—a man not holding public office—associating societal involvement with mental health.
5. Trans. William Arrowsmith (Chicago, 1959), p. 156.
6. Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden* (New York, 1964), p. 150.
7. A. Bartlett Giamatti, The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic (New York, 1966), p. 15.
8. Foucault, p. XII.
9. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston, 1969), p. 185.
10. "Once entered, I was joyous and glad/And believe me that I thought I was/Looking at the earthly paradise;/The vistas were so charming/It seemed to be heavenly"
Roman de la Rose (632-636) in Giamatti, p. 62.
11. Foucault, op. cit., p. 36.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. Ibid., p. 38.
14. Ibid. pp. 72, 74, 124.
15. *Edinburgh Magazine* (1800); in Hunt & Willis, *The Genius of the Place* (Cambridge, 1988) p. 244.
16. "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling."
Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (Notre Dame, 1958) p. 39.
17. Hunt and Willis, p. 242.
18. Rousseau's view of nature was an idealization as abstract as any that preceded it and has spawned many generations of righteous or reactionary defenders of their own definition of "the natural." This is the basis of the tenacious belief that mankind has descended into a decrepit present from some Golden Age or state of grace. Perhaps primitive man truly had less of an arrogance toward nature, as it frightened him, but it has also been argued that we are mechanical creatures and it is inevitable that we transform nature, and that this prospect is exciting—that history is positive. A call for awareness of our transformations and their impact, and intention in their execution, has been seen to be more sensible than rejection or romanticization. These are arguments of the ongoing debate between the cult of Progress and that of the Golden Age. This debate raged during the Enlightenment and was carried into the liberal-progressive versus revivalist and arts-and-crafts polemics of the next century. Neither side accomodated the concepts legitimizing the folly.
Lord Monboddo wrote in 1779 in defense of the orangutang, admired as a living ancestor of man, "If, I say, such an animal is not a Man I should desire to know in what the essence of a man consists, and what it is that distinguishes a Natural Man from the Man of Art?" (*Ancient Metaphysics*, pp. 41-42; in Rykwert, J., *On Adam's House in Paradise* [Cambridge, 1897]). Regarding Monboddo, Boswell reported this conversation with Dr. Johnson:
"I attempted to argue for the superior happiness of the savage life...
Dr. J: Sir, there can be nothing more false. The savages have no bodily advantages beyond those of civilized men...No Sir, you are not to talk such paradox: let me have no more on't. It can't be certain, far less can it instruct. Lord Monboddo, one of your Scotch judges, talked a great deal of such nonsense. I suffered him, but I will not suffer you.
B: But Sir, does not Rousseau talk such nonsense?
Dr. J: True Sir, but Rousseau knows he is talking nonsense and laughs

at the world for staring at him.
B: How so, Sir?
Dr. J: Why Sir, a man who talks nonsense so well must know that he is talking nonsense." (Boswell, J. *Life of Johnson*, Vol. 2, p.24; in Rykwert]).
19. Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 8, 7, 20.
20.Foucault, op. cit., p. 210.
21. "It was held that the pronouncements of reason, though they could certainly be obscured by passions and by ignorance, did nevertheless, whenever they could free themselves from these hindrances, speak with the same voice and utter the same timeless and absolutely valid truths, which were in harmony with those prevailing in the universe as a whole." Friedrich Meineke, *Historicism*, trans. J.E. Anderson (New York, 1972), p. LVI ff.
22. Roland Barthes, *New Critical Essays*, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1980), p. 39.
23.Foucault, op. cit., p. 242.
24. In Paxton's great greenhouse was gathered, to germinate and cross-fertilize, all cultural material: the beautiful, the practical, and the absurd—paintings, machines, furniture, animals, and plants.
25. Foucault, op. cit., p. X.

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Frontispiece From Pare, R., *Photography and Architecture 1839-1939* (Montreal, 1982), p. 118.
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8-13, 16, 17 Siren, O., *China and the Gardens of Europe* (New York, 1950), plates 11, 32, 82, 84, 91a, 98, 116, 192a.
14, 15 From Denis Diderot, *Encyclopedie* (Dortmund, 1983), pp. 39 and 40.
18 From Koolhaas, R., *Delirious New York* (New York, 1978).
19 Courtesy of Verlag Gerd Hatje, Stuttgart.
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This essay relies particularly on the works of Michel Foucault. It also acknowledges Jane Shumate's conceptual clarity.

Frontispiece: Le Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux, *Le Corbusier, Paris, 1937.*



Natura Morta

Peter Carl

Published here are the Preface and Part I of an essay on the problem of the meaning of nature to architectural interpretation.

In the Preface, the ontological, ethical and moral aspects of the issue are summarily exposed to view (a geneology of the problem comprises the unpublished Part II, and a more philosophical consideration comprises the unpublished Part III) for the purposes of framing the question. The argument is developed from the Ancient Greek reciprocity of physis *and* nomos, *whose implicit declaration of a domain of the natural and of the human derives from the tension of the divine and the human, refracted by the authority of* logos *as the preeminent domain of disclosure. This situation seems to give rise to an authentic interpretation (here exemplified by Aristotle), which preserves the tensional nature of the reciprocity, and a less adequate interpretation (here exemplified by the Stoics), which does not. The consequence of the Stoic interpretation is to preserve the basic intentions of the authentic understanding, but in a manner which undermines its content, or meaning. Various forms of this paradox are then seen to persist in contemporary thinking about nature.*

Part I constitutes a more intensive exploration of the paradox with respect to a portion of Le Corbusier's formulation of the ethical content of nature and culture. Le Corbusier represents the most elaborate understanding of the matter in contemporary architecture; his work furthermore exemplifies the manner in which the issues have been almost wholly absorbed into the architectural interpretation of buildings, at the expense of gardens. The analysis proceeds in three levels, each of which is emphasized as such in three successive sections. Firstly, a passage from his writing is used to show how the play of lawfulness and analogy in his work grows out of his understanding of nature. Secondly, the cultural space represented in his museums demonstrates how this play is seen to be fundamental to one of his main desiderata, "reconciliation with nature." Finally, the play itself is worked out as a contradictory attitude with time, with particular attention drawn to the temporal foundation of metaphoric space.

This issue of *Modulus* appears at a time when, for various reasons, nature has returned to the agenda of architecture. One index to the necessity of speaking of a "return" is the sheer absence of gardens in early modern architecture. The list of architects who could be said to have contributed to a reinterpretation of the garden is quite brief: Lewerenz, Wright, Le Corbusier and, more recently, Barragan would form the basis of any additions. If the list were expanded to include architects who felt that nature was important to their thinking, it would acknowledge that the interests of Goff, Häring, and Aalto would be accompanied not only by Soleri and Fuller, but also by the mystical speculations of Leonidov and Melnikov, and by those attentive to the use of materials, from Asplund and Kahn to Scarpa. Nature was that for which the domestic works of Mies were transparent; but the chthonic aspects of the Barcelona Pavilion must be situated alongside the similarly metaphoric thinking of Scarpa and late Le Corbusier. For many, the issue was effectively silenced by the reduction of nature to form by D'Arcy Thompson—still popular in the sixties—although very few architects failed to recognize the pictorial virtues of including plant life in their drawings and models. Nonetheless, there was a time, not so long ago, when architects could not—or would not—even draw a tree , let alone incorporate it in any higher speculation. As for the recent present, the rarity of competitions such as those for La Villette or portions of Barcelona speaks for itself.[1]

If this neglect were to be regarded as a positive intention, we might conclude that gardens disclose something irrelevant or opposite to the reality addressed by modern architects.[2] Perhaps this is a good thing, or, if not a good thing, at least some sort of consequence of contemporary conditions. On this hypothesis, a working sketch of contemporary conditions in respect to cultivation is not out of place. Generally speaking, gardens are what people do in the privacy of their yards; landscaping is what corporations, civic bodies, highway authorities and the designers of golf courses and theme parks do,

while various preservation bodies and heritage societies seek to sustain—in their original condition, of course—the remains of what might be termed the era of gardens. People are remembered and plants exhibited in the similar settings of cemeteries and botanic gardens. At the largest scale must be noted the rise of industrialized farming and the ever more critical national parks. The whole process takes place against the increased concern for ecology, which has gradually absorbed the end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it themes from the nuclear holocaust: if we do not kill ourselves with bombs, we will do so by living.

The necessary incompleteness of this picture does not prevent us from drawing an immediate lesson which is, in the first instance, political. At no point in the sequence is there a reciprocity between the introversion of private gardening and the ameliorative generalities of landscapists, except that both involve plants. The ecological issue too seems to constitute itself at the extremes of a choice of shampoo, on the one hand, and the global climate and economy, on the other. To the extent that a reciprocity does exist, it is one of conflict or, more accurately, compensation. Private life takes on the character of a refuge when the whole is perceived as the province of remote, barely manageable large-scale institutions—that is, as a neutral (or possibly even malevolent) sphere of power.[3]

The compensatory status of private life with respect to any experience of the whole points to a hiatus precisely where continuity is necessary. The reconciliation of the general (that is, the plenitude of particulars) in the universal is a question of experiencing the whole as ordered, as oriented. At least until the Baroque, the universal would typically be disclosed as a cultural paradigm, or symbol.[4] The content of order itself is ethical insofar as the content of such symbols can be summarized as the temporality of the highest good,[5] disclosed in the reciprocity of pragmatic time and paradigmatic time.[6]

Similarly, this is the content disclosed by the common etymology shared by "cultivation," "culture" and "cult," whatever their current status. What lies at the heart of this etymology is the reciprocity of culture and nature, or, in the terminology of ancient Greece, of *nomos*, law, and *physis*, nature.[7] This formulation, in turn, represents a level of articulation beyond that of the earlier cosmological cultures, for which the domain of human activity and that of nature was a continuum mediated by gods.[8]

It is only with the advent of contemporary science that nature could be reduced to the tableau of its phenomena and processes, and therefore conceivable as a domain separated from culture.[9] "Culture" in its current usage derives from the eighteenth century;[10] Plato and Aristotle concentrated upon virtue. Book *Beta* of the *Nichomachean Ethics* declares (1103a 24): "The virtues [*aretai*] therefore are engendered in us neither by nature [*hara physei*] nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity [or 'disposition,' translating *pephykosi*, whose root also connotes 'naturally' the term is qualified in the following sentence as *dynamis*,'potential' or 'power'] to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habituation [*han ethisthein*, from *ethos*, whence 'ethics']."[11] Nature and culture or tradition are distinguished; but the former acts as a receptacle for the latter.

Aristotle's formulation will be important to us later; but the background is first of all the archaic experience of the manifestation of the divine in nature. More immediate to Aristotle's thought was the Platonic conception of the good as the "groundless origin" (*anypothetou epi ten tou pantos arché*, *Republic*, 511), which is the culmination of the "ascent to reality" (or "essence," translating disputed versions of *ousia* 521c)—that is, reality dialectically structured in such a way that the lowest empowers the highest as its meaning in the tension of identity and difference—from becoming and genesis to being and essence, from the visible to the intelligible or knowable, from "the bottomless pit of unlikeness" (*Statesman*, 273d) to the identity that is the

good (which could not be named the "one," because the good and the one would then be two).[12]

Finally, the problem of the continuity of nature with the life of *praxis* (the meaning of which is essentially "ethical behavior"[13]) within the Aristotelian corpus is a matter of reconciling the ethical texts with those devoted to logic, physics, and particularly metaphysics. Vastly simplified, there are two important aspects to this problem. Firstly, the dialectics of potentiality (*dynamis*) and actuality (*energia*) are crucial to both the Metaphysics and the Nichomachean Ethics, and they ultimately point to the Heideggerian dialectic of the hiddenness and disclosure of *aletheia*, truth. Secondly, metaphysics, as the first *episteme*, addresses the problem of Being as Being (*'ontos e 'on*, Met. *Epsilon*, 1026a 13 ff.). The question "'what is Being' is in other words 'what is *ousia* (translated variously as 'essence', 'substance,' or, in the light of passages such as the present one, as 'being'; Met. *Zeta*, 1028a 14 ff.)." *Ousia*, in turn, is the essential aspect of *physis* (Met. *Beta* [Book III]1014b 16 f.). The elaborate cosmological speculation of Met. *Lambda* (which opens with the words "our inquiry is concerned with ousia"—*peri tes ousias é theoria*) is thus grounded in what is by nature, the *physei onta*; and it concludes that "the nature of the whole contains the good and the highest good [*agathon kai ariston*, 1075a 11]": "everything is ordered together to one end (*pros men gar hen hapanta syntetaktai*, 1075a 20)."[14]

From within the intracosmic reciprocities of humans and gods, of earth and sky, and from within the experience of the tendency of the whole of those reciprocities to orient themselves according to the tension between multiplicity and unity, the mode of disclosure of the whole as a whole differentiates historically from ritual reenactment of primordial conditions to the agonic discourse of the symposium, theater, law court and bouleterion, to the speculative discourse of the philosophers. At each stage in this sequence, a progressive emancipation is achieved from direct involvement in the concreteness of the whole. The transcendence of that which is given (for the purposes of myth, "given" literally, by the gods) in nature acquires, at the end of this sequence, a reciprocal transcendence in that which is possible to be disclosed as the highest (or most profound) truth. The question of the highest good is a question of the nature of the whole (*holou physis*) as order.

Diogenes Laertius (7.39-41) reports three natural allegories by which the Stoics sought to characterize the system in which they had organized philosophy (physics, ethics, and logic): a living being, an egg and a fertile field, or garden ("the surrounding wall corresponds to logic, its fruit to ethics and its land or trees to physics"). The choice of imagery indicates a sensitivity to symbolic traditions. The banality of their use points to an estrangement which is perhaps not accidently the product of an imagination interested in systematizing philosophy. In their different ways, Plato and Aristotle are careful to preserve the tensional character of the whole, thereby preserving the transcendence of the order as an ever-open call to thought (as paradigmatic, in the sense used earlier). In contrast, the Stoics mooted the notion of universal reason (the *hegemonikon*) by which nature, soul, reason and God could all be seen to participate in one essence, and which could furthermore be thought of as a caring Providence. Since there could be no proper experience of transcendence (that is, of the reciprocal necessity of difference to identity) in this regime, practical (moral) existence was deprived of primary orientation. It is only superficially paradoxical that this is a direct consequence of making practical existence their main concern.

Two aspects of Stoic thinking concern us here. Firstly, the sublimation of the open tension of the truth of order to an immanent concern for virtue took the form of a fascination with the notion of laws. This is an important moment in the history of the problem. What has happened is that the transcendent temporality of *physis* (birth/death as Order) has been disclosed to the presumed autonomy of *logos* in the form of authoritative

pronouncements as the permanence of beings in their Being. *Nomos* as the *mimesis* of *physis* (the time of becoming and passing away) takes shape as laws. The rendering of the temporality of *physis* in the form of laws is a constantly recurring testimony to the authority of *logos*, both in the sciences and the arts. The correspondence of the natural and ethical realms produced in Chrysippus an energetic effort to compose moral and physical laws, which, however, only betrayed its true character in late Stoicism, when Seneca and Marcus Aurelius could speak of the "necessity of fate." For Marcus, time appears as the great devourer, and one's own death has become the orienting metaphor of being.

A second unfortunate legacy of Stoic thinking was also a consequence of their conflation of moral and physical reality. They spoke of the natural and the unnatural and a choice to be made. The tendency to register this dichotomy in terms of good and evil is made explicit by Cleanthes. Whilst distrust of urban conventions is an archaic theme, the incorporation of a supposed conflict between the artificial and the natural in a popular and respected philosophy of virtue ensured its survival to the present day. Different philosophers framed the matter in different ways; but essentially the famous Stoic dictum, "live in accordance with nature" (*to homologoumenos te physei zen*), came down to correlating one's own reason with the universal reason. The proposition grew out of a conception of the wise man (modeled after Socrates and the *spoudaios* of Aristotle) and the Cynic disdain for traditional Greek culture. The intramundane paradigm of the wise man living according to nature is only one of several manifestations of what may be termed the Stoic problem: the preservation of the primordial ethical significance of the reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos*, but in a form which deprived it of any reciprocal tension, and therefore any genuine content.[15]

"The Stoic problem" may stand for the problem being addressed in this essay. The matter concerns more than a few ancient philosophers who may not have been very good in their studies of Plato and Aristotle. Nor are the huge influences of Stoicism during the Hellenistic-Roman periods, or the persistence of Stoic themes through early Christianity, the Renaissance and well into the present of direct bearing on the problem. The problem manifests itself in the positive preference for a partial, or incomplete reality. The philosophy is not the cause of this phenomenon but is its most eloquent expression. To translate the concluding sentence of the previous paragraph into simple human terms, the heart is in the right place—adherence to Stoic principles promoted a respectable decency—but it is stranded between the promptings of its own perturbations and the absence of a context in which these might be meaningful. It is not an accident that what was at best the framework of an *ars vivendi* became, by the time of Marcus, an *ars moriendi.*

That the Stoics may be taken as a useful vehicle for understanding the present situation may be gathered from a brief assessment of the contemporary understanding of the term "nature." The following sketch is grouped under four topics.

Nature is first of all that without which no home nor holiday is complete—the virtues attached to houseplants and home gardening are at one with the travel advertisements depicting Adam, Eve and the kids at the beach or in the mountains. The return to origins represented by suburbia and these scenes contains a redemptive component which is obscured by the tragic nature of private life; nature here performs the role of compensation for a life deemed the opposite of natural. This attitude is to be distinguished from the Stoic formula mentioned above only insofar as the benign providence of universal reason has been transformed into a faint memory of the Christian God. To the extent that Rousseau's "state of nature" is invoked to justify freedom from restraint or social authority, it is worth acknowledging that reconciliation with nature conceived as a movement towards freedom of the individual

produces the opposite of reconciliation. As Rousseau himself recognized, the movement ultimately comes to a halt in a pre-social condition. More to the point, the very conception of a "state of nature" deprives the traditional reciprocity of culture and nature of its ontological structure. Not only is the cultural half of the reciprocity devalued (it is artificial), but nature too loses its transcendence, becoming either of two things. It is merely a human characteristic and a basis of moral prescription. Alternatively, nature is like the garden of Candide: a tangible fraction of an unspecified vision of paradise (the positive correlate to the negative one is), appropriated in compensation for becoming overwhelmed by the attempt personally to come to terms with what are perceived as the infinite differentia (Joyce's "nightmare") of history.[16]

Secondly, and with respect to the contribution of science and technology to the contemporary understanding of *physis* and *nomos*, nature is that which is sustained by (or rather itself sustains or guarantees) an idiosyncratic use of the word "law." Grossly speaking, the ground is prepared for this usage in three stages, which are not in fact separate and distinct on account of the continuing vitality of texts such as the *Old Testament*, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and so forth. The first stage appears with the cosmological societies of the Ancient Near East, whose articulation of cosmic justice in terms of celestial temporality and solar iconography is still apparent in the *Timaeus*, where, however, the theme is embodied in the symbolic continuity (that is, the dialectical structure) of *logos* from *physis* and *poiesis* to discourse to the metamorphosis of number.[17] The second stage appears with the Stoic identification of nature with reason and the consequent conflation of divine, human and "natural" laws. The third stage is reached with seventeenth century science, where the "essence" of *logos* is reduced to the axiomatics of formal logic and mathematics, and the cultural content of *physis* to that of modern physics. A "law" of science is derived from the correlation of fragments of experience (hence "experiment") with mathematics; it is therefore something certain rather than something just or true. It has nothing at all in common with a law of human *praxis*, which is a matter of the ongoing interpretation of the highest good—what would earlier have been expressed as the eternal, divine order—in the context of *philia politike*, political friendship.

Since Galileo,[18] however, ambiguity on this point has prevailed to the extent that, for example, Le Corbusier has no difficulty rehearsing the Stoic belief that the laws of morality and the laws of science are the same thing.[19] To be sure, Le Corbusier is to be given some credit for concerning himself with the metaphorics of the "right" angle, most elaborately in his *Le Poème de l'Angle Droit* of 1947-53;[20] but the problem of reconciling contemporary scientific thinking with the anthropo-cosmological structure of the highest good is hardly a task to be accomplished within the framework of Le Corbusier's urgent poetics. Moreover, if technology's highest calling is well-being, the prevailing perception is surely misguided that the sheer pervasiveness of technology qualifies it to be regarded as a second species of nature (leading to fantasies of being able to simulate life[21]). That which is central to the traditional understanding of nature—its capacity to embody the ethical order—cannot even be represented in scientific terms.[22]

Thirdly, the problem of culture and nature is the specific subject of the philosophical problem of the dialectics of freedom and necessity. Insofar as this is not further speculation on the problem of virtue as framed by Aristotle,[23] the greatest ambiguities arise in the conception of freedom. One must distinguish between freedom-from and freedom-for. Freedom-from arises out of a fear of oppression (death as extinction), and is embedded within practical life; it is to be found in arguments devolving from the eighteenth century conception of liberty. Freedom-for takes human limitations as the point of departure for creative interpretation of the cultural paradigms.[24] The first is experienced as a right, the second as a gift, or opportunity. The standard interpretation of freedom-from as

liberty of the individual further complicates the picture, since the ethical orientation of the whole is left unclear. This latter is the central preoccupation of freedom-for. Nietzsche's argument that nihilism mandates a freedom from all values as the ground of a freedom for the revaluation of values must concede that the former is a hypothetical possibility guaranteed by the perdurance of value. A related notion is that of "natural law," which is meant to indicate the transcendent dimensions of humanly conceived prescriptions.[25] However, since Hobbes, the issue has become more a matter of "humans as they are" rather than as they might be, and therefore no longer transcendent. For his part, Comte's conception of natural law is hopelessly entangled in the confusion of scientific certainty and truth mentioned earlier.[26] The dialectic of nature and freedom is ultimately grounded in the transcendent freedom of Chaos.

Fourthly, nature currently manifests itself in the aesthetics of the primitive. This too, displays several stages, and again the earlier layers penetrate the later in disguised form. At the earliest level is the ritual reenactment of paradigmatic time, the time of origins, whereby temporality as such is renewed in the reciprocity with human history. The next stage appears in the attitude of the Renaissance towards Greece and Rome. Classical culture had maintained an important presence throughout the Middle Ages; but the Renaissance must be given credit for being the first society to take a historical culture as a paradigm. The Renaissance looked upon the Classical period as a whole, as an objective "picture," and set about understanding itself in the same terms. Ontological distance from the paradigm became thematized as historical distance, preserving thereby the temporal content, but in immanent form.[27] The final stage in this process begins in the late Baroque and may be recognized by the combination of radical objectification of culture (in which historicist knowledge replaces interpretation within a tradition) with the radical subjectivity of the individual (to whose powers of genius cultural integrity is entrusted). The conceptual distance between subject and object was not only expected to bring all problems to that horizon, but for the most part did. To speak further of the resulting fragmentation, of the liberation of cultural material into the museum-world of the "eternal present" or the selective appropriation by art would be to rehearse known themes. Of interest here are the modes of continuity which are established.

Among the more important of these is art considered as the domain of the "secular sacred,"[28] in which one is free of the obligations of any particular belief in god or gods, but somehow eligible to enjoy all the privileges of continuity with tradition, meaningfulness of one's artistic endeavours, and so forth. Interpretation of selected fragments of earlier or more "primitive" cultures becomes the basis of projected possibilities. The proposition is a substitute for interpretation with respect to the paradigms of tradition, insofar as previous values are seen to condition iconographic choices; but all authority is given to the projected possibilities. This paradox of the "secular sacred," which eventually differentiates to a more generalized "primitive," itself projects a paradox: an acultural essence (insofar as "sacred" is meaningful) of culture. This is culture as hypothesis.

With rare exceptions, the long history of the contemporary primitive sustained itself in the terms established in Romanticism: as a reservoir of material which might check the pretentions of science, but always compromised by its obeisance to that which it sought to overcome. The opposition between Cartesian *ratio* and Romantic *Erlebnis* was only apparent, since both placed the individual in an unmediated topography of infinite difference. The formalized, aestheticized and historicized characteristics of post-Enlightenment discourse established itself in a condition of mutual validation with the primitive. The result was a hypothetical domain in which the drama of the reciprocity of culture and nature, of *nomos* and *physis*, was transformed into endless reiterations of the calibration of the conceptual and the concrete.[29]

In the visual arts, the contemporary primitive disclosed a broad territory, of which some of the more prominent themes may be listed: the cultivation of earlier "styles," first Classic or Gothic, then of motifs from the Orient or Egypt, Africa, Iberia or Polynesia; the various manifestations of a "return to nature"; the involvement with iconographic codes of the Theosophic type; interest in pre-reflective dimensions of experience like shape, texture, color in their own right; the concern both aesthetic and political for the lower castes of society; the belief that dreams, certain forms of madness and myth all converged on some essence of the human imagination.[30] It is not too extravagant to claim that the primitive was the matrix in which modernism perceived the authenticity of its future. The reaction against the immediate state of the tradition at the turn of the century corresponded to the several visions of a new world simultaneously ancient and modern. The proposition should be regarded however as a consistent development of the historicism it desired to replace, particularly insofar as the combination of global aspirations and the hypothetical character of the new dispensation had always been the basis of an effort to transcend history, to invent what Eric Voegelin termed "an intramundane eschatology."[31]

Nonetheless, this orientation to the primitive is not without interest. Even in its most aestheticized and occasionally nihilistic forms, even in spite of the tedious involvement with the dialectics of "matter and spirit" which afflicted almost everyone's consideration of art at the time, the contemporary primitive preserved the possibility of the disclosure of truth in an authentic manner. The clearest testimony to this is to be found less in theoretical arguments for art either as a benign humanism or as an agency of revolution, than in the power of the better works to inspire interpretation and understanding.

Attention to the primitive was frequently accompanied by phrases such as "return to nature," "return to origins," and religious expressions like "redemption" or "the sacred." The persistent application of the term "ritual" to anything which displays recurrence and appears slightly more intense than everyday life testifies as much to a need as it does to ignorance. Dispensing with the sanctimonious or ignorant end of the spectrum, these attitudes can be placed alongside the more violent *saisons en enfer* in respect of what they have in common: an attunement to the always-already-there, not-yet-disclosed domain of *physis*: " 'Nature' has no history"[32]). The orientation to the primitive constituted itself primarily within the arts, and their mode of disclosure is rooted in metamorphosis and analogy. In the reciprocal transcendence of nature and truth, this mode of disclosure is oriented to the former, whereas philosophy is concerned with articulating the Same.[33] What is preserved, then, in the more authentic dimensions of the orientation to the primitive, is the potential for renewal of disclosure, the creation of the fundamental[34] conditions for disclosure. More than this art cannot do.

What we have done so far is to allow the Sophist formulation of *physis* and *nomos* to stand for the then unresolved manifestation of ontological difference within the horizon of cultural *praxis* (doing) and *poiesis* (making). We have then allowed Aristotle to specify that nature provides the capacity or disposition for tradition (as *ethos*) which itself is the matrix for disclosure of the highest good. The fundamentally ethical structure of the dialectics of disclosure has been glimpsed in Plato's *Republic*, and then in its restatement by Aristotle where the dialectics of *dynamis* and *energia* provide the mediating structure between the *physei onta* and the highest good. Finally, we have observed what is almost a return to the Sophist position in the identification of nature, soul, reason, God in Stoic thought. Without arguing the case in detail, the ambiguities of this position have been allowed to resonate, as it were, in a modern context afflicted by a highly reduced version of theory and practice derived from technology (in which theory has lost contact with its ontological orientation, and practice is domi-

nated by productive thinking). Beyond questions of political theory and practice in these terms, historicism and aesthetic thinking are the corollaries of this problem in the humanities. The consequence is that the original meanings are preserved in a distorted form—in a form which permits their truth-value to be open alternately (as in the contemporary primitive) to counterfeit and to legitimate disclosure.

The preface has served as a sort of "aerial view" of the topography of the problem. What follows considers a portion of Le Corbusier's formulation of the ethical content of nature and culture, and its manifestation in his architecture. Le Corbusier represents the most elaborate understanding in contemporary architecture and furthermore exemplifies the manner in which the theme has been almost wholly absorbed into the architectural interpretation of buildings, at the expense of gardens.

The River of History

Speculating upon the significance of Napoleon to the meaning of history, Goethe expressed himself as follows in a letter to Schiller dated March 2, 1802[35]:

> What one can observe on the whole, is a tremendous view of streams and rivers which, with natural necessity, rush together from many heights and valleys; at last they cause the overflowing of a great river and an inundation in which both perish, those who foresaw it and those who had no inkling of it. In this tremendous empirical process you see nothing but nature and nothing of that which we philosophers would so much like to call freedom.

Insofar as nature is here specified as a "tremendous empirical process," we are relieved of any obligation to think of the Biblical Flood. Goethe's deluge does not discriminate on the basis of foreknowledge, nor presumably good or evil. The aesthetics of the sublime are deployed to induce a sense of pathos, of subjection to an overwhelming totality.

In his "Introduction" to the new periodical on the fine arts, *Propyläen*, which he founded in 1798, we find Goethe desiring to give art "a content and a form by which [art] appears both natural and beyond nature."[36] Moreover, "in art we can in the end rival nature only when we have learned, at least in part, her method of procedure in the creation of her works." Had we not just heard Goethe describe nature as an "empirical process," we might think he were merely rehearsing sentiments which date back to the Italian Renaissance. That this is not the case is confirmed by the following prescriptions, also from the "Introduction." Firstly, "nature is separated from art by an enormous chasm [more sublime mountain landscape] which genius itself cannot bridge without outside assistance." As to genius, which even "Longinus" had recognized as necessary to the achievement of the sublime,[37] the "true artist" should "penetrate into the depths of his own soul, so as to produce in his works not only something light and superficially effective, but, as the rival of nature, something spiritually organic [a poignant phrase designed to indicate the supremacy of the spirit over nature]." As to the "outside assistance" needed to bridge the chasm, the requisite attention to technique is to be supplemented by theory: "we are particularly in need of principles...For every artist worthy of the name is now called upon to form, from his own experience and reflections, if not a theory, at least a number of rules of thumb, which he finds useful..." Moreover, dialectical principles are invoked to ensure the completeness of these rules: "...as far as possible, [the artist] should imbibe what is theoretically and practically opposed to him." Finally, if "nature is the great treasure-house of materials," Italy should be thought of as the great storehouse of art."[38]

This whole package is put together for the sake of the "true artist [who] strives after artistic truth." This truth consists of the organic spirit, which is to say a noetic product which appropriates nature and national cultures for the purposes of tran-

scending them. It is a version of freedom characterized by the powers of individual genius. It is rendered more completely autonomous by principles, like those of science, which would consign creative decisions to an accumulating body of theory. This in turn would ensure the outcome of an evolutionary process of the national purification of German art (and therefore German culture, the ultimate horizon of the organic spirit).[39]

Acknowledging the impossibility of doing justice to Goethe on the basis of a few hundred words (and accepting that Napoleon occasioned the gesture of despair in his letter), I would nonetheless propose that the dialectics of culture and nature exhibit the same orientation in both the "Letter" and the "Introduction." On this reading, the species of freedom desired by the "philosophers" of the "Letter" is a freedom-from the overwhelming totality of history and nature reduced to the level of the "tremendous empirical process." This variety of freedom is approximately that proposed for the artist-genius and, on that basis, for the organic spirit of German culture. History and nature are here experienced as death, which is to say as fate. Consistent with this, freedom is a wholly conceptual fabrication whereby the individual's confrontation with his fate is escalated into a redemptive program of European proportions (to say nothing of the extent to which history and nature themselves become a mere backdrop for the main drama of this project). In other words, the perception of history and nature as an objective plenitude is the correlative of a belief in the redeeming power of culture as hypothesis. The overwhelming totality of the first finds its complement in the fictive overcoming of the second. If Goethe's philosopher is well on the way towards joining Candide in his garden, they will soon be entertaining the true artist as well.

It might be argued against this view that Goethe had Kant in mind, and that it was the unprecedented figure of Napoleon which caused him to revise his faith. Taking into account his cultural program, however, we are moved to suggest that if Goethe did lose faith, it might have been because Napoleon's sword accomplished, or seemed to accomplish, what Goethe's pen could not. Certainly Kant outlines a different understanding of the reciprocity of nature and history, and of the meaning of political conflict in 83 of the Critique of Pure Judgement, entitled "Of the Ultimate Purpose of Nature as a Teleological System":

> ...we have sufficient cause for judging man to be, not merely like all organized beings a natural purpose, but also the ultimate purpose of nature...The first purpose of nature would be man's happiness, the second his culture...The formal condition under which nature can alone attain its final design is that arrangement of men's relations to one another by which lawful authority in a whole, which we call civil community, is opposed to the abuse of their conflicting freedoms; only in this can the greatest development of natural capacities take place. For this also there would be a requisite—if men were clever enough to find out and wise enough to submit themselves voluntarily to its constraint—a cosmopolitan whole, i.e. a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously upon one another...the fine arts and the sciences which, by their universally communicable pleasure, and by the polish and refinement of society, make man more civilized, if not morally better...and make us feel an aptitude for higher purposes which lies hidden in us.[40]

The highest purpose, finally, which the supersensible faculty of freedom may propose to itself, is the "highest good" (§ 84). This material from the *Critique of Teleological Judgement* (rather than from the more familiar *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement)* presents Kant's understanding of the deep context in which nature discloses itself as fulfilled in culture. The sequence from happiness to culture to community to cosmopolitan whole is depicted as the self-emancipation of nature for the

highest good. This is the matrix in which taste, "called *sensus communis*" (§40), "makes possible the transition...from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest," of which latter beauty is the symbol (§59). It is not unjustified to regard Kant's interpretation as a more differentiated form of the Aristotelian potentiality of nature which has the capacity for the actuality of virtue.[41]

The first edition of the *Critique* appeared in 1790, or eight years before Goethe's "Introduction" and twelve before his Letter to Schiller. Gadamer demonstrates that it is Schiller who first articulates the aesthetic consciousness upon which the notion (fundamental to the problem of the contemporary primitive) of the "secular sacred" depends.[42] It is, then, within this brief interval that the traditional understanding of the reciprocity of nature and culture makes way for the subsequent collusion between the empirical process of nature and hypothetical culture.[43] By way of reconciling this material with the character of our theme in a more recent interpretation, and bearing a more direct relation to architecture, I should next like to consider a river of history depicted by Le Corbusier.

The Meander: Lawfulness and Analogy

Before beginning however, it must be said that we do not expect philosophy or theology from Le Corbusier. However diverse the subjects in his library, these two are sparsely represented. Instead one finds poetry, some discussions of art, and a miscellaneous assortment of texts on everything from psychology and production methods to the Cathars and geometry. For the rest he relied upon the cultural milieu (of Paris in particular) to augment what he learned in La Chaux-de-Fonds, and upon his own imagination and experience. This much qualified him to rethink the town. To be sure, that he basically cultivated his education in practical life probably saved him in the end, since he was not equipped with the sort of university education which would fill him with immaculate arguments for why he should not think the way he did. Nonetheless, the conceptual quality of his cities are a mirror of the conceptual or hypothetical culture in which he presumed himself to dwell. More importantly, this manner of proceeding proposed to replace, or acknowledged the lack of authority of, interpretation with respect to the tradition. In this, Le Corbusier was hardly alone.

By the time of Le Corbusier, the authority of the Christian-humanist tradition, and then of traditional culture, had become subsumed in the project of its reinterpretation as theoretical knowledge, first in the sciences, then in aesthetics. Moreover, in the context of growing specialization, and the incompatibility of modes of discourse between individual areas of concern, authority appeared to lay with the specialists rather than with whatever passed for the culture or community to which the collection of special topics all supposedly referred. Mary McLeod's excellent account of the political scene in which Le Corbusier moved allows one to recognize the degree to which the aspirations included the integrity of cultural values, but the restriction of thinking to political theory and practice necessarily obscured the distinction between culture and politics.[44] It is then paradoxical but typical that Le Corbusier, whose attunement to a genuine poetics was not superficial, would turn to the autonomy of thought opened in the thematics of genius, as represented here by Goethe's texts, in order to establish a clearing in the autonomy of theoretical knowledge.

