
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The Harvard Architecture Review 8
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

BETWEEN TAXONOMY AND COMMUNION

An entrance wall incised with names of animal fables, the floor moves with the pressed weight of the body on glass, small glass panes laid over raw sheep fleece, crossed by a table of iron oxide, on it are laid a collection of animal and human teeth, the underside of the table drips red, staining the skins below, on the wall, a cage.

Ann Hamilton, La Jolla Museum of Contemporary Art 1990

The Harvard Architecture Review 8

The Harvard Architecture Review is a publication of
the students of the Graduate School of Design, Harvard University

RIZZOLI
NEW YORK

Editor Peter Coombe

Designer Lisa Govan/The Sarabande Press

Assistant Editors Jeffrey Inaba and Sam Mitchell
Copy Editors Arden Hank and Honor Winks

Cover Design Ross Wimer
Composition The Sarabande Press

The editors are grateful for the advice and generosity of Nicolas Grabar, Michael Horowitz, Andrea Kahn, Larry Levine, The Louver Gallery, and Nate McBride.

The editors wish to acknowledge the efforts and contributions of Arnold Lee, Andrew Yang, Susan Desko, Mary Fernando, and the following: Collette Creppel, Ame Englehart, Joy Fedden, Suzanne Franco, John Friedman, Ken Hilgendorf, Alice Kim, En Chuan LI, and Thomas Saltzman.

Send editorial correspondences to:
The Harvard Architecture Review 8
George Gund Hall, 48 Quincy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Send orders and business correspondences to:
Rizzoli International Publications, Inc.
300 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Rizzoli International Publications, Inc.

Printed and Bound in Japan

ISBN 0-8478-5501-5
ISSN 0194-3650

INDIGO BLUE

On the main floor of an old garage a platform of used work clothing, blue, layered, pants and shirts. Behind the mound a person erases, books, blue, line by line, back to front, saliva and a pink pencil eraser. Upstairs, soybeans hang in net bags, rotting, a window, a view down.

Ann Hamilton, Spoleto Festival, Charleston 1991

The diversity of arguments assembled here aid the delineation of a discipline whose boundaries are no longer easily described. Conventional distinctions, even between dissimilar activities, are strategically neglected, allowing the intrigues and intricacies of other disciplines to consume the one named here. The effect is never singular: proffering radical investigations and realignments of instituted boundaries, architecture is potentially remade through these speculative transgressions.

The articles are arranged such that the first and last bracket those between. The journal ends with a discussion of material and begins with drawing. In between are different paths leading in many directions, to and from architecture.

The Harvard Architecture Review 8



"One only knows a spot once one has experienced it in as many dimensions as possible. You have to have approached a place from all four cardinal points if you want to take it in, and what's more, you also have to have left it from all these points. Otherwise it will quite unexpectedly cross your path three or four times before you are prepared to discover it . . . The same thing with houses." Walter Benjamin, Moscow Diary

ANDREA POZZO: ***PLAN OF SQUARES WITH THEIR ELEVATIONS*****, 1707 ED.**

Disclosure: Approaching Architecture

ANDREA KAHN

1: APPROACHING ARCHITECTURE

Architecture, like the objects, places, houses, cities that it provides for our attention, demands approach from more than one direction. As Walter Benjamin noted in *Moscow Diary*, neither a single point of view nor a solitary passage has the authority to establish knowledge of a place; yet, despite their differences, each path and its attendant aspect are always similar. To come to know architecture is to uncover a multivalent field where any one point of view is insufficient as a means of discovery, where distance separates individual lines of approach.

The paths leading into architecture are not traced as easily as Benjamin's. A conception of architecture rests upon figuring relationships among its multiple aspects. These aspects include types of knowledge (theoretical, practical, technical) that are always kinds of making (drawn, written, built) and means of construction (conceptual and material). Alone none of these can fully describe architecture in either phenomenological or epistemological terms. Rather, it is a ranging and arranging task to proceed towards architecture and arrive at an understanding of architectural work: uncovering correspondences within a complex field. Drawing together program and site, theory and design, form and idea, architecture is a practice of constructive conversations opened through and exposing to view many claims to attention.

1: APPROACHING DRAWING

To approach architecture as Benjamin might, begin along one "path," architectural drawing, and proceed towards it from three directions: as a mode of production, a form of construction, and a type of architectural knowledge. Examining drawing in this way, and, in turn, considering the relations of drawing to building, provides entry into a multidimensional understanding of architecture. It is an investigation based upon the potential for analogical conditions, relationships of similarity **in** difference, to situate a "subtle resemblance of relationships" amidst the many facets of architecture.[1]

These are neither simple relations of identity, since the erasure of all difference forecloses the dialogue between alternative positions, nor are they metaphorical in structure. Analogy and meta-

1 This definition of analogical relationships is from Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, (New York: Random House, 1973), 21. On analogy as it relates to notions of conversation see David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 93: "Authentic analogical language is a rare achievement, since it attempts the nearly impossible: an articulation of real differences as genuinely different but also similar to what we already know. On a more existential level, an analogical imagination suggests a willingness to enter the conversation, that unnerving place where one is willing to risk all one's present self-understanding by facing the claims to attention of the other."

phor require the tensive coexistence of similarity and difference; in metaphor the figure is limited to a relationship between two terms, while analogies are relationships formed between relationships, creating multiple valencies of significance.

Because drawing inscribes a constructive conversation among architecture's many aspects, an important question ensues: How does drawing "work"? The drawing **as** object and the drawing **of** an object can never be completely separated or entirely conflated. Likewise, the activity of drawing as a process of conception cannot be disengaged from drawing as a notational operation. In addition, architectural drawing considered as a process, and as a mode of production, is a working medium through which ideas are manifest. Like other types of material construction, drawing invariably results in works of architecture.

Drawings are architectural objects configuring architectural knowledge. These objects are also manifestations of an abstract structure, a "secondary representation." Drawing, as a secondary representation, can be prescriptive, pointing to something which does not exist outside the drawing, such as preliminary design drawing; descriptive, depicting something which may or may not exist outside the drawing, for example a "design development drawing" or a survey document; and analytical, revealing otherwise unrecognized conditions, for example the presence of geometric or proportional systems. Drawings can exist by the grace of the possibility of built construction, as in John Soane's documentation of a construction process; by the grace of its impossibility, as in Piranesi's Carceri series; or independently of these concerns, as in the paintings of Massimo Scolari or the "Chamberworks" of Daniel Liebeskind. Whether explanatory or exploratory, drawing as both verb and noun is an inscription of architecture, an interpretation open to interpretation.

Just like the practice of drawing, the way one attends to drawing is a matter of custom. To approach architectural drawing depends upon two distinct, yet mutually informed, sets of conventions. There are graphic conventions which include interpretive notations such as systems of mark-making, scaling, and structuring. In addition, there are hermeneutic conventions, methods of "reading" drawings, based upon assumptions which ascribe meaning to—by construing interpretations of—graphic conventions. Hermeneutic practices establish the significance of drawing relative to other aspects of architecture and specify a drawing's potential tectonic relevance. Further, they promote or preclude recognition of the fact of drawing as both a designed object and a design process. Like all conventions, those structuring our understanding of architectural drawing can be modified over time. Changes to graphic conventions yield new ways of drawing and new ways of conceiving space, while changes to conventionalized interpretations affect what is assumed as



Hugh Ferriss approached drawing as a mode of conception; his works in and through drawing, the product of a conversation deployed between drawing as object and drawing of an object.In the 14th Edition *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Ferriss outlined the purposes of rendering: ". . . to convey advance realizations of proposed structures, to aid in crystallizing ideas in the architect's mind, and to interpret the significance of structures." That the interpretive function of drawing is often overlooked by the architectural constituency is evidenced most clearly in pedagogical arguments framing the question of how to teach drawing as one of media mastery or "communication skills" rather than design thinking.

HUGH FERRISS: *STEPPING BACK OF BUILDING BASED ON NEW YORK CITY ZONING LAW*, 1924



MICHELANGELO: *STUDY FOR THE FORTIFICATIONS OF THE PORTA DEL PRATO*, 1529



ANDREA PALLADIO: *PERSPECTIVE SECTION OF THE ROMAN AMPHITHEATRE*, CA. 1540

A drawing is always a partial view: It is sectional, a strategic taking a-part of an idea or object; it is prescribed by, and inscribes, a point of view. The drawing process, an approach to existing construction as in Palladio's perspective, or to a conceived construction as in Michelangelo's Fortification study, is a method of advancing understanding: a means of confrontation. In the words of Le Corbusier in Esprit Nouveau: "By working with our hands, by drawing, we enter the house of a stranger, we are enriched by the experience, we learn."



ANONYMOUS ITALIAN: *LESSON IN PERSPECTIVE*, 1780



ANDREA POZZO: *A CUPOLA IN HORIZONTAL PERSPECTIVE*, 1707 ED.

Projecting the drawing as object and the drawn object simultaneously, "construction lines" implicate the process of designing drawing as that of designing architecture. These lines suggest proportional or geometric relations; in Pozzo's perspective they delineate the affiliation between distinct orthographic conventions. Incorporated traces of abstract order, the projection lines of a 16th century lesson in perspective demonstrate drawing as construction and reveal reciprocity between *a* drawn and *a* built architecture.



RUDIMENTUM NOVITORIUM: WOOD CUT WORLD MAP, 1475



WALSEMULLER: WOOD CUT GORES, 1507



MT. ST. HELENS "BEFORE," WIRE FRAME PROJECTION

In medieval maps, a religiously founded conception of the world could be represented in narrative terms drawn from Biblical geography, or in the itinerary map corresponding to the path of the crusades (where spatial relationships were presented linearly). Later Ptolemeic and Mercator projections charted spatial relationships geometrically to create a graphic analogue of the physical world. Today, mathematically digitized images made by computer render physical conditions with abstract accuracy.

architectural knowledge and how it is seen to be embodied in drawing.

The consideration of two seemingly different drawing types reveals the assumptions which proscribe the potential of architectural drawing. Construction documents, or "working drawings," attempt to describe the materiality of a building.[2] They are produced for pragmatic purposes and are normally thought of as drawings **of** something. The graphic conventions used are determined by their commensurability with knowledge of material construction; evolve from different drawing types; and are a function of a settlement between many parties: banker, builder, designer.[3]

A similar settlement (contract) is at play when a drawing is conceived **as** an architectural work in its own right. Such drawings are typically labeled "paper architecture" or "theoretical," especially when the work is intended to remain "unbuilt." While the graphic conventions employed in these drawings are essentially the same as those used in construction documents their meaning often differs substantially.

2 Or furniture, engineered projects, etc.

3 As players in the "drawing game," they decide how to interpret the graphic conventions as architecturally meaningful. For a discussion of the "language game" as a social contract, see J.F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 14.

The standard interpretation of construction documents as something other than "paper architecture" detaches the corporeal from the conceptual property of drawing. In each case, one property is privileged, implying two contrary roles for drawing. One role suggests that drawing is predicated upon building; while the second proposes drawing as altogether "other" than built. These conventionalized views of the two drawing types establish false polarizations among the epistemological dimensions of drawn work.

A revised approach, now from more than one direction, alters how the work of drawing is conceived. When "working drawing" and "paper architecture" both are seen to abstract—literally draw out—the potentiality of architecture through their corporal condition these apparently distinct types no longer represent hypothetical limits. Here any architectural drawing is credited with the capacity to simultaneously construe diverse aspects of knowledge; any drawing can be read any number of ways, and each reading can offer another understanding.

The architectural content of any drawing is never given *a priori*; accepted readings are instituted by interpretation which remains a function of disciplinary and, thereby, politically informed settlements. To the extent that some drawings refer to "other" constructions and some do not marks an obvious distinction; but the role of drawings relative to other modes of production need not be the sole criteria for determining significance as architectural knowledge. More relevant to this determination is the



MORPHOSIS: 2-4-6-8 *COMPONENT DIAGRAM*, 1980



R.R. MILLET: *MAISON EN BOIS*, 1852

The arrangement as well as the choice of information in an architectural drawing reveals as much about the conception of construction as it does about the method. Morphorsis' exploded component diagram depicts individual building parts in sequential as well as spatial relationships, not only to one another but to the building as a whole. Rene-Robert Millet's *Maison en Bois* describes how building parts are made of smaller parts, but bears relatively little information about the way these go together at the scale of the building as a whole. This is shown instead by the uppermost elevations and sections, which are distinguished from the rest of the sheet by their shade and shadow, and are yet further separated by the underline of the drawing titles.



JAMES STIRLING: PLAN AND PARTIAL ELEVATION, STAATSGALERIE, STUTTGART

In James Stirling's plan/elevation/wall section of the rotunda at the Staatsgalerie, xerox images of the statuary offer one aspect of the architecture's materiality, the graphic conventions used to describe the architectural construction another. Corporeal representation and abstract representation are joined in the conception of the architecture through the construction of the drawing itself.

essential simultaneity of drawing as a formed interpretation of an abstract structure and a sufficient architectural object in its own right.

The numerous aspects of drawing manifest its architectural condition. By acknowledging this multidimensionality, drawing can be seen as analogous to the complexity of built form. Donald Kunze, in a discussion of reading as a metaphor for understanding architecture, poses the following question:

> What if the dimensionality of a work of art is not automatically given by the medium of the art form, but is *drawn* from an experience of the work: what if, in addition, the serial dimensionality of perception and the multi-dimensional restructuring of memory are implicit and indispensable to the understanding of any work?[4]

Kunze's statement situates dimensionality in interpretation, reinforcing an approach to drawing as working architecture. This affiliation is embodied in the Italian *disegno* (meaning design and drawing); the process of working *through* drawing is understood as the process of *working* through architecture. Approached as like, but not, building, drawing is a definitive architectural construction potentially incommensurate with, yet capable of critically disclosing, the limits of built work. Returning to the intial question: How does drawing work? Drawing *functions* architecturally as it *forms* architecture.[5]

Composite Drawing

To consider the critical capacity of drawing opens yet another analogical web. Since drawing is part of a heterogeneous field it is always and already a multivalent construction. It is possible to explore these multidimensional relationships by examining **composite** drawings. By virtue of the many dimensions they offer for interpretation, these drawings disclose the diverse aspects of architecture as many intersecting forces. Nevertheless, if composite drawings are distinguished from other types it is because they *explicitly* project architecture as an essentially multivalent field. The *multiple view*, a composite drawing of orthographic types; the *analytique*, a drawing of various scales and types; and the design drawings

4 In Donald Kunze "Architecture as Reading; Virtuality, Secrecy, Monstrosity", *Journal of Architectural Education*, 41, no.4, (1988), p.31; my emphasis.

5 To arrive at the operation of drawing suggested here involves a second "double reading" as well, this time of the notion "through": to work "through" in the sense of passing from one point to another, and to "work through" meaning within the constraints of, i.e., to operate architecturally.



GIOVANNI BATTISTA PIRANESI: A VAST GALLERY WITH ROUND ARCHES AND A GROUP OF PRISONERS ON A STONE, *CARCERI*, FIRST SLATE



GIACOMO BAROZZI DA VIGNOLA: *THE MANNER OF CURVING COLUMNS*, 1562



HUGH FERRISS: *PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO NEW YORK METROPOLITAN MUSEUM*, 1946



BERNARD TSCHUMI: *THE STREET, MANHATTAN TRANSCRIPTS*, 1981

Drawings refer to other drawings in various ways. Any "set" of drawings (presentation, construction, etc.) constitutes a context where single sheets are cross-referenced into a coherent and complete body of information. Drawings can also refer to one another as objects directly: Ferriss' *Proposed Alterations to the Metropolitan Museum* draws from Piranesi's *Carceri* series in the frontality of the building machine, the cascading lines of construction netting, the recession from dark to light through the depth of the image, and more generally, the quality of graphic mark. Through transformation, drawings can become like a palimpsest as, for example, the trace of Vignola's "Curving Column" in Bernard Tschumi's "Manhattan Transcripts."

of Carlo Scarpa, combinations of diverse types, scales, and media, all extend and expose how standard graphic conventions determine a conception of architecture. The importance of composite drawings is that they do more than admit the many aspects of architecture, they set these aspects in dialogue. As working conversations, composite drawings inscribe a critical, calculating construction where plans and sections, materials and measures, details and site strategies are subject to opportunistic interaction. Here, drawing is subservient to neither an *a priori* habit of mind nor an *a posteriori* construct; it is itself a working approach to architecture.

The Multiple View

In orthographic drawing, two plus two equals three. The multiple view, delineating plan, section, and/or elevation, makes this architectural mathematics explicit. The two dimensions of the horizontal plane added to the two dimensions of the vertical plane fabricate and contain the three dimensions of architecture's space. The interdependence between planes cannot be disclosed in a single orthographic slice, rather it is contingent upon two conditions: The coincidence of orthographic slices along a single shared line forming a *joint*; and the multiple *cut* which inscribes horizontal surfaces, vertical surfaces, and their attendant orientations simultaneously.

The convergence of the plan and section, as well as the impossibility of occupying one without the other, is recognized in these drawings. However, they go beyond simple orthographic invention; they represent a composite mode of conception. The cut, an explicit incision, implies opening up and occupying. Drawn together along the joint, horizontal, vertical, interior, and exterior overcome the dimensional disengagement imposed by distinct drawing types. The spatial abstraction of plan is mitigated by the experiencing body implicated in section and elevation. The abstraction of one orthogonal plane, once conjoined with others, forms architectural space as a resonant composition of diverse dimensions. The fragmentation given by many cuts exactly delineates the aspects of architectural work, suggesting a process of discovery where knowledge is accrued from many directions.

Unlike axonometric construction, where volume is made available in and by drawing itself and the projection displaces the subject to an other space not shared by the object, the composite drawing draws the subject in. Perspective construction can also "let the viewer in," but the points of view in a composite orthogonal construction constantly shift between different planes, in contrast to a single perspectival point of view enclosed in a set frame. The multiple view situates the viewer at once outside and inside, on plan and in section.