Le Corbusier was among the leaders of the early modern period who took the project of the revaluation of all values to mean: the present is a *tabula rasa* guaranteed by the future; culture is an open possibility of which each individual is its potential author (which in practice boiled down to a competition between artist-humanist and scientist). This radical freedom from values could only prevail within hypothetical culture, which consequently oriented itself towards conceptual paradigms. In architecture, form took this role; there were very few who did not believe that the entire cultural program could

be summarized in the few (highly ambiguous) criteria which attached themselves to the (highly conceptual) contemporary notion of form.[45]

The pervasive orientation has given rise to the belief that culture has no mediating structure between the *sensus communis* and what counts as knowledge. The tradition associated with the tensional reciprocity of nature and culture displays an ontological structure insofar as it is the matrix within which the potential disclosure of the highest good with respect to the whole prevails. Indeed the embodying power of nature with respect to culture is replicated in that of tradition itself with respect to cultural possibilities. The perception that tradition is either dead or the equivalent, without authority, corresponds to the experience that time is decay (i.e. that the truth of Being can never be fully renewed of its essence, but is always subject to the ever-escalating difference of temporal passage). The early modern preoccupation with a new beginning sustained itself on a thematics of overcoming that is a direct consequence of the dependence of radical freedom upon time as decay.[46]

Notwithstanding all of this and despite the obvious shortcomings, Le Corbusier's achievement stands up to prolonged scrutiny. For Cambridge University to praise him as a Renaissance man in the testimonial accompanying his honorary degree[47] was not a complete embarassment, despite the prominent differences between the basic understanding and orientation (and cultural literacy) of the average Renaissance architect and that of Le Corbusier. But on what does the perception of the quality of his thought rest, if such eulogies are at all meaningful? Is Le Corbusier to be written off as some sort of genius, or does the achievement point to specific areas of concern that are in any circumstances central and binding—that, in a word, prevail as if the tradition were still effective?

Le Corbusier thought sufficiently highly of his *The Radiant City*[48], of 1935, to have it republished, virtually unaltered, twenty-nine years later. In the one-paragraph "Commentary" to the later edition, he describes the work as "a key to a social and economic revolution...as strong as a rising tide." Furthermore, "All this [what is to be achieved] is placed under the masterful government of natural conditions: sun, space, greenery [*verdure*]."[49] This last remark is not an understatement, despite his reputation for designing *machines à habiter*, and despite the banality of the topography of the (120 pages of) radiant cities included in the text. The constant repetition throughout his writings of the triad of "sun, space, greenery" should not obscure the inscription of space itself within "natural conditions," an intention which is made more iconographically explicit in the work in La Chaux-de-Fonds and the last thirty-eight years of his work than in the twelve years of the Purist buildings and paintings.[50] The possibility that the metaphor of "the masterful government" points to some conception of natural law is confirmed by Part 3.4 of *The Radiant City*, entitled "Laws."[51] This section begins:

> The laws of nature and the laws of man.
> Since man is a product of nature, the laws he lays down for himself must accord with those of nature...
> The spirit animating [the laws of nature] is mathematics...The laws of nature are always there to urge us on towards the creation of human laws that will in their turn be prodigiously simple and yet prodigiously effective.[52]

The ambiguities surrounding the word "spirit" cannot obscure the impression that Le Corbusier's interpretation of (Stoic) natural law has been overlaid with the same confusion between scientific certainty and justice or truth that we observed in Comte.[53] Here in fact lies one of the significant limitations to his thinking. Despite his efforts to institute in his work a more metaphoric interpretation of mathematics and geometry, which for him essentially turns about the thematics of harmony, there is no denying the positivistic tendency of what he has written here.

1 Ponctuelle Machine Tournante. *Diagram Cast onto the Bell at Ronchamp.*



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These lines are part of the opening subsection of "Laws" entitled "The Earth is Our Clock," which concludes, "One, thirty, three-hundred-and-sixty-five, *those are the units by which all our undertakings must be measured.*" The continuing significance to Le Corbusier of this fusion of lawfulness and time may be judged from the fact that a later version of the accompanying diagram (fig. 1) was cast onto the surface of the bell he designed for the carillon which stands behind the church at Ronchamp.[54] By comparision with this somewhat Newtonian image (called *ponctuelle machine tournante*" in the *Poème*), what Le Corbusier writes, paints and builds in respect of the sun, light, the earth, shadow and so forth, constitutes an altogether more metaphoric milieu. Le Corbusier's work exhibits two forms of continuity. One of these is grounded in metaphor and analogy, which is to say, experience, memory and judgement; the other is conceptual and relies upon the internal consistency of formal patterns and relationships, mostly of number and geometry. As far as the painting and architecture are concerned, the mediating structure is supplied by cubist space. As for the writing, he deploys adjectives, adverbs and metaphors in a compacted *collagiste* manner which derives from contemporary poetry, and which has the virtue of allowing double readings to arise from what at first appear to be the flattest statements of fact.

One must speak, however, of a hiatus in Le Corbusier's representational procedure, and the basis of the difficulty is his understanding of the meaning of measure (which is the significant term in the sentence quoted above). His belief that axiomatic certitude is what characterizes lawfulness essentially, rather than being only one of several modes of order, prevents him from perceiving the true *logos* or *ratio* which would enable the reciprocity between nature and culture to obtain as a symbolic structure. Something of this kind is clearly his intention; but, by basing order on pure structure (the axiomatics) rather than on content (the reciprocity itself), the most rich and profound aspect of the intentions is forced to pay obeisance to the least.[55]

Measure prevails as structured reciprocity, initially between the human and divine, and then between the unknown and the known, the given and the possible, the hidden and the disclosed. Language is the most articulate manifestation of measure in this sense.[56] It is a question of the relation of analogy to measure—that is, the temporality of metamorphosis. It therefore lies at the heart of the originary meaning of *physis* and *nomos* (see note 8). Ultimately, measure is rooted in the primordial experience of the world as the tension between unity and diversity, and the disclosure of that tension as temporality. With respect to the analogic form of continuity in the work of Le Corbusier, then, we can say that he is sensitive to temporality as tensional structure. With respect to the conceptual form of continuity in his work, we can say that lawfulness as certitude has been instituted to overcome time as decay. The result is that Le Corbusier's primary interest, harmony (measure as reciprocity, as reconciliation), is compromised by its mode of disclosure and threatens to signify the opposite. This is what is meant by the preservation of symbolic material in a form which renders it impotent.

Having seen how Le Corbusier has developed natural law, we need to examine what he means by "nature." His famous "Law of the Meander" (*V.R.* Part 3.5.3) is expressed in his ambiguous (or obscure, according to taste) poetic style:

> ...A pastoral symphony.
> Nature!
> This prodigious spectacle has been produced by the interplay of two elements, one male, one female: sun and water.
>
> ...Water circulates; it flows down to the sea. And its progress is unbroken.
>
> Now the airplane suddenly reveals an irregularity in the smooth flow of the water towards the sea. An obstacle has barred, or at any rate obstructed, its path: a rock. The symptom does not belie the effect; the malady develops; an interplay of consequences in time and space is set into developing motion. A meander has begun to form [*est amorcé*]. For a moment, it remains merely a tiny break in the flow. Then the process of erosion has already begun, slowly eating away at the clear [*limpide*] and simple law that governs the downward flow of the water: thrust aside by the presence of this obstacle, turned off its axis, the water is directed against the opposite bank. It bites into it, wears it away, causes it to crumble. But then, forced back in the opposite direction, it begins to do the same to the other bank, further down [*Mais, pulsée hors de son axe, l'incidence lui imprime un movement contraire: mathématiquement, elle bute à l'autre rivage qu'elle mord et corrode*]. Deserting the straight line, the water is now flowing in a zigzag contrary to the simple law of gravity. Instead of flowing normally down to the sea in a straight line, the river will be held up in its course by this abnormality, a meander [*le méandre étant amorcé va la retenir extraordinairement*].
>
> ...In the sphere of human purposes [*sur le plan des destins humains*], the meander would prove a profoundly demoralizing influence, if it were not suddenly and miraculously broken through. For our human achievements too can sink into the silt of the meander; civilizations can disappear, our greatest works [*des apogées*] be engulfed, hegemonies be swallowed up. These things happen when the necessary energy is not forthcoming at the moment when it is required: history records the outcome, the page turns. A death has occurred.

Passages such as these from *The Radiant City* have not attracted much attention, scholarly or otherwise.[57] Both the contemporary interests of architectural culture and Le Corbusier's somewhat breathless style have contributed to regarding this aspect of his writing as self-indulgent poetic surplus. In respect of Le

Corbusier's deeper intentions, however, they are most important,[58] not only as iconographic indices, but even more as linguistic displays of his more analogic and synthetic mode of ordering. Not that it makes wonderful literature—were it not for the buildings, one doubts the text on its own would inspire a devoted following. What, after all, has been said here?

Firstly, we recognize two "laws" of the kind just discussed: a river seeks to obey gravity and travel in a straight line; and the formation of a meander is a self-annihilating distortion in the flow of the river. From the point of view of science, of course, these principles of natural hydraulics are hopelessly simplistic; but it is typical of Le Corbusier's attempt to reconcile scientific and poetic thinking. The proposition recalls his approach to engineering in *Towards a New Architecture.* No interest in the calculative complexity is displayed; rather his laws derive from direct visual experience, like those of Leonardo. His "laws" are for the most part his own invention, and he renders them in a "prodigiously simple" form in order that they disclose sufficient ambiguity, and can therefore be made to stand for (in this case, opposed) states of mind.

His language establishes an entirely analogic milieu. The smooth-flowing river is attended by the expected apparatus of geometric iconography: governed by the "clear, simple law" (of gravity, it flows in accordance with the "straight line," an "axis"; its behavior is normal.[59] By contrast, "this abnormality, a meander," offspring of an obstacle, is itself an obstacle holding up the course of the river. A "malady" of erosion develops, which "eats away," "wears away" and "crumbles" not only the banks of the river, but also the "clear simple law." We learn in the following paragraph that "*when the time comes, the meander is dispensed with*," which is to say in physical terms that it is abandoned by the river, and becomes an oxbow lake. The oxbow lake stagnates and the "malady" quickens "with parasites, with evil vapors, with fevers and rotting decadence."[60]

We are by now accustomed to having "the sphere of human purposes" ascribed to such phenomena; and the "profoundly demoralizing influence of the meander" is seen to prevail for whole civilizations and hegemonies. Less obvious, however, is the manner in which the reader is made to shift perspective in the course of the passage. We begin with what has been described previously as "a new way of looking: the aerial view,"[61] by way of an airplane which "suddenly reveals." We are then caught up in the turmoil of the river, alternately acting with decision on our nonetheless predetermined natural progress to the sea, and dying with indecision in the abandoned and fetid meander. Finally we appear for judgement in the book of history. Those of us who have stayed the course in this battle of life and death, right and wrong, good and evil, have enjoyed a semi-mystical experience, when victory obtained and the meander was "suddenly and miraculously broken through."

We must defer addressing the question as to how Le Corbusier the Manichean naturalist has transformed Goethe's "tremendous empirical process" into a morality tale, for this text is only part of an argument which culminates, by way of painting, in architecture. It is well known that urbanism was in fact the ultimate horizon of his aspirations (excepting the occasional map of Europe and North Africa); but it is my own practice to treat these designs as one does the ideal city-plans of the Renaissance—as speculative iconographic topographies. That Le Corbusier would strenuously disagree with this view I am aware; but fortunately none of the radiant cities were built, and for precisely the reason that the hypothetical culture for which they were intended did not exist. Indeed the principle of a future guarantee of the legitimacy of current possibilities (as opposed to the creative reinterpretation of the tradition) was so taken for granted by Le Corbusier that these cities were expected to produce, that is, to make concrete in its full plenitude, such a culture. This hypothetical culture is however that in which all the redemptive promise of Le Corbusier's "patient search" obtained; and we are therefore permitted to accord it a

"quasi-symbolic" status in respect of the portion of his endeavour which deserves study: the architecture.

It is highly questionable that one might be able to speak of a symbol which is restricted to the imagination of one man, not to mention its profoundly conceptual character. It is the nature of hypothetical speculation to move within the compass of symbolic thinking, incompletely to be sure and mostly opposite in its results. The ease with which a Le Corbusier can overlay competing realities has this at its source. The main point, however, is that for Le Corbusier, this "overlay" is a matter of the play of analogies within an iconographic field which is the basis of the urban thinking, the architectural design, and the painting and writing.

The Museum and the New Times

For the sake of brevity, we will keep our architectural investigations limited primarily to what can be related to the "law of the meander." As it happens, the three "perspectives" which the reader adopts during the passage correspond to the three most general aspects of the "law of the meander" which pertain to Le Corbusier's architecture. In "aerial view," his *plan libre* is as much a transaction between the curved and the straight as is the meander and the river, and presumbably therefore accomodates some of the same meanings.[62] The river which "circulates...to the sea" struggling to maintain its course against the threat of deviation is also the inhabitant following the transfigurational route through Le Corbusier's buildings.[63] Lastly, the book of history is the essential artifact of an intramundane eschatology; it is that in which are judged finally the "human purposes" of the inhabitants and of Le Corbusier (as we shall see below, this book, water and the museum all converge upon one intention).

This sequence of "perspectives" seems to have provided the structuring principles for Le Corbusier's Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux ("Project D"),[64] constructed in Paris two years after the publication of *The Radiant City*. The only full-page photograph of the building published in *Oeuvre Complète Vol. 3* (frontispiece) displays an airplane in the foreground and in the background, a very large open book (on which are written some laws of men—the "Charte de l'urbanisme C.I.A.M.": history in the future tense). The photograph is taken from the entry, and one traverses a straight line from airplane to book in order to commence the exhibition route. The only full-page drawing (fig. 2) published of the building is a diagram of this route; and it is nothing if not a meander.[65] This is in fact characteristic of his museums, and one of the significant aspects of the labyrinthine plan of the Museum of Unlimited Growth. What in fact he has built inside the tent of the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux is a combination of both the entry hall and the galleries of the Museum of Unlimited Growth.[66] Similarly, the installation he designed for the 1953 exhibition of his work in the Musee d'Art Moderne in Paris, is composed of a straight spine to which are attached fragments of meanders serving as exhibition walls.[67]

The meaning of the term "growth," in this context, is not limited to a potential increase in hanging-space; rather we are in the presence of another icon of future possibilities. The following lines appear in *Le Poème de l'Angle Droit* :

> Because the profound refuge is in the great cavern of sleep that other side of life in the night. How the night is alive rich in the warehouses the collections the library the museums of sleep![68]

From this it appears that museums are considered to be cultural reservoirs. Furthermore it appears that the more the museum could be contrived to be experienced like a dream, the greater might be its usefulness to (future) society. Like the nature or the Italy of Goethe, the museum is a treasure-house of cultural fragments, available to the appropriative requirements of artistic genius in the context of hypothetical culture. Le Corbusier's

2 *Diagram of the Route through the* Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux. *Le Corbusier.*



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museums embody his attitude to tradition, and therefore to culture itself.

I have shown elsewhere that Le Corbusier's museums exhibit an iconography derived from the sea ,[69] which of course is the object of the flow of the river of truth, goodness and life in "Laws." It would take us too far afield to fully develop this theme—which, however, pertains even to the space of his cities—although the phrase quoted above from the otherwise terse "Commentary" to *The Radiant City* concerning the "rising tide" of the portending revolution gives a hint of what is on his agenda.[70] The main point is that the museums disclose a characteristic setting for a fundamental component of Le Corbusier's picture of culture, which in turn is mediated by an iconographic typology [71] rooted in his reading of certain phenomena of nature.

The visitor to the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux is subjected to two apparently opposed experiences: the dream-state and a rigorously structured didactic message. As to the first, the space is chaotic: physically the route is alternately very compressed and then open. The walls are covered with photomontages, collages, murals, architectural drawings and painted panels left plain or emblazoned with items like ears of wheat (agriculture) and wrenches (technology);[72] lines of urgently phrased text run along floor edges, declaim from panels (fig. 3,4). Needless to say, the scale of this material ranges from vastly enlarged heads to detailed commentary. This style of space culminated, of course, in the Phillip's Pavilion in Brussels. Corresponding to the skylit entry halls of the museums of unlimited growth, all prevails in a sub-aqueous light filtering through the cloth of the roof canopy (the tent walls are opaque).[73]

This sort of space lies at the heart of the analogic side of Le Corbusier's conception of architectural order. It is the space of his paintings, for example, to which he repeatedly called attention towards the end of his life. It is entirely devoted to the

3 *"The History of Urbanism,"* Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux.

4 Pavillon Des Temps Nouveaux. *Painted Panels Depicting the Symbols for Agriculture and Technology.*

potential reconciliation of a field of fragments, and is experienced as a tensional reciprocity of those fragments. Architecturally, this space is typically affiliated with darkness, ambiguous orientation, the amorphous. Although it is demonstrably part of his conception of architecture from his earliest buildings,[74] the ground floor of the Pavillon Suisse represents something of a break-through in his interpretation; and it may be regarded as the direct progenitor of such spaces as Ronchamp and the assembly halls of the Parliament building at Chandigarh and, less directly, of such configurations as the upper two floors and roof of the Millowner's Building, his later roofscapes, and the site planning of the Capitol complex at Chandigarh. However much this kind of space may also derive from his reading of the Acropolis[75], the main intentions are declared in the latent chambers of potential reconciliation of the museums. Moreover, it appears that the collagiste style of his books, to which we referred earlier, is derived from the same intentions as this latent space: the notes, for example to the 1950 exhibition "Synthèse des Arts Majeurs" (Port Maillot, unexecuted) and for the 1953 exhibition "L'Oeuvre Plastique" both have cover sheets in which the exhibition title is written across his open book.[76]

The counterpart to the experience of disorientation which obtains from the initial fragmentary experience of the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux is the forcefulness of the didactic path which the visitor must traverse, a phenomenon which is also characteristic of his books.[77] After an introduction devoted to C.I.A.M. and the history of urbanism, for example, the route begins in the contracted and twisted space of a double ramp with very little headroom on its lower half, which is titled in a caption, *"la rampe 'Misère de Paris'."*[78] By contrast, the area summarizing the Four Functions of Urbanism is a broad, open platform taking up approximately a quarter of the space of the building.[79] The declamatory qualities of the text and images is familiar to any reader of Le Corbusier's books. The iconographic source of his didactic space (and of its linear structure) is



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

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the river of decisions which will be judged in the book of history affiliated with the "Law of the Meander." The compulsive urgency of the proposition corresponds to the depth of anxiety that the future redemption—that is, the building of a radiant city and its culture—will never take place. To adopt the terminology of Le Corbusier's text, the meander may never be miraculously broken through.

The transfigurational nature of the circulation (see note 63) through his buildings is structured about a movement from disorienting darkness to an oriented, axial light (with the important exception of his museums, political spaces and religious buildings, which remain within the latent darkness). The semi-mystical, or at least "miraculous," experience which is the result, derives its content from the deeper intentions of Le Corbusier's cultural aspirations. Insofar as these are explicitly bound up with the advent of the Corbusian city and implicitly with such desiderata as the reconciliation of nature with geometry, "*accord avec le cosmos*" [80] and so forth, the overburdening message of the didactic exhibitions reduces the more implicit order of the buildings to an epiphany managed by Le Corbusier.[81] The circulating inhabitant as river may be flowing to the sea from which the new culture may be born, or rising from indecision to decision, from darkness to light, etc., but ultimately this inhabitant is *homo viator*, the homeless pilgrim.[82]

The apparent conflict between the latent and the didactic space must therefore be seen as complementary. Of particular importance is the manner in which the radical freedom of hypothetical culture institutes overcoming command as its mode of being. The complementarity of the two forms of experience is in fact the inevitable outcome of the entire proposition. Similarly, the incomplete movement of hypothetical thinking within symbolic interpretation transforms the potential participation in the transcendent of the latter into the aesthetic tyranny of the former. [83]

There are aspects of the Corbusian project which have not advanced in their fundamentals from that represented by the texts from Goethe. If anything, he has gone further in the same direction. Goethe's river is still something beyond the affairs of any particular individual, but the Corbusian river manages to fuse the individual with whole civilizations, as if to presume the effective reality of the "organic spirit" rooted in the freedom-from the given context mooted for artistic genius. The "tremendous empirical process" of Goethe's river has become, with Le Corbusier, a single "law" pertaining to the hydraulics of rivers and to human affairs. What in the letter of Goethe is a query concerning the nature of lawfulness has become, with Le Corbusier, a species of law in which the results are guaranteed, like the formulations of science. If the river for both Le Corbusier and for Goethe has its source in the river of change, of endless Becoming, first voiced by Heraclitus, it is Le Corbusier who would transfix it into a positive principle and deploy it as an image of power over time itself. For Goethe, Italy and nature still enjoy a certain authority in their given conditions, despite the efforts of painters to conventionalize them as settings for a fairly restricted range of drama. Le Corbusier would reduce the phenomena of culture and nature to a group of iconographic types whose authority derives from such a network of interrelationships as the Iconostase for the *Poème*, where they could be regarded as a sort of universal scheme of meaning appropriate to all human situations.

This indeed is what happened in practice: the universal scheme, and its attendant eschaton of a harmony which annihilated opposites, was compelled to engage the living differences of concrete situations. The difficulty arises in his urban aspirations, where his universal scheme assumes the pretensions of a better reality, but is in fact the consequence of the transformation of a poetics of architecture into a technology of social redemption. This fatal inversion of his intentions arises because of the inability to distinguish between what is omitted in making theoretical assumptions and what must be left undis-

closed (what in fact is given to transcendence in order that it may be—partially—revealed) in poetic disclosure.

What this means in practical terms to Le Corbusier is that his specification of, for example, the river/meander as a metaphor for human intentions, automatically suppresses the host of other possible readings of river. This is step one, which is unproblematic as far as it goes. The next step is that it crystallizes in his mind as an icon whose meaning has been stabilized on these terms. In this form, it can enter into reciprocity with similar icons, which attain a second level of stability, which derives from the combination of completeness and internal consistency to which the iconographic field aspires. At this point, the original poetic disclosure has become "commandeered into assured availability," and made ready for whatever task presents itself. The alternative would be a more fluid poetics, in which the original moment of poetic disclosure was more directly open to the tension between typicality and difference that is the heart of every human situation. In literature, and staying with Le Corbusier's theme, I would commend Joyce's use of water in *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake* as a counter-example.

We still have not penetrated to the source of the problem, which is not generically different from the Stoic problem mentioned above. We have shown how it is possible to convert a moment of poetic disclosure into an artifact that displays many of the same characteristics as those of technological or theoretic thinking. The overcoming command of time as decay (fate) essentially characterizes modern theoretic thinking, and this arises from a necessary initiating element of symbolic thinking. Insofar as this motif is allowed to dominate thinking, one has instituted overcoming command of fate as something by which Being is measured (in the sense we used earlier). In this, Nietzsche represents the essence of theoretic thinking.[84]

Le Corbusier's effort to transform technology into a willing accomplice by rendering the phenomena of nature, technology and human morality as aspects of a single poetic discourse is a legacy of the Romantic effort to save technology through art. Similarly, the hermetic and esoteric themes he inherits from late Romanticism, which characterize the possibilities of the artist essentially, display the same predisposition towards appropriation as we observed in technological thinking. The ground was prepared by the vaguely Stoic and Neo-Platonic background to these themes, which themselves (and in their different ways) flattened the reciprocity between *physis* and *nomos* towards internal consistency. In this light, is the performance of Le Corbusier to be distinguished from that of Mannerism and the Baroque, whose books of iconography and emblems are not unlike his Iconostase, and whose involvement with a blend of Stoicism, Neo-Platonism and esotericism is well enough documented by legions of art historians?

Two main differences present themselves immediately. Firstly, the cultural context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had not yet constituted itself about theoretic knowledge in the same way. Secondly, the books of iconography (admittedly tedious in their own terms) represented the distillation of a shared cultural background; whereas Le Corbusier, like Madam Blavatsky before him, sought to discover a level of symbolism, a *clavis universalis*, which might simultaneously summarize and replace all previous iconographies (and therefore Christianity, philosophy, myth and the cultural matrices from which they came as well). Moreover, the dramatic content of the material in Alciati, Valeriano, Ripa, and others, originated in the Classical and Christian cultures; but these authors present this material in fragments, whose potential coherence is occasioned only by the situations and settings (ceremonies, festivals, frescoed and stuccoed rooms) in which they are deployed. Le Corbusier not only organizes his icons in a matrix with its own internal order, but gives the whole his own redemptive story. In Mannerism and the Baroque, the eschatology of Christian redemption is played out in the incarnation of the

word (connoting the soul and the divine) in the image (connoting the Body and the human). The fusion of word and image (*concetto*) anticipates the reconciliation of divine and human at the end of time. The "New Times" of the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux are indebted to the Christian formulation, but transfer the redemption to an intra-mundane eschaton, characterized essentially by the "radiant" city, and by the "miraculous" breakthroughs that it both represents and reenacts. Mundane phenomena are consequently the limits of speculation. For this reason, Le Corbusier feels obliged to research the whole spectrum of representational possibilities as his field of endeavor. Moreover, the writing, the painting, the sculpture, the architecture, and so forth, must be reconciled *as such*. His program for a *Synthèse des Arts* is in fact a program for the unification of Western culture. Within this, the play of analogy is itself the limit of eschatological thinking. For Le Corbusier, it is sufficient that utilitarian life is "redeemed" in the life of Art and the secular sacred.

Temporality and Metaphoric Space

Le Corbusier's entire program may be reduced to the following formulation: the redemptive moment of analogy is reenacted in the moment of decision of the man of *droiture*. This is his version of *physis* and *nomos*. The significant difference from the original is that Le Corbusier's poetic/scientific narratives of "Laws" and the *Poeme* have replaced the primordial transcendence of *physis*. Similarly, the man of *droiture* may only be a figment of Le Corbusier's iconology. The reenactment itself seems to prevail only within the representational reality of Art, thereby disclosing the supposed higher reality as a flattened version of the tensional transcendence of the given reality. Finally, the reenactment prevails as two moments. Le Corbusier's understanding of temporality is the key to the problem, and it is essential to examine the modes of time in his work.

In the first place is the time of Le Corbusier's own practical life, of which I am concerned here with only one significant element. It is well known that he organized his day into a version of the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa* . The morning would be spent in the studio at 24 Rue Nungesser-et-Coli reading, painting, writing and thinking; and the afternoon would be devoted to the atelier at 35 Rue de Sèvres, where often the results of the morning's cogitations would be handed to the designers in the form of virtually hieroglyphic representations of an issue.[85] In my view, this routine is not to be taken lightly—it is what enabled him to think so clearly, to keep the central issues alive. The mode of reflection was poetic more than philosophic; but most importantly, it was not theory/practice in the sense known from technology (notwithstanding the ambiguity of the results, in terms of what we argued earlier). It is the kind of reflection that actually makes buildings more difficult to produce, but it ensures that the interpretation, the meaning, does not get drowned in the problems of production (in the meander, in his words). This phenomenon is less a matter of genius than it is of preserving the openness to the truth of Being, or, to put the matter simply, of basic honesty.

A second species of time which we encountered was that of the contest between axial flow and fetid decay in the metaphor of the meander. Beyond what it says of miraculous overcoming, the image is constituted horizontally about the tension between curved and straight and vertically about the tension between, as it were, the *physis* of the river and the *nomos* of the principle of *coincidentia oppositorum*. It is this latter dimension which allows him to see the river metaphor as appropriate to his notion of practical life, as we have just seen, but also to the possibility for analogy itself. It is true that his iconography tends too quickly to, firstly, read all phenomena in terms of the conciliation of opposites, and, secondly, to resolve them. But insofar as he is compelled to manifest the opposition, the tension itself, which is the crucial factor, is alive in the work. In this way, he is moving in the region of the primordial meanings of the reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos*, of hiddenness and disclo-

sure. Moreover, the experience of the "miraculous" with which the fetid meander is broken through rightly borrows on the "sacred" language of the contemporary primitive. For this third element of time corresponds to the metaphoric moment, the condition of "*fusion*" (as it is called in the *Poème*), in which identity as the play of difference is disclosed as the temporality of metamorphosis. The moment has its ultimate horizon in the reconciliation of opposites (good/evil, life/death, contemplative/active, male/female, uncreated/created, etc.) in the primary desideratum of Le Corbusier's efforts: solar harmony. Again, in his work, this moment is never allowed to effect its full "blossoming," because it is constrained by the self-imposed commands of internal consistency (as a manifestation of unity) in his iconographic scheme and in that side of his geometrical thinking which needed to make of a building a geometric figure.[86]

There are four basic ways in which temporality is manifest in his buildings. The first is the geometric matrix which underlies the planning: it establishes a distribution of rhythm, which, however, is characteristically a closed figure. Allied to this are the fluctuations of depth and orientation engendered by the Cubist perception of geometric/iconographic fragments. Thirdly, the lighting and materials (of the later buildings) are configured about a reciprocity between the metaphoric power of the earth and the authority of the sun (e.g. raw concrete and shadow versus intense color and sharp sunlight). Finally, this tensional field of conflicting fragments is oriented through the topography. The geometric matrix and the content of the pilgrimage are explicit, prescribed and determined. The remainder of his modes of temporal representation, however, institute an altogether more implicit, more subtle and more metaphoric milieu.

What Le Corbusier shared with Surrealism (other than certain iconographic procedures) was the discovery that situated time as the key to metaphoric space. This discovery rendered irrelevent the prevailing use of the term "space," and with that the deeply embedded perspectivism that legitimized such a disoriented representation of the tensional character of Being in the first place. Although almost everyone of Le Corbusier's generation spoke of "time and space," what was meant in practice was the objectification of both (the point at which the attention to prereflective experiences like shape and colour met on equal terms with the abstract axiomatics of mathematics and geometry, excluding the dramatic middle realm where human intentions arose). There is no such thing as time as such, or space as such; something always occurs sometime somewhere. The attention to metaphoricity in Le Corbusier's buildings, or, more precisely, in those settings which are analogies of the aqueous museum-space, shifted the source of order from the autonomous perfection of architectural physiognomy to the intentionality of the inhabitant.

The most familiar example is the ground level of Pavillon Suisse. Here the various fragments call to each other in a way that is, at first, disorienting (deliberately so—the back wall reverses against the direction of entry, setting in motion a dilation of possible readings). It is only as one decides to eat at the table, or go to one's room, for example, that the elements acquire orientation: indecision in a fluid milieu is the matrix for decision and orientation. Moreover, there is nothing wasted, nothing simply to look at with aesthetic indifference; all the parts support one sort of choice or another, and each part comes to constitute the whole as a collection of invitations to make those choices. At the same time, the strangeness of this room, simultaneously both "straight and curved" and set in the darkness cast by the perpetual shadow of the residential block above, is sufficently coherent as to embody the uncertainty as a structure, as a promise of fulfilment. To the extent that one's identity is manifest in one's choices (the main content of both the law of the meander and of the paradigm of the upright man of *droiture* of the *Poème*),[87] one's personality is here dispersed and represented as a room. The *nomos* on which one's under-

standing would be structured is manifest in the laconic authority of the ever-transforming *physis* of this sea composed of plaster and stone and metal and variously translucent glass.

It all sounds terribly dramatic in this description, as if the next step were to invoke a Baroque chapel. In fact it is quite delicate, and easily missed; choosing to eat dinner or to sit at a table for conversation or reading is, after all, only so important in the larger scheme of things. However, the placement of the dining-table (which is white marble veined in grey, like the photographs originally on the wall behind) is suspiciously similar to the placement of the altar at Ronchamp and to the placement of the "shrine," made up of the book of history over the diagram of the solar cycle at the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux.[88] Similarly, the airfoil column at Pavillon Suisse rather insists upon its rôle as a slightly displaced pivot of the four quarters of the room. In fact this latter motif is meant to suggest the fusion of cave and airplane,[89] the sub-aqueous dream and the reflective distance of the aerial view. And the table on its supports recalls the horizon established at entry by the massive pilotis supporting the reserved ground of the residental block. It must be admitted that Le Corbusier's insistence upon the continuity of house and temple[90] recalls the embarassing monumentality of a notion of private life (with its attendant Stoic overtones of natural, that is, personal, virtue refracted through Rousseau and Romanticism) that could not be better designed to destroy any hope of an authentic disclosure of the sacred.

There is, however, another way of looking at this. As Vesely has demonstrated,[91] one finds, in the Greek *polis*, a recurring tension between the earth and the newly-won *meson* (middle—the site where difference is reconciled in a higher unity) of discourse. It replicates the disclosive dialectics of *physis* and *nomos*. It has its origin in the courtyard before the archaic sacred palace and the site of sacrifice before the residence of the god, the temple. In the *polis*, it appears in the orchestra of the theatre, the Areopagus (the rock of Ares, where murder trials were held), the enclosure of law courts, the bouleterion, the agora itself, even the running track and the courtyard of the house indirectly share this setting. These are all sites where decisions are made; and the Greeks were quite conscious of the similarity between this public resolution of a question and the *agon* of sacrifice. Moreover, all these sites are linked to the Delphic *omphalos*, *physis* incarnate as an oracle. In this way, all discourse is situated in respect of *physis* (*nomos*), and distributed according to Moira (cf. note 7). At each site, the earth (*physis*) is prepared as spatial enclosure to receive the sacrifice of the *agon* of discloure (*nomos*). In this manner, architectural interpretation participates in, by establishing the right conditions for, the temporal disclosure of the order of the *polis*.

Le Corbusier, like so many modern architects, sought to recreate what were seen to be the paradigmatic values of ancient and primitive cultures. With the dialectical structure of the Greek *polis* in mind, we can better evaluate the results. Here, the iconographic scheme of Le Corbusier acquires its main value. Firstly, the autonomous consistency of his scheme was forced to take account of concrete situations; and this instituted a creative difference. For his iconographic scheme was not explicitly about architecture; it was about life, as he saw it, and the reality of strange metaphors involving sounding boards, rivers, axes, sexuality, measure, copulating, clouds, redemption, and so forth. Secondly, his astute poetic faculties allowed him to prefer what have always been primordial themes. To have oriented the primary reading of these interiors to water is to affiliate them with the originary waters (Apsu, Okeanos) by which Chaos was represented, and to which it gave the only apparently contradictory dual meaning of the waters of life and the waters of death (and therefore rebirth and regeneration). His awareness that what originates here is time itself is constituted by the river/journey of metamorphosis about which these spaces are structured. "The book of history," with which we have already identified these spaces, sits above the solar cycle in the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux to indicate the

reciprocity between the indeterminate paths of choice, the dark potentiality which seeks the light of understanding, and the sun's ruthless division of time into two conditions, which is the origin of all further division, the establishment of measure. Measure for him is the medium of exchange between sensation and intellection; and in the form of rhythm, it is the matrix in which space itself is allocated and distributed in its differences (insofar as they are in fact different and not merely subdivisions of one substance). The potentiality of the field of fragments, the intitial reading of these rooms (the condition of prone sleep in the *Poème*), becomes oriented and purposeful on the basis of a choice to do something made by the inhabitant. At this point, a "miraculous breakthrough" occurs, an awakening: one is consumed by a metamorphic "fusion," and released from chthonic disorientation to the "joyous" participiation of one's own rectitude (*droiture* —rendered as creative sacrifice in the *Poème*) in solar harmony. This is meant to be a daily cycle (following "our Lord, the sun"), pertaining not only to domestic routine but to the meeting of parliaments, worship in the church, and so forth (creativity itself, as we saw above, is the heart of the analogy). However it is also replicated in the constantly recurring lesser choices made within a building, at one extreme; and, at the other, it is ultimately oriented to the "radiant city" in nature (the "radiant" spirit—his version of *nomos*—rising from, and giving orientation to, metamorphic matter[92]—his *physis*).