Resulting from the conscious discontinuity of its cuts, the composite drawing manifests the processes and contemplation of architectural work. The multiple view allows distinct drawing types to be



SIR CHRISTOPHER WREN: CHAPTER HOUSE OR BAPTISTRY FOR ST. PAULS, 1675



SCAMOZZI: *PIANO DELLE OFFICINE DI QUESTA CASA FIANCO DESTRO*, 1615



WILLIAM KENT: *DESIGN FOR A NEW HOUSE OF LORDS*, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, 1735



ANDREA PALLADIO: SCENE FRONT, TEATRICO OLYMPICO, 1580

The multiple view has long been associated with bilaterally symmetrical structures. Its potential, however, goes beyond this historical association with symmetrical forms. It is worth noting that these compositions do manifest a representational relation as concieved by the French system of naming drawings; "*coupe horozontale*" and "*coupe verticale*" denote a correspondence lost in the English distinction between "plan" and "section." The graphic separation of Scamozzi's plan and section implies, rather than draws out, a proportional correspondence. In William Kent's plan/interior elevation, unwrapping vertical surfaces about the perimeter of the plan suggests a spatial volume, but the composition is predicated on the formal order of the drawing *as* object; three of the four elevations suspend a gravitationally determined approach to vertical surfaces. Palladio's elevation/section, deployed along a single line, inscribes a sequential relation limited to the vertical dimension.



BALDASSARE PERUZZI: *INTERIOR OF ST. PETER'S AT ROME*, CA. 1515

The Renaissance problem of the centralized church necessitated building significant correspondence between the phenomenal and epistemological aspects of architecture. The multiple view provided a means to represent the interdependence of the corporeal and the abstract in architectural construction. The resolution of the analytic aspect of drawing (that which makes evident the underlying, abstract structure of a work) with the documentary (that which reveals the different physical parts of a work using separate graphic devices) is achieved by explicitly projecting a geometric relationship between multiple cuts, drawing them together as complementary and necessary to the representation of the object as a whole.

approached in a non-linear way, putting forth architecture as a speculative pursuit which cannot be reduced to situating a single answer, but which calls for a chorus of questions.

Analytique

The Analytique goes further than the multiple-view to establish resonance, not simply between orthographic dimensions, but between graphic scalar conventions as well.[6] The analytique brings together diverse scales and views which all share the space of a single drawing: a site plan, often nestled in the shadows of a doorway or window, fragments of plans and sections, elevations set in a landscape, ornamental details. Their suggestive yet fragmentary construction evoke the entirety of an architectural project.

The "frontispiece," a particular class of analytique drawings, offers an interesting exception to the classic, Beaux Arts pedagogical strategy which advanced a "logical" sequence of drawings and scales in the course of the design development process. Today this rigorous pedagogical axiom still provides a precedent for architectural design studios more often than not practiced in professional life. Preferences for particular drawing types, for example, the institutionalized reading of the plan as "generator"; sequential adoption of different scales; distinctions between "design" and "presentation" drawings, all are notions which continue to effect the creation and the interpretation of drawing. Allying certain drawings, and media, with discrete moments in the design process can engender false conjectures about the supposed prerequisite character of one drawing type over another. More problematic still, such patterns of use can falsely prioritize particular design issues and engender assumptions as to the superority of one aspect of architecture over another. This constrains the potential value of drawings by limiting possibilities for their use, ultimately affecting a more fundamental level of architectural

6 J. Harbeson, "The 'Analytique' or Order Problem", *The Study of Architectural Design, with Special Reference to the Program of the Beaux Arts Institute of Design* (New York: Pencil Point Press, 1927), 7.

It is valuable to distinguish between two uses of the term "analytique" which refers, on one hand, to "a study in proportion, and in the elements of architecture- the treatment of walls, doorways, windows, cornices, balustrades, porticos, arcades, etc." often made as large scale study drawings of profiles adopted to develop specific details; and, on the other hand, to describe a drawing which composes multiple architectural aspects in one drawing.

JOHN VEGEZZI: *A COLONNADE*

With its centered column detail *A Colonnade* is bifurcated, presenting the repetitious bay of this architectural type on the most frontal surface of the drawing. A partial plan and an elevation are located in the left bay of the drawing, a larger elevation in the right bay. *A Doorway*, by comparison, is essentially a symmetrical composition, centered on the single element of the door itself. A small plan is superimposed on the more darkly shadowed balustrade directly under the perspectivally recessed elevation. As the balustrade slips behind the larger scale urn in the lower left hand corner, a connection is drawn between the curvature of the urn base and that of the posts. A section inscribed midpoint, above the urn, is (like the plan) partially obscured by a rendered pilaster.



D'ESPOUY: *CORI, TEMPLE OF HERCULES*



WILLIAM ULRICH: *A DOORWAY*

In *The Study of Architectural Design*, John Harbison provides D'Espouy's *Cori, Temple of Hercules* as "an example of a 'composed' sheet, showing plan and elevation at small scale, and details at a larger scale." The bisection of both plan and section with similar shadows correlates these two aspects of the drawing, pulling the eye back from the more frontal plan to the recessed elevation and finally to the landscape beyond. The siting of the elevation, slightly off-center in relation to the framing columns in the foreground, is reiterated by the rightward shift of the larger details relative to the overall proportions of the sheet. The analytique manifests the fundamentally composite condition of architectural work—a thought process which moves back and forth through in and out, and in and over, over and over again.

conception. Such practices inform how architecture is thought.

The analytique entails a conception of architecture through discontinuous knowledge. Its precise alignments virtually cleave apart the order of building. The viewer, as well as the maker, must project a whole out of the constituent elements of a single drawing. Proportional and compositional correspondence is made between pieces of a comprehensive, yet essentially incomplete, construction. Adjacencies in the drawing suggest possible affiliations between physically distant, but conceptually proximate, building parts. In addition to describing elemental correspondences, the analytique draws out relationships between ideas and forms. (The making of architecture is rarely, if ever, a linear procedure.) The analytique, despite its overt disjunctions, infers conjunction across a speculative field.

As one approaches any object (drawing, building, or otherwise) the ability to see detailed information increases in inverse proportion to a perceivable sense of overall ordering principles. To understand how the particular relates to the whole one must confront these two aspects of a work simultane-

ALDO ROSSI: *LITTLE THEATRE WITH HAND OF THE SAINT OF SHADOWS*, 1978



ALDO ROSSI: *DOMESTIC AND URBAN ARCHITECTURE*, 1975

A drawing is a site. It creates a physical context to strategically sight information and intention. The monumental scale of Aldo Rossi's coffeepot—real scale of the drawing *as* object, as well as implied scale in terms of the relative importance of the objects drawn—describes specific ornament (cornice lines), material (masonry lines), and surface construction (stair profile). The smaller scale of the buildings beyond affords more generalized information as to overall massing and schematic fenestration.

ously.[7] In building and drawing alike different scales proffer different types of information. A change of scale is directly related to a change in point of view, and, as such, a change in visible aspects of construction. This correspondence not withstanding, it is impossible to ignore the fundamental difference between drawings and buildings. There is always an aporia between them which cannot be bridged in phenomenal terms. However, by virtue of informative tectonic relationships which are inherent to drawings as well as buildings, including, but not limited to, those of scale, material, form, and composition, a common ground exists.

As it points to the potentiality of construction, the analytique manifests the significance of its particular structure. While often construed simply as an exercise in formal composition, even by the most devoted followers of the Beaux Arts system, to understand the analytique as merely an empty compositional conceit is to overlook its tectonic relevance as a configuration of multiple relations at multiple scales. To construct an analytique is to design architectural relationships in and through a drawing process marked by a conscious understanding of the architectonics of drawn composition itself. Equally, to conceive of the drawing itself as a site, to recognize that the location of an image within the confines of the page can have a meaningful relation to the location of a building within the confines of a physical place, is to understand the process of drawing as a process of structuring architectural knowledge. It is to see drawings as inscriptions of architecture. Without conflating drawn and built work, or subsuming drawing under building, each can define architecture in its own terms.



VIGNOLA: *FIRST RULE FOR PERSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION*, 1583



JAN VREDEMAN DE VRIES: *PERSPECTIVE*, 1604

In Vignola's *First Rule of Perspective Construction*, viewing subject and object of vision are seperated and at once conjoined by the picture plane which intercepts and transforms projected lines of vision. The enclosive power of perspectival construction is underscored by Jan Vredeman de Vries' *Perspective* where one pair of viewing eyes is prone, trapped, inside the drawing. Two others (or three, if the reader as viewer is accounted for) stand outside the drawing, safe to peek timidly through the threshhold of the picture plane.

7 For a discussion of the relation between universal and particular as it applies to the problem of representation, see Ernst Cassirer, "Introduction and Presentation of the Problem" *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 75-114.

The Drawings of Carlo Scarpa

The drawings of Carlo Scarpa manifest the definitive as well as the critical potential of drawing through the simultaneous presence of so many fragments. Any one drawing is never a singular prospect. These drawings are neither wholly determined by conventionalized modes of graphic delineation, nor do they eschew the conditions of material construction; instead, they implicate the corporeal and abstract conditions of architecture in a complex configuration. Throwing together media, multiple dimensions, varying scales, and diverse conventions of representation, Scarpa's drawings preclude the location of a single, privileged point of view.

Within the constraints set by the tectonics of drawing, they present an architectural projection characterized by insistent co-figuration. The drawings celebrate diverse aspects of construction, and are revealed as conceptual constructs in material form. These are architectural projects. The resonance of Scarpa's drawings is not limited to the concurrent claims of different drafting conventions. It is also a function of the way these conventions are materialized through the process of making the drawing as an object.

"Rendering" is commonly taken to describe a process of adding information (pertaining, for instance, to lighting, or building material) to an already existing drawing. Augmenting lines with color or shading may add a sense of materiality to the image, but the effect is surficial. The underlying information is not substantially altered by the overlaid medium. Scarpa works with the substance of drawing. A single drawing type as well as a single drawing medium are deemed insufficient to authorize architecture. Here ruled lines coexist with sketches; the pen shares space with the pencil; different sheets layer up on one another—marks converge and converse across and through the surface of the page. The knowledge embedded in Scarpa's constructions being always and already dependent upon the *other* approach, the *other* dimension, the *other* mark.