It is possible to see that Le Corbusier has attempted to link the reciprocity of these critical spaces with the town in a fashion that recalls the structure of the Greek *polis*. What appears to be shared may be stated as a thematic in which disclosure as a dramatic event rooted in *physis* both reenacts a cosmogonic drama (origins of temporality) and constitutes a mode of participation in what can be disclosed of the truth of the order (temporality as Justice). By way of beginning to examine this proposition more closely, we must confront some internal contradictions and compromises that Le Corbusier has introduced. In the first place, the indecision (sleep) which is the matrix for decision (wakeful action) is fundamentally characterized by the transaction between dream-state and didactic message that we saw in the museums. What initially looks like a version of the Heideggerian dialectics of concealedness and unconcealedness is in fact circumscribed by Le Corbusier's iconography, if his intentions are that the truth of the order of the Corbusian city conforms to the content of his iconographic scheme. Under these conditions, the inhabitant ignorant of the iconography is stranded in sheer *aesthesis* (it is just another building with a more interesting topography than most); or, as one of the elect possessing the iconographic key, is drawn into a *gnosis* whose meaning is managed by Le Corbusier; or, having completed that course, is caught up in a species of harmony for which the rest of culture and history is a deficient background.[93] Secondly, these rooms display a contradictory attitude to temporality. The intra-mundane eschaton (the book of history) is confused with the latency of Chaos, and furthermore is mediated by a temporality which vacillates between metaphor and reason as the "*orbite fatale*" (see note 54), which is a consequence of his desire to, in effect, complete time as a geometric figure. Le Corbusier failed to realize that, as far as architecture is concerned, the question he sought to resolve, the tensional structure of the order, manifested the conditions for the disclosure of truth only in its posing. In its attempted resolution, he reverted to the fatality of the theoretic context, the overcoming command of time as decay.

What this means more concretely is that he failed to distinguish between the role of architecture and the role of discourse and practical action in the constitution of the symbolic order. The architecture of the *polis* is a physical setting for the ongoing, and certainly unspecified, disclosure/interpretation of the truth of order. The Corbusian city attempts both to complete the meanings and to invest them in its physical attributes and their disposition, which, in turn, gives rise to an over reliance upon iconography as a bearer of meaning. He has in fact inverted the

structure of the *polis*; the buildings are doing all the talking. This is nowhere more evident than in the forcing-chamber of the interior of the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux, which we have already established as fundamentally representative of Le Corbusier's understanding of cultural continuity.

This phenomenon (which, historically, precedes Le Corbusier by approximately two hundred years) may be expressed as a loss of faith in the communal life and public discourse of the town to preserve the order, and a corresponding displacement of that faith to the artifacts. At this point, they are presumed to bear "messages";[94] and the architecture of the town becomes as so many tombstones commemorating the death. This is not an idle analogy; what of course is attempting to be fixed, or preserved, in this fashion is time itself, although the futility of this effort is sublimated in what is experienced as elaborate fantasies of spatial continuity. "Elaborate" here does not connote spatial complexity, although that is often one of its manifestations. The object of this quest is guaranteed spatial meaningfulness, which has two phases. Firstly, the embodying power of architecture is projected as a universal context; and secondly, that universality is characterized in terms of internal consistency. In this quest Ledoux and Piranesi, Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier are all hunting the same unicorn.

The belief that internal consistency could guarantee the meaning becomes in turn the requirement that a building as a whole work of art (a matter of intensive interpretation) be understood as a complete, or total, work of art (a matter of extensive interpretation). The symbolic depth of the tensional reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos* is converted into the horizontal extensity of Nature and History which threatens to drown the individual (whose creative genius takes on the task of overcoming the—self-assigned—threat). The only way in which the contradictory demands of internal coherence and extensive reference can be met is by further reducing what is now regarded as the plenitude of meanings to the few horizons of reference which favor internal coherence. These are then accorded "symbolic" status within a non-symbolic understanding (which incidently promotes the recurrent confusion of symbol with sign).

The meaning of this phenomenon has nothing to do with the difference or continuity between Ancient Greece and contemporary Europe;[95] however the particular form of differentiation in accordance with theoretic self-consciousness from the compactness of Greek (or Medieval, for that matter) culture has everything to do with its persistence. It is the setting for hypothetical culture, whose temporal orientation is constituted in the overcoming command of time as decay. The structured rift in the earth that is the receptacle for sacrifice in the settings of the *polis* has become the whole project, with the result that the disclosure of temporality which it anticipates in the *meson* of discourse has been stilled.

In describing the "metaphoric moment" of fusion in Le Corbusier's work, we stressed the importance of the element of choice, of the matrix of indecision for decision. It proposes to constitute, therefore, the moment of *prohairesis* by which the human rises from nature to reflect upon preferred options (see note 53). That something of this kind is on Le Corbusier's mind may be deduced from the importance of creative action to his notion of fulfilled time in the *Poème*. This moment is constituted in the Greek settings as a structuring of the earth for agonic discourse, as the collective disclosure of the truth of the order in an oriented setting. By contrast, the cosmological iconography of the Corbusian settings are first of all pertinent to an individual; and secondly, the moment of choice is oriented to the thematic of the journey in a topography of meaningful artifacts (*homo viator*, see note 82). Temporal experience in the Greek case is fulfilled in participation in the collective agonic disclosure of truth (here seeing political or legal or dramatic or philosophical discourse as modalities of the broad consciousness of *logos*, the preeminent domain of disclosure). Temporal experience in the

Corbusian case is fulfilled in a sequence of perceptions leading to the "death" of one's sleepfulness and the "birth" of one's wakefulness in solar harmony. The collective component in the Corbusian proposition is in fact a hiatus between the sum total of individual perceptual experiences and alienation in the overgeneralized and transcultural notion of harmony (see above, and note 93).

Nonetheless, Le Corbusier's recovery of the metaphoricity of dwelling, even if only momentarily in selected settings, is an essential contribution. True, it is only an individual who is making the choice, a character from Becket stranded in his or her potential meaningfulness: the reciprocity prevails between an isolated inhabitant and a setting governed by aesthetic modes of continuity. If, however, one looks through his iconography and concentrates upon the situations for which his settings are intended, this quite fragile moment of fusive metamorphosis hints at something more profound: "an entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It has its being only in becoming and return."[96] This is the basis of symbol (see note 5).

To the extent that these chambers implied a "world" to Le Corbusier, they were quite profound in their own right. To the extent, however, that these rooms also constituted the limits of his speculation, they were crippling. The perfection of these spaces so dominated his imagination that he was incapable of understanding the metaphoricity of dwelling outside the framework of individual contemplation of a "picture." Because of his fundamental lack of trust in the communal disclosure of the openness of truth, he was incapable of imagining the metaphorical moment as a more complex structure of related settings. The possibile continuity of his buildings with a larger context was sacrificed in order to support these rooms—the buildings remained objects in a field (a field governed by the standard collusion of technics and aesthetics), and his towns were vastly enlarged versions of these rooms. More importantly, Le Corbusier never derived the lesson from his own "agonic" life that the moment of choice or decision held its authenticity not because it took place upon an elaborate stage, but because it is the moment when the individual dies as an individual and is reborn in public discourse and practical action and reflection in a world. A world is constituted in the reciprocity of the potential reconciliation with nature, the receptacle of the *ethos* of community (tradition), and potential disclosure of the truth of the order.

We have attempted to distinguish with some care in the work of Le Corbusier the problem of symbolic material preserved in a distorted form which undermines its meaning and legitimate intentions. It is a problem which very few architects have understood even as well as Le Corbusier. The distinction or even opposition between nature and city, for example, remains a commonplace.

For both Cartesian *ratio* (in the sciences) and Romantic *Erlebnis* (in the arts), nature is the preeminent object of study because it has become specified as the opposite of the subject who thinks or experiences. Nature has become the topography of infinite difference, the "not" of which the individual is positive correlate (as locus of "spirit"), the potential death of this individual. From this derives the project of worldly salvation and the necessity of the creative indiviual (genius) to it. Le Corbusier's "pact with nature" (or Rousseau's "return to nature") has become a pact with death-as-decay (fatality) *except insofar as* nature has been "redeemed" in Art, that is, in an architectural topography. The architecture seeks to embody the highest values—which means those pertaining to the creative individual. What has been "overcome" is what is essential: a proper orientation to the disclosive death of the *agon*. The paradoxical order of *physis* as birth/death has been reduced to the negative complement of life as a concept. The reciprocity of nature and culture preserves within it an essential transcendence which

cannot be reduced to what of either is open to explicit appropriation and management, whether by technology, historicism or aesthetics. The movement towards appropriation institutes the reiterated overcoming of time as decay, which is to say the cultivation of culture as death.

Notes

1. Evidence of a need to manifest architectural and natural order as if they were different occurs as early as the combination of Neo-Classical theory and the attitude to nature displayed in the English Garden. Brogniart's curious domestic garden designs, for example, seem to obey criteria based upon this anxiety. See below.

2. On this possibility, see R. Assunto, *Ontologia e Teleologia del Giardino*, (Milano, 1988), pp. 19 ff.

3. Richard Sennet's still useful *The Fall of Public Man* (Cambridge U.P., 1974) traces the development of the belief that a discontinuity prevails between public and private life. His history suggests the possibility that the autonomy of large-scale technological and political entities are as much a result as a cause of the process of estrangement. The term "biosphere" has usefully concentrated minds upon the continuity and transcendence of nature even in this scientific sense; but the frequently-mooted political equivalent, the "global village," is a hopeless reflection of how little understood is the problem. The more recent refrain, "global thinking, local action", is a slight improvement, insofar as action is better situated. However both expressions serenely declare precisely the hiatus between public and private, the hiatus in the meaning of order under discussion here. What ultimately is at issue is what Voegelin calls, the "public representation of transcendent truth" (*NSP*, p 83).

The term "representation" here endows a creative connotation to participation in truth, and in respect of the distinction between politics and philosophy. This is an important problem, which has its origin in the relation of *methexis* (participation) to the reciprocity of *logos* (reasoned discourse) and *ergon* (deeds or work), in Plato, and is a problem with which much of this essay is concerned. Gadamer is the source of this concern. His emphasis upon the passive nature of participation ("Theoria is a true sharing, not something active, but something passive [*pathos*], namely being totally involved in and carried away by what one sees." [*T&M*, p. 111]) is meant to counter the inadequacy of the prevailing modern emphasis upon subjectivity, and to indicate the transcendence of the truth of being, by which one is appropriated, in Heideggerian terms. However, when Gadamer elsewhere speaks of "holding fast to what one sees before one's eyes as right not only in *logoi* (in discourse) but also *ergoi* (in deed)" (The Good, p. 96), I am moved to restore something of the early Heideggerian notion of "care" (*B&T*, pt. III). Insofar as the truth of Being is disclosed within beings, this "holding fast" creates the conditions for participation, and is, then, the creative element in it.

My interest, in the early part of this essay, in the points of proximity between the modes of disclosure of *poiesis*, *praxis* and philosophy must not be allowed to obscure the differences. This matter, in fact, is the key to the problem of "public representation of transcendent truth". Within the practical (that is, moral) sphere, one could specify the importance of institutional structures in the context of "the tensions of self-consciousness and opposition" (*NSP*, p 82). However, in virtue of the emphasis here upon modes of disclosure, I will offer—simply in the form of a stratification of reciprocities (some of which is clarified in the text and notes below)—a minimum sketch of the levels of mediation between the reciprocal transcendence of nature and truth: potential reconciliation in nature; tradition; *philia politike* (political friendship); *poiesis; praxis*; philosophy of *praxis;* philosophy of being; potential disclosure of truth.

E. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, (U. of Chicago,1952 and 1983); H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London, 1979 (Glen-Doepel trans. of *Warheit und Methode*, 1965); H.-G. Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good*, op. cit.; M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Oxford, 1962,(J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson trans. of the 1931 and 1957 editions of *Sein und Zeit*, Tubingen).

4. To that rendering of the term "symbol" which is better restricted to "sign" (a form of reference confined within a codified system and therefore guaranteed as to the relation of A to B), I am here preferring an understanding of symbol as cultural paradigm. In this, interpretation of the symbol is oriented to the content of the symbol, moves between the spontaneous and the reflective, and encompasses several modes of representation (eg. law and choral practices). The interpretation is oriented but otherwise open, and the interpretative history of any particular symbol—constituted in the tension between paradigm and *praxis* (cf. note 6, below)—provides the ground (tradition) for subsequent disclosure of the symbol's potential meaning (which is inexhaustible, at least in its fundamental content, if not as a particular vehicle of symbolization—i.e., what was once disclosed in the mere mention of a rose by St. Bernard now requires exegesis, but the results of such inquiry still give rise to thought).

5. The orienting power of symbols corresponds to their own orientedness; they are receptacles of transformation as the essential manner of their permanence. They disclose a destiny and are fundamentally

temporal in their content (Christian eschatology is only one mode of the possible temporal orientation of a symbol). In this essay, I will use "destiny" to connote the temporal fulfilment of meaning, as against "fate," which refers to a more limited concern for one's own success or failure (and therefore a concern for one's death as the essential meaning of time). Put another way, fate is an immanentized version of destiny: fate, for example, tells me that it was my turn to be torpedoed, whilst destiny orients my thinking to the meaning of conflict as a mode of reconciliation. Culture (understood as beings oriented within Being by a complex of symbolic structures and institutions) is then situated within the tension between tradition and the destiny of the potential meaning of the primary symbol. "' Being' ever and always speaks as destiny [*geshick*], and thus [is] permeated by tradition." (M. Heidegger, "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics", in *Identity and Difference*, New York, 1969, p. 51; Stambaugh trans. of 1957 Neske edition of *Identität und Differenz*) .

6. The distinction between paradigmatic and pragmatic time derives from the argument of M. Eliade's *Myth of the Eternal Return* , or *Cosmos and History* (Bollingen, 1954; W. Trask trans of *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour: archétypes et répétition*, Paris, 1949). Pragmatic time is the time of human *praxis*, of the decisions, accidents and victories of history; and it derives its meaing from its reciprocity with paradigmatic time, the time of origins (which may be symbolized eschatologically, as in Christianity), fundamentally experienced as eternal, the time of primary symbols. The disclosure of these symbols prevails in the reciprocity, and, in the context of deep historical changes, are open to reinterpretation as to primary figures, iconography, and so forth.

7. The standard translations of *physis* as "nature" and *nomos* as "law," "custom" or "convention" are only approximately accurate as they stand and are utterly wrong if read in the light of the prevailing view that culture is something artificial, and therefore the opposite of nature. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the formulation itself is a product of Sophist thinking, and consequently stigmatized by Plato's scorn ever since. The terms must be seen in the light of the development of Greek thought from the archaic to the classical periods, what is often described as the shift from *mythos* to *logos* (which is acceptable only insofar as the differences are not emphasized over the similarities). A proper consideration of this issue is well beyond the scope of this note; but given the importance of the reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos* to the rest of this essay, the matter demands brief attention.

The pre-Greek origins (both in the Ancient Near East and in the archaic strata of the culture that eventually became Greece) do not distinguish between culture and nature; rather one finds a continuum mediated by gods (see below in text and note following). Lawfulness, nature, order are compacted into one experience mediated by religious institutions of which the king would be the most prominent figure. In the subsequent process of differentiation from this religious matrix, the mainly secret rites of the palace devolve to the *demos* (the people [the milieu of *nomos*]—in fact the citizens—of a country, district or land [the milieu of *physis*]) structured as a *polis*. The open discourse of the political and legal institutions corresponds to the devolution of matters concerning origins, or the *arche*, from the priests to the open discourse of philosophy.

In this light, it becomes possible to say something about *nomos*. Cornford shows that *nomos* is derived from the verb *neimen*, "to dispense." Furthermore the cognate words show that "behind the familiar sense of *nomos*, 'custom', 'use', 'law', lie traces of an older spatial significance—the notion of a range [in the sense of the dwelling and lands of a shepherd] or province, within which defined powers may be legitimately exercised..." He continues, "If we are right in thinking that Moira [cosmic Justice] ultimately meant the division of the universe into distinct provinces, it is clear that this division, as soon as it comes to be the work of a personal God, can be conceived as a *nomothesia*—a laying down or fixing of nomoi; and that this process is simply a redistribution to Gods and men of their domains, privileges and honours..."(*RP*, 27-30). It will be appreciated in this the degree to which *nomos* is already embodied in *physis*, in which dwelling in a land recalls dwelling in the universe. The later situation is excellently depicted by Gadamer: "[T]he convention according to which the sounds of language or the signs of writing mean something is...the agreement on which human community, its harmony with respect to what is good and proper, is founded...[It is] an expression of that fundamental agreement in what is good and proper...[W]hat was good and proper, [the Greeks] called the *nomoi*, as the decree and achievement of divine men. But for Aristotle, this derivation of the *nomos* characterizes more its value than its origin...religious traditon for Aristotle is a way to the knowledge of being and value" (*T&M*, 391). What is being described here is the ethical content of tradition itself. Vernant calls attention to a critical factor in the process of differentia-

tion from the religious matrix to the *polis* in his analysis of Hesiod: the distinction made between the *ergon* (work) of the farmer and that of the artisan. That of the farmer is the origin of the proximity of cult, cultivation, and what would later be named "culture." Athenian religion, and Athenian society, remained fundamentally agrarian in orientation. The *ergon* of the artisan, by contrast, was both urban and marked by the suspicion and awe which had attended the shamans: his was a world of secret communion with the powers of nature. Much later, after this secret communion had become identified as a species of knowledge (concerning the creating of something which previously did not exist), it became necessary to reconcile this knowledge with that concerning the cosmos, of whose essence was the problem of its origin, its *arche* (which also connotes foundation, ruling principle) (*MTG* , pp. 248 ff.). The overall process of reconciliation is the background to the host of issues surrounding terms like *techne*, *poiesis*, *mimesis*, and the similarities and differences between productive understanding, moral and political understanding, and epistemic understanding, as both Gadamer and Vesely have argued at length (*T&M*, passim; and *PA*, passim). That in fact these address a common problem can only be seen in terms of the religious framework from which they descend.

The same principle prevails with respect to the sphere of knowledge that concerned the cosmos. Cornford first demonstrated that what is still often described as the "Greek scientific revolution" is in fact a slow process of transformation of the original religious matrix into the order of the polis (see also Snell's analysis of the transformation from spoken and poetic language to philosophic discourse, although the principle of non-contradiction is given a bit too much prominence [*DM* , pp 213 ff.]). Both the Milesians and the more mystic tradition in the Greek colonies of southern Italy take as their essential topic *physis* as a manifestation or embodiment of lawfulness. By the time of the Sophists, *physis* possessed three meanings. The most primordial stratum carried the meanings of generation, being born, becoming—what later is disclosed in the term *natura naturans*. This meaning then gave rise to a second, *physis* as all that exists, since even the cosmos came into being—what later is disclosed in the term *natura naturata*. These finally become enshrined in the usage so important to the philosophical speculation on being, *physis* as the "nature" or "essence" of something. We may allow Aristotle, who is generally regarded as the culmination of this process and moreover is regarded as having established for western thinking—including both science and Christianity—the fields of discourse in which the problem of being will be articulated, to express what is the fundamental continuity in the history of the matter: "...the Divine pervades the whole of nature...that they [the earliest thinkers and philosophers] supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying...to this extent only, then, are the views of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us" (*Met*. 1074b 3-14).

It would seem, then, that the Sophist distinction between *physis* and *nomos* is either a tautology (articulating lawfulness twice) or an error, apparently distinguishing lawfulness in the natural realm from that of the *polis*, consequent to an awareness of the potentially autonomous nature of human thought. The emphasis in the Sophist texts upon the conventional nature of human lawfulness reinforces this reading for most scholars. Most notorious in this respect were "the opening words of [Protagoras's] treatise...his Truth..." "Man is the measure of all things" (*Theat*., 152a, 161c, etc.).

Whatever the true value or otherwise of the Sophists (and Voegelin's cautionary remarks are instructive [*WP*, Pt. 3, Chap. 11]), I will offer that their formulation frames the problem in a manner that makes of Plato's *Republic-Timaeus* a direct response. Acknowledging the more fundamental contributions to later thought made by the philosophers prior to Sophism, *physis* and *nomos* point to their eventual differentiation as body-soul, or the sensible and the intelligible within the symbolic structure of *logos* for Plato, and to such insights as the relation between *morphe* and *eidos* , or between *dynamis* and *energia* in Aristotle. The reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos* may be regarded (and will so be regarded for the purposes of this essay) as a compact metaphor for the ontological difference between the possibility of Being and the beings in whom Being is disclosed. Put another way: as disclosure is always partial, its consequence is always a concealment, which gives to order its transcendence (the always-already-there, ever-open, not yet disclosed); and the formulation *physis / nomos* corresponds to the experience of distance from the transcendent given conditions for order and of nearness to the immanent conditions for the disclosure of order. And finally, in terms of the mythic origins: *physis* has its source in the potential for anything to exist at all—Chaos; and *nomos* has its source in the inexorable temporal structure of that which does exist—Justice.

The question as to whether the experience of the *polis*, as that human

institution in which order is disclosed most fully, may have influenced the formulation of the reciprocity of *physis* and *nomos* is, then, a secondary consequence of the fundamentally temporal conditions in which the primary order can be manifest to questioning. This is expressed in the nature of reciprocity itself: like metaphor it discloses an identity whose nature can only be manifest in a play of difference (in respect of which Snell's discussion of the "necessary metaphor" in Heraclitus is most apt, although his essentially philological approach causes him to distinguish this too strongly from what he terms "divinity...the unknown element in proportion" [*DM*, 219-221]). The argument in this and the preceding paragraph might be most succintly summarized by a reading of the famous concluding phrase of *Timaeus* 37c-38b: "time [the experience of ontological difference] is the *mimesis* [*nomos*] of eternity [*physis*]."

F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation*, (Sussex, 1980,orig. 1912); H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit.; J.-P. Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, (London, 1983, anon. trans. of *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* , Paris, 1965); D. Vesely, *The Poetics of Architecture*, unpublished manuscript draft, (London, 1983); B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought*, (N.Y., 1960, T.G. Rosenmeyer trans. of *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*; Hamburg, 1955); E. Voegelin, *Order and History Vol II, The World of the Polis*, (Louisiana State U.P., 1957); and his *Anamnesis*, (U. Notre Dame Press, 1978, Niemeyer ed. and trans. of *Anamnesis: Zur Theorie de Geschichte und Politic*, Munich, 1966).

8. What precedes the reciprocity of *nomos* and *physis* is the more compact tension between stability and fecundity in the Ancient Near East. These terms will not be found in the standard literature, but are the result of my own research. "Stability" refers to the domain of the eternal, but does not carry an exclusive orientation to either celestial or chthonic symbolism. "Fecundity" refers to the domain of the temporal, essentially understood within the framework of regeneration (our own attitude to death as simple extinction, or to origins outside the thematics of "birth," did not characterize their thought). In general, thematic emphases prevail, rather than the style of thought familiar from the sixteenth century onwards. Temporal consciousness is inextricably connected with its modes of disclosure. Ritual forms the representational basis not only of their myths and cultus, but also of what we tend to divide into the separate spheres of temple-palace ceremonial, agriculture, military affairs, astronomy, architecture and urban design, the economy and agriculture. However, it is possible to overemphasize the difference between Greek and pre-Greek representational consciousness. The "Enuma Elish," to take a familiar example, exhibits a careful attention to the iconicity of various strata of discourse throughout the founding of the three temples which are the basis of its narrative (and presumably historical) structure.

9. However even scientific research raises moral consequences which lead thought to consideration of ethics. Martin Heidegger's essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" (now in the collection of essays of that title ed. and trans. Lovitt, N.Y., 1977, pp. 3 ff.; originally "Die Frage nach der Technik", from *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Neske edition of 1954), shows how this is not simply a matter of adequating research to social norms but touches on the very basis of scientific and technological thinking. Among the consequences of his argument is the possibility that the forms of continuity and reciprocity between simple biota and certainly within more elaborate ecological domains are insufficiently characterized by the current terminology ("system," "environment," "milieu," "information," "complexity," etc.). If the tendency of "information technology" to regard devices like thermostats as "intelligent" is wholly to the advantage of the device, it is not naive anthropomorphism (and without wishing to obscure the real differences) to regard the subtlety and refinement of biological reciprocity in terms which approach the qualitative understanding of justice. However, the main point concerns the cultural meaning of the prevailing methodologies, on which, of course, the classic text is H.-G. Gadamer's *Truth and Metho*d, op. cit.; but see also Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, (London, 1958 and 1962).

10. Which, like the contemporaneous transformation of "style," became a conceptual denomination of something that was missing in the contemporary experience of the whole. See both Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1750-1850*, (N.Y., 1958), and Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit., Part I.

11. Trans. H. Rackam, from the Loeb Edition, 1926, 1934, and successive reprints. See also 1144 b.1ff for the relation of this issue to virtue, prudence and cleverness (*deinotes*).

12. On this point, compare such passages as Republic 524b-c with the *Parmenides*. The matter ultimately pertains to the disclosure of truth through dianoia: cf. the readings of H.-G. Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic*, (New Haven, 1980), Chaps 4-7; and of John Sallis, *Being and*

requirements of this note, even restricting our attention to this one work. However it can at least be offered that, beyond the explicit uses of the terms "morality" (for eg. his idea of the content of Roman planning, pp. 146-47) or "morale" (for eg. architectural planning as a plan of battle, p. 166), the issue includes his use of terms like "purity," "order," "elementary," "legislation" (most of which are deployed in respect of artifacts of formal thinking) etc., and, above all "harmony," whose description on p. 138 effectively summarizes the ambiguities and contradictions: "Standardization is imposed by the law of selection and is an economic and social necessity. Harmony is a state of agreement with the norms of our universe. Beauty governs all; she is of purely human creation; she is the overplus necessary only to men of the highest type."

20. The *Poème* was originally published as a boxed set of about 156 lithograph plates of handwritten text and drawings, (Paris, Teriade, 1954); recently republished in book form by Fondation Le Corbusier, 1989. "*Droiture*" (which D. Becket-Chary, in her unpublished M. Phil. essay on *Droiture*, 1989, proposes to translate as "rectitude") is the term he uses in this work to identify right action in the world, the upright (as opposed to prone, sleeping) man against the sea-horizon, the vertical mediation of this horizon as the boundary between earth and heaven (and therefore, in respect of the previous reading, the reconciliation of man with nature—the subject of this essay), the reflected gaze of himself in the moral authority of Yvonne, "*ange gardien de mon foyer*" as the embodiment of the principle of *coincidentia oppositorum*, and, among still other themes, the sacrificial cross-in-square/circle that is his icon for cosmological reconciliation through artistic creativity (G3 of the Iconostase). This, like John Dee's monad, is intended to be a vehicle of *gnosis*, in virtue of its role as a summation of the network of icons which comprises Le Corbusier's fabric of meaning. It is an aim of my forthcoming book on Ronchamp to demonstrate that the ambiguities and confused borrowings of his earlier arguments have, by this date, been refracted into the sort of self-referential scheme of iconic fragments one sees in the Iconostase. Becket-Chary has also produced the only thorough study of the *Poème* (unpublished Cambridge M. Phil. dissertation, 1990).

21. The ethical question here has been misplaced, in my view. It is usually posed in the form, "should we try to build such things?" The drawbacks—offered by those who would answer "no"—are equally frequently populated with golems or concerned with cost or pragmatics. These negative responses are easily dismissed by those pushing for further effort on behalf of simulation because it is tacitly agreed by all that building something is what is involved. The project is thus situated within the existing protocols of technological making. The obvious point of correspondence between the given reality and the simulated one lies in the creative power of making. In other words the proper criteria for evaluating the project lie within those normally deployed for artistic making.

It is the simulation issue which makes this most clear, and, within that, the question of what mode of simulation is to be considered—video, robots, Turing space, and so forth. Whatever the mathematical questions, all criteria for evaluating reality are derived from the given reality. In what way, then, is the quality of the result to be distinguished from an animated cartoon, a puppet show, or, if the results are as good as the more enthusiastic predictions, a play, an opera, etc.? Or is the idea that the result would be so indistinguishable from the given reality as to pass unnoticed? However, in that case, why even bother, particularly if the only way to simulate reality is to incorporate everything of which the given reality is composed (ie. can a person—or even a cat—really be conceived as a sort of complex vacuum cleaner, an off-the-peg item not requiring one billion years of evolution, nor the rest of nature and society, perhaps all of history as well)? In this light, the "life" that is being simulated is either very expensive theatre, or an overly exuberant conception of utility (on which latter, see P. Rossi's analysis of the *ippisimae res sunt veritas et utilitas* concept from Bacon's *Novum Organum* , in *Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts in the Early Modern Era*, pp. 151 ff., N.Y., 1970; S. Attanasio trans. of *I Filosofi e le Macchine*, Milan, 1962). If this can be said of the apex of technological ambitions, it surely pertains to the rest. Here, I am siding with the views of, among others, T. Rozhack and J. Weizenbaum (the reviewers' praise for Penrose, op. cit., as an argument against "strong AI" seems misplaced, by virtue of its philosophical naïveté, and of the lack of even a scientific argument beyond the implications of the second law of thermodynamics). I believe my colleague, Dalibor Vesely, will be considering matters related to these more thoroughly in his forthcoming "Conflict II," op. cit.

22. Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good* , op. cit., Chap VI, "The Idea of Practical Philosophy," pp. 159 ff.

23. So much appears to be the burden of P. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: the Voluntary and the Involuntary* (Northwestern Press, 1966;

trans. E.V. Kohák of *Le Volontaire et l'involontaire*, Paris, 1950).

24. "...letting-be...exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment into the open region. Letting-be, i.e., freedom, is intrinsically exposing, ek-sistent. Considered in regard to the essence of truth, the essence of freedom manifests itself as exposure to the disclosedness of beings...the ek-sistence of historical man begins at that moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what are beings? In this question unconcealment is experienced for the first time. Being as a whole reveals itself as *physis*, 'nature,' which here does not yet mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as such as a whole, specifically in the sense of emerging presence...The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a 'time' which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the region for every measure...Man does not 'possess' freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive *Da-sein*, possesses man—so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history. Only ek-sistent man is historical. 'Nature' has no history...The essence of truth reveals itself as freedom." M. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. J. Sallis of "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1942-43), from the fourth edition of *Wegmarken* (Klosterman, 1961); see also M. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (J. Stanbaugh trans. of lecture course, 1936).

25. Cf. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago, 1953. Strauss remarks in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, (Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968, Vol 2, pp.88-90 reprinted in *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, U. of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 138): "Nature was discovered by the Greeks as in contradistinction to art (the knowledge guiding the making of artifacts) and, above all, to *nomos* (law, custom, convention, agreement, authoritative opinion). In the light of the original meaning of nature, the notion of "natural law" (*nomos tes physeos*) is a contradiction in terms rather than a matter of course." This would seem to disagree with our own reading (note 8), but is to be attributed to his concern to distinguish natural right ("what is by nature right or just...*physei dikaion*", ibid.) from natural law (which is conventional). We are, then, in basic agreement. His distinction between natural right and natural law is more effective when dealing with the modern situation, for which purpose he may have read the earlier material in this way. This would appear to conform to Gadamer's observation (*Truth and Method*, op. cit., pp. 471and 490): the main point is that at *N.E.* 1134b 27ff, Aristotle "ascribed a simply critical function to the idea of natural law, rather than a positive, dogmatic one. It has always been felt to be shocking...that he distinguishes between conventional and natural law, yet goes on to claim that natural law can be changed...I consider that what we can learn from [the classics] is the absolute distinction that exists between a *politike techne* and a *politike phronesis*. Strauss does not in my opinion give sufficient weight to this. Here too Aristotle can help us not to become involved in an apotheosis of nature, naturalness and natural law that would be nothing but an impotently doctrinaire critique of history..." The modern conception of theory and practice indeed does not generally distinguish between the priorities of political action (*politike techne*) and those of political contemplation (necessary for the consideration of a *politike phronesis*). See also note 4, above.

26. A. Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1864); abridged trans., H. Martineau, *The Positive Philosphy of A. Comte*, 2 vols, 2nd edition (London, 1875). Three aspects of this work are of interest for the light they shed upon the cultural dilemma exhibited in the problem of the "contemporary primitive," below: the objectification of social reality, the formulation of the eschaton as a state of objective reality (domination of nature), and his respect for the institutions, but not the God, of Roman Catholicism.

27. This said, it is also the case that the tension between a conceptual culture of this kind and the depth of the given, late Medieval, culture did not manifest itself until the period of Mannerism. From this point, the main effort was given over to the reinterpretation of the symbolic structure in respect of, by then, better understood perspectivism. If Kepler is easily situated within the Baroque context, however, Galileo and the Parisians are indicative of the more theoretical understanding which underlies the last of my three stages. Cf., D. Vesely "Conflict I," op. cit.

28. On this see H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit., Part One, in particular II.2.b, and also Supplement I, "Hermeneutics and Historicism", pp. 460 ff.

29. Gusdorf, G., Vols. IX and X of the projected thirteen-volume *Les Sciences Humaines et la Pensée Occidentale* (from 1966, all Paris, Payot), *Fondements du Savoir Romantique*, 1982, and *Du Néant à Dieu dans le Savoir Romantique*, 1983.

30. The belated recognition that Modernist architects were concerned with iconographic matters has served mainly to increase the subject-matter governed by formalistic thinking, rather than saving the case for Modernism in the face of postmodern criticisms. If anything, the results so far only confirm the continuity between Modernism and Postmodernism. The general background is usefully surveyed in the L.A. County Museum of Art catalogue, *The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890-1985* (Tuchman, Freeman, et. al., N.Y. 1986). Although oriented to painting, the themes and images were what inspired most architects of the period. It is worth appreciating the debt these interests owed to late Romanticism and Decadence; see J. Pierrot, *The Decadent Imagination, 1880-1890* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981); trans. D. Coleman of the second part of Pierrot's Ph. D. Thesis, Univ. of Paris IV, *Merveilleux et Fantastique*, 1974; and G. Michaud, *Message Poétique du Symbolisme* (Paris, 1978).

31. An unfortunate result was to compromise the status of the very heroes and legitimate political objects of this vision—the culturally disenfranchised. Concerning the notion of an intra-mundane eschatology, which is considerably indebted to Karl Löwith, see E. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (U. of Chicago,1952 and 1983) pp. 117 et. seq.

32. M. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", op. cit. This is the most compact formulation of the transcendence of *physis* of which I am aware. *"The work lets the earth be an earth"*(emphasis original); M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", A. Hofstadter trans. of 1960 Reclam, Stuttgart, edition of "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke ," in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (N.Y., 1971), p. 46.

33. Cf. P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (London, 1978), pp. 256 ff., partic. p 301; R. Czerny trans. of *La Métaphore Vive*, (Paris, 1975).

34. "Fundamental" is used in the sense of basis, fundamentum, after the manner of the late seventeenth century Bolognese musical theorist (and follower of Monteverdi) A. Berardi, who interprets the *cantus firmus* as divine law, and the *cantus figuratus* as human law. The musical analogy is meant to call attention to the temporality of reinterpretation of the potential disclosure of truth (freedom—the *cantus figuratus* can be related to the *affetti* of the Baroque melody) in respect of nature/tradition (in which the *cantus firmus* lends its iconography to the *basso continuo*). M. Bukofzer, *Music in the Baroque Era* (London, 1948), p. 393. Compare Schopenhauer's conception of architecture as "the bass-notes of nature."

35. Quoted in K. Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949), p. 53.

36. All quotations taken from John Gage's translation of the "Introduction to the Propyläen," *Goethe on Art* (London, 1980), pp. 3-16.