It is the very impossibility of separating distinct scales, views, details, and forms that permits Scarpa's drawings to make an architectural claim. Scarpa approaches drawing, like building, as construction. Scarpa exploits drawing as speculation by invoking the significance of the material of drawing, the mark, through a conscious transgression of accepted graphic habits, and in an eschewal of conventionalized interpretations of the function of architectural drawing. Discussing the work of architects, Scarpa describes these transgressions:

> These are mistakes you make in thinking, acting, doing. So you need a double-crossing, a triple-crossing kind of mind, the mind of a thief, of a speculator, of a bank robber. And you need to be sharp—alert to everything that's going on or might be going on.[8]

The notion that one must be attendant to not only what is going on, but to "what might be going on" is essential to architectural thinking. Scarpa's draw-

8 Francesco Dal Co, "The Architecture of Carlo Scarpa" *Carlo Scarpa, the Complete Works* (Milan: Electa/ Rizzoli, 1984), 53.



CARLO SCARPA: SECTION AND ELEVATION OF ENTRANCE, BRION VEGA C. 1969

". . . Scarpa's compositions proceed by means of breaks and conflicts; suspicion of the norm necessarily leads towards difference. And difference is in fact the crux of each of Scarpa's fragments. They display the desire for incompleteness into which the meditation on design flows." Francesco Dal Co



CARLO SCARPA: ELEVATION AND SECTION OF CHAPEL, BRION VEGA C. 1969

"I want to see things, I don't trust anything else. I put them down on paper in front of me so I can see them. I want to see and that's why I draw." Carlo Scarpa



CARLO SCARPA: STUDY PLAN, CASTELVECCHIO C. 1956

"Now is perhaps the moment to say straight out what I've been intimating; that there are two fundamental methods for describing the world. These, with no originality but considerable prejudice, may be called the Concrete and the Abstract, the Terminal and the Relational, the Real and the Ideal, or, as I prefer, the Thick and the Thin (there will be other names) . . . . There must be data: there must be observations; there must be facts, incidents events, the Thick side says, while the Thin reminds us that there also must be order, structure, form; otherwise, and without math, there is no science; without logical analysis and argument, no philosophy; without arrangement and connection, no history; and without rhetoric, without pattern, without coherence, there is only the ordinary novel.

The war for reality is therefore a struggle between data and design . . ." William Gass, *Habitations of the Word*

ing, with its surfeit of information, encourages exactly this kind of attention. It establishes a field within which discoveries can be made. This condition, however, is not peculiar to the mind of a single architect, nor to the particularities of a specific drawing type, but rather remains a matter of how architecture is approached.



CARLO SCARPA: SKETCH PLAN, NATIONAL GALLERY AT MESSINA C. 1974

"Every resemblance receives a signature; but this signature is no more than an intermediate form of the same resemblance. As result, the totality of these marks, sliding over the great circle of similitudes, forms a second circle which would be an exact duplication of the first, point by point, were it not for that tiny degree of displacement which causes the sign of sympathy to reside in an analogy, that of analogy in emulation, that of emulation in convenience, which in turn requires the mark of sympathy for its recognition." Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*

2: APPROACHING DRAWING

The architectural condition of any drawing revealed by, but not limited to, composite types, rests upon acknowledgement of the existence of the mutual rights of multiple authorities. This is what licences drawn and built work to enter into a mutually critical, and as such, constructive relationship. The analogous status of drawing and building does not assume the objects of drawing and building to be the same, nor does it suggest that they depend wholly on one another. Rather, it is precisely what lets dissimilar modes of production engender similar constructions, disclosing architecture as an epistemologically as well as a phenomenologically multidimensional field.

Only when drawing is seen to inscribe its own architectural ground is it possible to accord it both a definitive role in shaping the conception of architecture and a substantive tectonic relationship to built form. This is neither a simple affiliation, since by advocating an analogous correspondence between drawn and built construction one must concede that they are equitable and different claims; nor is it a matter of maintaining a notion of transparency between conceptual, graphic, and built construction. Present in this affiliation is a confrontation, a tension. The model of conversation clarifies this point: A conversation involves letting go of expectations in

order to entertain other possibilities. It requires relinquishing control. To converse constructively, drawing as well as building must have its own voice. When a drawing is considered the residuum of an already formed mental construct, or when it is regarded as the description of a construction yet to be, the possibility of utilizing drawing as a critically distinct aspect of architectural research, and interpreting it as a sufficient form of knowledge, is foreclosed. However, when the objects of drawing and building are approached as compatible and possibly analogous, they achieve a non-subservient, non hierarchical affiliation.[9]

Interpretations of the relation between drawing and building that disavow the constructive role of this tension (mistaking it for contention) strive to construe the many aspects of architecture as so many parts of a harmonious epistemological whole, rendering an acritical relationship between aspects. Acknowledging the tension, by contrast, elicits constructive conversations between claims.

Since drawing and building each have the epistemological authority to affect the conception of the discipline it follows that there are numerous and potentially discontinuous ways of knowing architecture. To willingly enter into conversation with drawing is thus to risk a prior understanding as to the relative status of various architectural claims to attention. The interpretation of drawing as analogous to building actually offers a model for interpreting analogous conditions between other architectural claims.



WAYNE THIBEAU: *STREETS AND BUILDINGS*, 1980

PAUL KLEE: *HIGHROADS AND BYROADS*, 1929

While opposed, the abstract and corporeal properties of drawing need not be incompatible. The combination of these two aspects may be more readily acknowledged in paintings and drawings which, on one hand, are not assumed to bear the burden of representation to the same extent as architectural drawings, and on the other, are expected to transcend a purely descriptive function in the creation of representational imagery.

9 For a discussion of how similarity and difference contribute to the production of meaning see Paul Ricouer on the structure of metaphor as an "is like/is not" relation, in "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling" in *Critical Inquiry*, 5, no.1 (1978); also "Between Rhetoric and Poetics: Aristotle," in *The Rule of Metaphor Multi-Disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

2: APPROACHING ARCHITECTURE

Architecture obviously possesses aspects far more numerous than simply drawing and building. In terms of modes of production alone, they include written texts and models, films and photography, and video as well. In addition, there are theoretical claims, professional claims, scientific claims and artistic claims, technological claims, historical claims, functional claims and formal claims, sociological claims, and economic claims, to name just a few. The number of parties vying to assert legitimating criteria as the basis for disciplined architectural production is staggering.[10]

Architecture is thus a configuration, a settlement of mutual relations between parties, a composite endeavor. To contemplate this configuration is to investigate settlements formed between claimants, to ask how different interpretations and interpreters construct the architectural field, to consider the shape of the discipline as a whole. The examination of drawing is only one part of a larger scheme to consider such settlements that resonate within and between the phenomenal and the epistemological dimensions of architecture. It is a project motivated by a fundamental, and perhaps unresolvable, question: Do the multiple aspects of the field engender one architecture or many? In essence, it is a question arising from a preoccupation with the instituting of architecture as a discipline.

As Hayden White has remarked, "the politics of disciplinization, conceived, as all disciplinization must be, as a set of negations, consists in what it marks out for repression for those who wish to claim the authority of discipline itself for their learning."[11] These politics define the external limits of a discipline as well as the internal realms of its various aspects. They police the boundary between established fields, such as architecture and engineering or architecture and art, while at the same time guard proprietary limits within a single field. Thus, the disciplinization process can be described as a struggle for the power to control the contents and determine the limits of any epistemological field. To scrutinize this struggle is to reflect upon what is considered architecture.

Given the historically privileged notion of the harmonious and unified work of architecture, the most traditional conception of the architectural field is as a single territory, placing its many aspects within the realm, and under the rule, of one. Also given this history, the traditional ruler is that given by building. Here, architecture's many claims are enclosed by a single, dominant voice. To conceive separate claims as so many separate architectures would be to chart a discipline where conversation is limited, as individual claims vying for dominance foreclose recognition of other voices. Such is a map of multiple architectures. However, if one aspect of architecture is located in an at once similar and different territory from another, if different claims

10 This has been noted in different terms, specifically the intersticial location of architecture between art and science, by a host of critics and theoreticians, Alberto Perez-Gomez, Dalibor Vasily, Jennifer Bloomer, Werner Oeschlin, on drawing specifically.

11 Hayden White, "The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation", *Critical Inquiry*, 9, no.1 (1982): 119.

are seen as equitable yet discontinuous, then architecture can become a self-critical practice wherein different aspects, approaches and claims work to disclose the limits of one another.

In such an architectural field, the critieria of judgment determining how theory and practice, or technology and history drawn together inform architecture as physical, and epistemological, field are opened up to question. The nature of the politics of the discipline provides the material for the work of architecture. Such is the basis of a constructively critical practice, where distinct claims contribute to the shape of the discipline as a whole without necessarily being wholly determined by one another; an architecture prepared to "enter that unnerving place where one is willing to risk all one's present understanding by facing the claims to attention of the other."[12] It is the foundation of a discipline open to the knowledge of itself as other, predicating significant production upon the responsibility of continual questionning as to the critieria of significance itself.