37. On "Longinus," and particularly the distortion of the notion of "genius" towards the "subjective and emotional" during the late eighteenth century, see R. Lee, *Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic Theory of Painting* (N.Y., 1967), pp. 68-69. In the present context, the original text, which was concerned with Rhetoric, is instructive [*On the Sublime*, II, 1-2]: "Genius [translating *megalophue*, whose cognate words signify high-mindedness, confidence, arrogance, but also greatness of mind, magnanimity, and grandiloquence] it is said, is born and does not come of teaching, and the only art for producing it is nature [to *pephykenai*—from the same root as Aristotle's *pephykosi*, above, p. 2]. Works of natural genius, so people think, are spoiled and utterly demeaned by being reduced to the dry bones of rule and precept. For my part I hold that the opposite may be proved, if we consider that while in lofty emotion Nature [*physis*] for the most part knows no law, yet it is not the way of Nature to work at random and wholly without system. In all production Nature is the prime cause, the great exemplar; but as to all questions of degree, of the happy moment in each case, and again of the safest rules of practice and use, such prescriptions are the proper contribution of an art or system." (trans. W.H. Fyfe, in the Loeb Edition, 1927).

38. In the context of the overall program, the significance of Italy is revealing: "For the German artist, and for the modern or northern artist in general, the transition from formlessness to form, and the maintenance of form once attained, is difficult, nay, almost impossible. Let any artist who has spent some time in Italy ask himself whether contact with the best examples of ancient and modern art etc. ..." (Gage, op. cit., p. 10). There is a subtle difference between what is proposed here and the nominal intent of the Grand Tour, which lay somewhere between improving one's taste and consolidating the European tradition insofar as it was deemed to have its *fons et origo* in Rome and the Italian Renaissance (which of course did not prevent Europe and particularly Italy from being regarded as a vast museum, in whose coffee shop, as it were, one could make fruitful contacts). Goethe's proposal, however sympathetic his own Italian Journey, connotes a strange species of cultural appropriation which makes of form both an essence of Italian Art (and therefore presumably deeply embedded in its culture) and something which might be extracted from that context and transplanted in the (presumably equally deeply

embedded) northern pathology of formlessness. The approach to nature prevails on a similar basis. The degree to which "form" has become a conceptual construct which flattens the texture and depth of reality, but nevertheless aspires to carry a moral imperative, is very much a constituent part of the radical objectification of culture and subjectivity of the individual mentioned above.

39. As far as the modern period is concerned, Nietzsche produced the definitive statement concerning the transfiguring power of Art, and of the artist's role in whatever transfiguration of culture was likely to take place. Acknowledging that the term "truth" for Nietzsche carries the special meaning of its bankruptcy in the context of the late nineteenth century state of the European tradition, statements like "We possess art lest we perish of the truth" (*WP*, frag. 822 [1888]) must be seen in the light of art's capacity to create the conditions for disclosure, discussed above. See particularly *WP* frag. 853 (1886 or 1888), and M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Vol I: The Will to Power as Art* (N.Y., 1979, D.F. Krell trans. of 1961, Neske edition of *Nietzsche*). *The Will to Power* (N.Y., 1968, W. Kaufmann trans. [with R. Hollingdale] and ed. of, basically, the Gossoktav [1911] and Musarion [1920-29] editions of Nietzsche's notes).

40. From the 1892 Bernard translation, republished by Hafner (New York, 1951), pp. 279 ff.

41. This is not to argue, however, that such a reading exhausts the content of Kant's argument, or that the passage quoted does not pose problems from this point of view. The most significant of these, particularly in respect of what follows and note 44, is that, as Gadamer argues (*Truth and Method*, op. cit., pp. 38-39)," ['The Critique of Judgement'] was the end of a tradition, but also the beginning of a new development. It limited the idea of taste to an area in which, as a special principle of judgement, it could claim independent validity—and, by so doing, limited the concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason...The importance of this cannot be easily overestimated, for what was here surrendered was that element in which literary and historical studies lived, and when they sought to set themselves up systematically under the name of 'human sciences' beside the natural sciences, it was the only possible source of their full understanding...Kant's transcendental analysis made it impossible to acknowledge the claim to truth of the tradition...[T]his meant that the unique method of the human sciences lost its justification."

42. H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit., Part 1.I.3.a, pp. 73 ff.: "The turning-point seems to have been Schiller, who transformed the transcendental idea of taste into a moral demand and formulated it as an imperative: adopt an aesthetic attitude to things"; and later, p.79, on the contribution of this attitude to the conception of the artist as "secular saviour." See also Part 1.I.2.b.iv, pp. 69 ff. concerning the notion of the "Greek 'religion of art.'" Schelling declares,"what ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for the arts," and,"Greek mythology is the highest archetype of the poetic world." *The Philosphy of Art* (U. of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 35-6, from lecture course of 1802-3.

43. By this I do not mean to suggest that the lights suddenly went out, so to speak, in approximately 1793. If one wishes, it is possible to trace the origins of the later situation as far back as fourteenth century Humanism, not to mention the even older contribution of Stoicism. More immediately, the ground had been amply prepared by Galileo and Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Voltaire, Rousseau, and so forth. What I do mean to indicate is the authoritative survival of the traditional understanding to the time of Mozart.

44. M. McLeod, *Urbanism and Utopia: Le Corbusier from Regional Syndicalism to Vichy*, 2 vols., Princeton University Ph.D. dissertation, 1985 (UMI, Ann Arbour). Here begins a dialogue with her argument which, for clarity, is kept in the endnotes. It arose when we shared a lecture platform at the Architectural Association in London—our views on Le Corbusier appeared to be basically aligned but sufficiently different to merit attention. The question at issue is the relation of poetics to politics, and secondarily, Le Corbusier's inclination one way or the other.

I have perhaps unjustifiably taken it as her assumption that politics is, or even ought to be, the primary arena for the manifestation of social morality (it is, at any rate, the virtue of her text to have considered Le Corbusier from this point of view), as if in conformance with Aristotle: Politics "is the master-craft [*architektonikes*]" (*NE* 1094a 28). With any belief in the importance of morality to political discourse one would have little difficulty, so long as poetics, philosophy, etc. are not therefore made subject to a political program. The most extreme interpretation of this point of view would be that politics becomes the substitute for traditional culture, in consequence of the modern emphasis upon theoretical knowledge. I use the term "ethical order" to identify the transcendent dimension of the highest good, and expressions like "orientation to thought" to indicate the manner in which the necessarily independent modes of discourse of politics, poetics, phi-

losophy, etc. consider the matter. What poets (or architects, using "poetics" here in the sense of "*poiesis*"), politicians, or philosphers produce or disclose provides the semi-permanent mediating structures in which culture is embodied historically, in respect of the dual transcendence of nature/tradition and the ever-open disclosure of truth. The domain constituted between mores and morals is clearly dependent upon the tradition for its authority. These cannot be the product of theoretical speculation, just as neither nature/tradition nor truth can be framed as political objectives (an ambiguity made possible by the Marxist concept of "ideology," which, in McLeod's text, only surfaces explicitly in the concluding remarks). See note 4, above, and also below.

45. Fundamental on this subject is Vesely, "Conflict I," op. cit.

46. The internal consistency of axiomatic constructs and, later, of formal logic, are necessarily propositions without time. In Plato, this refers to the eternal, the dialectical complement of the temporal. This dialectical understanding is missing in the specification of time as a concept in post-Cartesian thinking. However, the fundamentally dialectical nature of temporality does not go away, rather it exists as the complement to logical thought itself.

47. For this document, see J. Petit, *Le Corbusier Lui-Meme* (Geneva, 1970), p. 125, in which he is honored as *Carolum Eduardum Le Corbusier*.

48. First published in Paris as *La Ville Radieuse* in 1935, and then again in 1964; trans. Knight, Levieux, Coltman (New York, 1967).

49. Ibid., p. 3.

50. Moreover, the mediating position of space between verdure and the sun corresponds to his version of the tension between matter and spirit (a distant memory, theoretically constituted, of *physis* and *nomos*). It is manifest as a presumed desire to identify with the sun. However the complexities of the issue in his work may be judged from, firstly, the remarks in *V.R.* concerning the drive of the plant to orient itself to the sun (p. 78), to which is related a drawing in *La Maison des Hommes* showing trees bending, not because of the wind but because of "the call of the light"(the image, p. 7, has two captions: "*L'homme est un produit de l'energie solaire.* [de Broglie]" and "*Le vent n'a pas incliné ces arbres; c'est à l'appel de la lumière qu'ils ont répondu.*"). Secondly, we find, also in *Maison* (between pp. 174-175) a tree deployed as an elaborate diagram which shows the structure of human creativity, colored from red roots to blue branches (his characteristic colors for the reconciliation of opposites such as male-female, sun-moon, light-dark, architect-engineer, etc.—cf. the cover plate for the *Poème*). Finally, we find, in his *Poésie sur Alger*, the office building of the last project for that city represented fused with a tree, whose "*poésie rayonne sur Alger*"(pp. 14-15, cf. also pp. 22 and 42). In other words, not only the building but the tree has become identified with the solar iconography. However, the proposition is fundamentally constructed about the desire of the world of shadow/becoming (see below) to be redeemed in light/being. The whole point behind the *brise-soleil* (lit. "break-sun) is after all to generate shadow in the interior of the building. That an undoubted knowledge of the alchemical tree lies behind this thinking helps to illuminate his attitude to the artist-architect and to iconography generally, but should not obscure the continuity of the themes pertaining to verdure (the full complexity and importance of which may be gauged from the emphasis it enjoys in his drawings and texts—the table of contents of *V.R.*, for example, shows a laconic diagram illustrating the four levels of soil needed to properly nourish a young tree) with, for example, those pertaining to the biological cell (*V.R.* pp. 143-147), to the space generated by pilotis and interior columns, and, most important, to the "pact with nature" which is one of the primary desiderata of the Radiant City (on the complexities of which latter see Carl, 24 Rue N-C, *Ronchamp*, and Becket-Chary, *Poème*, op. cit.).

51. Later in this section, we read, for example, "life was pursuing its natural impulse towards organization. This impulse towards organization exists throughout nature." In part, this sort of sentiment is designed to situate within paradigmatic nature Le Corbusier's interest in a political authority which, like that of Colbert, would command the Radiant City into existence. The difficulty distinguishing the poetic evocation of human insight from the use of (often the same) metaphoric language to render the desiderata of human actions in the writing of Le Corbusier is the source of the ambiguity which enables McLeod to read his work as basically political in content. Insofar as the matter was confused in Le Corbusier's mind, her reading is not unjustified. My feeling is that this second use of metaphor in Le Corbusier's writings conforms to his attempt to see all aspects of his life in poetic terms (see, for example, his treatment of the Academicians or of those who always say "No!" in the *Poème*, sections B and D, where they are related to a larger thematic of good and evil and to the struggle of artistic creation). This view depends, however, on regarding the late writings as authoritative for the earlier periods, in articu-

lating the themes which have remained constant throughout the vicissitudes of his career (without denying a process of development). The sheer complexity of these themes makes them adaptable in detail (iconography, modes of expression, emphases), but resistant to change in their fundamentals. My reading of "the law of the meander" is intended to demonstrate this principle.

52. *The Radiant City*, op. cit., pp. 76-80. McLeod shows how Le Corbusier's regional syndicalist colleagues considered similar issues (op. cit., pp. 119 ff., 134 ff., 150) in the light of a "vague Bergsonian" notion of *bios* and *logos*. Judging from the content, this appears to have been more a matter of translating "matter" and "spirit" into terms affiliated with their agenda than a profound reinterpretation of *physis* and *nomos*. Once again, however, the incomplete movement of hypothetical thought within symbolic thinking manifests itself. Similarly, her evaluation of *bios* as "an intuitive mind-picture," inadequate by comparison to "a logical construct leading to the implementation of a new order" (p. 424), depends either upon taking a reasonable poetics for bad politics, in the case of Le Corbusier—or upon underestimating the fundamentally "logical" or theoretical identity of *bios* and *logos*, in the case of Mouézy-Eon and Lagardelle, who are most closely identified with these terms. Important in this respect are the remarks of Gadamer: "Animals have *bios* and *praxis*, which means a way of life...The way of life of human beings is not so fixed by nature as is that of other living beings...the concept of *prohairesis* can be predicated only of human being. *Prohairesis* means 'preference' and 'prior choice'...[P]ractical philosophy is determined by the line drawn between the practical knowledge of the person who chooses freely and the acquired skill of the expert that Aristotle names *techne*...[P]ractical philosophy needs to raise to the level of reflective awareness the distinctively human trait of having *prohairesis*, whether it be in the form of developing those fundamental human orientations for such preferring that have the character of *arete* [virtue] or in the form of the prudence in deliberating and taking counsel that guides action." *Reason in the Age of Science* (MIT, 1981), F.G. Lawrence trans. from the articles published in *Vernunft in Zeitalter der Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt 1976), pp. 90-102.

53. Indeed, the use of "prodigiously simple" in this passage is meant to recall the affiliation of moral and physical "laws" from *Towards a New Architecture* (cf. note 19, above). Moreover, the immediately following "prodigiously effective" confirms that we are meant to consider the laws of science as paradigms for moral prescription rather than nature as a paradigm for ethical order.

54. The iconographic intention here displays several layers, as usual. We begin with the relevant passage from "Laws" under consideration here: "We live in the presence of three spheres./ Our dictator: the sun./ The globe on which we live out our destinies: the earth./ And a companion forever whirling around us: the moon." To the extent that the image is meant to partake of the thematic of the "music of the spheres," the numbers which accompany the drawing on p. 77 of *V.R.* are given a geometrical reading in their appearance on p. 15 of the *Poème* (the sun=a circle; the moon=an equilateral triangle; and the earth=a square divided in half—to reflect the fact that the sun "brutally" divides the day in half: dark and light as the origin of measure—and measure for Le Corbusier is the medium of exchange between time and space—the half-square is the first step in producing the Modulor, which later is drawn on a black rock—matter as matrix for spirit, again—diagonally across from the planetary diagram in the *Poème*). Finally, Le Corbusier affiliates the sun with reason, describing it as "*un magister...une orbite fatale*" (Prelude 2, pp. 1-2, cited in McLeod, op. cit. p. 269). In traditional terms, this mixture of Stoic themes and Neoplatonic iconography is made possible by what both these philosophies share: an attention to consistency at the expense of diversity. The planetary system held such a fascination for Le Corbusier because he saw it as the source of the reconciliation of opposites, which, to him, was one of the constituent properties of existence. Whatever he subsequently does with this theme, it is to his credit that he recognized its fundamentally temporal character.

It perhaps should be remarked, however, that Le Corbusier's diagram is even more primitive than anything considered by ancient astronomers (although its duplicate appears in Maier's *Atalanta Fugiens* (#45), with the earth at the center. He dispenses with the rest of the universe in its entirety, and therewith the traditional way of using this material to frame the dialectic of the eternal and the temporal as manifest in a whole. The spheres as nuclei of meaning are also rendered as if they constituted a human relationship, in which we are meant to read the diagram as a sort of dance or folk tale concerning the "solar family," as naive in a more essential sense. The planetary system is emblematic of "threeness," which in standard Pythagorean iconography stands for the whole. To the extent that Le Corbusier identifed himself with the sun, it is possible to read the earth and moon in respect of the two most

important female figures of the Poème, Yvonne and the Licorne. In any event this play of the-one-and-two-others recurs in his paintings (eg. a man and two women) and his architecture (eg. the three chapels at Ronchamp).

55. I do not mean by these remarks to open consideration of an anti-geometric canon in architectural design; but I do mean to suggest that the meanings attached to its use are the opposite of what are typically claimed for it. There is no more pervasive commonplace in the discipline than that a building conforming to one or another geometry is possessed of "order." The presence or absence of any particular form of geometry is unimportant in its own right, as most engineering works demonstrate. It is a question of content, and this is a question of implicit versus explicit geometry, or, to put it another way, of how best to get what is most unlike geometry to be experienced as if it were geometry. See also note 18.

56. Nicely inverted by Le Corbusier in *Towards a New Architecture*, op. cit., p. 68: "Geometry is the language of man."

57. The notable exception is McLeod, op. cit. The geneology from radical syndicalism is quite explicit (Le Corbusier's articles for Plans eventually became *La Ville Radieuse*). Without over-stressing the point, she argues that the transformation in his iconography, which takes place from the late twenties onwards, is at least strongly supported, if not directly influenced, by his association with the regional syndicalists. This periodization is remarked upon by Le Corbusier himself. McLeod also notes that, despite being a leading figure in the regional syndicalist journals, his contributions display a personal interpretation of the issues that is indebted to his poetics. Moreover, much as the regional syndicalists saw themselves as outside the given political divisions, Le Corbusier tended to identify himself primarily with respect to his architectural knowledge. As I have said, I tend to accept his testimony in this matter, on the basis that his architectural and his poetic intentions are virtually inextricable, and that these remain approximately consistent throughout his career. What changes is the iconography (which shows three phases, after his arrival in Paris) and the degree to which his poetic concerns remain masked behind a technical and professional discourse (progressively less so as his career wears on and as he finds terms and images by which these concerns can be liberated from private thinking). Compare, for example the passage above (page 13) with *Towards a New Architecture*, op. cit., p. 69: "Architecture is the first manifestation of man creating his own universe [this of course derives from Vitruvius], creating it in the image of nature [eighteenth century interpretation], submitting to the laws of nature, the laws which govern our own nature, our universe." I will register it here only as a suspicion that Le Corbusier's involvement with certain figures of regional syndicalism (eg. Pierrefeu and Winter) was more important to his deeper intentions than the movement itself.

58. For example, "Laws" provided the material for the whole first section ("A, milieu") of the *Poéme de l'Angle Droit*. Similarly, the notion of "characters" (*les caractères*, the critical section "E" of the *Poème*), mooted in section 4 of "Laws" is the key to his attitude to iconography, and accounts for the sort of personalization of objects we saw briefly in note 54 (see also note 71).

59. These axes of course have a lively pedigree in Le Corbusier's early writings: "This sounding-board [which responds—physically—to harmonious proportions] which vibrates in us is our criterion of harmony. This is indeed the axis on which man is organized in perfect accord with nature and probably the universe, this axis of organization which must indeed be that which all phenomena and all objects of nature are based; this axis leads us to assume a unity of conduct in the universe and to admit a single will behind it. The laws of physics are thus a corollary to this axis..." (*Towards a New Architecture*, op. cit. pp. 192-193). I quote this mainly for iconographic purposes, which are well enough known—it hardly makes sense outside the analogic style of Le Corbusier's prose. That it is not entirely original to Le Corbusier does not need emphasis; but to these themes ought to be added such items as the cultural content of the straight line, and the straight line as metaphor for the uniting of thought and action (McLeod, op. cit. p. 157). Relevant also to this mode of thinking is the similarity between the "curves of human life" (*V.R.*, p 81) and the modulor diagram. It is possible to carry on in this fashion indefinitely; we are touching upon one of the critical iconographic fields in his work. It may be useful to remark that however often he crosses the paths of traditional interpretation of geometric figures, it is the serene emptiness of those figures which allows them to attract so many references (this coupled with the mesmerizing effect of the axiomatic laws by which they are governed).

60. The sentence, "The world liquidates a dead civilization" appears in Le Corbusier's tribute to the Spanish Republicans, McLeod, op. cit., p. 158.

61. The theme that one's perceptual understanding is fundamentally

conditioned by the height of eye will be familiar to most readers of Le Corbusier's works (it is fundamental to the two Modulor books, for example). In J. Petit, *Le Corbusier parle* (Geneva, 1961), p.78, one reads: "*Le vol d'avion=spectacle à thése=philosophie* [!]*...En l'air, d'en haut? Ce n'est que sauvagerie, indifférence à nos notions millénaires, fatalité des évènements et éléments cosmiques...d'avion, pas de joies...mais une longue, assidue, mélancolique méditation.*"

62. A prolonged review of the meaning of the dialogue of the curved and the straight in Le Corbusier's work is beyond the scope of the present essay. Suffice to say that the much-rehearsed phenomenon of transparency has its origin in the coordination ("fusion," see below) between the intimate spaces protected by curves and the rhythmically declared general context, which takes its reference from the thematic of the horizon as represented in the *ville radieuse* (reconciliation of particular with general, in Le Corbusier's terms). The blocks *à redent* themselves of the *ville radieuse* weave back and forth across the *axe héliothermique* in a replication of his solar diagram, and thereby fuse the thematics of the meander with those of the sun (see below). Finally, Le Corbusier's fascination with curves generated by the moving projection of straight lines (as in the hyperbolic paraboloid of the assembly-hall at Chandigarh or all the curves of Ronchamp except those at the top turnings of the chapels and the east termination of the roof) points to the manner in which this thematic was absorbed into the more dense, more implicit, but ultimately more rich topographies of the later buildings. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Maisonnier (who was, in American and English terminology, the "job captain" for Ronchamp) for the informative interview granted me, during which he emphasized that Le Corbusier worked and reworked the great south wall of Ronchamp as a matter of a dialogue between the curved and the straight. Finally, the concluding hieroglyph of the *Poème* is built about the "pact with nature" as manifest in a *coincidentia oppositorum* between given nature and possible geometry. The "right" and "left" clasped hands of A5 of the *Poème*, is the basic icon of reconciliation and of the role of Le Corbusier's "open hand," both "giving and receiving"—F3, in the process (which may also be taken as a summary of the political question mooted in note 51).

63. Most commentators on Le Corbusier's work have observed the presence of the *promenade architecturale* derived from the principle of the *marche* in the theory of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. However the iconographic significance of this route has not attracted similar attention. In a word, the buildings are typically structured about a passage from ambiguous orientation in darkness to a position of framed, "axial" light. Usually this transpires as a vertical ascent, though the meaning is more important to him than the actual configuration of the route in any given case (see, for example the way this theme is handled in the "primitive" houses, eg. Maison Mathes). The museums, the religious spaces and such political spaces as the parliament chamber at Chandigarh leave this movement unfulfilled for reasons partially explicated below in the text. The content of this route, and why I have named it "transfigurational,", derives from his positing of artistic creativity as a fundamental metaphor for the renewal of society, following Nietzsche. Cf. Carl, '24 NC,' op. cit., note 40 here, and below, in text.

64. The major publication of this exhibition is the book by Le Corbusier, 1937; (Boulogne-sur-Seine; 1938). Plans and elevations of the pavillon feature (with some comment) in the "Preface" to a collection of Le Corbusier's paintings and drawings entitled, *Le Corbusier, Oeuvre plastique, peintures et dessins, architecture*; Galerie Balaÿ et Carré (Paris, 1938). In view of the scarcity of these publications, my references are all to its appearance in *Oeuvre Complète* Vol. 3 , 1964 reprint of Zurich, 1939. Cf. K. Frampton, "The Rise and Fall of the Radiant City: Le Corbusier 1928-60," in *Oppositions* 19/20, 1980; and M. McLeod, "Urbanism and Utopia," op. cit., pp. 21 ff. The inverse relation between the importance of Le Corbusier's Pavillon de l'Esprit Nouveau (1925) to the exhibition itself, on the one hand, and to the subsequent history of modern architecture, on the other, was repeated in 1937 (most notable at the time for the deliberate confrontation of the similarly styled Soviet and German pavilons, and for Picasso's "Guernica"). This is clear not only from the Exhibition catalogue (*Exposition Internationale Arts et Techniques Paris 1937 : Le guide officiel mai-novembre , Paris, 1937*), but also from the recent review of this exhibition (*Catalogue Paris 1937 Cinquantenaire , Institut Francais d'Architecture*; Paris Musées, 1987; pp. 250-253). What both of these publications make clear is that Le Corbusier's initially more ambitious proposals for the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux (Projects A-C) were quite in keeping with the rest, which included, for example, temporary colonial towns on and opposite the Allee des Cygnes.

65. This style of drawing, which he called the "marriage of lines," (eg. *Poème*, p. 138), became progressively more important to him in his later paintings and lithographs. It involves the use of a continuous single line, Ariadne's thread, to weave from the "meandering" laby-

rinth a figure.

66. Compare the plan with "Project C" of the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux. One hopes that the Leger tapestry has been enlarged—see p. 157, *O.C.* 3, op. cit.—a fragment of which may have made its way into the Tokyo Museum entrance hall sketches (*O.C.* 7, p. 189).

67. See O.C. 6, pp. 11 ff. FLC Doc F#2-10-148 (Synthèse des Arts Majeurs) uses the phrase "*l'une des aureoles dit 'méandre'*" to refer to the sort of pavillion one finds attached to the spine of the 1953 exhibition.

68. "*Car le gîte profond est/dans la grande caverne du/sommeil cet autre côté de/la vie dans la nuit. Comme/la nuit est vivante riche dans/les entrepots les collections la/bibliotheque les musées du/sommeil!*

Poème, op. cit., p. 84. Le Corbusier several times calls attention to his rediscovery of Rabelais late in his career (most publicly in the so-called "*testament spirituel* "—his last text: "Here, at this point, I must give thanks to two men: Cervantes and Rabelais" (full text in *Le Corbusier, mise au point*, J. Petit, ed., [Geneva, 1987]; this portion does not appear in the extract published in *Oeuvre Complète, Last Works*, [N.Y. and Zurich, 1970], pp. 168. ff); elsewhere see *Modulor II*, pp. 206-9, and *Sketchbook* H32, pp. 75-80 and 85-89, dated June 10, 1954, where the descent to the temple of the *Dive Bouteille* is copied out *in extenso* (*Le Corbusier Sketchbooks 3*, MIT and FLC, 1981, trans. A. Serenyi, with M. Rowen and A. Kahn, trans. ed. P. Serenyi). The *Dive Bouteille* is the object of search for the last three books of *Gargantua and Pantagruel*; but book V seems to have most attracted Le Corbusier's interest. The reasons are multiple; but what is of most importance to us in the context of the present passage, and of the basic theme of this essay, is what he would have found in the very last chapter of Book V (from the J. M. Cohen trans., Harmondsworth, 1955, pp. 709 ff.): "...when you come to your country bear testimony that great treasures and wonderful things are hidden beneath the earth...So much as you can see of the heavens, and which you call the Phenomena, so much as the earth reveals to you, so much as the sea and all the rivers contain, is not to be compared with what is concealed in the earth. It is only right therefore that, in almost all languages, the Ruler of the Underworld has been known by epithets implying riches...that sovereign deity, whom the Egyptians of old called in their tongue Isis—that is to say the Veiled, the Hidden, the Concealed...When asked wherein the greatest wisdom lay, Thales replied: 'in time.' For it is in time that has discovered, or in due course will discover, all things which lie hidden; and that is the reason why the ancients called Saturn or Time the Father of Truth, or Truth the Daughter of Time." This extraordinarily dense and interesting passage is (indirectly) only partially explicated in the text and notes here; but it must be taken as the most articulate formulation of Le Corbusier's "cosmological" interests (see below) known to him, of which he, apparently, had only a partial understanding himself.

69. Cf. Carl," 24 NC," op. cit.

70. Cf. *mise au point*, op. cit. "Consider the surface of the waters...Consider also the entire "*azure*" [*l'azur*—it is a term derived from Symbolist poetry, usually connoting, at the most literal level, the sky, but more widely, a particular essence of reality; Le Corbusier is here playing with his own iconographic conflation of sea and sky] filled with the good that men have achieved...for, after all, everything returns to the sea." The treatments of this topic by Slutzky and Moore are imaginative and suggestive, but occasionally at the cost of exceeding the bounds of Le Corbusier's iconography. R. Slutzky, "Aqueous Humour," *Oppositions 19/20*, 1980, and R. Moore, *Le Corbusier, Myth and Meta Architecture*, Exhibition Catalogue for the *Poème de l'Angle Droit* (Atlanta, 1977).

71. To the remarks concerning Le Corbusier's notion of "characters," note 58, the following should be added (Sketchbook F24, India, March 16, 1952; from Le Corbusier Sketchbooks Vol. 2, op. cit., numbers 700-707): "Intuitively over the past 20 years [note date] I have evolved my figures in the direction of animal forms, vehicles of character, force of the sign [by which Le Corbusier means, approximately, "symbol," although ironically they also had the conventional value of signs], algebraic capacity for entering into a relationship between themselves and thereby producing one poetic phenomenon [here one sees an attempt to merge the concept of metaphor with that of proportion, see Heraclitus in note 7 above, except that what is actually happening is that the metaphoric moment has been displaced from an original encounter with phenomena to a 'fusion' of the codified icons, on which see below in text] make a grouping of these forms and ideas and notions by isolating them from their context and assembling them...The characters appear, qualifying people and keeping or proposing their typology." In the context of French academic theory, "*caractère*" is one of the key terms denoting decorum. Given Le Corbusier's (Stoic) intention to conflate the moral and the physical, one must presume that his plural form not only carries his iconographic meaning, but also represents a continuity with its established meaning.

72. Both these icons reappear in the collection of *signes* for Chandigarh

(cf. FLC NIVOLA 2, p. 237), which indicates their enduring importance for him as images pertaining to a dialectics of human productivity related to his larger effort to reconcile engineering with nature (as it is expressed in the essay "Unité"—see also Mcleod, op. cit. from Chap. 3, *passim*, for the practical and political aspects of this dialectic, which is one of the main themes of the regional syndicalists. Cf. also note 79, below).

73. There is an amusing sketch on p. 153 of *O.C.* 3, op. cit., which depicts the interior of the entry hall of "Project C" for the Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux with an uncharacteristic interest in reflections: the visitors appear to be walking on water. The caption to this illustration refers to the entry hall, which is at the center of the building and is reached by passing beneath the galleries, as the "*nucléus du musée, point de départ de l'entreprise*." To judge from the drawings of the exhibition tent, ventilation did not enjoy the same priority as the iconography of light, a not uncommon circumstance in his buildings. In the scholarly literature, the tent is usually reconciled with his comments and drawings in respect of the Desert Shrine in *Vers*. However this has become subsumed in another thematic involving the cave—for reasons cited here in the text. It is one of the continuities between his museums and sacred buildings, and the whole story is enigmatically worked out in sections E2 (tent) and E4 (cave-labyrinth) of the *Poème*. It should be pointed out that, while this conforms to Le Corbusier's personal interpretation of the possibilities offered by the "secular sacred," the conception of exhibition pavilions as "temples" was long established (see for example the *Exposition 25*, which featured "temples" devoted to perfume and to elegance). The principle derives from English garden planning, following from a process of valorization of the notion of "temple" to embody physiognomically the main themes of architectural meaning, which begins in the late seventeenth century.

74. Notice, for example, the mound of earth raised to second floor level through which one enters in the Villa at Vaucresson.

75. What is not generally recognized about his fascination with the Acropolis in the scholarly literature, is that its various settings contain most of the primary iconography of the *Poème*. See Carl, Ronchamp, forthcoming.

76. FLC Doc F#2 10 139, for example.

77. His exhibitions often manifest a didactic content. For example the 1935 *Exposition d'art dit "Primitif"*, held in his flat at 24 Rue Nungesser-et-Coli, is a fine summary of the milieu of the primitive in the context of the secular sacred: disposed about the modern primitivism of Le Corbusier's studio and *salle* were archaic Greek statuary, Benin bronzes and attractive stones, interspersed with contemporary works by Laurens, Léger and Le Corbusier.

78. Cf. *Oeuvre Complète , 1934-38*, op. cit., p. 166

79. Beneath this was what McLeod, op. cit., p. 311, describes as the "culminating section of the exhibition [which] was in fact devoted to *Prélude*'s program of agrarian reform." She also observes that the "Industry Conquers Building" display in the same area includes "a peasant and a metal-worker joined hand-in-hand," on which see note 72, above.

80. The phrase comes from Le Corbusier, "Unité," in *Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, Hors Serie, April, 1948; Cf. Carl, "24 NC," op. cit.

81. Le Corbusier's thinking *ad novum*, that is, beyond the given context of history (in which promise and frustration are inextricably joined), raises the question as to whether his vision constitutes a fulfillment of present conditions or the opposite: a straightforward rejection of these conditions, a lack of trust in any society other than that conforming to his own criteria.

This, it seems to me, is an aspect of utopian thought that professors Rowe and Koetter fail to consider when they call attention to "the tragic dimension" of utopia [*Collage City*, M.I.T., 1979; Rowe, whose lectures on the subject date back to the early 1960's, deserves credit for identifying the "redemptive," or "salvational" content to the modernist project, although it seems we share points of disagreement as to its ultimate merits]. What must be distinguished is the orienting power of, for example, the symbolic Temple of Ezekiel (which culminates in its rendering as city [*Ezek.* 48.35]) within the hermeneutics of exile, on the one hand, and the instrumental program of utopian projects, on the other. The latter suffer from the attempt to purify the world of whatever are deemed ills—or sins—by the author, and to establish a permanent timeless condition of stability in the immediately achievable future. The symbolic depth of the monastery derives as much from its situatedness in the secular context as from its orientation to the heavenly paradigm. To universalize the brotherhood of the faith (of whatever persuasion or fabricated description) is to deprive it of any meaning—to say nothing of instituting the characteristic boredom of utopian visions. While I have expressed the tension between the orienting power of the symbol and the instrumental program of

the utopia as an opposition, this pertains primarily to the results. The intitial movement of thought is identical, and it is to this moment that any "tragic" content is to be attributed. Historically, of course, the modernist project has its roots in the attempt of Renaissance humanism to render Heavenly Jerusalem in terms of the technodramatic matrix of perspectivity (and therefore susceptible to manifestation in paradigms which could be vehicles of concrete design—the so-called Ideal Cities).

Deciding the question in Le Corbusier's case is complicated by the fact that his professed vision of culture is basically that contained in Rabelais, which is difficult to fault. However, it is not a straightforward enterprise to square this vision with what he provides in his radiant cities.

82. Gerhard Ladner, "*Homo Viator,* Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order," *Speculum, Vol. XLII,* April, 1967, p 233. The primacy given to what is termed "circulation" in modern design—it is generally the primary mode of continuity in a work—is derived from the *marche* of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. In terms of content, it suffers from both an overestimation of its value and an underestimation of its true nature (the individual "circulating" usually being regarded as a spectator of the physiognomy of the architecture), with the result that one is always travelling in the same place.

83. McLeod, op. cit., pp. 307 ff., details the mutual affection of the Italian Fascists and Le Corbusier. That the organization of reality on theoretic principles leads to a situation whereby aesthetic choices become ethical lies is something the Fascist and Nazi regimes only extended in degree from what preceded them.

84. "Nietzsche set the demand that one doubt more profoundly and fundamentally than Descartes, who had considered the ultimate unshakable foundation of all certitude to be explicit self-consciousness." H.-G. Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, op. cit., p. 100.

85. Mr. R. Aujame describes this process (paraphrase): Le Corbusier would observe a problem in a drawing, say almost to himself "Architecture is difficult," and then pass on to something else. The next afternoon, he would return with a very small drawing showing a proposed solution, which almost invariably became the point of departure for a new understanding of the building. Aujame, in emphasizing the breadth of creative solutions to the massive amount of work in the atelier in the fifties, also remarked that the distance Le Corbusier kept from the atelier (not only this daily routine, but also his constant travelling and other commitments) actually helped the quality of the buildings. This is at variance with the generally held view of both Le Corbusier's influence on the day to day running of the atelier and of the conventional attitudes to what the norm should be. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Aujame for the very instructive interview granted me.

86. His deep interest in buildings like the *unité d'habitation* and the spiral museum, which, by comparison with the other works, seem almost diagrammatic, is derived from the same principle of compression of meaning into a sign that we discussed above (note 70). It also conforms to the principle related to the valorization of the temple (note 73), in its role as a paradigm for design (here in the context of the secular sacred), deriving of course ultimately from Vitruvius.

87. Cf. *mise au point*, op. cit., p. 14: "I am 77 years old and my morality can be summarized thus: in life it is necessary to act [*faire*]. That is to say, to act [*agir*] with modesty, exactitude, precision...To be constant it is necessary to be modest, one must be persevering. It is a witness of courage, of interior force, a qualification of the nature of existence."

88. As he did with his Dersert Shrine in *Vers* (the primary icon of the "contemporary primitive" for Le Corbusier), he is probably conflating the Tent of the Ark of the Covenant with the Tent of Meeting Jahweh with Moses, as this is still quite common.

89. This reading is repeated in Le Corbusier's studio at 24 Rue Nungesser-et-Coli, also using a ventilaion duct (one suspects the reference to "air" is part of the *jeu*). The duct is treated illusionistically to combine with a column to form a V-strut, which therefore carries the wing/cave of the vault. The address itself would also appear to be part of this theme. It recalls the famous attempt by the French aviators to fly non-stop across the Atlantic, which probably was not as interesting to Le Corbusier as the fact that they vanished into the sea.

90. Cf. Carl, "24 NC," op. cit.

91. What follows here is based upon Vesely's fundamental analysis of *chora* in the symbolic structure of the *polis* (Poetics, op. cit.). Out of respect for Vesely's original (unpublished) work, it should be pointed out that my rendering of this material is both vastly abbreviated and slightly distorted towards the sacrificial component, in the light of W. Burkert, *Homo Necans: the Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth* (UCLA Press, 1983), Peter Bing trans. of German edition of 1972.

92. Cf. *The City of Tomorrow*, p. 287: "these green parks with their relics

Frontispiece: Frederic Church, West Rock, New Haven, *1849. Courtesy of the New Britain Museum of American Art, New Britain, Connecticut, John B. Talcott Fund.*

It is important when thinking of American land to realize that this is a precious, non-renewable resource that we tend to treat as if it were cotton cloth, or pork bellies, or underarm deodorant.

—Leo Marx

A Conversation with Leo Marx

Carrie R. Wilson

This interview took place at the end of May, 1989 as an elaboration of some of the themes presented in a lecture given by Mr. Marx at the "How We Build" Conference at the University of Virginia in February of the same year. In that lecture he spoke of his view of the American ideology of space, which clarifies certain attitudes towards land stewardship in the United States.

The values of our civilization are currently at odds with the conservation of the land. The value system that allows for waste of the land extends to our civic, social and political lives as well. We see cities which are not only the product of the commodification of the land, but of a lack of stewardship in many realms of our lives. We are confronted with an ideologically impoverished society. In Mr. Marx's point of view, one can find the balance between civilization and the land which is maintained by the classical ideals of pastoralism. When this balance is found it can begin to inform not only design, but an attitude which can resist the kind of society which values the land and nature only as a commodity and a foundation upon which one can build a richer, more just society of which land stewardship is an integral part.

. . .

In the past you have discussed what you call the American ideology of space which encompasses three attitudes towards the land and nature: primitivism, progressivism and pastoralism. Each version embodies attitudes towards nature, the city and by extension the land. Could you discuss these value systems, and what value the land has implicitly and explicitly to each system?

Well, these are attitudes that change over time, so I'll have to talk in general terms. I think it's helpful to go back to the notion of an American myth built around the originating voyage to the new world and the words "Columbus discovered America,"[1] and the mental map that represents this phrase. It is striking—the seemingly innocent verb "discovered" is drenched in the Eurocentric presumptions of white racial superiority and domination. A nation's mental map, like the famous Bostonian's map of the United States—where Boston fills a third of the nation—is a shared, expressive, highly distorted representation of a people's actual geographic situation. Each point of view encompassed in the American ideology of space, primitivism, progressivism, and pastoralism, locates its highest values in a different section of this map. The first principle of this ideology derives from the initial European impression of the boundless immensity and seeming emptiness, or ahistorical character of the new world.

The dominant version of the myth, or progressivism, is based on the norm of civilization which is seen to be located in the great cities of Western Europe, and European civilization. Its values are the values of the best things we associate with civilization, like the city. We talk about the city on the hill for all the world to see. Nature and the land are conceived in the language of Genesis as that which human beings dominate. The progressive, or utilitarian, view of the land is to place it in the service of our expanding civilization.

In progressivism's most vulgar, crude form, nature has no purpose but to serve human beings. It encourages a very aggressive attitude towards the land. According to the social, political and economic ideology of capitalism the land is valuable only insofar as it can be incorporated into the economy. This is an extremely utilitarian view. The rhetoric of the utilitarian has a military cast—it is dominating, aggressive. It envisages a war against the land. It is the dominant view that has driven our treatment of space, one that at the end of the eighteenth century informed the belief in progress. The idea of progress is essentially a conception of history, the notion that history is a continuous expansion of human knowledge—knowledge of and control over nature, especially through the advance of science and technology.

At the other extreme, where ultimate value is located in unspoiled nature, is primitivism. The idea is to get as far away as possible in time or space or both from the centers of civilization.

1 View of Chicago, Illinois, nineteenth century.

2 Riverside, Illinois, Frederick Law Olmsted. Promotional illustration.



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This involves an idealization of nature, like the noble savage or the natural sublime. Primitivism provides a hypothetical basis for a critique of society, but primitivism is not in itself much of a program. This is not a view of the land that is very practical, and it is not a version of the ideology that people actually live by. But, it has been a valuable resource for artists—some of the great American painters such as Church (frontispiece), who idealized the wilderness—and it had its place in providing incentives for great national parks and for conservation.

The chief alternative to progressivism is pastoralism. Pastoralism valorizes a golden mean or *via media* between the extremes of civilization and nature: a middle landscape. It is associated in American history with Jefferson, who thought of his ideal Virginia as a middle ground between the overcivilization of Europe—too much constraint, the negative aspects of the *ancien regime*—on the one hand, and the license of the Western frontier—"savagery"—on the other. So the middle landscape combines the best of nature and civilization. It is pastoralism which has inspired many of the architects, landscape architects, and planners who want to ameliorate the consequences of the utilitarian, market view (fig. 1, 2).

The two highest forms of civilization have been seen as the villa—the locus of the cultivator of the earth—and the city—the locus of the good citizen. How does the villa and its contrast to the city fit into the construct of pastoralism? Could you describe the two types of pastoralism you have discussed in the past, that is, the differences between simple and complex pastoralism?

Well, the villa has served very nicely for some versions of pastoral. As you say, it can be the locus of the urbane cultivator of the earth and the person who wants civility and the freedom associated with living outside the city. Its locus is a middle landscape that is neither urban nor wild. This is the semiprimitivism associated with Virgil. The city to the pastoral mentality has always embodied too much complexity. The pastoral

3 Jeffersonville, Indiana, from a plan by Thomas Jefferson for a city with alternating green spaces. Drawn by Jas. M. Van Hook in 1879, from a copy by J. W. Ray of the original plat of 1802.

4 Jeffersonville, Indiana in 1817 where the properties have replaced the original green spaces. Drawn by Jas. M. Van Hook in 1879, from the original plan by John K. Graham, 1817.

motive, the urge in the face of increasing complexity and power, to move toward nature, has always been played against the power of the city; the city is a place to move away from. Thus suburbia becomes a version of pastoral.

What I meant by simple and complex pastoralism is this: simple pastoralism is that form of pastoralism that envisages an ideal, a relatively simple ideal, without facing up to the imposing forces—the city, the power of the machine, etc.—that would impede its realization. Complex pastoralism does try to cope, it sets up the pastoral as an ideal, but contemplates it in tension with the forces opposed to it.

Jefferson saw the farm, the American villa, as the locus of not only the cultivator of the earth, but also the good citizen. The good American city was dependent upon the citizen's involvement with cultivation. Is the value system of the city dependent upon, possibly even determined by, the values brought from the villa to the city, as Jefferson implies by his cultivator/citizen? What was Jefferson's intention? Given that there is no place for the city in the ideals of pastoralism, what might be the connection?

Jefferson was frightened by cities. In Query 19, *Notes on Virginia*, one reason he gives for keeping manufacturers out of the republic is his fear of the mobs located in great cities. He associated cities at that time with the creation of a propertyless and powerless proletariat, and that frightened him.

If you identify the city with the modern industrial city, there is little about it that can be reconciled with pastoralism. The more privileged residents of the city, in building villas outside its boundaries, create the suburbs. That brings up a dubious feature of complex pastoralism, which becomes obvious in suburbia. The suburb is an effort to have it both ways, to combine the advantages of the wealth and power generated in the city and the amenities of the countryside.



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

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Jefferson hinted at an urbanism that could be evaluated in terms of complex pastoralism, his "checkerboard" plan where the city and the pastoral landscape were provided in one place (fig. 3, 4). This idea of a hybrid between the city and the pastoral remained rather diagrammatic. Versions the of pastoral maintained the separation between city and country. Would you speculate on these possibilities in today's terms?

In other words, could we have a society that's sufficiently wealthy and sufficiently egalitarian to enable most people to enjoy having it both ways? That seems a long way from reality. But it does point to the possibility, suggested by some contemporary American cities, of a more or less universal suburbanism. Thus the downtown core is a non-residential business and service area, and everyone lives on the more or less suburbanized periphery.

Jefferson saw the land as something which teaches you how to be a good citizen. If one has a citizenry which sees that same value in the land, which remains above commercial interests, there isn't the problem of a select few people controlling the land and the city, and the political meaning that implies. Whereas, once commerce enters the picture there is a problem. Do you think Jefferson is getting into that, in a roundabout way, in Query 19?

I think he is, but we have to remind ourselves that in Jefferson's day, Virginia's was an agricultural, slave economy; he was a slave owner. Our problem is that we really don't have any alternative models. There was a time, even up to twenty years ago, in which we had versions of socialism, but the socialist societies are so discredited at the moment that it seems queer to bring that up. In America today there are very few socialists. The mere hypothetical existence of a political and economic system that was not market-driven and that seemed feasible changed the way people thought. I suppose the most plausible alternative social order in the world today is represented by the social democratic societies in Northern Europe; the Scandinavian countries which are more egalitarian than we are, where you also see something like a widely shared combination of country and city life.

It has been argued that the first American suburbs evolved out of an ideal of the villa and an ideal of the pastoral. But the suburb is also an example of complex pastoralism, as it allowed for a technological link between the suburb and the city, the railroad, and eventually the automobile. How has the suburb's development benefitted from the various uses of complex pastoralism? What is the importance of the suburb to the progressive attitude towards the making of American space?

The suburb is a very complicated development. Suburbanization in America is on the one hand primarily a part of the general urbanization: the suburbs grew as the cities grew. So far as they provided an alternative to the urban core you could say that the suburb embodies a form of pastoralism; although the difficulty here is that the suburbs solve some problems by suppressing societal complexity—I'm thinking of the separation of classes, the tendency of the suburb to be rather homogeneous in respect to race, ethnicity, and class. In a way the two motives intertwine in suburbia. It may be seen as an expansion of civilization, often as an improvement, and at the same time as a retreat. I think that the essential drive behind suburbia is a combination of the idea of utility, conquest, and pastoral withdrawal. We go back to the initial movement of white Europeans, the centrifugal impulse towards the land. Thus, while suburban pastoralism is a modification of the dominant utilitarian ideology, it is only a partial modification. It shares certain fundamental conceptions about the land with progressivism. I think that's why—although there are these three variants within our ideology of space, progressivism, primitivism, and pastoralism—it's not unreasonable to speak of *the* American ideology of space. It's a singular ideology which encompasses two themes, and sometimes one is dominant, sometimes the other.

5 *Cartoon, Roger K. Lewis.* Washington Post, *November 5, 1988.*

They share the ambiguity that has existed since we "hit land", so to speak.

Right, and they have in common certain fundamental social and economic assumptions, especially the concept of land as utility and commodity. It is important when thinking of American land to realize that it is a precious, non-renewable resource, though we tend to treat it as if it were cotton cloth, or pork bellies, or underarm deodorant. One result is a chronic carelessness in our use of the land. There is no distinction made between land that is good for nothing but building and land that could be prime farm land. When the ecological movement started in the seventies we heard a lot of talk about the rate at which prime land was being paved over for parking lots and shopping malls.

What evolved out of complex pastoralism, out of the guise of complex pastoralism, is a set of communities centered around forms of the progressive attitude towards the land. What I'm thinking about are those communities that no longer stem from the first villa ideal of the suburb, at some point the lots became too small, the land was paved over, the automobile became the most important design element. It was no longer a pastoral scheme. More importantly, these communities became an interpretation of the city that was devoid of any political, civic or social purpose (fig. 5, 6).

At what point were these communities possible? How did they legitimize themselves out of the ideals of complex pastoralism?

It's hard to say if those are communities. It might be useful here to talk about what has happened in the last twenty years, because there is a serious debate about the significance of what is going on now. There is a widespread sense that something new is happening in our pattern of settlement. There's a cacophony of names for it—exurbia, slurbia, ruburbia, edge city, technoburb, the countrified city and the gentrified city. This new development comes down to two quite different forms;



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6 Lakeside Apartments, Northern Virginia, 1991.

7 Thomas Cole, Home in the Woods, *circa 1846. Illustration courtesy of Reynolda House Museum of American Art.*

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the first is the new urban core, which develops at the outer edge of the metropolis. It looks like a new city, with high rises, and lots of space, and people commuting in more than out. It lacks many of the cultural amenities we associate with an old city, but is in a sense a new kind of city. Joel Garreau of the *Washington Post*, who is writing a book about them, calls them "edge cities." Fourteen are developing on the outskirts of the Washington area, but they're also emerging in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Phoenix. That's one form. Whether it's a distinct new form of city is hard to tell. It's certainly not stereotypical suburbia.

The other form that is now developing is unrelated to the metropolitan area. It is a new kind of low density settlement that occurs at a distance from the city, beyond the outer reach of suburbia; we might call it ruburbia. Characteristically this settlement is based on the rapid population growth associated with new industries such as electronics and other high-tech enterprises, especially those small firms that employ two to three hundred highly skilled workers. These people are eager to have their own homes on their own land well removed from any neighbors, and with access to outdoor life. There are something like five hundred counties in this country where the population has risen two to three hundred percent over the last fifteen years, yet which contain no communities of more than two or three thousand people. The nearest thing to a community is a mall along the freeway, a high school set off somewhere, a church, but very little else. These people lead very privatized lives, often commute long distances, although some work at home. Both new kinds of settlement mingle the old motives of pastoral and progressive. They express that same centrifugal impulse, that need to get out from the center. Whether this is another expression of pastoralism or not is unclear.

What you've described happening in recent town development, in the development of the "technoburb," is technology and the utilitarian de-

velopment of space seen as ends in themselves. Have technology, the progressive attitude, and the commercial proclivities of the "dominant cultural group" replaced the essential need for civic and political activities? Perhaps this is a rhetorical question—what does it mean to the United States that a new town is often no longer a political reality? Or perhaps even a social or civic reality?

I suppose that for some people communication technologies replace the need for social and political activities. In these new low density ruburbs described by John Herbers and others, people rely very much on television for their connection to the outside world. I suppose some find this adequate. If you're asking me what I think, it seems very thin culturally, and indeed appalling: an antisocial degree of privatization.

In fact, we should keep in mind that this centrifugal impulse to cut loose and get away from others was described by Tocqueville as *individualism*. Remember, Tocqueville felt he couldn't write about American life without inventing a new word, *individualism*. Mixed into this new pattern of settlement is a very atomized concept of society, where each family is on its own (fig. 7), having cut those communal ties which in the American imagination often were identified with the crowded Old World.

This leads to the impoverished sense of civic responsibility reflected in such facts as the failure of half of the people to vote. It evinces that widespread tendency nowadays to avoid civic obligations. It's also true, as we have learned in recent years, that it's hard for a candidate to get elected unless he promises not to raise taxes, though we have one of the lowest tax rates of the industrial nations. Implicit in this pattern of settlement and treatment of the land are the extremely high value put on privacy and the individual and the low value put on communal institutions.

We have a romantic view of the individual. He is an ideal in our society. Because of this romantic view we are hesitant to touch the rights we've established for the individual. In what ways do you think the idealization of the individual parallels what happens to the land?

One foundation of this kind of individualism is the right to private property, and land comes in here, too. This misuse of individualism associated with John Locke is a possessive individualism where the achievement of the individual is measured by his or her property. This view accords with the imperatives of a capitalist economy.

The value system of pastoralism is at odds with the need for the individual to engage in commercial activities and with commercial activities as an end in themselves. Jefferson addressed this in Query 22, "The cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous and independent of citizens. But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to commerce. They will exercise for themselves." And he adds the social contract implied by this: "Wars then must sometimes be our lot."[2] If there is monetary value attached to the possessions of a country, it must be defended, and this situation is by necessity part of the social contract.

This demonstrates one problem of complex pastoralism. In some versions of the pastoral the wilderness gives man the potential of proving the virtues of his industry through civilizing the wilderness. America is a combination of both this industry applied to creating Jefferson's ideal of the pastoral and those who "exercise for themselves." Could you elaborate on the relationship between Locke's statement, "All the world was America. . ."[3] and the social contract implicit in Jefferson's Query 22?

When Locke wrote, "Thus in the beginning all the world was America" he really was talking about the fact that in America land was so abundant that much of it had no value. This was unimaginable in Europe, but in America much of the land was not yet part of any market system and thus simply not worth anything to anybody. So in the beginning America seemed to confirm the view that the value of land, as of most things,

depends upon its availability for exchange, for becoming a commodity. That raises a particular set of problems when applied to a non-renewable resource like land, air or water. Land does not have the usual character of commodities. Of course Jefferson's valorizing of land fit his anti-bourgeois and rural orientation, and it also comported with the tension between New England and Virginia. He saw New England as a center of commerce, and in these remarks there is the anticipation of the conflict that would lead to a civil war. The two systems were founded on two very different sets of economic institutions and assumptions. In, Virginia the chief embodiment of pastoralism was the Southern plantation. Many Southern writers idealized the plantation as an organic middle landscape society. Pastoralism is such a loose concept that it can be adapted to the defense of many social systems.

Obviously people involved in commerce don't necessarily defend the ideals of the land. It has never seemed that the person whose interests were mainly commercial would feel the same obligation expressed by Jefferson. Isn't the social contract that Jefferson recognized in Query 22 in conflict with what he valued most?

He recognized this the very year that *Notes on Virginia* came out. A man named von Hogendorp wrote and asked Jefferson whether he really meant it about not developing manufacturing. Jefferson replied that he would like to see the United States stand with respect to Europe precisely on the same footing as China. He said: "But this is a theory only and a theory which the servants of America are not at liberty to follow. Our people have a decided taste for navigation and commerce which they take from their mother country. . ."[4] So he recognized the dominance of mercantile capitalism, and the incompatability of the two ways of life. This dominant ideology of space assumes that land exists chiefly for utilitarian purposes, and is subordinate to the market system.

What if the tables were turned—the pastoral became the dominant ideology, and land were not a commodity. Would the people who engage in commerce be in the same position as a pastoralist is now?

It is difficult to imagine what form that would take, but if our society were to put more limits on what could be done with the land, control it, regulate it, we would arouse tremendous resistance. It would be a divisive political issue. It's hard to see what force could push such a program through, short of a severe ecological crisis.

Which is what some people believe we are now in.

On the other hand, we hear a lot of talk nowadays about "post-materialist" values ostensibly adopted by many who reach a certain level of affluence. It is at least conceivable that a new ecologically-oriented pastoralism may emerge as a significant cultural force in the 1990s.

At the founding of our country the tyranny of the individual was understood as something to keep in check. There was a fear of one individual gaining too much power. There is an act of tyranny taking place today, though it is not of one specific individual, but many individuals. Is our social contract still one that can evolve a check?

In the passage where Tocqueville defines individualism, he distinguishes it from selfishness or egoism. He says: "Selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness."[5] That's a fairly grim notion of what possessive individualism leads to. If Tocqueville is right, individualism can erode our democratic institutions. It could be argued that something like that has been happening in the 1980s.

What are the values that must be maintained to keep technology and commerce as only means to greater ends, and not a "way of life" as they have become in so many places?

The values we have to rely on are first, democratic values, an appeal through democratic institutions to the majority to employ these forces on behalf of the community as a whole. Subordinate to that of course would be the intrinsic values of the land, of nature. If for example the hypotheses of global warming and ozone depletion prove correct, we will need to defend the environment for everyone as against the benefit of special interests. That could be the opening wedge for greater constraints on the exercise of pure market decisions. I think we tend to put too much faith in the ability of the market to make wise choices of social policies. The market works well in some areas, in distributing some goods, allocating some resources. But its effect can be devastating when it comes to rare and unrenewable resources, like land, air, water and energy.

Is there a threat today to our political system from the free market? If so, from where do the changes in our way of thinking need to come?

The two long have been present side by side with periods of great tension, but never with the threat of one totally obliterating the other. Arthur Schlesinger and his son, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have espoused a cyclical theory of American history, which has some truth in it, namely that our society follows a pendulum swing in which the business class dominates intermittently, as in the twenties. Then came the Depression and the rest of society mobilized against business and imposed the New Deal restrictions. Today the business community is again dominant. The market ideal rules. It would probably take another recession to swing the pendulum again. But these alternations occur within a common value system. These are secondary fluctuations based on fairly enduring commitments. The threat to the environment may raise questions about the long-term viability of these fundamental assumptions about private ownership.

This next question gets to one of the topics I found most interesting about your lecture, that of the liminal figure. The hope one sees in regards to stewardship of the land comes from the liminal figure: the shepherd and the Jeffersonian gentleman farmer, to name two. The latter figure, the man who can move between nature and civilization, the garden and the city, has existed in the past and must always exist. Do you see the participation of other such figures today?

The shepherd figure is an idealization that was developed by artists, poets, writers—not by the shepherds themselves. The shepherd figure has played a conspicuous part in Judeo-Christian religion—the Pope still carries a crook and speaks in the language of the Twenty-third Psalm. Pastoral rhetoric has always involved an idealized realm on which people project future goals. It has always been at odds with the daily, practical, economic round. So I think we are probably going to see that same tension, that same anti-materialism, expressed by people coming from the arts, from religion, and more importantly from environmentalism, a new idealism, with a more specific aim of resolving tensions between society and nature. I think we will be seeing many more environmentalists active in the political process.

And here of course we come to the people you are interested in—architects, landscape architects, and planners. I have the sense that many of them are groping for a way to be more independent of their clients. Many architects and landscape architects have come to realize that they can't simply take their values from their clients. They need to establish a basis for realizing values that are not purely commercial. Whether that can happen or not, I don't know. That's a problem for the professions, first, and, finally, for our whole society.

That's very much a problem for the professions. The choices one makes, whether to work on "the strip" or other such places, are decisions that are based on the values held by the individual. Getting back to the liminal figure, it intrigues me that an individual can move between two worlds and maintain a center. And that is an example of a place to start. Beyond that. . .

We should try to be more specific about how that would work for architects and planners. One of the first steps would be for them to develop an independent voice, to recognize that they have responsibilities beyond individual clients or groups of clients. They have a social and political responsibility to the larger society, since they are the professionals who shape the space we inhabit. But what form that independence would take, what economic base it would rest on, is hard to imagine.

One thinks of Jefferson again, he was an architect and he was a politician, he didn't have the problems of our overcivilized environment.

Let's not forget that Jefferson *did* have a base: a slave economy.

But the citizen cultivator, the citizen architect, seems an example of the potential liminal figure.

However, the program would have to be conceived by a group. Otherwise they would be vulnerable to the weakness of the individual. There would have to be some profession-wide embodiment. Architects and planners would be involved if there *was* an ecological crisis. We see that sense of civic obligation prefigured in Olmstead, Sullivan, even as early as Andrew Jackson Downing, and today in some professionals like Ian McHarg, people who try to make connections between ecology and civic responsibility.

The crisis of what we designers do is that everyone is trying to reinvent architecture. It gets so single-minded that we tend to forget the social or the political ends, or that we need to become politically active as a group. So there is a double problem there. On one hand, there are the market demands of a few individuals, and on the other, an individual who is producing an idiosyncratic art form without a social or political end. Many times the latter satisfies the former.

I'm sure there is going to be another turn of the wheel. I'm not sure when, but it has to come because many of the problems we face cannot be solved without systemic changes in the political realm.

In The Machine in the Garden *you quote Emerson as saying the serious artist "must employ the symbols in use in his day and nation to convey his enlarged sense to his fellow men." What do you see as the symbols of our nation today, and are they ones which support the land? If not, then what direction do you see the artist taking to rediscover such symbols?*

My facetious candidate for the symbol of the 1980s is the stretch-limo, a distinctive and repulsive emblem of the period we have just lived through. It's arrogant, it's ugly. . . I don't know where artists are taking us in search of other symbols. I wish I did. What are the encouraging developments of the recent past? You tell me. Many symbols of our period are derived from electronic technologies. If we go back to Jefferson's time, when the modern idea of progress first developed, science and technology were seen as a means to a social and political end. Little by little the end eroded and was supplanted by a commitment to the most rapid acceleration of the pace of technological innovation, scientific inquiry and economic growth as ends in themselves. With enough technology, scientific advance, and economic growth, progress was thought to be assured. It seems a very shallow idea, because it treats our powerful technology and its values—which are all instrumental values: efficiency, power, productivity—as goals. There's no link to ultimate, goal-setting values like justice, freedom, or harmony between social organization and nature. But these instrumental values are not enough. I'm not a primitivist—I don't want to get rid of civilization or technology. But it is crucial to recognize that technological systems, however necessary, are not sufficient. They have to be subordinated to the attainment of identifiable political and social ends.

Like getting back to the classical ideal of the city as a place where people live nobly and justly.

And *that* ideal is compatible with a vigorous defense of the land as well. I don't think its so much a matter of developing new values or symbols, as reinvigorating the *old* ones. The widening gap between the rich and the poor in this country shows how much we need to rediscover our commitment to a more just society. That principle is intimately related to all of these issues. The people who most need power to change the environment of the inner city, the people who live there, are powerless. If they had more political power we couldn't get away with offering them the kind of housing that they suffer now.

In the art world there is too much emphasis on inventing new symbols and brand new ideas. Some of our old ideas are great, but we have never given them a chance. I think what Emerson really meant in his remark about contemporary symbols was something like that. Having an "enlarged sense" is simply a bringing up to date. We do need to bring these venerable ideas up to date.

Notes

1 Mr. Marx attributes this analysis of "Columbus discovered America" to Stokely Carmicheal, from about 1965.

2 Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, 1782, Query XXII. From *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York, 1972), p. 285.

3 John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True and Original,Extent, and End of Civil Government," in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., *The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill* (New York: The Modern Library, 1939), p. 422.

The entire passage referenced is as follows:

> Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take; for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or a hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated... in the middle of inland parts of America, where he had little hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family.
>
> Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so that is now, for no such thing as money was anywhere known.

4 Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Hogendorp," October 13, 1785. Op cit. p. 384

5 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. Ed. Phillips Bradley (New York, 1945), p. 104

Figure Credits

Frontispiece Courtesy of the New Britain Museum of American Art, New Britain, Connecticut, John B. Talcott Fund. Photograph by E. Irving Blomstrann.

1 From Julius Gy. Fabos, et. al., *Frederick Law Olmstead; founder of landscape architecture in America* (Amherst, 1968), p. 49.

2 Ibid., p.52.

3 From John W. Reps, *The Making of Urban America* (Princeton, 1965), fig. 189.

4 Ibid. Fig. 190.

5 Courtesy of Roger K. Lewis.

6 Courtesy of Phillip Jones.

7 Courtesy of Reynolda House Museum of American Art, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Healing and Cultivation

Pamela Burton and Richard Hertz

The predominant ethos of European and American civilization has favored reason over intuition, the male over the female, the strong over the weak, the "civilized" over the "primitive," the West over the East, white skin over any other, human beings over "lower" animals, human beings over the earth...[1]

This ethos of power and control implicitly divides the world into dominant and dominated. Western history is viewed as identical with history itself. Only recently have alternative world views been considered seriously by Western authors. Willis Harman argues that "we who have been educated in modern society naturally assume that our scientific view of reality is essentially correct and other 'prescientific' or 'primitive' views are wrong. But we have to consider the possibility that some of those other views are seen through other cultural windows, and emphasize other aspects of the total human experience; they are not so much wrong as complementary. There is also the possibility that some sort of 'transmodern' view in the future may be quite different from our own—and equally correct."[2]

The predominant ethos is what Thomas Kuhn calls a paradigm—the most basic set of assumptions, symbolic generalizations, beliefs, values, and "shared exemplars" of a community.[3] Assigning primacy to one group of values over their antithesis goes hand in hand with viewing history as almost a transcendent entity which has its own direction and goals—a mythic force which irretrievably and in a deterministic way leads human beings to earthly paradise...or chaos.

Art, architecture, and landscape architecture are not apart from this dominant paradigm. They are inseparable parts of a culture which values technology, money, prestige, and control. These white, male values, allied with the idealized notions of Reason and Progress, are bringing not only Western civilization but the whole world closer to environmental and economic collapse. The landscape may be viewed as social discourse, both reflecting and commenting on social values and community concerns. At its extreme, when simple guidelines are absent, the landscape becomes hysterical discourse, creating



dissonance rather than understanding. The way we treat our landscape is the way we treat ourselves.

An alternative paradigm is evolving in Western consciousness, drawing not only, or primarily, upon Western discourses but rather on multiple, global discourses. The fundamental basis for this new paradigm of an ecological, self-sustaining politics of design is the realization that problems can no longer be effectively contained or isolated. "In the world as Simple Machine it was unnecessary to consider such (complex) chains. They basically just did not arise. Things were more immediately connected through direct 'causes' and 'effects'. But in a world where everything affects everything else, it is increasingly more difficult to say clearly and simply what is cause and effect. Everything is simultaneously cause and effect."[4]

The new paradigm contrasts economic "living" with the art of "dwelling," where to dwell means to create a community in which one retraces the lives of one's ancestors. Ivan Illich says that the ritual creation of space occurs through a transformative process of inner space to urban form. "An agglomeration of huts or tents turns into a settlement or town only when its space has been recognized ceremonially as substantially other than rural expanse, when it is opposed to the 'outside', when the paths that traverse its space are recognized as roads."[5]

The new paradigm is regarded as subversive because it rejects hierarchy and specialization. Gary Snyder says that "a ruling class to survive must propose a Law: a law to work must have a hook into the social psyche—and the most effective way to achieve this is to make people doubt their natural worth and instincts. To make 'human nature' suspect is also to make Nature—the wilderness—the adversary. Hence the ecological crisis of today."[6]

Planetary culture rests on a world view based on healing the natural world. It arises from a marriage of Silicon Valley with China and Japan. Our model here is that of cultivation, personal and social, of individuals and of nature.

What implications does a change in world paradigm have for landscape architecture—a profession which is at the intersection of art, architecture, and traditional methods of cultivating the earth? The practical implications are many, from encouraging in one's work connectedness to the natural environment to respecting the earth's resources and refraining from poisoning

Frontispiece: The Post-Industrial Landscape.

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the Earth and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth.

—Genesis 1:26

Losing Ground: Post-Industrial Identity in Architecture and Urbanism

Ellen Dunham-Jones

In today's world of satellite broadcasts and genetic engineering, we do not simply take dominion over the Earth, we supercede the bounds of its rules and ignore natural limits. In the pursuit of control and efficiency, contemporary technology, modes of representation, finance, entertainment, and information converge to dematerialize and homogenize the world. In place of the paradisical garden given to man in Genesis, these forces (re)produce an artificial existence. Spatially and temporally distanced from the natural environment, this post-industrial reality of images, bar codes, and electronic transactions erodes our affiliation with tangible places and things.

As the permanent representation of specific human action, architecture would seem to resist such dematerialization and universalization. Traditionally, through the elaboration of place, architecture has served as the point of connection between the self and the environment. It has provided both man and place with a particular identity from which it is possible to establish a relative order of the universe. By describing reality, the natural and the built support a meaningful existence for man.

However, we see in contemporary architecture and urbanism the same spatial and temporal distancing, erosion of natural limits, and artificiality of instantaneous reproduction that is so prevalent throughout our accelerated culture. From the fast food restaurant to the cookie-cutter condominium, the built environment is being restructured according to post-industrial norms. Urban, suburban, and rural divisions are being rendered obsolete by new urban hybrids: exurbs, technoburbs, beltway boomtowns, urban villages, and edge cities. Contradictions in terms, these forms are engulfing us within a monoculture in which architecture's traditional capacity to define place, describe reality, confer identity, and mediate between the natural and man-made is utterly lost.

For the past twenty years, discussions of architecture have been dominated more by the stylistic issues of postmodernism, neorationalism, and deconstruction than by issues of land use, environmental responsibility, or technology. Designers have not focused on the enormous impact that the change from an industrial to a post-industrial society has had on contemporary culture. This article investigates the consequences of post-industrialism on American architecture and urbanism, particularly as they have affected identity, affiliation and stewardship.

Post-Industrial Society

The term "post-industrialism" was popularized by sociologist Daniel Bell who in 1973 proposed that the United States was entering a new phase of development which he called post-industrial society:

> The concept "post-industrial" is counterposed to that of "pre-industrial" and "industrial." A pre-industrial sector is primarily extractive, its economy is based on agriculture, mining, fishing, timber or other resources such as natural gas or oil. An industrial sector is primarily fabricating, using energy and machine technology, for the manufacture of goods. A post-industrial sector is one of processing in which telecommunications and computers are strategic for the exchange of information and knowledge.[1]

Bell's prediction has proven true in many ways. Service jobs, especially in trade, finance, and recreation, have increasingly replaced manufacturing jobs. Their growth has been accompanied by phenomenal advances in telecommunications technology and the omnipresence of computers. Electronic transactions, automated systems, and instant communication characterize the new economy as they expand control and market reach.

1 Epcot, Disney World, Florida. Epcot Center has reproductions of the world's great cities within walking distance of one another. It is disarming for its intentionally surreal and unintentionally accurate portrayal of the "global village" made possible by telecommunications.



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For example, Benetton, a fashionable clothing manufacturer, links the cash registers in its world-wide retail shops to a central plant. Sales trigger the production of replacement merchandise automatically.[2] Benetton literally transforms production into reproduction, the product into a substitute. Other post-industrial activities also substitute technological access for physical access: computer networks, credit card purchases (buy now, pay later), home shopping broadcasts, and in vitro fertilization. Such activities decentralize development and de-emphasize material presence and consequently our ties to the immediate physical world.

According to H. V. Savitch, post-industrialism transcends production to deal with its effects (financing, marketing, etc.).[3] It emphasizes a processed second generation reality removed from natural origin. As new technology conquers presence, it puts into question time and distance, terms by which we measure our existence and understand ourselves and our world. Modern global communication and travel minimize our experience of distance: forests, mountains, and oceans lose their significance as natural boundaries and spatial conditions. Between the eternal suspension of frozen embryos and the instant heat of microwave ovens, time is collapsed and the present moment is emptied of significance. The media exacerbate this sense of flux and continual change. According to Tom Shales, journalist and media critic for the Washington Post, at the click of a remote control button:

> ...you can get a fix of yesterday at almost any hour of the day or night. Whereas it's not quite so easy to get a fix on or a fix of Right Now, This Minute....it's almost always some other time...it's 1977 and time for "James at 15." It's 1980 and time for "The Associates." It's 1967 and time for "Dragnet," a recycle even then. On a good night, or a bad night, you can get a different year from every channel.[4]

Coupled with Hollywood's predilection for sequels, (the

Rambos, *Halloweens*, etc.) and remakes (*Breathless*, *The Fly* , etc.), the interest in past celluloid prompts Shales to call the eighties the "Re-Decade."

Postmodern food, fashion, art, and architecture similiarly collage old and new or simulate the past as convincingly as possible. Nouvel chicken pot pies, Ralph Lauren yuppie classics, and Robert Stern revivalism seek the authority of the past yet reveal the inauthenticity of its replication. Driving through newly-constructed neighborhoods is not unlike flipping through television channels: each turn reveals a new time and place. We have dissipated contexts, relativized differences, and neutralized meaning. The surreal juxtapositions of Epcot Center are everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Ultimately, many of postmodernism's attempts at endearment only estrange us further from the identity and order that architecture is asked to provide.