JOHN SOANE: PROGRESS DRAWING, VAULT, THE OLD COLONIAL OFFICE, 1818

12 David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, 93.

The *Arengo*, or Assembly Point, blends romanticism and militarism to imply a sense of both classical and military ruin. Meant to enshrine 27 Italian military victories with 27 shell-topped columns, the composition perversely implies the effete decadence of what it ostensibly exalts.

The Camera in the Garden

J. SAGE

Nestled above the shores of Lake Garda lies the *Vittoriale degli Italiani* (Victory-Shrine of the Italian People), a villa built between 1921 and 1938 that is today a minor touristic oddity frequented by patriotic Italians and travellers at loose ends. A closer look, however, reveals a complex whose formal expression of the political paradox of its time establishes a cinematic alternative to the traditional theatrical vocabulary of the garden villa.

Spread over nine hectares, an urban fabric of paths and niches links a variety of reworked rustic buildings original to the site with a series of monumental interventions. Along the paths and throughout the interiors are anecdotal recollections of Italian heroism intended to evoke a collective national memory. Interrupting this personal narrative are idiosyncratic monuments marking a more self-conscious attempt to indoctrinate the viewer at a civic scale: a Greek theater, a mausoleum and the prow of a World War I battleship embedded into the hillside. (Figures 1-4)

The Vittoriale embodies the uneasy marriage of nineteenth-century romantic nationalism with the twentieth-century totalitarian ideology that succeeded it. In an attempt to celebrate the aspirations of the Italian nation, abstract civic monumentality is grafted onto the picturesque intimacy of individual anecdotes. The effect is cinematic. Like a movie-goer, the visitor penetrates the defined frame of the screen to explore a miscellany of juxtaposed worlds, simultaneously arrayed at various scales. One has the sense of being both a part of those worlds and placed at a distance — in their thrall, if not always privy to their meaning.

Poet and Architect

The Vittoriale's owner and creator, Gabriele D'Annunzio (1863-1938), was an extraordinary aesthete, poet, journalist, war-hero and Italian nationalist, particularly prominent in the first few decades of the twentieth century. He was a poet and dramatist first, but his literary work was often preoccupied with themes of heroism, military action and Italian national destiny. Drawing on ideas of individual transcendence gleaned partly from Nietzsche, and on a rich tradition of exalted nationalism, he glorified the Italian character, Italy, and its military and spiritual independence, symbolized for him by the city of

Venice. After the golden period of the *Risorgimento*, D'Annunzio emerged against the politically uncertain backdrop of late nineteenth-century Italy as one of the most flamboyant exponents of Italian militarist nationalism.[1] He wrote and gave speeches in favor of Italian intervention in World War I, and contributed political polemics to the Italian (and occasionally the American) press. He also held political office, seeing himself as a Manzoni to his own generation.[2]

The Italian literary critic, Mario Praz, described the poet as ". . . a Barbarian and at the same time a Decadent, and there [was] lacking in him the temperate zone which, in the present period of culture, is labelled 'humanity'. The twofold nature of this extremism explains why D'Annunzio has been a warrior as well as a voluptuary."[3]

In 1915, when Italy joined the Allies in World War I, the poet turned his considerable talents to the production of military exhortations. During the course of the war, D'Annunzio emerged as Italy's

1. Aerial View

1 *Risorgimento* (literally revival or resurgence) is the term given to the period of Italian unification culminating in 1870.

2 Alessandro Manzoni, generally considered Italy's first modern novelist, was also politically active, and influenced the early movement towards Italian unification by establishing a standard, non-dialect Italian into which he rendered his own masterpiece, *I Promessi Sposi (The Betrothed)*.

3 Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 401.*

great charismatic hero, engaging in a series of dramatic military stunts. He made his most famous stand from 1919 to 1921, when after the conclusion of the war, he led a mutinous raid that held the city of Fiume (today Rijeka), purportedly Italian but awarded to Yugoslavia. The episode ended unceremoniously as D'Annunzio and his followers were evicted from Fiume with the complicity of the Italian government. It did, however, confirm him as a prominent national figure and potential leader.

> It was D'Annunzio in the Fiume adventure who first succeeded in creating a new technique for the evocation of irrational hatreds and loyalties. 'The occupation of Fiume . . . will furnish Fascism with the model for its militia and its uniforms, the names for its squads, its war-cry and its liturgy. Mussolini will copy from D'Annunzio the whole of his stage-scenery, including the dialogues with the crowd . . . D'Annunzio will be the victim of the greatest piece of plagiarism ever seen.'[4]

In the early 1920's, D'Annunzio was, therefore, both a potent role model and a possible threat to the young Fascists. For a time he seemed to represent a more populist vision of the great military state—but by the mid-twenties, Mussolini succeeded in maneuvering the aging D'Annunzio into silence. In part, D'Annunzio was demoralized by the failure of his Fiume adventure, but he was also distracted by the building of the Vittoriale. Mussolini made substantial financial contributions to the Villa's construction, hoping these would help him to neutralize D'Annunzio. (Figure 5) Although there is no evidence that D'Annunzio made this trade-off knowingly, the building project kept him too busy to rally any militarist alternative to Fascism.[5] His faith in the Vittoriale was sincere and its financial support by the State was, as he saw it, only right.



2. The battleship *Puglia*

Work on the Vittoriale began in 1921 when, returning from his ignominious ouster at Fiume, D'Annunzio sought a home in the Trentino-Alto Adige,

4 A. Lyttleton, *The Seizure of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 35, quoting A. Tasca, *Nascita e avento del fascismo.*

5 R. De Felice, "D'Annunzio, Mussolini e la Politica Italiana, 1919-1938", in *Carteggio D'Annunzio-Mussolini 1919-1938,* eds. R. De Felice and F. Mariano (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1971), XLVII-L.
P. Chiara, *Vita di Gabriele D'Annunzio* (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1978), 371-72, 387-88.

3. The upper level of the mausoleum showing D'Annunzio at the center with his comrades from Fiume arrayed about him.

territory recently recovered from the Austrians. He engaged a local architect by the name of Gian Carlo Maroni. Maroni's provincialism was no obstacle for D'Annunzio, whose own travels and education could compensate for and shape Maroni's more naive sensibilities. Most important to D'Annunzio was the fact that Maroni was a fellow irredentist and a wounded veteran: his main qualification was not as an architect but as a symbolic comrade.[6] The early site plans show that with the exception of a few changes in the mausoleum and the theater the villa as seen today is D'Annunzio's conception.

> Everything here has, in fact, been created or transfigured by me. Everything here bears the stamp of my style, of the sense I mean to give to style. My love for Italy, my cult of memory, my striving after heroism, the presentiment I have of my Country as it will come to be, all these things are embodied here . . . .[7]

Out of what he initially conceived as a simple retirement haven, D'Annunzio created a public shrine and museum which in 1923, only two years after construction began, he donated to the Italian people and state. While its message was redefined as public, the structure and form of the Vittoriale's interior and exterior landscape were inspired by D'Annunzio's personal literary and military exploits.

Tied to its time, the Vittoriale also stands strangely apart from many of the most memorable and influential projects of its era—projects done either in the name of the Italian Fascist regime or under its ideological umbrella. The Vittoriale's formal anachronism lies in its almost complete disregard for the abstracted classicism of buildings like the *Casa del Fascio* (1928-36) by Giuseppe Ter-

4. The *Puglia* from above

6 Irredentists advocated the incorporation of all Italian-speaking areas into Italy. Fiume, which D'Annunzio occupied, was a prime example.

7 G. D'Annunzio, Act of Donation to the Italian State, 22 December 1923, in A. Mazza, *D'Annunzio and the Vittoriale* (Brescia: 1987), 15.

ragni, the *Casa delle Armi* (1933-35) by Luigi Moretti and the *Palazzo dei Congressi* (1938) by Adalberto Libera. The siting, scale and political associations of these buildings, allied symbolically and formally with the great *fora* of Republican and Imperial Rome, lend them meaning that extends beyond simple historicism. They define the citizen in relation to the state as an anonymous member of a larger obedient mass. The individual's identity is subordinated to that of the crowd and his role clearly defined. The message is expressed in an architectural language that while classical in many respects, overtly beckons a future world. (Figure 6)

5. Contemporary post card showing Gabriele D'Annunzio and Benito Mussolini on the occasion of the Duce's only visit to the Vittoriale, in May, 1925

The message of the Vittoriale is the opposite, focusing on the past and the personal. The intention to create a nationalist myth out of romantic and idiosyncratic narratives is effected by the translation of individual stories and characters onto a larger, "civic" scale. Unlike a museum or reliquary, however, where more subtle polemics are defined and revealed, the Vittoriale leaves the visitor with the burden of comprehension. Its murky message, and the way that message is relayed, set it apart from its contemporaries. It remains a telling product of its transitional time.

Memento and Shrine

The Vittoriale is an accretion of mementos so astonishing in their relentless variety that the visitor is drowned in a sea of trivial, albeit evocative detail. These mementos are present at two radically different scales: the personal and the monumental, the juxtaposition of which is ironically more meaningful than the message of any memento alone.