Late Capitalism

Post-industrialism cannot be understood in isolation from late capitalism.[5] Late capitalism relies on streamlined, ever more efficient production and the creation of new markets through stimulating demand rather than responding to it. Operating primarily through economic optimization, marketing, and advertising, late capitalism enforces universalization through standardized products and contributes to dematerialization through an emphasis on hype over substance. It is the world of the multinational corporation and the franchise store.

Despite superficial differences, a shopping mall in Vermont differs little from one in Alabama in physical design or products for sale, just as an assembly line in Brooklyn differs little from one in Taiwan. While a developer will conduct a market survey to determine the particular habits of local consumers, the same developer is just as likely to bulldoze a site flat, effacing its particular nature, to impose the standard plan more easily. In the continual search for new markets, trusted formulae are reproduced such that the new market resembles all others. The successful conglomerates swallow up local "Mom and Pop" shops, eradicating local identity and control. As products and places are homogenized, only the advertised image is differentiated.

It is in this attention to image that late capitalism particularly conspires with post-industrialism's unwitting drive towards dematerialization. Product design, manufacture, and advertising are geared towards maximum sales. Value is measured less by the assets of the product than by the sales its advertised identity can generate. Today's manufacturers employ armies of marketing consultants, advertisers and public relations firms to create images which will stimulate desire for their goods and services. Their interest is more in producing an image of the product than in the product itself. Richard Bolton has written:

> The information society, late capitalism, advanced urban life, postmodernism—call it what you will—the present is marked by the loss of the object, by the invisibility created by communication, by the electronic and photographic distribution of images, information, and capital. Objects are merely vehicles used to reach some rarefied semiotic state.[6]

Simulacra

No one has described this heightened attention to images over reality more provocatively than French sociologist Jean Baudrillard. He discerns four successive phases of the use of images. First, as representations, images reflect reality; second, they distort it; third, they mask its absence; finally, they bear no relation to it whatsoever: they are their own pure simulacra.[7] Baudrillard feels that our media-saturated information age is irreversibly converging upon the fourth phase. The danger is

not simply that images distance us from material reality, but that simulations in fact substitute for it. To feign an illness is to make believe one is ill, but to simulate an illness is to produce in oneself some of the symptoms. Since the simulator produces "true" symptoms, is he ill or not?[8] Whether on a television screen or through the windshield of a car, mediated images render the real ambiguous. Baudrillard describes this as a self-perpetuating system, "when the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality: of secondhand truth, objectivity and authenticity."[9] This is precisely what we see happening in the heightened sensationalism and hyperreality produced by the media. Since *Star Wars* battle scenes grip many of us emotionally more than footage of genuine conflict, the major television networks produce entertainment-oriented news programs that include reenactments. Such simulations further blur the lines between the real and the artificial, the produced and the reproduced.

In an absurd attempt to deny reality, the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development in 1983 ordered the placement of decals depicting curtains and flower pots on the windows of abandoned buildings. The repeated image of simulated normalcy through burned-out sections of the Bronx was meant to literally blind our view to the actual devastation. This papering over of a serious problem with a cheerful image points to the danger of simulated versus actual solutions.

Baudrillard argues that simulations distract us from the oppressive reality of capitalism. By soliciting superficial differences—racing stripes or bucket seats—capitalism responds to the need for personal expression while prohibiting systemic change. But to Baudrillard, such personal expression is meaningless and simply reflects the hegemony of the system. Like Valley Girls, we express ourselves as unique individuals in exactly the same way. "In the personalized act of consumption, it is clear that the subject, in his actual need to be a subject, ends up as an object of economic demand."[10] In this sense, even personal expression is preprogrammed.

Advertising, fashion, and the media determine the expression of public identity as well. "Advertising in its new dimension invades everything, as public space (the street, monument, market, scene) disappears. It realizes, or if one prefers, it materializes in all its obscenity; it monopolizes public life in its exhibition. It is our only architecture today."[11] Microchip technology and mass media have far outstripped architecture in the ability to inform public consciousness. The media's ability not only to reflect current events but to actively direct change was dramatically borne out by the December, 1989 revolution in Romania, and the strategic capture of the television station.

Claudia Donà has described this mediated condition. "Endowed with quasi-divine powers—speed, omniscience, ubiquity—we have become Telematic Nomads...freed from the constraints of a historical and 'unique' coincidence between 'place' and time and can realize in its stead the power of being everywhere while remaining in one place."[12] Disconnected from time, place, and one another, we construct our own private realities by sealing ourselves off, plugging in and tuning out. This passive retreat into a simulated world negates the need for direct experience and active engagement of the physical world. Occasionally shocked by reports of its deterioration, we are nonetheless comforted by the ability to simply change the channel.

The Problem of Identity

As post-industrialism erodes our connection to place, it erodes our identity. The writers of the United States Constitution understood the necessity of bonding to a place when they set

2 The Strip, Manassas, Virginia. The road into town becomes "the strip" as it is built up with fast-food joints, chain discount stores, and shopping malls. The strip frustrates our attempts to identify with it as we would a downtown. It differs little from other strips and lacks civic functions and landmarks. Its chain stores and franchises are owned and run by distant strangers, not local families. We may shop on the strip, but we do not care about it. Without a sense of belonging to a place, there can be no stewardship and no direct engagement with and concern for the environment.

land ownership as a prerequisite for citizenship. They believed that only through such a stake in community property could an individual vote wisely and act responsibly. While we no longer require land ownership, we still insist on residency as a precondition of suffrage. Only through sharing in belonging to a place do we take on responsibilities to place and one another.

Belonging to a place works two ways. We identify with our places, and they identify us (as New Yorkers, Californians, etc.). When our places make us proud, we value and care for them; when they make us ashamed, we neglect them and suppress our association with them as a stigma. Martin Heidegger would say that to live detached from place and community is to inhabit without dwelling, to exist without being. What kind of citizens will emerge from a simulacra/shopping mall culture? Where will lessons in civic responsibility, purpose and participation be taught? Post-industrialism's technological independence from place and community and its emphasis on marketing and commodification advance private profit over public good.

At a time when so many factors are inhibiting attachments to place, architecture and urbanism need to provide more than simply shelter. As we examine post-industrial architecture and urbanism, we must ask whether they exacerbate or resolve the problem of identity and the conservation of place.

Post-Industrial Urbanism

The impact of post-industrialism and the concomitant effects of late capitalism and simulacra on architecture has been extreme, though not always recognized. Changes in where, what, and how we build have affected why we build and the perceived purpose of the profession.

Computer networks, fax machines, overnight mail, air condi-

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tioning, and the growth of truck over rail transportation have reduced dependence on traditional cities and encouraged an unprecedented dispersal of new development. Nationally, this is reflected in the expansion of the Sunbelt, locally, in the urbanization of suburbia.[13]

President Jimmy Carter's Commission For a National Agenda For The Eighties argued that the perception of cities as permanent monuments was naïve and unrealistic and that the government should cease trying to ward off the inevitable decline of industrial cities and regions through federal subsidies. A sort of urban Darwinism has emerged from this struggle for survival. Cities which have not adjusted to the changed conditions, mainly in the industrial northeast and midwest, face economic extinction, while new species of urban forms have evolved specifically in response to post-industrial technology and needs: exurbs, edge cities, and urban villages. These post-industrial hybrids are proliferating across the country and dominate current development.

The 1980 census reported that twenty-seven million Americans commuted from one suburb to another, whereas only half that number travelled from suburbs to downtown cities. Gradually, the suburbs are usurping the role of cities and transforming themselves. Richard Louv describes this phenomenon:

> The first industrial cities may have seemed to the eyes of prairie farmers and small-town merchants just as strange as this new arrangement does to those of us who grew up thinking that cities and suburbs looked a certain way... The pastoral dream is recrystallizing, reforming itself into a new shape, a new post-suburban, post-industrial urban form stretching hundreds of miles into the countryside, attuned to shopping malls, airports, and freeways, with housing and workplaces clustered together within a low-density milieu, with mixed zoning, urban villages, walled communities and frontier values.[14]

Throughout the seventies and eighties, commercial, retail, and high-density residential uses began to take advantage of their technological independence from the city and of the cheaper cost of outlying land. Office "parks," retail malls, andtown-houses without towns began to cluster around suburban highway intersections. These developments took the form of either urban villages organized around a shopping mall or of exurban office parks along a beltway. As the *Wall Street Journal* reported, they followed predictable patterns:

> In the 80s, exurban boomtowns have sprung up all over the U.S. The first sign is usually a few office buildings, often the spillover from a neighboring town. If the offices fill up, the race is on. Houses are built. More office buildings rise. The fast-food outlets come in. So do the more pioneering hotel chains, such as Ramada Inns and Holiday Inns. If the area keeps booming, there is another wave of national chains, maybe a Denny's and a Red Lobster restaurant, a Pier 1 Imports, and a Mariott Hotel.[15]

This pattern of decentralized development emphasizes convenience for consumers over convenience for producers, who have traditionally relied on centralized resources. As Charles Leven, Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Studies at Washington University, has written:

> The most important concept in understanding the metropolis of the twenty-first century is that the "old" cities were designed to maximize production, but the "new" city is determined spatially to maximize consumption.[16]

One need not look far to corroborate this observation: the fungus-like accumulation of commercial activity along the highways, the continued necessity of easy-access parking to business viability, and the desertion of the more densely built downtowns as even local retailers relocate to shopping malls at the edges of town. Department stores, once the epitome of urban shopping, began to realize the advantages of suburban

3 Shopping Mall. In car-oriented suburbia, the footprint required for a commercial parking lot typically exceeds that required for the building. Monstrous parking lots create water run-off problems and enforce greater distances between buildings thereby demanding continued reliance on the car while negating place-making possibilities with other buildings on the street/strip. The mall, prime culprit in this syndrome, turns its back on the blight it creates and offers a hermetically sealed artificial environment as placeless refuge.

locations and supported mall construction through the seventies and eighties. Undifferentiated, proliferating and placeless, shopping malls exemplify post-industrial consumption, universalization, and dematerialization.

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Ironically, the mall on the highway is becoming a nucleus of urban activity in its own right and often generates an urban village. Louv writes:

> The urban village in concept is a place in which work, residence and recreational opportunities are in balance. It is an old idea, but its support by developers and public officials is new. The idea is to create small towns inside, on the fringes of, or even beyond the metropolitan area; instead of a single downtown, dozens of urban villages: regional shopping centers with night entertainment, offices, department stores, light industry, all acting as magnets for new residential areas, especially condominium developments.[17]

As self-sustaining entities, urban villages are supposed to offer short commutes, diversity, low densities, and minimal strain on city services, while their limited size and green belts are supposed to maintain ecological balance. In fact, these advantages are seldom borne out. Los Angeles, a premier example, is a constellation of eighteen urban village cores that focus business, retail, housing, and entertainment in the dispersed cityscape.[18] Though praised for its mixed and lively subcultures, its problems with mudslides, smog, traffic, and the lack of indigenous water are notorious.

Decentralization has led to a greater, rather than reduced, reliance on automobiles due to the impracticality of mass transit systems in low density cities, the mobility of today's workforce and its willingness to commute, and the essentially suburban morphology of exurbs and urban villages. Jonathan Barnett describes Tyson's Corner, an exurb in Virginia, as the consequence of car-oriented planning:

4 Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Ten years ago Tyson's Corner was rural farmland. Today, two malls and countless condominiums later, it is a city of over sixty thousand people, yet it has virtually no sidewalks, no public places, and no civic identity. It has been built by private speculators for private people in private cars and private worlds.

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> [You] are staying at a motel located along [a major] highway interchange. The office where you are going for your meeting is within sight of the motel, on the other side of the interchange. You get into your car and drive for several miles along service roads, along a highway in the wrong direction, along more service roads, until you have negotiated the passage between your motel and your appointment. Yes, it would have been faster to walk, except that there are several chain-link fences in your way, and you might well be killed crossing the highway...Your meeting runs on past lunchtime, and you all decide to go out to eat...you must all get back into cars, drive down service roads around and back again, to get your lunch...The motel, the office building, the shopping center and the restaurant represent the ingredients of an entire city center. Their location at a highway interchange is entirely rational and predictable. All that was needed was for someone to design their relationships to each other, and to the highways in a reasonable way.[19]

It is not simply the gross accomodation of the car to the exclusion of the pedestrian that is so disturbing at places like Tyson's Corner, it is the lack of planning for the public realm. Apparently, civic space is deemed unnecessary by developers for a generation accustomed to the privacy of indivual cars and home entertainment (VCRs, cable television, etc.). In a study of Naperville, Illinois, a post-industrial new town, Nicholas Lemann found that middle class Americans have gone from glorifying group bonding to glorifying individual happiness and achievement.[20] Post-industrial urbanism exacerbates this loss of shared public goals through the loss of public space.[21]

The lack of public presence is due in large part to the lack of public authority as planning agencies have little chance to affect these overnight sensations. The lack of restrictions appeals to the developers of these fast-tracked exurban sites and has led to the privatization of civic services and government.

At Tyson's Corner, for example, coalitions of developers, employers and local officials have formed Transportation Management Associations (TMAs), private "shadow governments" to combat traffic and fill the gap in public planning. Robert L. Miller credits the Tyson's Corner's TMA with coordinating the road system satisfactorily but writes:

> What is worrisome about Tyson's Corner is the stubbornness of its privatization, its explicit denial of a shared public life, and its way of leaving some people out.[22]

Regardless of the quality of the services rendered, at issue is the nature of authority. Like condominium managements or co-op boards, TMAs protect private interests, and they wield control over an increasing percentage of the population. These new echelons of private government can control our lives to a degree that we would never tolerate from a publicly elected government: they can dictate the color of curtain liners or the hours that a grandchild can visit.

The control of tenant populations has led to exclusionary developments. As Christopher B. Leinberger and Charles Lockwood comment, "The vast majority of America's urban villages, in fact, have one thing in common: they are growing in white, upper-middle-class areas."[23] Such privately financed segregation suppresses diversity, debate, and protest. The lack of a public realm and forum inhibits political discussion and limits democratic access. Only profit and control direct decision-making. These private communities are cities in image only.

Post-industrial urbanism removes us from the institutional center of the city, segregates our public and private lives, increases the spatial and cultural distance between classes, and habituates us to wasteful modes of consumption. Physically and culturally, we are losing ground.

In the late sixties and early seventies, perceptions of the same problem in modern architecture—a lack of concern for physical and cultural context—gave impetus to the development of postmodernism. Designers shifted their concerns from functionalism and tectonic construction to architecture's capacity to "speak" through syntactic, semantic, and symbolic references structured by popular codes and myths.

As a periodization with precise characteristics, "postmodernism" eludes consensus.[24] At least two opposed attitudes coexist under its name, variously described as zeitgeist/genius loci; traditional/schismatic; reactionary/resistant; neo-historicist/poststructural; or, if we reduce "postmodern" to a style, postmodernist/deconstructivist. While useful in understanding the intentions behind specific works, such terms distract from the unifying characteristics underlying the apparently divergent work of headline practitioners such as Michael Graves, Peter Eisenman, Frank Gehry, and Philip Johnson. These characteristics include a tendency to develop a narrative to explain the work; an emphasis on formal and visual features justified in terms of their elaboration of meaning rather than function; a fascination with drawings and models as ends in themselves; and the determination of the value of a project by the formal quality of its design regardless of political, social, economic or constructional considerations. At its best, postmodern architecture reinstates an interest in place and enriches the public realm, whether through tradition or inventive critique. Unfortunately, its coincidence with late capitalist attitudes has led to an increasing complicity with the problems of post-industrialism. Postmodern architecture's obsession with imagery and signification over tectonic fact amplifies dematerialization.

Aggravating the postmodern separation of form and content, post-industrialism removes materials and construction meth-

5 The Lewis Thomas Building for Bio-Chemistry, Entrance, Princeton University, by Robert Venturi.

6 Section Through Elements Suspended in a Void, The Peak, Hong Kong, Zaha M. Hadid, 1982. In the pursuit of communicative imagery, postmodern architecture tends to divorce form from construction. Both the more obviously simulated forms of unsupported arches and gypboard keystones, as well as the skewed joints, slashed planes and gravity-defying collided forms of deconstructivism contribute equally to the denial of the physicality of architecture.

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

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ods from their original places, climates, and cultures. The standardization of building products and methods initiated under modernism has intensified under post-industrialism. Computerized inventories and expanded distribution networks have made building components readily available throughout the country. Contemporary construction details and specifications come out of *Sweet's Catalogue*, and are not selected according to local traditions or craftsmen's abilities. Never before has so much building relied so little on local materials and customary solutions. There is not only a loss of differentiation and identity in the buildings, but a universalization of construction. Building becomes a process of assemblage.

Contemporary design also becomes a process of assemblage. Designers choose between various prefabricated, standardized parts rather than resolve function, material, and cultural memory. Detached from clearly stated design intentions, elegant solutions become mere graphic devices, categories elide and ersatz products proliferate: fiberglass classical cornices and wood-grained formica.

Is it a coincidence that postmodernism and post-industrialism have existed side by side? Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre suggest such a connection between economic cycles and architectural style .[25] They argue that the economic recession of the early 1970s induced architects to enhance the apparent value of their services by awakening a desire for visually exciting architecture. Extended further, their argument suggests that postmodernism is a direct result of post-industrialism. By reducing style to packaging, postmodernism complies with post-industrialism's emphasis on marketing over production. Postmodernism can be seen more as a sales strategy pitched at a discriminating consumer than as a return to tradition or as a rejection of modernist universality. It responds to the yuppie who can afford an individualized statement and insists on one.[26]

7 Advertisement for FRP Composites System, Manufactured by MFG. Copies without originals, the buildings of the post-industrial landscape are particularly reliant upon synthetic materials. Plastic laminate, "Dryvit," and fiberglass are seamless, infinite, and perfectly suited to serial imitations and floating signifiers, as used by chain stores and franchises.

Developers perpetuate this trend. Like advertisers, they often determine the sales campaign of their product prior to initiating production. In their eyes, architects are packagers brought in to spruce up the image of a building. As an executive of a Houston development corporation put it to an interviewer, "we've done so many large office buildings we're able to make 90% of the decisions before the architect draws a line."[27]

Developers, formulae, market surveys, and feasibility studies have nullified the modernist ideal of the architect as social redeemer and replaced it with the architect as stylist. Just as changes in fashion create and bolster a market, the "-isms" of recent years have played into the commercial need for a marketing strategy. The search for "curb appeal," "highest and best use," and media coverage has given architecture the qualities of a designer suit, bought and sold by the client, and left it devoid of public responsibility and presence.

The co-optation of socially progressive and potentially subversive idealism by the capitalist power structure has been discussed at length by Italian historian and critic Manfredo Tafuri. Concluding that architecture under capitalism has no choice but to serve the interest of the status quo, Tafuri sees architecture today "obliged to return to *pure architecture*, to form without utopia; in the best cases to sublime uselessness."[28] Ironically, postmodernism's formalist retreat from ideology has resulted in its easy commodification. Notwithstanding sincere efforts to draw from a tradition of meaningful forms, postmodernism's seductive imagery lends itself to advertising consumption. Michael Rustin writes, "The 'public spaces' of the postmodern era are places designed above all for a social experience of consumption. The characteristic postmodern environments of Fanueil Hall in Boston, Inner Harbor in Baltimore, South Street Seaport in New York, and their Covent Garden and Camden Lock equivalents in London, are precisely this kind of deliberately lively and (within limits) diversified consumer marketplace."[29] Office buildings, traditionally the

A savings in excess of 50% in erection time and on-site labor is achieved by Bob Evans with a maintenance free (FRP) composites system.

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province of engineers, became one of the prime postmodern building types once corporate clients competing in the service economy realized the value of a designer image. Even the demand for architect-designed plates, teapots and jewelery reveals the degree to which architecture is used to sell a product rather than to describe and give meaning to the world.

As architecture bows to the immediate needs of commercial identity, fashionable trends, and budgetary shortcuts, it advertises consumption but is itself consumed. As a commodity, architecture calls attention only to its own image, rather than to the history of ideas. Such an architecture of floating signifiers is transient both in the literal sense of stage design and in the resonance of what it communicates.

Transience, alien to traditional concepts of architecture, is enhanced by post-industrial and late capitalist forces. Marketing's emphasis on imagery, mass production, and standardization lead to a sense of interchangeability and impermanence. The public realm of the city is lost in the flux of the market, making bonding to place and culture difficult: the public television channel has replaced the public place as the locus of cultural information; home entertainment centers keep the community at home; the endless loop of the beltway perpetually defers center and becomes the only fixed referent. Transience is institutionalized. Freeway freedom propels us to search like technologically mobilized lemmings for a center which no longer exists.[30] J.B. Jackson has suggested that while the road is emblematic of the American political identity, it is destructive to our identity as inhabitants of this earth with roots.[31] Increasingly, the road dominates the place, as the televisual dominates the actual, and architecture is made tangential.

When architecture loses its status as a fixed referent in the landscape, it can no longer provide us with what Christian Norberg-Schulz has called "an existential foothold." When it merges with the flux around it, it loses its capacity to orient and house, to critique and edify. Commodification, universalization, and dematerialization strip architecture of its ability to make places sacred and strand us in a profane and meaningless world. They enforce our isolation and discourage us from forming relationships with ourselves and our surroundings. Can they be resisted?

Modes of Resistance

Victor Hugo argued that the invention of the printing press would kill architecture (*"ceci tuera cela"*). The mass produced book would usurp architecture's role in communicating social hierarchy and values. Postmodernism attempts to regain architecture's former status through the reinstitution of legible forms. References external to building itself—context, history, narrative—were introduced to expand the relevancy of architecture. Without addressing issues of materiality, Robert Venturi, Michael Graves, Colin Rowe, and others proposed postmodernism initially as a means to resist universalization and cultural alienation.

Contemporary classicists have gone a step further and argue for a return to classicism in large part as a critique of contemporary architecture's distance from the myth of its construction.[32] For Demetri Porphyrios, architecture can resist commodification and dematerialization only by referring to the tectonic sources of its own making. Classicism elevates the act of construction to a language through its systematic articulation of shelter, load, and joint. Porphyrios also advocates classicism because of its ability to resist the market-driven emphasis on changing fashions. Only classicism in its constancy defies commodification. Leon Krier has extended these arguments to include the reconstruction of contemporary cities as European preindustrial cities. Krier sees classicism and traditional construction as a means to resist the wastefulness, dehumaniza-

tion, and devaluation of architecture since its surrender to industrialized processes and economic optimization.

But in the Information Age, television has killed the book, and increasing numbers of architects find neo-historicist postmodernism a nostalgic simulation acritically affirmative of consumer society. By contrast, poststructuralism and deconstructivism critique the status quo and revive modernist confrontation and composition.

Poststructuralism's critique and rejection of definitive meaning, value, and authority in favor of open-ended interpretation has been recognized by Hal Foster as a strategy which defies easy commodification.[33] Through arbitrary play or the deemphasis of the work in favor of the text (Barthes) or the privileging of subjective response, non-hierarchical structures, and the continual deferment of meaning (Derrida), the poststructuralist object refuses standardization and closure. Textual deconstruction and the detachment of signifiers from signifieds have informed the work of Peter Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind, and Bernard Tschumi.

Although these modes of resistance address commodification and the debasement of architecture through consumerism, they do not resolve the full range of problems presented by post-industrialism. Classicism and neo-historicist postmodernism often end up promoting universalization (through stylistic similitude), while deconstructivism and poststructuralism deliberately celebrate dissolution and foster dematerialization. Both are capable of producing successful, significant places which are critical of their surroundings yet seemingly indigenous to them; Duany, Plater-Zyberk's Seaside masterplan and Eisenman's Wexner Center come to mind. But deconstructivism and neo-historicist postmodernism have become styles which are more often appropriated as responses to the zeitgeist than as profound reactions to the genius loci. As styles, rather than methodological approaches, their employment is in lieu of a significant engagement of place.

Placelessness

Place is becoming technologically obsolescent. The modalities of the Information Age—telecommunications, mass media, mass marketing, and computer networking—have enveloped us in a system that negates the local and circumstantial. How we live, work, and build are largely independent of where we live. The system introduced by post-industrialism and endorsed by corporate capital promotes placelessness.

Although space needs continue to escalate, the connection of space to physical and cultural context is potentially disruptive to late capitalist efficiency. Postmodernism revived the concept of dedicated, non-universal places, but misunderstood place as simply bounded space.[34] We need to recognize place as a pre-existing condition to be elaborated and articulated, not invented or made. Only then can we begin to resist placelessness.

Contemporary technology distances us from place by minimizing the effects of time, distance, climate, topography and even physical presence. Although technology once revealed natural conditions and provided access to natural resources, it now processes and conceals nature.

For example, we can compare a traditional round clock with a digital clock.[35] The round clock shows time as a matter of revolution related ultimately to the movement of the Earth around the sun. The clock metaphorically and symbolically reveals the connection between time and place, our place in the solar system. By contrast, although the digital clock communicates time more efficiently, it in fact offers less information. Its liquid crystal numerals literally dematerialize, connected only to the electrical impulses passing through them.

8 Detail of Photo-Sensitive Wall, Institut du Monde Arabe, Paris, Jean Nouvel. Nouvel's south-facing curtain wall of self-adjusting camera irises in his Institut du Monde Arabe integrates references to its time and dual citizenship of place. While using sophisticated contemporary technology, it refers both to the Parisian tradition of expressive steelwork, (the Eiffel Tower, the Pompidou Center, etc.), as well as to the traditional intricate geometric screens of arabic architecture.



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Heidegger distinguishes between modern technology, which exploits nature and treats it as a standing reserve, and premodern technology, which reveals and "un-conceals" the nature of being and the being of nature.[36] He and, more recently, Demetri Porphyrios have traced the roots of "technology" back to the Greek word for art, *techne*. *Techne* implies a crafted art that expresses constructional logic poetically. From it emerges the idea of a tectonic architecture which "un-conceals" its relationship to gravity, material, time, and place an architecture expresses natural forces without appearing to dominate them.

The use of tectonic expression to link architecture to place is one of the central proposals made by Kenneth Frampton in his arguments for Critical Regionalism. He writes, "the generic term 'architectonic' refers not only to the technical means of supporting the building but also to the mythic reality of this structural achievement; that is, it should display the way in which the artifact interacts with nature, not only in terms of gravity, but also in terms of its durability with regard to the agencies of climate and time."[37] Construction and tectonic expression become particularized through their interaction with place.

Frampton differentiates between a reactionary, conciliatory regionalism which dogmatically promotes the traditional over the innovative from a critical regionalism which, "while remaining committed to the modernization process, would nonetheless be able to qualify the received consumerist civilization through a consciously cultivated 'culture of place'."[38] Borrowing Paul Ricoeur's definition of terms, Frampton equates universal or global civilization with universal technology and the liberating aims of modernization. Yet he recognizes the problems of universality and placelessness which result from modernization's tendency to completely usurp the particularities of culture and place. "The fundamental strategy of Critical Regionalism is to mediate between the impact of universal civilization with elements derived *indirectly* from the peculiarities of

9 Museum of Roman Antiquities, Merida, Spain, Rafael Moneo. The museum's brick-faced concrete construction recreates the scale and forms of ancient Rome, yet the alignment of the piers to the present grid of the city clearly differentiates the modern intervention from the existing ruins. The dialectic between old and new is particularly evident in the reading of the horizontal concrete floor slabs with the steel handrails as thin, modern insertions into the grand, heavy system of arches.

a particular place."[39] By amalgamating the two, critical regionalism aims to consciously prevent modernization from overwhelming traditional cultures and environments while encouraging progressive ideals and discouraging political isolationism and simulated postmodern nostalgia. The ideal is not to regress to fiefdoms, but to synthesize our participation in global civilization with a commitment to the place at hand and immediate action. As one environmental slogan puts it, "Think globally, act locally."

Without prescribing the specific characteristics to be derived from either global civilization or local culture, Frampton has defined the points of opposition between them in a series of articles published between 1982 and 1988. In addition to distinguishing the particular within the universal, he emphasizes the need to enrich the tectonic expression and experience of the architecture as opposed to the imagistic iconography typical of postmodern decorated sheds. "Critical Regionalism should, in my view, lie beyond style. It should devote itself in the last analysis to establishment of bounded domains and tactile presences with which to resist the dissolution of the late-modern world."[40] This concern for particularization and materiality empowers the critical regionalist to resist post-industrial universalization and dematerialization.

Like the best work of earlier modernists such as Luis Barragan, Frank Lloyd Wright, Alvar Aalto, and Carlo Scarpa, Rafael Moneo's recent Museum of Roman Antiquities in Merida, Spain exemplifies Critical Regionalism. It synthesizes the specifics of time (understood as a zeitgeist and as a desire to recognize the advancement of knowledge and technique) and place. Built to house artifacts from Merida's Roman culture, the building engages the past in point/counterpoint dialogue with the present. Without indulging in nostalgia, Moneo reconnects us to the tradition of Roman construction and occupation of the site. The mythology of the program—ancient Roman culture—is recalled not simply by recourse to images, but through elabo-

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10 American Memorial Library, Interior Perspective, Berlin, Steven Holl. The plan of Holl's library is organized around a "browsing circuit," a spiraling, sequential promenade which celebrates the open stack system. Urbanistically, the building recapitulates the metaphor of openness by acting as a city gate. But rather than operating primarily through metaphor and symbolic imagery, the building reveals itself experientially. For a library, a building type which more than any other confronts the ramifications of the Information Age, this is a critical gesture. In a world of virtual presences, intangible realities and invisible networks, Holl's library reasserts the importance of direct experience and knowledge of the tangible world.

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rations of its material conditions. Rather than continuing the postmodern practice of divorcing form from content, the Merida Museum makes a point of uniting them. The building speaks to both the universal conditions of gravity, load, and modern construction, and to the particular traditions of its site, region, and program.

Steven Holl's architecture similarly reflects ideas about tectonics, materiality, and the articulation of place. In his monograph, *Anchoring*, Holl writes:

> Architecture is bound to situation. Unlike music, painting, sculpture, film, and literature, a construction (non-mobile) is intertwined with the experience of a place. The site of a building is more than a mere ingredient in its conception. It is its physical and metaphysical foundation.[41]

Conclusion

With so many factors to displace us and to distance us from our condition as inhabitants of the land, it is imperative that architecture resist the status quo complacency about these changes. We need to realize the powerful potential of architecture to mediate between man and the environment, to both alleviate the rootlessness of the Telematic Nomad and accept responsibility for the health and well-being of the earth. We need an architecture that works to ground us in place, to provide us with a footing from which to evaluate contemporary technology critically and embrace it selectively, rather than one that celebrates dissolution and the placelessness of telecommunications. We need an architecture of affiliation, engagement, and stewardship.

Without an architecture that bonds us to the earth and to each other, our lives will be as empty as the rapacious sprawl of exurbs and suburbs. We will become strangers to ourselves, interlopers in our own homes, tourists in our own towns,

forever cut off from public virtues and concern for our environment. Without attention to the need for architecture to engender love, pride, and cultural bonding to place, our most stylish efforts, most pragmatic solutions, and most sincere critiques will simply add to the decay of an already unhealthy planet.

Notes

1. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1976), p. xii. See also Alain Touraine's *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York, Random House, 1971).
2. John Thakara, "Beyond the Object in Design," J. Thakara, editor, *Design After Modernism* (New York, 1988), p. 27.
3. H. V. Savitch, *Post-Industrial Cities* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1988), p. 4.
4. Tom Shales, "The Re-Decade," *Center, A Journal of Architecture in America* (#4, 1988), p. 19.
5. See Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," Hal Foster, editor, *The Anti-Aesthetic* (Port Townsend, 1983).
6. Richard Bolton, "Architecture and Cognac," in Thakara, op. cit., p. 90.
7. Jean Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra," Brian Wallis, editor, *Art After Modernism: Rethinking Representation* (New York, 1984), p. 256.
8. Baudrillard, op. cit., p. 254.
9. Baudrillard, op. cit., p. 257.
10. Jean Baudrillard, "The System of Objects," in Thakara, op. cit., p. 181.
11. Jean Baudrillard, "The Ecstasy of Communication," in Foster, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
12. Claudia Dona, "Invisible Design," in Thakara, op. cit., p. 158.
13. This is not to suggest that all recent building has taken place outside of older center cities. Quite to the contrary, the explosion in the service sector has led to an office-building boom and subsequent housing and retail development which have reconfigured many skylines. New York City, on the verge of bankruptcy in 1975, lured development with tax incentives and various floor-area bonuses and successfully gentrified its way to a full-fledged post-industrial city. Cities which have not managed to gentrify and attract white collar businesses have been left behind by this growth. Detroit's population in 1986 was only 62% of what it was in 1950.
Census data from Donald E. Starsinic and Richard L. Forstall, *Patterns Of Metropolitan Area & County Population Growth: 1980 to 1987* (Bureau of the Census, 1989), Table 1.
14. Richard Louv, *America II* (New York, 1985), p. 45-6.
15. Bernard Wysocki Jr. and Michael J. McCarthy, "Latest New Frontier: Exurban Boom Towns," *Wall Street Journal* (New York, June 23, 1989), p. A7.
16. Louv, op. cit., p. 52.
17. Louv, op. cit., p. 54.
18. Charles Lockwood and Christopher B. Leinberger, "Los Angeles Comes of Age," *Atlantic Monthly* (1988), p. 33.
19. Jonathon Barnett, *An Introduction to Urban Design* (New York, 1982).
20. Nicholas Lemann, "Naperville: Stressed Out in Suburbia," *Atlantic Monthly* (1989), p. 46.
21. For a description of the increasing disparity between rich and poor as a result of the post-industrial expansion of white collar workers in New York City, see Savitch, op. cit., p. 306.
22. Robert L. Miller, "Dwelling Urbanisms: Town, City, Suburban City," *Casabella* (#555, 1989), p. 62.
23. Leinberger et. al., op. cit.
24. Definitions focus variously on postmodernism's relative values, quest for meaning, and collapse of fundamental beliefs in "metanarratives." All have in common an overriding concern for signification and what Horace Newcomb has called a "dissolution of the real into representation."
25. Alex Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "The Narcissist Phase in Architecture," *Harvard Architecture Review* (Volume 1, 1980).
26. While the Bauhaus tried to eliminate class discrepancies in material goods through mass production, postmodern status symbols exacerbate social distinctions.
27. As quoted in Robert Gutman, *Architectural Practice, A Critical View* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1988), p. 54.
28. Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia, Design and Capitalist Development* (Cambridge, USA, 1985), p. ix.
29. Michael Rustin, "Postmodernism and Antimodernism in Contemporary British Architecture," *Assemblage* (#8, 1989).
30. Today's decentralized development manifests the decentered condition of contemporary man proposed by deconstructionist thought.
31. J. B. Jackson, *Discovering the Vernacular Landscape* (New Haven, 1984), p. 27.
32. Demetri Porphyrios, "Classicism is Not a Style," *Architectural Design* (#58, 1988).
33. Hal Foster, "Postmodernism: A Preface," in Foster, op. cit.
34. See Steven Peterson, "Space and Anti-Space," *Harvard Architectural Review* (#1, 1980).

35. This example was brought to the author's attention by W. Jude LeBlanc.
36. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," David Farrell Drell, editor, *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York, 1977).
37. Kenneth Frampton, "Place-Form and Cultural Identity," in Thakara, op. cit., p. 59.
38. Frampton, op. cit., p. 55.
39. Kenneth Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," in Foster, op. cit., p. 21.
40. Kenneth Frampton, "Ten Points on an Architecture of Regionalism: A Provisional Polemic," *Center, A Journal of Architecture in America* (#3, 1977), p. 22.
41. Steven Holl, *Anchoring* (Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1989), p. 9. Comes of Age," *Atlantic Monthly* (1988) p. 33.