At a glance, the expansive and articulated landscape of the Vittoriale recalls the great garden villas built by Le Nôtre and Lutyens, as well as more singular examples such as Hearst's *San Simeon*. More revealing, however, is its similarity to the villa at Tivoli built for the Roman emperor Hadrian. (Figure 7) That villa, although built to express the learned and worldly grandeur of the emperor, was explicitly private. While the Vittoriale was imbued with a civic mission almost from its conception, it was, like Hadrian's Villa, a retreat for a man and his coterie: a distinctly personal statement. As at Tivoli, one of the most interesting aspects of the Vittoriale is its eclectic and disconnected collage of events, set in a lyrically composed landscape. Moreover, each villa is a complex of parts where no one



6. The piazza created by Adalberto Libera at the *Palazzo dei Congressi* at EUR.

single structure is as powerful as the "*poché*" that binds them.

The plan that D'Annunzio and Maroni developed for the Vittoriale elaborated the *poché* of the villa at Tivoli, making its rotations and circumlocutions the subject of their design. In a reversal of the expected relationship between figure and ground, the *poché* becomes figure and major objects and spaces read as ground. (Figure 8)

The unexpected transformation of the *poché* into a ceremonial path, reminiscent of a miniaturized Italian hilltown, provides a familiar, yet odd counterpoint to the more monumental aspects of the Vittoriale. In the entry sequence especially, one sees the naive use of individual and often enigmatic elements: a plethora of plaques, steles, inscriptions, and so on, strewn about like fragments in a great ruin, contained in a network of niches, stairways and paths. The visitor is at once a giant amid this urban Disneyland and a dwarf beside the larger objects engaged by the *poché*. Populated with mementos that carry the central meaning of the Vittoriale, the *poché* provides a structure through which D'Annunzio presents his private recollections at an ostentatiously civic scale.



7. Plan of Hadrian's Villa

At a smaller, more personal scale, an array of souvenirs of war and heroism is sprinkled throughout the site. D'Annunzio gathered for the shrine any kind of object that commemorated Italian heroism—however indirectly—whether belonging to him or to others. Many of these fragmented and anecdotal memorials bear inscriptions, sometimes composed or dedicated by D'Annunzio himself. The majority of the texts are mysterious, alluding to places, events, and even intentions no longer recognizable—if indeed they ever were.[8]

The symbolic or heraldic architectural fragments are even more inscrutable than the texts. (Figures 9-11) The facade of the *Prioria*, for example, D'Annunzio's principal residence facing the *Piazza Dalmata*, is encrusted with coats of arms and architectural details that, while perhaps of personal significance, are entirely miscellaneous. (Figure 12) The formal treatment has precedent in medieval Italian towns like Padua and Arezzo, where the facades of civic buildings bear historical fragments, but at the *Priora* the layering is divorced from any specific content. The facade thus borrows an image that evokes the presentation of civic history without any specific history to present.

Similarly, the *Prioria* interiors are created from a sense of mystical encrustation, sometimes more easily dismissed as degenerate domestic kitsch, but whose formal character parallels the more explicitly architectural exterior landscape. Alberto Arbasino described the interiors as

> . . . a Triumph of the Shrunken: tiny little rooms and haphazard corridors, like something from the house of the Seven Dwarfs, made still narrower, more suffocating, and cramped by the famous accumulation of thousands and thousands of knickknacks.[9]

Like the gardens the rooms of the house, with their anecdotal tale of relics and fragments, also

8 For example, on the facade of the *Prioria* one encounters these verses from St. Francis, with an incongruous last line added by D'Annunzio himself:

Praise be unto Thee, o Lord, for our sister, mother earth,
Which sustains and governs
And brings forth different fruits with different colored flowers and grass.
Praise be unto Thee, oh Lord, for our Sister, the Death of the body,
From which there is no man living who can escape.
Blessed are the dead who die well in war.

9 A. Arbasino, "The Poet and His Shrine," *FMR* (1984): 96.


LEGEND
1. Gardone Riviera Sopra
2. Monument to the Fallen
3. Entry Piazza
4. The Piave
5. The Theatre
6. The Tempietto
7. Piazza Dalmata
8. The Schifamondo
9. The Prioria
10. The Mausoleum
11. The Puglia
12. The Arengo
13. The Laghetto delle Danze

8. Site Plan

9. The *Piave*, sculpted to recall a pier of a bridge over the Piave river near Milan, commemorates the Italian line of defense held there for nearly a year beginning in 1917. The angel with its feet bound represents the tethered but naturally imminent Italian victory.

10. Unidentified artillery next to a Roman sarcophagus set into the sequence of paths between the *Piazza Dalmata* and the landscape beyond.

11. *The Laghetto delle Danze* at the lower edge of the Villa

convey a subtext involving remembrance and ambiguity of place and scale. (Figures 13-17) Propellers and steering columns from fighter planes are enshrined with miscellaneous literary and religious relics. Some have known histories, others are flea-market acquisitions. Together they reinforce the impression that a collection of partial views describe a whole (even an unclear one), and that the incidental defines the fundamental.

If the vast majority of the scattered fragments at the Vittoriale is so obscure as to be practically indecipherable, the effect of the ensemble remains an apotheosis of the very principle of the memento. If these physical tokens originated from a common consciousness they might evoke an architecture that symbolizes and creates a collective memory. Instead the result is idiosyncratic and obscure.

Set amidst these small souvenirs, in an attempt to make a truly civic statement, is an ensemble of larger ones; inflated mementos, equally enigmatic, but of a physical and political scale that is more appropriate to the hegemonic ambitions of the time. These self-conscious statements of public glory take three significant forms: a theater, recalling the role of political and artistic polemics in the formation of the national spirit; a mausoleum, representing human mortality against the backdrop of national endurance; and a warship, symbolizing military might and technological ingenuity. (Figures 18-21) Each is a magnified example of the same phenomenon. Fun-

12. Facade of the Villa Cargnacco as transformed into D'Annunzio's home, the *Prioria*. Named in jest for D'Annunzio's choice of such a modest abode, it retains very little of its original character.

13. The Room of the Relics, containing at least two altars. One pyramidal composition of miscellaneous Eastern gods is surmounted by Madonna and child. The other is composed of fragments from a variety of Italian altarpieces and more militaristic relics. Each carries the idea of enshrinement with only occasional reference to an Italian hegemony. For example, the steering wheel at the center of one composition, was used in a race of D'Annunzio's inspiration across Lake Windermere in England in which Sir Henry Seagrave was killed.

14. The entry vestibule to the *Prioria* appropriately carries the language of the exterior landscape within.

15. The *Zambracca*, the study and dressing room where D'Annunzio died, filled by three enormous wardrobes, casts, and other paraphernalia.

16. The Room of the Leper, so named for D'Annunzio's characterization of himself, like the leper, being touched by the God. It was the room in which he intended to contemplate death and in which he lay in state.



17. The Globe Room, filled with books and guns, the death masks of Napoleon and Dante, and other less easily identified masks.

damentally arbitrary, these mementos are used not for their specific meaning but to symbolize the act of commemoration itself.

Camera and Garden

If the mementos set within the web of *poché* give the Vittoriale its first layer of meaning, the second comes from the way in which the visitor is asked to negotiate that *poché*. The effect is not only to confuse the viewer cognitively, but also to disorient him physically; placed in a familiar but skewed setting, the viewer is subjected to a new spatial experience.

The spatial sequence of the Vittoriale, like its literary aspect, demands the visitor's active engagement, in contrast to other "theatrical" garden villas like those of Le Nôtre. Le Nôtre, taking the idea of the proscenium as frame and boundary, created gardens like *Vaux le Vicomte* where theatrical views are constructed according to the laws of perspective: the viewer is placed on a fixed axis or point from which to appreciate vistas according to specific rules.[10] The viewer, in turn, can count on these rules holding fast. At the Vittoriale, the visitor is freed from all theatrically axial order to become both actor and audience in a spatial sequence more reminiscent of the movies than the stage.[11]

A movie, free of the physical demands of continuity, can combine disconnected visions at radically different scales. Like a movie-goer, the visitor to the Vittoriale encounters a defined frame and travels beyond it to develop a changing understanding of the scene. Upon penetrating each framed view, he discovers shifts in direction and scale. The landscape is traversed with the informality and ambiguity of the movie camera. It becomes unstable, provocative, and elusive, producing an idiosyncratic journey informed only by anecdotal memento-ism.



18. Paths leading to the *Puglia*

This cinematic disorientation is most conspicuous in the sequence from the entry portal to the *Piazza Dalmata*. (Figures 22-32) Lured by a framed view

10 H. Hazlehurst, *Gardens of Illusion* (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1980), 17-25.

11 As Italy's most celebrated playwright, D'Annunzio was solicited to work in the early Italian film industry and did occasionally write scripts and captions for Italian movies. P. Chiara, *Vita di Gabriele D'Annunzio* (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1978), 239-40, 352.



ahead, the path climbs towards the *Piazza Dalmata*, the spiritual and physical center of the Vittoriale and the only place where all its gestures seem united in a single effort. The cinematic collage of scenarios at radically differing scales, found elsewhere in the Villa, is here more subtle and allusive. Perhaps the simplicity of the original house supplied D'Annunzio with a firm core against which to work. The *Piazza Dalmata*, organized around two axes and defined by layers of differing depth and scale, recalls other aspects of the villa but nevertheless maintains its unadulterated formal strength and stability. As the climax to the entry drama, it is the only knot that ties the spatial and temporal stories of the Vittoriale into one drama. It establishes the center at the eye of the cinematic storm, and the critical link from the entry sequence to the gardens beyond.

This sequence begins at the meeting of the town and villa. The *Monumento ai Caduti* (Monument to the Fallen) extends the entry piazza of the Vittoriale axially across the public road, creating an edge to the haphazard town behind, and blurring the distinction between public and private domains. (Figure 22) Passing under the arch of the Monument to cross the road, the visitor has breached the first of four entry layers. The funnel-shaped piazza is in turn defined by three distinct gate-like layers: first, two pavilions holding down the splaying walls of the piazza between which the visitor walks; second, a more explicit triumphal arch as proscenium,



20. The mausoleum, replacing an earlier much more rustic burial site, is made up of three Roman sarcophagi set at right angles to each other on a mound of earth. Turning the traditional ancient prototype inside out, the core contains an altar while the tombs, all replicas of ancient sarcophagi, ring the top with D'Annunzio raised aloft amidst them.

21. The Theater, under construction by 1934 and completed in 1953.

19. Opposite: The strongest of the monumental objects, the *Puglia* combines the popular appeal of the theater with the sanctity of the mausoleum to produce both the most ridiculous and the most powerful element in the entire landscape. Given to D'Annunzio as a gift from the chief admiral of the Italian Navy, it was sited to point symbolically toward the Adriatic. This brutish symbol of Italian naval strength and glory, literally wedged into the forest surrounding it, close but unable to reach the water below, belies the irony of D'Annunzio's mission.

22. The entry piazza of the Vittoriale, showing the Monument to the Fallen and Gardone Riviera Sopra on the left, and the Vittoriale entry gate on the right.

with two minor arches spanning the path; third, the entry gate itself. The Monument and the first two "gates" blur the moment of entry, introducing an ambiguity of meaning and place that will soon become familiar.

The portal, sculpted as a rough triumphal arch, reverses the classical pattern of solid to void: two apparently identical, major voids on either side of a minor, solid center. (Figure 25) Upon closer inspection, the right portal, visually blocked by an echo of the central solid of the entire gate, marks not a public way to the villa but a direct service path to the theater. The path has split, shifting the axis of movement from the center to the left, forcefully redefining the visitor's focus. A sinuous tail of lilliputian urban landscape emanates out of the central pedimented plug of the gate, to occupy what once had been the main entry axis. It acts as a scenographic backdrop to the visitor's exploration and an alternate miniature world into which one may enter as a giant. (Figures



23. The entry gate seen from the Monument to the Fallen



24. The proscenium arch before the entry gate

25. The entry gate

26. The path towards the *Piazza Dalmata* splits again at the *Piave*. The theater peels off to the right and the center is again redefined to the left.

26-29) The main path, therefore, has been replaced by a thick, inhabitable zone of *poché* that allows the visitor to traverse and experience two worlds, two scales, simultaneously.

Weaving between these two experiences, the visitor's path continually shifts left, offering choices that cannot be understood and information that cannot be assimilated. Each assumed center is redefined as the path that cannot be travelled. The visitor is both observer and player, giant and dwarf, outside the Vittoriale and within its draw, in front of the screen and free to move beyond its boundaries. "The film should not flow consequentially, but jump backwards and forwards with flashbacks, and create contrasts as in a fairy tale . . . ."[12]

In the Vittoriale, the visitor repeatedly understands spaces seen from a distance, only to discover something quite different up close. His sense of scale is continually redefined by his movement through the landscape, a theatrical freedom singularly associated with the motion picture camera. Dramatic and ambiguous, the Vittoriale creates a sense of disorientation rather than enlightenment.

Message and Memory

The cinematic narrative that binds the Vittoriale and its mementos takes on a sinister air when considered in the light of the villa's polemical intentions. What finally distinguishes the visitor's experience of the villa from that of a movie-goer is that the spatial adventure—like the literary one—imparts a false

12 The quotation is taken from the script for a movie set in one of the new towns built by the Fascists, "An American in Sabaudia" (1935) in which P.M. Bardi describes his fascination with the power of the camera. *Sabaudia*, R. Burdett, ed., (London 1982).

27. The miniature inhabitable urban landscape that occupies the center emerges from the solid pediment between the two arched doorways.

28. Looking back at the central pediment of the entry gate from within the Vittoriale. The paths that grow out of its rear change the scale of the gate from a monumental entrance to a miniature urban landscape in which the pediment is transformed from a ceremonial lintel to a ledge on which one might rest a weary foot.



29. Beyond the *Piave*, the path splits yet again; the left leads to the *Piazza Dalmata* and the right to the gardens below.

sense of self-determination, accentuating a sense of continued confusion. The elaborated *poché* is conspiratorial, refusing to offer a simple romantic stroll among nationalist spirits. The stories presented in miniature are lost in the sheer prolixity of symbolic information, while the more authoritarian voice embodied in spectacular scaleless feats conveys no larger or synthetic message. At the Vittoriale one is aroused and confounded by a fluid relationship between its parts, but uncertain about its larger meaning.

This disorientation is a political allegory of its time. It is not born of desire to confuse, but rather from the genuine constriction of the romantic spirit by a more monolithic idea. Intended to glorify the individualistic, romantic struggle of turn-of-the-century nationalism and its apotheosis in the transcendent state, the landscape of the Vittoriale is a fundamentally personal narrative disrupted by the imposition of monumental style and message. The promise of a coherent grandeur is constantly disappointed. To the modern visitor, this disappointment aptly epitomizes the betrayal of nineteenth-century aspirations in fascist Italy, and the bewilderment of the romantic individualist in the modern state.

30. The *Tempietto* is filled with mementos from the poet's life, virtually impossible to see or decode.

31. The *Piazza Dalmata* with the *Prioria* at left.

32. The *Piazza Dalmata* as the central stage on which the drama formally unravels.

Hagia Sophia, Istanbul

Ethics and Architecture

HENRY N. COBB

Ethics — that is to say the science of morals — is a subject not much discussed in schools of architecture, nor in the profession for that matter, except at a rather superficial level bordering on the banal. Indeed, serious probing of ethical questions has been virtually taboo in contemporary architectural discourse, largely because it is presumed to be impossible to talk about morality without moralizing; and it is well-established that moralizing is the death of art. Yet a head-in-sand attitude toward the ethical dimension of architecture has, in my view, significantly diminished the art of architecture in our time. Hence, I am moved to offer a few observations with the aim of encouraging you to give some thought to this inescapably problematic aspect of contemporary architectural practice.

I begin by drawing on the authority of the *Oxford English Dictionary* to establish the meaning of the two words that delimit the terrain of this discussion.

ETHICS is defined as "the science of morals" and further as "the department of study concerned with the principles of human duty."

ARCHITECTURE is defined as "the art or science of building or constructing edifices of any kind for human use."

Reducing these definitions to their essentials for our purpose here, when we speak of ethics in architecture we are speaking of principles of human duty as they may relate or apply to the art and science of building for human use. Now, the points of entry that one might select to begin an exploration of this very broad topic are virtually infinite in number, and I will make no special claim for the one I have chosen other than that it touches those aspects of the subject that I find most engaging as well as most accessible. I launch my probe with a question that momentarily expands the frame of reference: How do principles of human duty relate or apply to *works of art*? We can go a long way toward answering this question by referring to an aphorism of the poet-philosopher Paul Valéry, who wrote: "*We recognize a work of art by the fact that no idea it inspires in us, no mode of behaviour it suggests we adopt, could exhaust or dispose of it.*" This statement seems to me precisely correct. And though its eloquence be sacrificed, I think its meaning is not lost when we rephrase it as follows: A work of art always *transcends* those principles of human duty which it may embody or to which it may refer. Thus the work of art

is alone among human productions in being privileged, indeed obligated, to escape the rule of human duty. Hence we can say that the only absolute duty imposed on a work of art is that of being *un*dutiful.

I have begun by making this briefly-sketched argument for the intrinsic amorality of art for two reasons: first, I believe it to be the *sine qua non* shared by all works of art, including architecture; and second, it brings into focus the poignant, one may even say tragic, situation of architecture as the one art whose ethical dimension clearly cannot therein be satisfactorily encompassed. For it must be obvious that the duty to be undutiful, while true, is scarcely the whole truth about the role of ethics in architecture. Herein, then, architecture separates itself decisively from all other arts, and to understand the nature of that separation we need only refer back to the OED's definition as I cited it earlier: "Architecture is the art or science of building or constructing edifices of any kind for *human use*." The key words here are "human use." These words place architecture under an ethical obligation from which other arts are specifically exempted: to wit, works of architecture are asked to be so constructed as to be *useful*—in other words literally to *accommodate* the society that sponsors their construction. Hence, a work of architecture is inescapably enmeshed in that system of ethical constraints, those principles of human duty, from which its art status demands with equal insistence that it be liberated. The reconciliation of these seemingly irreconcilable demands precisely defines, in my view, the ultimate task of the architect. And the difficulty of this task surely explains why it is so seldom fully accomplished, as well as why we so highly value those works of architecture in which we see evidence of its having been even partially accomplished. Furthermore, I would argue that a condition invariably prerequisite to such accomplishment has been the availability of well-established principles of human duty—that is to say some system of ethics—to which architects have given their allegiance and which in turn has provided them with a reliable definition of "usefulness" on which to base their professional work.