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Frontispiece, 2-4 Courtesy of Phillip Jones.
1 Photographs by Richard Guy Wilson.
5 Photograph by Ellen Dunham-Jones.
6 Courtesy of Zaha M. Hadid.
7 Courtesy of the MFG Corporation.
8 Photograph by Gregg Bleam.
9 Photograph by Hector Ruiz-Velazquez.
10 Courtesy of Steven Holl.

Frontispiece: Tapestry, Garden Ground with Ladies and Gentlemen, *Brussels, Sixteenth Century.*

The vernacular, the urban, the contemporary perception of nature is a very complicated matter; all that now seems obvious is that we are adopting a demystified, demythologized definition which automatically includes human participation—if only as a moderating, rationalizing force.

—John B. Jackson

Anthrophobia, Or the Death of Landscape

John B. Jackson

By now the Sierra Club no doubt supposes that it invented the Wilderness Experience. Not so: the experience has long been part of our history, and the current version is little more than a replay of eighteenth century Nature Romanticism: the belief that anyone exposed to the forest for a certain length of time underwent a spiritual awakening, became aware of the Great Seamless Web of Being, and thereafter renounced the world. Judging by some of the literature which the Experience has inspired, it was also an effective way of inflating the ego.

There is, however, plenty of evidence that the Wilderness Experience can often produce more enduring results; that it can in fact produce both a social order and its appropriate landscape. In the Middle Ages, hunting and killing wild animals was the favorite diversion of the ruling class. It was a group sport, cruel and dangerous, marked by much ceremony and involving the collaboration and help of many people. Social standing and military prowess determined who did the hunting: the higher the status of the hunter, the larger and fiercer the animal he could pursue. "Each part of the hunt, indeed each portion of the quarry, received a particular name," says Michael Brander in his book, *Hunting and Shooting*. "Each note of the hunting horn had its particular meaning." What might otherwise have been a bloody carnage, a riot of competitive killing, was transformed into an elaborate ritual, a solemn celebration of the courage of both hunter and victim.

Another ethical component in the culture of hunting was its role of protector of the peasants. Crops and livestock were being destroyed by wolves, boars and ravenous deer until the hunting nobility came to the peasants' rescue. The peasants themselves played a part—though a menial one—for they too used the forest and depended on its resources. Though ecologically speaking the forest was a confusion of marsh, thicket, dead trees, vines, and rock-strewn hills, it also contained many open, grassgrown spaces where hogs and cattle could graze, and streams and lakes full of fish. The people of the village went there to gather herbs, berries, nuts, mushrooms, and firewood. It had its social uses: ceremonies marking the coming of spring and the planting of seeds took place in the forest, which was haunted by ancestral spirits. In remoter, less accessible parts, pioneer families, out of sight of the law, cleared small plots of land and homesteaded. Throughout the lonelier woods, hermits and outlaws lived in concealment, and everywhere there were ruins to remind people of their past.

For all its wilderness the medieval forest had been humanized by paths, boundary markers and gathering places. Certain plants and trees were jealously protected, either by peasants or the nobility. Animals deemed worthless were soon exterminated, whereas others, like the rabbit in England, were introduced from elsewhere. Innumerable jurisdictions and holdings and separate territories, each with its own laws, its own calendar, its own privileges, divided the forest into a mosaic of special places, and its complexity baffled outsiders. Its elusive and half hidden seasonal resources made no one rich, but persons familiar with its labyrinthine secrets found it a hospitable landscape, a place of rewarding relationships, natural as well as human. In one way or another many shared in what it had to offer, satisfying their daily needs without doing lasting damage.

Several centuries later, however, the forest underwent a change of status: it became the exclusive property of rich landowners who kept the villagers out and reserved it for some special purpose: hunting, lumbering, or the raising of livestock. It thus ceased to be a common resource, a common bond, and to the excluded peasants it seemed a symbol of aristocratic privilege. When revolutions flared in the ninteenth century countryside of Europe, the forest bore the brunt of popular resentment: it was cut down or set on fire, and later expropriated.

Among the early colonizers of the New World there were no grounds for this kind of class antagonism. The exploitation of

the wilderness was open to all, and necessary to most, and the extraordinary abundance of game of every kind made hunting a tame affair, an easy way of getting food, calling not for woodcraft or daring but merely good marksmanship. When in the eighteenth century a few minor restrictions were placed on hunting at certain seasons, the ancestral hostility flared up again, and it was charged that the rich landowners living in town were plotting to deprive the small farmer and the backwoodsman of the necessities of life. Hunting continued, unabated, and when railroads penetrated the Eastern countryside in the first decades of the ninteenth century, the local farmers discovered that they could make good money shipping fresh-killed game to the cities by rail to be sold on the open market. It was then the turn of the city sportsmen to protest: if an end were not put to this commerce, there would soon be no hunting left anywhere along the Eastern seaboard. They accordingly banded together in 1844 in New York to form the first American conservation group: The Association for the Protection of Game. It had two objectives: the outlawing of the sale of game on the public market and the encouraging of amateur field and forest sports.

Among its founders was a young Englishman, Henry William Herbert, better known in later years by his pen name, Frank Forester. He had recently arrived in New York and took pains to inform his friends that he came from a respectable "county" family and had been brought up in the tradition of fox hunting and other field sports. It occurred to him that he could play an influential role in American society by serving as arbiter of gentlemanly sporting behavior.

He was well aware that Americans were expert riflemen and that they had their own ideas of hunting, preferring, for instance, to wait in concealment for the quarry to make an appearance rather than tracking or pursuing it, on foot or on horseback. This relaxed approach meant that the average amateur hunter saw little need for special equipment or special knowledge of the habits of wild animals. It also meant, as Herbert soon realized, that except in the South (where hunts in the English tradition were still common) few Americans had known the excitement of hunting in the forest or marshlands, of exploring the wilderness. They were thus ignorant of the most rewarding aspect of hunting: contact with wild nature. This was something Herbert resolved to teach them.

He appears to have been a difficult young man, often involved in lawsuits and personal quarrels. He made an unhappy marriage and in 1859 killed himself. But he was an enthusiastic sportsman and talented writer. During his short career he became widely known not only as a hunter and woodsman but as editor of a sports periodical, author of several lightweight novels, and especially as author of a series of popular and still enjoyable handbooks: *Fish and Fishing*, *Horse and Horsemanship*, and *The Complete Manual for Young Sportsmen*, all of which were still in print as late as the 1880s.

The popularity of his books came in part from the great amount of sporting information they contained. Herbert advised on how to choose the right gun for each sport, how to choose the right clothing, the right saddle, when and where to hunt for specific game, and how to camp and live in the forest for days on end. He told how to cook over a campfire. But what made the books good reading were the vivid, firsthand descriptions of the hunting experience, the behavior of animals, and above all the descriptions of the forest setting. Herbert confessed that he found bay shooting (the shooting of ducks and other aquatic birds) boring. What excited him was hunting buffalo or elk or deer or bear: "...animals which are pursued in the sports of the wilderness...the noblest, the largest, and in one instance [the bear] the fiercest in the world."

He told of hunting moose in Canada with an Indian guide in winter when the snow was deep; of getting up "while the stars are still bright and the air keen and cold," and then tramping on

snow shoes through the northern woods looking for signs of game. He told of hunting deer in the Appalachians, and how the young hunter had to learn from long experience that "the slightest variations of surface, the changes in the growth of timber, the qualities of the lying ground and the feeding ground, the hours of the day, the situation of the sun, the shifts of the wind, must be known and noted." The rewards of thus exchanging city luxuries for forest fare were "the manhood the hunter would gain and the fun in gaining it."

Implicit in all his advice was the need for understanding a particular forest environment, a feeling of responsibility for the wilderness and its survival as the locus of sport. The hunter came to see it, temporarily at least, as his own domain, and thus one aspect of this sense of possession was contempt for the city dweller, the outsider not familiar with forest lore. Herbert visualized the American hunter as a solitary figure who treated the woodsman or farmer as an equal but who despised the "vulgar cockney" who wore the wrong clothes and was entirely lacking in hardihood. Yet even in its less formal American version, the code of the hunter as outlined by Herbert was deliberately macho, with aristocratic and military overtones, and snobbish beyond belief. It had none of the elegance of the medieval hunt and very little sense of community responsibility. But it had a strong sense of territoriality, and it implied a sustainable relationship between man and the wilderness and the outside world. They all lived in relative harmony and adjusted to one another. Herbert's wilderness still had a place for an ethical use of the landscape.

In 1888 a new conservation group came into being: The Boone and Crockett Club. Its first president was Theodore Roosevelt, and its hundred members were all rich and prominent Easterners who, like Roosevelt, had had experience hunting big game in the West. According to its bylaws, the Club was "to promote manly sport with the rifle," and no one could join who had not killed at least one bear or buffalo or moose—a stipulation reminiscent of medieval aristocratic hunting rules. Furthermore, the bylaws repeated many of the traditional ethical restraints: no killing of elk or deer floundering in deep snow, no killing of bear or cougar caught in traps, no killing of animals which were swimming, etc. All of the members seem to have been disciples of Frank Forester and wrote long accounts of their hunting adventures in Nepal or of their shooting predatory wolves for the peasants in Sardinia. What they all regretted was that the Club had no territory of its own. Territory would have meant not only the right to exclude outsiders, but the right to assure responsibility for the forest and its management.

The West was still wide open, of course, and rich in big game, but unhappily commerical hunters, to say nothing of Indians, already outnumbered and competed with the amateurs of the Boone and Crockett Club. However, there existed throughout the West at the turn of the century a number of National Parks and Forests in a wilderness condition. Hunting was forbidden in all of them, though they contained an immense amount of big game. It occurred to the Club that this game, if it continued to multiply, would eventually outgrow its supply of food, and what would happen then? Would the animals overrun the surrounding country, or would they die of starvation? It would certainly be a valuable service to the parks and to the nation (so it seemed to the Club) if certain qualified organizations—well established hunting clubs for example—were licensed to control the excess number of deer and elk and bear in the National Parks and Forests by means of judicious killing. All that was called for was a slight rewording in the then current definition of amateur big game hunting: instead of its being described as an aristocratic "manly sport" promoting certain desirable moral and physical characteristics, it could be reinterpreted in more modern terms as a form of biological control, an environmental service devoid of ethical bias.

But the proposal came to nothing. For one thing, in the 1920s

1 William Henry Jackson: The Snowy Range Near Boulder Pass, Colorado. *Circa 1875.*

the Federal Government was in the process of enlarging and increasing the functions of the Parks and Forests to include the providing of "pleasuring grounds for the people"—in other words, making them areas of recreation. Within a short time, despite their remoteness, primitive accommodations and wretched roads, they became popular with vacationers and tourists as well as with students of the natural environment. A rapid increase in the number of automobiles in the Parks and the influx of families with children soon did much to transform the quality of the Parks and Forests; a new kind of wilderness experience (deplored by professional sportsmen, but keyed to the needs and tastes of an urban public) told the Boone and Crockett Club that it had better look elsewhere for a territory. It accordingly gave up its self-assumed role as aristocratic protector of the forest to a number of conservation groups, and eventually disappeared into a scattering of private hunting preserves, some of them very luxurious, in Canada and in the South.

The most active of these conservation organizations was the Sierra Club. There is little need to say much about the Club and what it now stands for. It is widely recognized (and in certain quarters even admired) as a symbol of environmental intransigence and an enemy of urban culture. It was founded in 1892 by a group of well-heeled San Francisco nature lovers, admirers of the prominent nature writer, John Muir. Its original stated purpose was the study and protection of national scenic resources, wilderness areas, wildlife, forests and streams. In its earlier years it was a small, informal organization of men and women fond of hiking, fond of exploring the Sierras, fond of taking landscape photographs and of attending lectures by fellow members. But in the 1950s, largely because of a change in its leadership, it undertook to develop and promote a "wilderness ethic"—a philosophy designed to instruct the membership and to guide its own very energetic program of self-promotion.

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Strictly speaking, a wilderness is a large tract of land left in original, uninhabited condition. In government parlance it was an area remarkable for its ruggedness, its relative inaccessibility and the absence of any man-made features. In the former sense there was and still is plenty of wilderness in the United States; but those areas which fell within the National Parks or Forests were set aside from the areas meant for popular recreation, and were called Primitive Areas. On general grounds the Sierra Club disapproved strongly of what the Park Service did to accommodate the vacationers and tourists: the roads and campgrounds and trailer hook-ups. So it confined most of its attention to the Primitive Areas and fought to have them extensive enough to assure the wilderness visitor almost total isolation from the outside world and its inhabitants. Contact between those two very different kinds of public was unavoidable, and one of the less admirable characteristics of the average Sierra Club member has long been his or her outspoken dislike of the urban holiday public and an attitude of moral superiority.

By far the best study of the Sierra Club is Linda Graber's book, *Wilderness as Sacred Space*. It is a thoughtful, well-documented and fair-minded analysis of the Club's philosophy and policy. Graber gives full credit to the dedication of its members and recognizes the great contributions they have made to the whole environmental movement. Of special interest is her discussion of the Sierra "Wilderness Experience" as an example of sacred space as defined by Eliade. I am not alone in believing that most nature mysticism is a sham, whether it is Muir's ecstatic testimony or the mean-spirited and egotistical effusions of Edward Abbey. In any case, wilderness mysticism is still mercifully rare, and the Sierra Club obsession with space is worth examining for other reasons. What the Club has always wanted is control over an autonomous, self-governing, exclusive, remote natural space, with its own rules and its own guardians. That, I think, is why it has plotted and negotiated for more and larger parks, and why it has campaigned for "buffer zones" to guarantee the purity and isolation of parks; why it persuaded the Government to create well-defined "Wilderness Areas" throughout the country, and finally why it continues to promote "controlled environments"—well outside the parks and in the midst of farming and grazing and lumbering landscapes—lest any future expansion of various Parks and Forests or Wilderness Areas be handicapped.

How are we supposed to understand this insatiable appetite for more and more *lebensraum*? Largely in terms of hostility to the technological, urbanized, overpopulated world. Those scattered parks and forests and wilderness areas are defensive outposts of scenic beauty and environmental purity. In their fight against destruction and pollution and consumerism and the ultimate death of the continent, the forces of Good, of Beauty, of Life itself have created these islands of greenery and flowing water and tranquility to serve as reminders, warnings, incentives to turn back and restore the world to what it had once been. No compromise is possible.

The other explanation of this expansionism is political. The public which makes use of the various wilderness areas is small, but very influential and very vocal. It consists of two groups: men and women of higher than average education and income and of a conservative (not to say reactionary) point of view, and a motley collection of radical ecologists and students out of patience with a "repressive" and materialist society. There is also a small minority of earnest men and women seeking to establish some link—religious or scientific—with the natural world. What unites them all is the hope that the wilderness experience will somehow provide them with a peace of mind which eludes them in the everyday world. In all its phases the wilderness philosophy makes much of the evils of the modern world—overpopulation, abuse of technology, and urbanization—and always it implies that there was some other period or other social order that avoided them. Thus the large WASP contingent regrets the loss of "community" and at-

tachment to place, and likes to recall a feudal landscape, pastoral or agricultural, closely identified with nature. Whereas the radical wing among the fellowship dreams of primitive myths and of the Earth Mother Goddess. All agree that what they must have in order to be happy is a protected, isolated environment, empty of people and their artifacts, remote from cities, where the surroundings remind us of our origins and of the necessity of putting down roots. The establishing of "place" and obedience to environmental laws preclude all man-made artificialities of landscape and cities.

We are dealing here, of course, with a space meant for recreation, and not for the solving of the problems of everyday existence; so why should we criticize the taste of a small minority? Unfortunately the Sierra Club, among other environmental organizations, is determined to impose its point of view on the rest of the country and has deliberately sponsored the expression of very reactionary ideas. It is hard to forgive and impossible to forget Ian McHarg's statement, widely circulated, that man is a "planetary disease," a sentiment echoed by Paul Ehrlich; or Edward Abbey's statement that he would rather kill a man than a snake; or Garrett Hardin's statement that redwoods are more important than human beings. The latest manifestation of environmentally sponsored anthophobia is called "Earth First," a group of environmental terrorists which practices life-threatening sabotage, and which was inspired by the writings of Edward Abbey himself.

It is particularly distressing to see how the design professions have done their bit in the systematic devaluation of the human contribution to the environment. Centuries of gardening and farming and engineering, centuries of discoveries and experiments in the realm of nature are entirely overlooked. All that matters is the passive aesthetic experience of the environment, and the celebration of origins and roots. A particularly exasperating expression of this anti-human trendiness is the rejection of the word "world" (because of its social and political connotations) in favor of "earth" or "planet." In one of its appeals for money, the Nature Conservancy refers to "our exquisitely beautiful planet."

In the face of all this evidence of rampant environmentalism and anti-humanism we can perhaps be forgiven for turning our backs on this particular wilderness experience and focusing on one which takes place in the more popular, more openly recreation-centered portions of our National Parks and Forests. These places have become so much visited by vacationing Americans of all classes that they are now threatened by overcrowding. The environmental sense of horror at this development can be imagined, but a more normal reaction has prevailed: the Parks and Forests in question are doing their best to accommodate the larger public. We are not always aware of the role played by State and Municipal recreation areas. Although in the aggregate they are only half the size of the Federal Parks, they serve twice the number of visitors. Since these smaller areas are located primarily to serve a weekend or holiday urban population they are not always of great scenic or environmental value. In fact, many of them are entirely artificial. What they start with is a body of water (usually impounded), an area of forest or second growth, and sometimes a natural landmark: balancing rock, waterfall, hill with panoramic view. So their attractions are in a sense man-made, just as the landscape containing them is: an agreeable and flexible composition of parking lots, playgrounds, trailer park, golf course, beach and a sizeable area of natural forest and even wilderness. There is a local environment, a rustic trail to the hilltop. The whole central visiting area is full of people. They lie on the grass to sleep, to get tanned, to practice aerobic exercises; they swim, they jog, they take brisk walks; they water ski and wander about to find or make friends. There is a constant sound of radios, a constant smell of barbeque smoke, a constant coming and going of cars and trailers. The Park rangers and attendants wearily check to see that fires are put out, lost children found, trash put into containers, radios si-

2 Lake Accotink Park, Fairfax County, Virginia. 1990.

lenced after nine in the evening, and among themselves refer in very unflattering terms to the public and its predictable misbehavior. Wilderness buffs, passing through the park in their search for "meaningful" experiences, scornfully dismiss the activities of the crowd as mere recreation.

Recreation is probably the right word: recreation as pleasure and relaxation, but also as a recharging of exhausted bodies and minds: re-creation of a threatened identity; recreation by means of contact with nature.

A favorite study among anthropologists, geographers and academic environmentalists is the manner in which various societies or various historical periods "perceive the environment," which is another way of saying how they define the man-nature relationship. The subjects most often chosen are pretechnological societies or isolated religious groups, such as Mennonites. What they rarely study is how the contemporary blue-collar urban American "perceives" his or her environment. I suspect that if such a study were made it would reveal some surprising characteristics: among them the fact that (because of racial and ethnic infusions from other parts of the world) the old Northwestern European WASP concept of nature and landscape is fast losing its significance for the majority of urban Americans. Nature is no longer sacred; it is no longer entirely green, it is no longer the place where we put down roots and acquire a new identity.

Nature is a value-free source of energy, almost always invisible and impalpable, so powerful that direct contact with it is dangerous. Nature in consequence has to be filtered, diluted, made to conform to Federal standards of safety. Sun and air and water, taken straight, can harm us; hence the "treatment" of water in pools, the sun lotions, the filtered "conditioned" air in our houses. Nevertheless it is nature which provides us with health and vigor and peace of mind, and all of those activities we see at the recreation area are inspired by an urge to absorb,

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to assimilate and possess the invisible healing powers of the environment: its green resiliency, its constant variety, its reassuring plenty. Americans hardly need to be told that we have over the last generation become almost obsessively health-minded. The media flood us with information about new ailments, new cures, new threats to our physical and psychic well being; and one response to this growing awareness of mortality is a turning to nature: natural foods, natural remedies, natural forms of exercise, and open air sports as an effective way of establishing contact with the regenerative forces in the environment.

The vernacular, the urban, the contemporary perception of nature is a very complicated matter; all that now seems obvious is that we are adopting a demystified, demythologized definition which automatically includes human participation—if only as a moderating, rationalizing force. Just as the untamed wilderness is rejected as too unpredictable in favor of the grassgrown open space interspersed with trees and bodies of placid water, the anarchic sense of individual uniqueness is tempered among most of us by an awareness of the rights of society. A philosophy which exalts health and safety to the status of virtues cannot be called heroic, and religion seems to play a very small role in our definition of the purpose of existence. But that can and probably will come later.

In the meantime a new and somewhat synthetic version of the forest as the setting for human interaction with nature is evolving throughout the country. It deserves closer study and a much more respectful approach, for with it come new forms of social collaboration based not on competition and an exaggerated sense of territoriality and the sanctity of origins, but on the sharing of limited, temporary resources for health and well-being. As our population continues to grow—who can realistically expect the population bomb to be defused by environmental threats?—and as it becomes more non-European, we will turn more and more to these public areas of nature experience and learn to participate in their benefits. The human landscape, much simplified, much impoverished, but still essential, will reappear and the true wilderness will fade into the background.

"'Man is the measure of all things' was never entirely satisfying. But it is a thousand times preferable," Richard Neuhaus writes, "to nature as the measure of all things—especially if by 'nature' one means everything apart from man."

Figure Credits

Frontispiece From Heinrich Gobel, *Tapestries of the Lowlands* (Hacker Art Books, 1974), plate no. 196.

1 From *Photography in America*. Photograph by William Henry Jackson.

2 Photograph by David Vetter.

City Design and Social Responsibility
Choices

Lee Weintraub and John di Domenico

1

1 The South Bronx.

The decision to become an architect or landscape architect brings with it a responsibility to share the acquired knowledge and skill of designing environments for, and with, all people. The emphasis of this statement is placed on "all people": an intuitive notion of a social agenda once popular, however seemingly forgotten.

Fifty years ago, the American city reached maturity, and large urban centers were seen as desireable, exciting places to live. It was assumed then that the designer played an intrinsic role in the physical shaping of public urban life through the public works of the city. Design influenced by this attitude extended through the Depression and continued into the 1960s. In New York, we marvel at the beauty and revel in the luxury of the white sand beaches of Jones Beach, the verdure of Central Park and the urban drama of Rockefeller Center: places that designers of previous generations produced for us as members of the public.

Those disturbed by the lack of a current social agenda need only turn for inspiration to the Environmental Tradition, brought to New York in the 1860s by Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux. Although concerned with an aesthetic urbanism, Olmsted and Vaux clearly proclaimed the need for a new social agenda at a time in New York when the needs and health of the public were scarcely addressed. The legacy of this architect/landscape architect team can be seen today in most large American cities. Their work, which exemplifies the unabashedly American tradition of bringing the garden into the city, has influenced a generation of designers. In the past few decades, however, social responsibility and a social agenda for the public sector have disappeared.

Great wealth has been amassed during the 1980s, and little attempt has been made to improve the quality of a public environment for all the people. The social agenda that once produced a collection of urban treasures has vanished as many

of today's most talented designers exercise their talents on private projects that minimally extend the concept of "public" to a chosen few. Programs established to provide public open space in exchange for profitable development rights have been disappointing at best. In the city of New York, for example, developers may add extra square footage to the volume of a building in exchange for a "bonus plaza" or public open space as part of the project. Many of these spaces are minimal efforts that conform not to the needs of the public but comply instead with the rules of the bonus.

At present, piecemeal projects proceed with little consideration of their role in the larger city. Sadly, the public sector now depends on the private sector, or developers, to make decisions to which it may then react. Instead of promoting a visionary city, this process produces a reactionary city as it moves from one episodic event to the next, in a continual state of crisis. In addition, graduates of our design schools are loathe to work for public agencies, once the cutting edge of design, believing that they are repositories for uninspired and bureaucratic maneuverings. The designers and planners who are with public agencies do in fact seem to be trapped by the processes of policy-making, rather than encouraged by the necessities of neighborhood building and citymaking. What is needed is a revival of interest in creating a vision of what our cities can be, not by just imposing an architectural form on the city, but by imposing a vision that could act as a catalyst for the discussion of what the city should be. The opportunity to publicly discuss this vision might develop it, transform it, and eventually allow it to become a built reality. Such a process engages the community for which it is proposed, and has the potential to generate an image and a place that becomes about the community and not about the self-interests of its designer or developer. For such public discussion to occur, there must be designers in public agencies who are willing to immerse themselves in the bureaucracy and who can contribute to the designing as well as the policymaking of our cities.

This is not a call for the return to the romanticized architecture and parks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it is an attempt to suggest a new agenda for the study of American urbanism, architecture and landscape architecture. An agenda for urban design would unify the activities of architecture and landscape architecture, ideally, academically and professionally, and could produce models of urban form with an improved social agenda. Such an agenda is not motivated by fashion, but by an impetus to explore the tools of successful design, most important of which are environmental tradition and the context of culture and place. This agenda would bring the garden back to the city. It would incorporate nature with the technology of architecture, and would provide for a more humane social environment for the great majority of our cities' populace.

What follows is a collection of projects from the past decade in neighborhoods in New York. The spaces show what can be done in the confines of despair, as several of the most successful have taken root and prospered in the urban devastation of the South Bronx.

These projects, which recall and recreate the sense of neighborhood that is integral to the American urban tradition, are logically the product of context, and respond to the ideals upon which their designs were based. The communities were involved in the process of design, an approach that is critical if the client is to understand the designer and the designer to better understand the client. The results are projects which reflect the collective images and aspirations of the people of the neighborhood and respond to the requirements of the site. This approach to urban design is proving to be clearly more successful than an image which reflects only the interests of the independent developer or designer.

2 *Tiffany Plaza: Rendered Plan.*

3 *Tiffany Plaza.*

4 *Tiffany Plaza.*



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Tiffany Plaza

In the Hunt's Point neighborhood of the Bornx, Tiffany plaza is a public park tht also serves as the forecourt to St. Athansius, a Catholic church which is the social focal point for this largely Hispanic community. Design elements consciously establish links to this ethnic heritage and create a dialogue between the church and the public plaza. At the most public level is a linear fountain of seven classically-inspired lion heads, constructed of concrete, cast stone and glass block. A second level, surfaced with lawn and terrace, provides a green refuge. A lectern and cast stone platform create a stage for neighborhood and church events and reinforce the civic role of the plaza. As a result of the exchange between church and neighborhood, Tiffany Plaza functions as an outdoor forum for the integration of the neighborhood through religious ceremonies, church-related social gatherings, concerts and festivals.

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5 Longfellow Garden.

Longfellow Garden

Also in the Hunt's Point section of the South Bronx, Longfellow Garden is the open space component of a sweeping plan to revitalize the area, sponsored by a non-profit housing corporation. Part urban park and part exurban residential landscape, Longfellow is composed of three ascending brick terraces that follow the slope of the land. The first terrace acts as the entry. Benches line the terrace, and hidden water sprays, which provide a cool retreat in the summer for the neighborhood children, are built into the paved surface of the floor. Shallow steps ascend to the next level and an open lath structure, supported by polychrome concrete columns, replete with fountain and cherubim. The uppermost terrace is composed of formal planting beds, tended by neighborhood residents, which thrive in a neighborhood where few thought such a thing was possible. The success of Longfellow garden is in the affection that the nearby residents feel for it.

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11 River Court Gardens: Existing Site.

12 River Court Gardens: Figure-Ground.

13 River Court Gardens: Collage.

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

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River Court Gardens

The site is a vacant tract of land 810 feet by 210 feet near Yankee Stadium in the Bronx. Three sides are bounded by six story tenement buildings, the fourth by an elevated rail line. The design proposes a type of unit and urban structure that recall the traditional elements of the streetscape, garden and front stoop, as alternatives to the point towers and suburban tract houses of the recent past. The housing units proposed are situated along a series of mews, buffered from the transit line by a zone for parking and trees. There are three housing types: single-family three-bedroom houses, one-bedroom units, and two-bedroom units. Each apartment, built of concrete block with stucco finish, has a private open space. Most have gardens. As an urban intervention, the new block creates an



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edge condition that establishes limited access. Once inside this permeable enclosure, the mews act as a conduit for pedestrians, encourage interaction, and create a sense of community among the residents. Collectively, the form of the units shapes a dialogue between the private and public open space that reinforces the solid/void dynamic of the city.

At Tiffany Plaza and McKenna Square in Upper Manhattan, it is the outdoor space that unites spiritual thought and social spirit with the architecture of the city and creates a forum which addresses ethnic constituency in the reemerging neighborhood. Longfellow Garden is a living example of the kind of project that can be created and maintained in the South Bronx. Each is a beacon in neighborhoods where aspirations run high have been arrested. Stabilization, preservation and new development programs have taken hold. It seems that a more responsive South Bronx is poised to grow and blossom again.

If a place as steeped in despair as the South Bronx was a decade ago is ready for change, it seems appropriate that designers begin to address these issues again.

Figure Credits
All figures courtesy of Lee Weintraub and John di Domenico.

Frontispiece: Abstract Composition.



The Pillar Project

Felim Egan, Sheila O'Donnell and John Tuomey

1 The Pillar, the 1950's.

2 Photograph taken March 7, 1966 by Shane O'Toole, organizer of the 1988 Pillar Project.

3 Dublin, Ordinance Survey Map, 1847.

Background

The Nelson Monument on O'Connell Street, Dublin's main street, was built in 1808 to celebrate the British victory at Trafalgar. Its intended symbolism had been translated over time into the collective culture. It was a landmark defining the city's center, a terminus for public transport and a popular meeting place. A spiral stair led up through the 134-foot-high doric column to provide a panorama over the city.

Its domination of the Dublin skyline was unchallenged until 1966 when the figure of Nelson and part of the column were blown up by paramilitary protestors. The remaining stump was hastily removed by the Irish Army in the interest of public safety.

Since the loss of the monument, many other landmarks in Dublin have been destroyed through corporate vandalism and neglect. Commercial office buildings have encroached on the skyline of the city. Large areas of the city's center have been depopulated. Yet the absence of this monument has never been fully accepted. Its memory persists, giving it a presence in the public consciousness which contradicts the evidence of the void. Now, more than twenty years after its removal, it is remembered by people who have never seen it.

In 1988, we were invited to form an architect/artist collaboration to participate in an exhibition of proposals for the site, subtitled *Architecture, Sculpture, the Monument and the City*. Our collaboration with Felim Egan gave rise to a project which neither party would have anticipated but which each can recognize as an integral development of its work. Drawings passed between architects and artist at every stage of the project, from idea to detailed design.

The project represents our interest in the history and tradition of the city, and in the landscape as an inspiration to contemporary architecture: an architecture that is appropriate to a particular place and cultural context.

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

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

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4 The Pillar: 1808, 1966, 1988.

5 The Pillar: East Elevation.

6 The Pillar: North Elevation.

Project Description

In response to the memory of Nelson's Pillar as a landmark image in the center of Dublin, this project reinstates some strategic elements of the monument, giving them a new role at their original location on the site.

The base is reinterpreted as a platform which could be used by speakers and dignitaries at parades and demonstrations. A stone-paved square marks the footprint of the Pillar on the ground.

The capital and part of the shaft of the doric column is replaced as a fragment, a literal reconstruction of the mass in space, a collective keepsake. It is to be made of white portland stone, like a ghost of the original grey granite column. It is pinned together in the manner of archeological reconstructions.

A public telescope is proposed at Nelson's eye level so that the vista of the city, Dublin Bay and the mountains beyond can be enjoyed.



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

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

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7 The Pillar: Model.

8 The Pillar: Plan at Street Level.

9 The Pillar: Plan at Column Fragment Level.

10 The Pillar: Plan at Public Telescope Platform.

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The platform, column and telescope are supported from a leaning lattice structure made of steel, through which runs the curved green line of the copper-clad elevator tracks.

Like the existing sculptures on O'Connell Street the new monument faces south, responding to the long axis of the street.

The project was designed in a collaboration between Felim Egan, Sheila O'Donnell and John Tuomey. Structural consultants were Terry O'Neill and Fearon O'Neill Rooney.

Figure Credits
Frontispiece Courtesy of Felim Egan.
1, 3-10 Courtesy of John Tuomey, Sheila O'Donnell and Felim Egan.
2 Photograph by Shane O'Toole.



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

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

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Frontispiece: Tidal Garden, Eastern Shore of Virginia. Plan.



Littoral Drifts

A Tidal Garden on the Eastern Shore of Virginia

Warren Byrd

Not magnitude, not lavishness,
But form, the site,
Not innovating wilfulness,
But reverence for the archetype.

—Herman Melville

...And the message was essentially that this *world was beautiful, too, that behind its tangle, sorrow and decay were intelligence and goodness.*

—Paul Shephard

...It may be more useful to think of the garden as the symbol of the environmental forces creating society than of society arbitrarily creating gardens.

—Paul Shephard

This design investigation came out of *Transforming the American Garden*, an exhibition sponsored by Harvard University and the National Endowment for the Arts. It is a personal venture into the known and unknown, the conscious and subconscious. It is a search for landscape precedents and archetypes to inform new works in old places.

While gardens have countless purposes, making them draws from two bases: the mind (memory) and the place (region, locale). We can also refer to these two sources as the ideal and the circumstantial.

The ideal represents a model of perfection that exists only in the mind. The search for the ideal becomes a quest for origins, for the garden speaks to and from the collective memory. "A garden, to be a garden," states Ann Leighton, "must represent a different world, however small, from the real world, a source of comfort in turmoil, of excitement in dullness, security in wildness, companionship in loneliness. Gardening offers a chance for man to regulate at least one aspect of his life, to control his environment and show himself as he wishes to be."[1]

The circumstantial represents the physical and spiritual specificity of a region. Local terrain and lore distinguish a place from others and make it special. Artifacts and natural facts together describe an inhabited realm.

These twin foundations of ideal and circumstance require representation through design. In this investigation, the model for the ideal is the Orto Botanico in Padua, Italy, and the circumstance is the Eastern Shore of Virginia (frontispiece). The date of inception is 1986. The reasoning behind these choices follows.

The Ideal

In his description of an imaginary house in the exhibition *Houses for Sale*, Arata Isozaki claims, the "house must possess two basic qualities if it is to be considered architecture: 1) it must be supported by a simple spatial organization which cannot further be reduced and 2) it must express some shape which implies house form."[2] He goes on to explain his work: "the house is conceived as a frame composed of sixteen independent columns placed at equal intervals to produce nine squares. The division of a square into nine equal squares is one of the most primitive human attempts to represent the cosmos two-dimensionally."[3] Isozaki's interpretation of fundamental architectural representation is certainly not unique. Vitruvius, Alberti, Palladio, Le Corbusier, Kahn, and many other architects have worked with the nine-square ideal (fig. 1). Furthermore, Gaston Bachelard and Mircea Eliade have explicated the potency of architectural images associated with building and dwelling: roof, room, wall, floor, door, window, stair, attic, basement, etc.

This design exploration seeks equivalent universal origins and images for the garden. It extends Bachelard and Eliade and engages the speculations of Christian Norberg-Schulz in *Genius Loci* and the prospect/refuge theories put forth in Jay



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

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1 Origins: Architecture—The Nine Square Grid.

2 Origins: Gardens—Paradise, The Garden of Eden, The Four Rivers.

Appleton's *The Experience of Landscape.*

The garden derives its irreducible and universal structure from symbolic, rationalized interpretations of Paradise and the Garden of Eden: "a garden divided into four quadrants by four rivers, based on the cosmic cross. In symbolism the number four is the number of creation, the symbol of nature. There are four winds of heaven, four seasons, and four corners of the earth."[4] (fig. 2) In the Bible, the tree of life centers the plain of the Earth, and four rivers issue forth to the cardinal points. We see these compositional and symbolic forms in countless gardens and representations of gardens from Persian tapestries to the Patio of the Lions at the Alhambra, from the Taj Mahal to the Villa Lante at Bagnaia. Even a cursory review of landscape primers of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries suggests the staying power of this four-square imagery. "The four square forme is the most usually accepted with all, and doth best agree to any man's dwelling," writes John Parkinson in *Paradise in Sole Paradisus Terrestris*, 1621. "Trayles and arbours...serve both for shadow and rest after walking."[5] Parkinson's other landscape elements include "a maze or wildernesse, a rock or mount, and there can be even a fountaine in the midst thereof to convey water to every part of the garden."[6]

The Orto Botanico embodies this ideal. Established in 1545, it is the oldest extant botanical garden in Europe. Its four-square layout inscribed within a circular wall expresses man's rational enoblement of nature. As the University of Padua's center for botanical study, it belongs to both the individual intellect and the city. The Orto Botanico displays the known botanical world for study and integrates it with the cultivated Renaissance ideal. As an ideal it also permits a broader perception of the garden, one that extends the boundaries beyond purely domestic enclosure. It allows for public involvement and perception.

This garden will be about: light/dark; up/down; inside/

3 *Elements of Landscapes: Mount, Garden of Eden, Bosque, Theater.*



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outside; then/now; center/perimeter; figure/ground; life/death; activity/repose; hard/soft; sharp/dull.

It will use four particularly sacred elements: the mount, a symbol of transcendence; the parterre, a memory of the Garden of Eden; the bosque, the ordered forest primeval; and the theater, space and spectacle, its stage a symbol of clearing.

These elements are ordered by direct alignment, not yet of a particular site (fig. 3). The parterre and bosque are bracketed by the theater and mount. The mount gestures toward the sky like Petrarch seeking the view. It is the desire to seek heaven, to break from the gravity and the weight of the world, and the culmination of the journey. The theater is of the earth, inseparable, but emerging. It is the cave or grotto as place of origin or birth.

The stage frames the journey to the sea. The parterre's centered perfection suggests earthbound attainment and choice (the four directions). The journey is through the forest, like marching to certain expectations, yet the sacredness of the grove might also be a kind of fulfillment.

Circumstance now challenges this initial transformation of the Orto Botanico into a loose ensemble of landscape archetypes. No garden would seem real until it yielded to place and revelled in the particularities of people and dreams, fragrance and weather, soil and sinew (fig. 4).

The Circumstance

As I have chosen a model for man's fecundity in the Padovan botanical garden, I shall choose a model for nature's fecundity: the Eastern Shore of Virginia.

The Eastern Shore extends like a swollen finger pointing the way toward the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. It separates the



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4 First Transformation: Synthesis of the Elements.



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5 Second Transformation: Recognition of Past Landscape (History and Existing Condition).

Bay from the Atlantic Ocean tenuously, like a great barrier reef. People talk of this land and its waters in reverential tones as the birthplace of a nation and the most productive estuary in the world. There is magic and sublimity in the austerity of it all. It is the world both harsh and benign, simple and cluttered, backward and forward. It is fertile yet deadly, unpredictable yet known. The grand business of agriculture presses forward in almost endless rows. It is a place of genteel squalor, with graceful plantations and migrant laborers' quarters. The laborers find their Eden in bottle and song and an open road: it is deeper south than Deep South. The edges of the Eastern Shore are frayed and fringed and dance with death and delight. NASA and oil companies occupy the margins, looking away, scarcely seeing the corralling of the spirits.

The tidal creeks wander as the mind does; its salt-sweet water eddies through green Spartina fields. Posts stud these waterways like so many remnant woods flooded and stripped. Beached work boats and clapboarded houses lean dull against pearly white banks. Deep creeks of darkness draw in to make what center it can of Onancock. Accomac is drier still, bypassed some, but old and full of stories. Places have names like Bullbeggar, Assawoman, Chincoteague, Saxis, and Oyster. Names which evoke an odd and exotic sense of the region. Marsh mallows, like cotton, blanket the inland sea. Houses and walled gardens drip with rose and wisteria, framed by two kinds of myrtle, one waxy, one wrinkled. The loblollies are sacred sentinels, the oaks like iron forges marking the graveyards' bent and barely legible tombstones. The stone is such a treasured thing here, unnatural as it is. The boat is such a temporal thing, wooden as it is.

The second transformation of the tidal garden recalls this landscape. It recognizes the presence of the past by interpreting the purity of the ideal. It suggests history and reorientation (fig. 5).

6 Third Transformation: Composition shears along the center line. Two distinct realms are established.

7 Fourth Transformation: Elements are positioned and aligned.



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The landforms allude to the nature and presence of fragmented, isolated dunes from earlier coastal shorelines: the mount recalls "roundabouts" or "washarounds," those coastal high points formed by the breaching of a once continuous dune line (figs. 8, 9). The low points of these sand and grass chains soon became inlets and the highest reaches became lozenged islands as wind and water wrapped their bases and rounded their tops. Over time, these daily, seasonal and annual cycles establish a series of stratified vegetative and soil layers, less tolerant of salt and water as the land rises. These high mounds become treasured places for dwelling, outpost, prospect and sanctuary in an otherwise planar, horizontal landscape.

In earlier cultures, the mountain served as the symbolic place of the gods. It oriented man and gave him a point of aspiration. The theater was its counterpart, a place of spectacle and departure. It isolated man to put him in touch with his mind and soul. The theater at Megalopolis on the Peloponnesos in Greece served as an initial source for this alignment of theater and mountain: a theater that once presided over dreams of future cities yet always understood its reverence to the natural world from which it was born. In the tidal garden, the theater faces the rising sun and limitless views of marsh, sea, and horizon.

The theater and canal symbolize harbor and cove, the other treasured dwelling places of the Eastern shore. The remnant landscape suggests a rural graveyard in search of secure high ground: the walls fend off the rising sea, and the oaks replace the headstones and stand as sentinels. Undulating grassy terraces roll down to the marsh, extending the theater's stage. The hedge-enclosed garden rooms recall the gridded lushness of the Accomack, the "other side of water place."[7] They also hint at the brick-walled garden of magic and decay moored near Wachapreague, Virginia, the Orto Botanico of a nursery no longer. Wachapreague means little city by the sea.

The land's intersection with water and marsh shears the ge-



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8 The Eastern Shore of Virginia: Aerial View.

9 The Eastern Shore of Virginia: View.

ometry of the garden (fig. 6). The skew recalls an earlier shoreline of different inclination and reinforces the centrality of the marsh and remnant landscape. The mount shifts to a secondary location and establishes a new, local axis. The marsh and tidal creeks complete the garden and make its edges ambiguous, suggesting its infinite extension. Did we create the marsh or capture it? Good ecological sense suggests the inappropriateness of filling or destroying tidal marshlands. Stewardship suggests that this was created marsh, established on dredge spoil. Nevertheless to create is always to destroy something. The benthic community cries silently. Perhaps the cultivated lands suggest our consciousness, the wild lands our subconsciousness, and the ebbs and flows of the brackish tidal world, their resolution.

The pergola marsh walk is a transformation of the 230 foot long pergola that encloses the outermost boundaries of the gardens at Hestercombe in Somerset, England. It extends the garden into the marsh as a bridge between mountain and horizon (fig. 7). The pergola encloses and frames, yet also exposes and isolates. Fragrant and cloying wisteria and rose pervade. They battle the wind, the sky, and the overwhelming marsh. They are part of the spectacle a garden wants to be: temporary transport from the sulfurous stench of decay as life is renewed.

The marsh is regulated tentatively by equidistant poles that are like a grove forgotten and drowned, an unplanked dock (fig. 10). Tidal pools ornament the depth beneath. Algae-laden stones slip into them as counterpoints to the mount. A labyrinth embraced by the southern pier bares its contours only twice daily.

Despite the garden's insistent structure, it is the power and processes of the natural realm which define the place. The tidal garden provides only an insecure foothold from which to observe the environment—and to become part of it. It is the order of nature, in patterns, in movements, in seemingly boundless space, that directs this garden and its elements. Like the meanders of a tidal creek or the land bridge connecting Chincoteague to the mainland, the garden invites one to leave the solid earth and to wander seaward, skyward.

A garden's tale may finally be told in its details: the family crest, the horn of plenty, the river gods reclining. The detailed images in this garden would draw on symbols of sea and sky and land entwined, perhaps adapted as the pavement to thresholds or as screens to the horizon. These would be the last reminders that the tidal garden seeks an everchanging middle ground between here and there.

This garden is fashioned from the stuff of the mind and the stuff of a place.
This old garden is new;
This new garden is old.
This garden tries to enclose;
This garden must always be open.

8

9

10 The Eastern Shore of Virginia: View.

10

Notes

1 Anne Leighton, *Early American Gardens for Meate or Medicine* (Boston, 1970), p. 6.
2 Arata Isozaki, *Houses for Sale*, ed. by J. Archer (New York, 1980), p. 46.
3 Ibid.
4 Leighton, op. cit.
5 John Parkinson, *Paradisi in Sole Paradisus Terrestris* (London, 1629), quoted in Leighton, op. cit., p. 172.
6 Ibid.
7 Raus Hanson, *Virginia Place Names* (Verona, Virginia, 1969), p. 20.

Figure Credits

All figures courtesy of Warren Byrd.

Morphosis:
The Landscape of Tension and Risk

Aaron Betsky



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1 Flores Residence: Sketches.

The architecture of Morphosis is, as they call it, "an architecture of tension and risk." According to Thom Mayne and Michael Rotondi, deep inside of us and in society, live monsters. Their work makes present the dangers of our technological world that are usually suppressed by bland facades and functional floor plans. Most frighteningly, they release those systems of repressive orders that we have internalized. Architecture can act as the labyrinth that contains the frightening minotaur, but it will smell of the danger. In order to work, it must first build the danger. Their architecture is therefore not easy, pleasing or comfortable. It is hard-edged, confrontational, and wrought with peril. As such, it borrows much of its power from the eighteenth century notion of the sublime: it presents architecture as an image of the terrible forces of nature, beyond the scope of human understanding and dangerous to our very humanity. But to Morphosis, the terror exists not in crags and peaks, but at the scale of the surveyor's tools. It is precisely our attempts to measure, reason with, and subdue nature that are sublime. Filled with hubris, we throw our grids against the stars and mark off the space of human habitation. This is essentially a violent and futile act, but it is one that must nonetheless be made in order to affirm, if not our humanity, then certainly our ability to act. The architecture of Morphosis thus becomes a tectonic web cast out over nature. In the process, it dissolves into fragments and thus disappears as a coherent object. Yet the vision also has its grand and grim side. Mayne and Rotondi seem to espouse a cultured version of the beauty of a backhoe—it is not for nothing that the only romantic source Thom Mayne will acknowledge is "dead tech." The disjunction between man and nature creates an architecture of tension and risk.

Their preoccupation with the ability of architecture to extend into nature, and to fragment in the process, thus irredeemably altering the nature in which it was buried, goes back at least as far as the Sedlak House of 1980. Conceived as a garden pavilion in a dense, somewhat ramshackle neighborhood, the house has two parts. The first is a stick-like structure, clad with a collage

of wooden planes that alludes to the chaotic confusion of human habitaiton and the contingencies of the everyday. The second piece is a massive, sloping wall, treated as an abstract form and gridded at a forty-five degree angle. Thus, it both protects the frail human house from nature and rises up as if it were part of nature. Here nature and geometry merge. Yet this ideal is already slightly twisted; allowing, in its cracks, for light, entrance and that most natural of human activities: going to the bathroom.

In the Cohen House project, the tension is resolved, or at least fleshed out into a much more stable habitation. The house is split into two levels, each of which is focused on an outdoor space. On the upper level, it is a swimming pool area, measured by the march of columns and completely controlled in its geometry. On the lower level is a garden looking out over the city. This garden is defined by the compound outline of a retaining wall and thus escapes from the rigid orthogonal forms of the house. In between these two versions of nature, the manmade and the "natural," the house twists and turns its way down the slope, pivoting around a third courtyard and an enclosed patio focused on a pool of water. Water in fact is used to resolve tension: it runs from the top all the way to the bottom, forming a ritualistic connector which allows the inhabitants to live between their hedonistic man-made nature and the uncontrollable scale of the real world. The crack has become a split that actually ties the whole house together, and nature becomes an unstable ground for existence.

In the Flores addition, the tension turns into a progression. The addition is added onto a somewhat rambling bungalow. The architecture of the new piece turns these tentative orders into something quite grand and complicated: a rhythmic structural sequence runs lengthwise through the house, claiming every inch of the difficult site for sophisticated human control. The actual delimitation of habitation, however, is formed by a series of walls that run at right angles to this rhythm. They

2 Sedlak Addition: Exterior.

3 Cohen Residence: Model, Plan View.

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

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4 Cohen Residence: Model.

5 Flores Residence: Section.



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

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develop from being very obviously man-made, through a series of sectional and functional splits and deformations that actually flesh out the activities of the house, until they turn into hedge walls looking out over the city. Small balconies poke through the hedge walls, launching you over the precipice. Here, architecture is both fulfilling its own tendency to ever greater formal complexity and refinement, and dissolving into nature. Perhaps this is a building at the end of an architecture that is exhausting its possibilities and, in so doing, becoming so intricate as to dissolve into the cracks of its own systems.

In the Crawford House, 1990, the complexity of the architecture reaches a state of grandeur that is equal to its site. This huge house is no humble statement about human habitation. It is a monument to money, architectural skill, and the technology that these two in combination can command. The house is once again organized by a rhythmic geometry that in this case creates the actual solids and voids that anchor the activities of the house. The system at right angles to these bays is one that connects entry and the view of the ocean. It represents one's experience of nature, which here penetrates and deforms the architectural order. In this case, however, this line is also supposed to be a line in the Mercator grid, thus making a global claim for this bit of measurement of the earth. By now, however, there are no cracks between man-made nature and human culture, and certainly no fragmentation of the latter by the former. Instead, there is a giant arc and a profusion of semi-autonomous fragments.

Mayne claims it as the mark of human habitation, an abstract gesture of violating the land and taking possession. It is a boundary. Within this boundary, there is play: the fluid movement from function to function through a web of architectural orders so manifold, so over-articulated and so complex as to form a labyrinthine, new kind of world. It is a world of hyper-order, a new nature reached by giving oneself over to the overdetermination of architecture and technology.

6 *Crawford Residence: Axonometric Abstraction.*

7 *Crawford Residence: Section and Partial Plan.*

8 *Crawford Residence: Model, Plan View.*

9 *Crawford Residence: Model, North West View.*



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

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

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

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10 Chiba Golf Course, Club House: Sectional Model.

11 Chiba Golf Course, Club House: Model, West View.



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

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In the golf club in Chiba, Japan, it all threatens to turn into a Zen game. The club's organization is in many ways similar to that of the Crawford House, except that the system has been stabilized. The club has become an earthwork, a self-conscious mark on the land. The architecture of tension and risk is symbolized by the trusses, compounds of steel tension and compression members that seem to be continually pumping iron above your head. The building as an object has thus disappeared, leaving only the instruments of measurement and violation to define the program. Yet the building is also supposed to reflect the swing of the arm and the arc of the ball. This is a tension, ritual or game about the game of golf, perceived as a way of measuring a (very man-made) land. Whether this is perceived as a parody or a parable is up to the observer. In fact, much of the tension and risk in the work of Morphosis lies as much in the intention as it does in the built product.

Figure Credits
1, 3, 4, 6, 7 Courtesy of Morphosis.
2, 8-12 Courtesy of Morphosis. Photographs by Tom Bonner.
5 Courtesy of Morphosis. Photograph by Colortek.

12 Chiba Golf Course, Club House: Model, Top View.



12

Living with the Land
A Case Study

Joseph Mashburn

1

1 Aerial View of Site.

In responding to the challenge of land stewardship, the designer's sensitivity to impalpable and unquantifiable, but powerful aspects of landscape[1] are a valuable tool. Because of what is at stake, much has been written advocating more scientific (and presumably more foolproof) design methods when addressing environmental issues.[2] However, in the past, architecture's most direct and fruitful design has been perceptually born and evaluated, implicitly subjective and synthetic, and clearly dependent upon individual designers' sensibilities. Though subjective, a designer's observations of and design responses to the land may of course be analytically approached and consciously organized.

In most instances, a history of human habitation is included in what the designer inherits fromthe land. Designers must make conscious and value informed decisions regarding the qualities which should be changed in the present condition of land use and what should be preserved. What is often sought is preservation of certain existing emotive powers of a particular place or the fostering of a new condition which would be appropriate to the landscape characteristics of a particular area. These characteristics usually include past use. As a means toward linking future land development to either existing or proposed characteristics of place, the designer's knowledge and understanding of an area's land use history seems essential, and the eventual perceived relationship of the completed design to past development is critical.

The case study House in Central Texas is constructed on a six and one half acre rural site lying in the Braza River Valley (fig. 1). The process of design included research into early and present-day Texas vernacular construction. Individual historical houses were studied, and some traits were identified which appeared to be consistent. Some recurrent observations from this analysis included the relationship of the building mass to the ground plane (fig. 2), the use of simple roof geometries, (fig. 3) etc. These aspects are characterized by an economy of means

stemming from tectonics used as a powerful determinant of form. Pragmatism and directness were observed in many aspects of these vernacular houses. In this way, agricultural buildings, common frame construction, farm and ranch gates, oil field technology, and utilities are similar to pioneer buildings.

The new house was intended to be perceived as clearly connected to previous land use, but the constraints of the new building (and the predilections of the designer) ruled out any attempt to simply replicate previous house design. The strategy used to reconcile these different requirements proposed that the house should be fit into its landscape by analyzing and honoring elemental aspects of the area's earlier development rather than consciously duplicating the formal properties found there. Values and attitudes that underlie the new and the past designs were similar. There do exist obvious formal differences between the new house and its ancestors, but these differences are contextually discordant because of the more profound links of method and objective. Many aspects of previous land use are often devalued by subsequent superficial imitation and image-making. Overly simplistic artificiality undermines the overall objective of a meaningful perceptual link to previous land use.

Some formal characteristics of the vernacular houses were used in a more self-conscious manner. For example, the dogtrot was a popular house type occurring in Texas and elsewhere during the time of the early settlement of Texas (fig. 4). Its evolution has been attributed to both functional and formal pressures[3], and it has been simply defined as "two equal one storey rooms on either side of a central hall joined by a common gable roof."[4]

In the same way, the new Texas house was split into two wings and the roughly equal halves separated by the central hall and covered by the continuous gabled roof (fig. 5). Contemporary

2 A Vernacular House: Texas.



3 A Vernacular House: Texas.

4 Up-Turned Dogtrot House, Steven Holl.

5 Plan.



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

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constraints were allowed to permutate the basic dogtrot form and enclose it in a way which is similar to certain historical adaptations of the house type. A house was produced which replicates the typal form of the dogtrot, but in an abstracted, schematic way.

Patterns of use were of course considered in the design of the new house, with the social use understood to be linked with the surrounding landscape. An early decision based on program split the house into two wings, each with its own requirements for daily use (fig. 6).

The zoning of the house into a dogtrot scheme facilitated its adaptability to changes in use according to season. In the winter, the living function shifts location from the pavillion living and dining space to the dogtrot, (fig. 7), which is heated by a large wood stove. Although most of the exterior walls in this space are glass, the floor of concrete paving blocks on earth fill serves as a heat sink for the radiant heat of both the stove and the sun.

The basic linear character of the plan was to facilitate ventilation and to take advantage of the prevailing south-southeast breezes in the warm months. The long thin shape was also a response to the character of light under the trees of the site. A linear scheme allowed the balancing of the strong south winter light with openings to the north to provide a more even light, especially in the living areas of the house. The kink in the plan allowed all trees to be saved and placed the tallest and thickest trees of the site in the most ideal relationship to the house, that is, to the south. A suitable specific site on a repository bank was located in consultation with landscape architect Tom Woodfin.

The choice of materials was influenced by other aspects of the site. It was apparent early in the design process that grade beams could not be used for the foundation. The oak trees of the area are particularly sensitive to any root disturbance, and

6 Interior View of Living Room.

the soils are highly expansive. The use of drilled footings was suggested by the fact that the largest auger available attached to a common farm tractor, which of course fit easily under the trees.

Design guided by a commitment to stewardship of the land is ultimately synthetic and spiritual. It is the resolution of many problems, and much more than that. It is the making of a unified whole from disparate concerns involving the land. In seeking this unity, a designer may be at once self-expressive and a selfless channel for the forces of place. The designer's means are at once tectonic and poetic; rational and intuitive. These solutions are born of needs and desires, of invention and precedent. When attempting to practice land stewardship in architectural design, as always, architecture lives in the participant's emotional response to perception. In this sense, architecture guided by a sense of stewardship, is simply architecture.

6

7 Exterior View of Entry.

7

Notes

1. Arthur Koestler eloquently illustrates the emotive power of landscape in *Bricks to Babel*, (New York: Random House), 1980. Chapter 27, "The Art of Discovery and the Discoveries of Art."). Here Koestler discusses our physiological reactions to art, and he equates this reaction to two other perceptions, that of God and that of the landscape.
2. Raymond G. Studer, in "Design of the Built Environment" (from *Handbook of Housing and the Built Environment*, E. Huttman and W. van Vliet, Editors (New York: Greenwood Press), 1988, distinguishes "environmental design" from architecture. Studer states that environmental design is "independent from dispositions of individual designers, or historically conditioned norms of enterprise." It will be argued here, however, that both history and the "dispositions" of the designer are valuable tools in design, especially as it relates to landscape.
3. Steven Holl's "Rural and Urban House Types in North America", *Pamphlet Architecture* No. 9 (New York), 1982, outlines both of these views of the evolution of the type. In quoting Richard Hulan (p. 14), Holl describes the functional nature of the dogtrot type as "not so much a way of framing space as living in space." Holl also explains that "the type cannot be given a purely functional explanation" because of the clarity and enigmatic character of type.
4. Ibid.

Figure Credits

1 Photograph by Joseph Mashburn.

2, 3 Courtesy of Joseph Mashburn. Photograph by Gustavo Arce.

4 Courtesy of Steven Holl.

5 Courtesy of Joseph Mashburn. Drawing by Kyle Talbot, and Joseph Mashburn.

6, 7 Courtesy of Joseph Mashburn. Photograph by Paul Hester.

Clark and Menefee, Architects

1 Croffead House: Street Facade.

2 Croffead House: View of Living Room.

3 Croffead House: Site Plan.

The site of the Croffead House is a surburban lot bordered on two sides by confluent rivers. It is the last lot along a street that suddenly opens up to striking river views. The house is at once the continuation and the terminus of a line of houses with fairly consistent spacing and setback. We wanted, therefore, to observe the neighborhood pattern and to end it in recognition of the river enfrontment. The site is further remarkable in that it is divided by a line of live oaks almost parallel to the street that extends through the whole block.

The house has two components, a thirty-two foot concrete block cube containing the living areas and a concrete and glass block loggia containing entrances and the interior stairs. The formal entrance is along a stone walk leading up an exterior stair toward the chimney. Glass behind the chimney allows a view through a two storey living room to the river beyond before entering the house.

The interior is organized around a single masonry column which divides the house into two halves. The left side has a low ceiling and holds the kitchen and dining area; the right side contains the double height living room with a fireplace at one end and a projected glass bay at the other. A balcony level above the kitchen contains a bedroom, dressing room and bath overlooking the living room to river views. The ground floor has a separate entrance leading to a painting studio beneath the living room and to a bedroom, bath and utility room beneath the kitchen.

The interior walls of the concrete block cube are stuccoed and painted. Most of the sub-division of the space is done with wood cabinetry to reinforce the volumetric unity of the house through the use of as few walls as possible. All of the service rooms are located in one quadrant of the square plan. In a sense, this placement recapitulates the strategy of the site plan where the house occupies one quadrant of the land.

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4 Croffead House: View of Entry.

5 Croffead House: Section.

6 Croffead House: Section.

4



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

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7 Croffead House: Ground, First and Second Floor Plans.



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8 New Orleans Museum of Art Competition: Section-Perspective.

9 New Orleans Museum of Art Competition: Site Plan with Front Elevation.

In the three competition projects, a single idea was explored, that of creating ambiguity between what was landscape and what was building.

At the New Orleans Museum of Art (NOMA) the building was placed in a lagoon so that it might appear as a floating garden connecting the cultural institution with the natural setting of the surrounding City Park. The building was arranged as a surround of the old museum, a place partly park, partly building. The roof of the auditorium was designed as an amphitheater for concerts and gatherings.



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

NEW ORLEANS MUSEUM OF ART COMPETITION

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10 New Orleans Museum of Art Competition: First Floor Plan.



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11 The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History: East Elevation.

12 The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History: Model.

The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History was dug into the desert hillside to reduce its visual impact on the land. This strategy allowed the roof top to become a path to the park beyond, a promenade from which one could look down into the galleries to see the collection even when the building was closed. Material from the excavation was used to make an earth-form surrounding the front of the building.



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

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13 *The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History: First Floor Plan.*

14 *The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History: Section.*



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

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15 The Phoenix, Arizona Museum of History: Site Plan.



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16 The South Carolina Marine Science Museum Competition: Perspective.

17 The South Carolina Marine Science Museum Competition: Site Plan.

The South Carolina Aquarium, like NOMA, was designed to be seen as a terraced garden in the river, reached by a footbridge. Its inverted roof domes held water which spilled from the highest to the lowest and finally into the river, signifying the movement of water in South Carolina from the mountains to the sea. The river terrace was meant to recall the bastions of the city's original defenses.

Figure Credits
1,2,4 Courtesy of W.G. Clark and Charles Menefee. Photographs by Timothy Hursley (The Arkansas Office).
3,5-17 Courtesy of W.G. Clark and Charles Menefee.



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

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Biographical Notes

Aaron Betsky *is an architectural critic and designer living in Los Angeles. A teacher at CalPoly Pomona and the Southern California Institute for Architecture, he is a Contributing Editor for* Metropolitan Home. *He is also the author of the forthcoming* Violated Perfection: The Fragmentation of the Modern *(Rizzoli) and* The Architecture of James Gamble Rogers *(Architectural History Foundation/MIT). Mr. Betsky grew up in The Netherlands and received both his B.A. and his M.Arch. at Yale University.*

Pamela Burton *was born in Santa Monica, California in 1948. After receiving a B.A. fron the University of California at Los Angeles in 1970, she received an M.Arch. from UCLA in 1975. She practices landscape architecture and currently is principal of Burton & Spitz, a firm which has worked on Bravo 20, a bombing range; Hydrotopia, a retreat for scientists, theologians and convicts; UCLA Northwest Campus housing; Los Angeles's Department of Water & Power's reservoir sites; UCLA Law School; and the Escondido Cultural Center with Moore Ruble Yudell. Her work has been featured in numerous publications and she is presently co-editing a book with Richard Hertz entitled* The Contemporary Landscape: Theory and Issues. *In addition to her professional practice she teaches at Southern California Institute of Architecture and has guest-lectured at RISD, the University of Virginia, and UCLA.*

Warren T. Byrd, Jr. *received a B.S. in Horticulture from Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1975 and a M.L.A. from the University of Virginia in 1978. He practices landscape architecture in Charlottesville, Virginia and is the Chairman and Associate Professor in Landscape Architecture at the University of Virginia. His work and writing have won numerous awards, including the ASLA's Bradford Williams Medal and H.W.S. Cleveland Fellowship. In 1986, he participated in "Transforming the American Garden: 12 New Landscape Designs,"an exhibition of 12 designs by outstanding young landscape architects sponspered by Harvard University and the National Endowment for the Arts. Mr. Byrd has been and continues to be a lecturer and jury member at universities and professional organizations across the country.*

Peter Carl *received a B.A. from Princeton University in 1968 and a M.Arch. from Princeton in 1974. Since then he has taught at the University of Kentucky where he participated in the "Roma Interrotta" exhibit with Colin Rowe and Steven Peterson. He has worked in the office of Michael Graves and has written several articles on Mr. Graves's work. He has published articles in* The Princeton Architectural Review *and* Daedalus *and is currently a Fellow of the College of Architecture, Cambridge University.*

W.G. Clark *received a B.Arch. from the University of Virginia. He has taught at the University of Virginia and at the Harvard Graduate School of Design. In 1974, he started his own practice and in 1985 joined with Charles Menefee to form Clark and Menefee, Architects, based in Charleston, South Carolina. His office has won several national design competitions and two AIA national honor awards for built work. He is currently teaching design at the University of Virginia and was formerly the Chairman of the Department of Architecture there. He doesn't like cigars, poetry readings or drum solos.*

John di Domenico *is a principal of the New York City-based design firm of Weintraub and di Domenico. He received a degree in architecture from the City College of New York and a M. Arch. degree in Urban Design from Harvard University, where he was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to study in Rome. He is a professor of architecture and planning at the Center for Architecture of the New York*

Ellen Dunham-Jones *received a B.A. in Architecture and Urban Planning,* Summa Cum Laude, *and a M. Arch. both from Princeton University. She has worked for several architects in New York City, most recently for Peter Eisenman on the Wexner Center for the Fine Arts at Ohio State University. She is continuing her research on architecture, urbanism and post-industrialism with a grant from the W. Alton Jones Foundation.*

Felim Egan *was born in 1952. He studied at Belfast, Portsmouth and Slade School of Fine Art in London. He has exhibited widely since*

1978, representing Ireland at A Sense of Ireland *in London, 1980, at the Xle Biennale de Paris, 1980, and at the 18a Bienal de Sao Paulo, 1985. Awards include: Arts Councils of Ireland and Northern Ireland, GPA and an Arts Council of Northern Ireland scholarship to the British School at Rome, 1980. He is a member of Aosdana. His work is in major galleries and collections in Ireland and abroad.*

Richard Hertz. *After receiving his undergraduate degree from UCLA in 1967, Richard Hertz received his Ph. D. in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. He taught for one year at the University of California, Riverside, and for six years at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. In 1974, he began teaching at the California Institute of the Arts, Valencia, where his academic interests shifted from philosophy to contemporary art theory and criticism. In 1979, He became Chairman of Academic Studies at Art Center College of Design, Pasadena, in charge of the Liberal Arts and Sciences and the graduate program. In 1985, Prentice-Hall published* Theories of Contemporary Art, *presently in its fourth printing; in February, 1990, Prentice-Hall published* Twentieth Century Art Theory, *written with Norman Klein.*

J.B. Jackson *was born in Connecticut and educated at Harvard. He served as a combat intelligence officer during World War II and in 1951 founded* Landscape *magazine, which he edited for 17 years. He has taught at U.C. Berkeley, Harvard, the University of Texas, and the University of Minnesota. His books include* The Necessity for Ruins and Other Topics, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape, *and* Landscapes *(edited by Ervin Zube), and his essays appear in numerous anthologies and periodicals. He makes his home near Santa Fe, New Mexico.*

Leo Marx *has held the William R. Kenan, Jr. Chair in American Cultural History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1976. A scholar of international renown, he is an acute observer of the history and evolution of American society. Mr. Marx has been particularly concerned with the relationships between man, nature, and technology, and the function of values in culture. His book,* The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Idea in America *has shaped all subsequent discussion of its topic since publication in 1964, and is a source of insight and inspiration at schools of architecture and landscape architecture. Mr. Marx is a literary critic of note, and his articles on a variety of topics are often seen in distinguished periodicals. Mr. Marx has held teaching posts at Harvard University, the University of Minnesota, Amherst College, and Brandeis University, and has served as a Fulbright visiting lecturer in England and France. Twice a Guggenheim Fellow, he has held positions of leadership in a number of scholarly organizations.*

Joseph Mashburn *received a B. Arch. from the University of Houston and an M. Arch. from Texas A&M University. He has taught at Houston and A&M and served as the Associate Department Head and Graduate Coordinator at A&M. He is currently Associate Professor in the College of Architecture and Urban Studies at Virginia Tech. His work has received several design awards and has been published in* The Architectural Review, Progressive Architecture, The Journal of Architectural Education, *and other periodicals. He is a partner in the Newport, Virginia based firm Mashburn & Mashburn.*

Thom Mayne *is a principal partner in the Santa Monica based firm Morphosis. He received a B. Arch. from the University of Southern California and an M. Arch. from Harvard University. He is currently a board member and professor of Architecture at the Southern California Institute of Architecture. He has taught as a visiting faculty member at Harvard University; Columbia University; U.C.L.A.; the University of Pennsylvania; the University of Texas at Austin; Washington University, St. Louis; and Miami University, Ohio. With his firm, he has won many national design awards and*

Charles Menefee III *received a B.Arch. from Carnegie-Mellon University. He has taught at the University of Virginia and as a Distinguished Visiting Critic at Clemson University. From 1981 to 1985 he was with the Charleston Architectural Group as Principal.*

In 1985, he formed Clark & Menefee Architects with W.G. Clark in Charleston, South Carolina. The firm has won several national design competitions and two AIA national honor awards for built work.

***Sheila O'Donnell** graduated from University College Dublin School of Architecture in 1976. She received an MA in Environmental Design from the Royal College of Art in London. She has worked for Colquhoun and Miller and Stirling Wilford and Associates. Since 1981 she has been in private practice in Dublin and is a Studio Lecturer at UCD. Her work has been exhibited in Ireland, Britain and Europe. Her publications include* Figurative Architecture—The Work of Five Dublin Architects *(AA, 1986) and* O'Donnell and Tuomey Buildings and Projects 1981-1988 *(Gandon Editions, 1988). She has lectured extensively in Britain and taught at Princeton University. Her awards include an AD Project Award, 1984, an AAI Award, 1986, and the AAI Downes Medal in 1988 for her design for a new Irish Film Center. She is now in practice with John Tuomey.*

***Michael Rotondi** is a principal partner in the Santa Monica based firm Morphosis. He received his architectural training at the Southern California Institute of Architecture in 1973, of which he is currently a board member and the director. He has taught as a visiting faculty member at the University of Moscow, the University of Minnesota, Columbia University, U.C.L.A., the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Texas at Austin. With his firm, he has won many national design awards and competitions.*

***Michael Stanton** was educated at Antioch College and Harvard University and received his M.Arch. from Princeton in 1984. He has practiced in New York, London, Boston and Washington, D.C. and has taught at The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, RISD, Catholic University and the University of Miami. He was an editor at Academy Editions, London and at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, where he contributed to their retrospective volume published in 1984. Articles have appeared in* Art and Design *and* Urbis 6. *He was the first Aga Khan Travelling Fellow in 1980 and is the 1990-92 Steedman Fellow with Fellowship in the American Academy in Rome. He currently teaches at Tulane University.*

***John Tuomey** graduated from University College Dublin School of Architecture 1976. He worked with Stirling Wilford and Associates on projects including Staadtsgalerie, Stuttgart, and Science Center, Berlin. He worked in Dublin at the Office of Public Works, 1981-87, as architect for a number of public buildings and projects, including Laboratory at Abbotstown and Courthouse at Smithfield. He is in private practice with Sheila O'Donnell. He has been widely published and exhibited internationally, including at the AA, London, and the Institut Francais d'Architecture. His publications include* Figurative Architecture *(AA, 1986) and* O'Donnell and Tuomey *(Dublin, 1988). His awards include an AD Project Award, 1984, an AAI Award, 1987, and the Lord Mayor's Milennium Award, 1988. He teaches at UCD and has taught at Princeton University and Harvard University.*

***Lee Weintraub** is a principal of the New York City-based design firm of Weintraub & di Domenico. He was trained at the City College of New York's program in Urban Landscape Architecture. He has worked as a principal planner at the Department of Planning and Development of the City of Trenton, New Jersey, and from 1979 to 1984 he served as Director of the Bureau of Open Space Design for the Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the city of New York. He currently serves as a member of the New York City Landmarks Commission, and the New York State Council on the Arts. He is a professor of urban landscape architecture at the City College of New York.*

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