You will have noticed that a new term—"professional work"—has suddenly appeared to complicate this discussion. I have purposely kept the word "professional" out of my remarks up to now in order to

make it clear that this talk is not about "professional ethics" as conventionally defined. But having made that point, I am now obliged to speak of the architect's professional work, inasmuch as this is the only term that suitably encompasses all those ethical considerations—all those principles of human duty—that are embodied in his or her obligation to design edifices for human use. And this brings me at last to the heart of the matter that I set out to explore, which is not after all the general topic of ethics and architecture but the more specific problem of ethics as bearing on current practice. It seems to me that the question of what in fact constitutes *usefulness* has become the central ethical dilemma of contemporary architecture. Of course this dilemma has always existed, but in earlier periods of human history it was more or less successfully subsumed or sublimated within prevailing value systems—value systems that engendered a sufficiently strong consensus in any given society so that architects could clearly understand how buildings of various types should be designed in order to be acknowledged by that society as useful. But today many aspects of that consensus have vanished, and it is this circumstance, as reflected in the conditions of contemporary practice, that has, to quote a recent statement by Stanley Tigerman, "radically displaced ideals about ethical behaviour." However, "displaced" seems to me not quite the right word, implying as it does a definitive shift one way or another. Rather, what we have witnessed, and what I have myself repeatedly experienced, is a kind of *entropy* of ethical principles—a dissolution brought about by the proliferation of conflicting value systems, with none having gained sufficient allegiance to constitute a consensus that could foster the elaboration of a reliable code of ethics governing professional conduct. By now I'm sure you understand that I am talking not about a code of ethics in the AIA sense of the word, but about a much broader code embracing concepts of how architects ought to respond to the number and diversity of competing interests that cry to be heard—and quite possibly *should* be heard—with respect to virtually every significant building project.

To put it another way, I cannot recall a single commission undertaken by my firm in the past thirty years that has not required us to make difficult choices concerning how and to whom we render our professional service and how and to whom the intended building will make itself useful. These choices

are difficult because the numerous constituencies whom we, as a matter of professional responsibility, see ourselves as serving—the client institution, the building's users, its neighbors, and so on—these diverse constituencies are often fiercely committed to widely divergent and deeply conflicting principles of human duty. This is especially true in the large-scale urban building projects that have always constituted a significant component of our practice. Hence, a disquieting ambivalence with respect to ethical issues—a pervasive uncertainty about how best to fulfill my *duty* as a professional—is a nearly perpetual state of mind for me, as surely it must also be for every architect in practice today whose work significantly touches or shapes the public realm. And although the anxiety felt by architects as a result of such uncertainty is perhaps a matter of merely private concern, there is another much more troubling consequence for architecture that stems directly from this contemporary ethical predicament. For just as entropy in physics invariably entails a diminishment of available energy in the affected system, so the phenomenon of entropy in ethics has measurably diminished the architect's capacity to shape a positive outcome from the always-problematic encounter between architecture and power.

It is surely true that all the arts, through the institution of patronage, are to some degree instruments of power. Nonetheless architecture, owing to the expenditure of labor and material required for its production, is clearly the art most inextricably enmeshed in the belief systems and institutional mechanisms that govern human culture and society. Hence the uncomfortably intimate embrace between architecture and power: an embrace to which architecture often passively submits, within which it occasionally struggles, from which it never escapes. Neither the supine posture of surrender nor the futile dream of deliverance has yet produced a significant built project. But architecture's *struggle* to speak and act within and against the embrace of power has resulted in some of the most fascinating and profoundly moving manifestations of human intelligence: it has produced buildings wherein overt allegiance to *power*, clear mastery of *technique* and explicit dedication to *use* have been subtly combined by the architect's skill so that these edifices for human use become, marvelously, instruments for *speculative thought*—instruments that relentlessly, if covertly, challenge the con-

ventions, the preconceptions, and finally the very powers that brought them into being. Then indeed, if all too rarely, does architecture reach the highest realm of art. That the science of morals, however beset by uncertainty, is as indispensable to this attainment as is the science of building seems to me beyond question: without the latter a work of architecture perhaps will not stand, but without the former it surely cannot *mean*.



Vitruvius, *Siege Machines, The Ten Books of Architecture,* French edition of 1837

Architecture: The Lament for Power and the Power of Lament

CATHERINE INGRAHAM

This is an essay that enters architecture (to bend Manfredo Tafuri's words to my own ends) as if it too were an enchanted forest, a magic circle that leaves us weightlessly suspended.[1] But, I would like to argue, this so-called weightlessness lacks neither materiality nor political force. On the contrary, even as one moves through apparently trackless (improper, unmarked) territory, the force of the political and the material is never left behind. As with all weightlessness, one is never without reference points — never really without *weights*, implicit or explicit, that orient the discussion or polemic in a certain direction.[2]



Vitruvius, *Catapult, The Ten Books of Architecture*, 1837

Although this essay started as an exploration into architectural power and space, it soon became an indirect exploration into the loss of power, that is, into the lament for lost power that is articulated everywhere in architectural theory, history, and practice.[3] What seems to me interesting about this swerve from the positive possession of power to the lament for power is that architecture finds a special kinship with the structure of lamentation, an affinity I will investigate shortly. But let me go back for a moment.

At the risk of oversimplifying a far from simple issue, one might say that the ideological power of architecture, which includes its aesthetic power as well, is traditionally understood as the built expression of what other power structures, outside of architecture, desire. These other power structures include the bureaucracies of committee, government, family, and so on. Architecture, from a traditional vantage point, builds what these power structures commission, and the analysis of architectural power habitually dissolves into a consideration of political, economic, and social ideologies associated with these

1 Tafuri uses the image of the enchanted forest pejoratively in regard to poststructural textual analysis. See Manfredo Tafuri, "The Historical Project," in *The Sphere and the Labrinyth*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

2 Foucault's remarks on why he was interested in his subject have always impressed me: ". . . I am not at all the sort of philosopher who conducts or wants to conduct a discourse of truth on some science or other. Wanting to lay down the law for each and every science is the project of positivism . . . Now this role of referee, judge and universal witness is one which I absolutely refuse to adopt . . . If I do the analyses I do, it's not because of some polemic I want to arbitrate but because I have been involved in certain conflicts . . . " See Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trs. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). In the case of this essay, my argument has no particular meaning or significance outside of architecture. At the same time, it is only by straining the boundary of the discipline—that same architectural context within which the polemic operates—that one can formulate these arguments in the first place.

3 There are, to be sure, different forms of lament. Some are elegiac, others are enumerations of what has been lost or left behind. Ruskin, Laugier, Alberti, Le Corbusier all adopt the strategy of lament as part of their polemics.



Lebbeus Woods, *Einstein Tomb 1*, Dream Cities, 1985

governing structures.[4] One never gets to architecture, in some sense, although I do not want to be mistaken here as advocating a return to an apolitical analysis of architecture, nor to be suggesting that "getting to architecture" means that there is a thing, intact, inviolate, to be gotten to. What I do want to suggest is that current models of ideological analysis—perhaps more an enlightened historicism than anything else—have yet to be thought architecturally, in the sense that Foucault, for example, began to suggest in his work on panopticism. I keep returning to one section in that almost exhausted essay (exhausted for architectural purposes, in any case) because it suggests for me the enigma and difficulty of discussing architectural power.

The astonishing thing about the panopticon, Foucault says, is that:

> . . . it arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not added on from outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact. *The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations function in a function, and of making a function function through these power relations.*[5]

This remark opens the possiblity that architecture is a disciplinary mechanism that constructs, through a peculiar and oblique control over function and space, at least some of the power relations subsequently seen as anterior to it. The reason I call the control of function and space "peculiar" is because I believe Foucault is claiming something more, something in excess of the functionalism or spatiality normally associated with architecture. The "points of contact" within architecture that might situate specifically architectural kinds of power are not available in any direct sense to enlightened historicist analysis because they are points at which the instruments of historical consciousness are in a kind of suspension. That is, they are points in space, rather than points in time.[6] Architecture constructs these points of contact architecturally and spatially, and then represses or subordinates them to the temporal (which is also the historical constitution of the ideological), preferring instead the role of servant, politically unconscious artist, developer.

In Foucault's scheme, panopticism became possible as a power system only through the architec-

4 The ideological analysis of architecture in the end can only be developed in hindsight, historically. This is the double bind that Tafuri articulates in both "The Historical Project" and in *Architecture and Utopia*. Frederic Jameson, in particular, tries to address this issue in "Architecture and the Critique of Ideology," in *Architecture Criticism Ideology* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1985). Jameson asks the question: "Can space be ideological?" At stake in both of these essays is the possibility of thinking *space* for itself. The concept of ideology, although classically opposed to correct "historical consciousness" (Marx and Engels) is nevertheless always tied to a betrayal of "real-life conditions," or to an account of reality that is predominantly historical.

5 Michel Foucault, "Panopticism," in *Discipline and Punish*, (New York: Random House, 1979), 206. My emphasis.

6 I will not argue here all the pieces of the spatiality-temporality problem. There is no question that in Foucault, as well as Fredric Jameson and Manfredo Tafuri, there is competition between what one might call the "spatial" point of view (which is horizontal and extensive or arranged) and the "chronological" point of view (which is vertical, historical, hierarchical). Naturally, one cannot easily dismiss the interconnectedness of space and time, but I do think one can say that temporal analysis has repressed spatial analysis in ways that "spatial sensibility" has itself been complicitous with.

tural mechanism that refined, indeed produced, the structural relations of surveillance-through-transparency.[7] One needs to have a certain theory of power in order to say this—perhaps Foucault's idea of power as moving in far more refined, more personal, more local ways than most (particularly infrastructural) models of power allow. But, more importantly, this idea opens a philosophical chink in the armature of architectural history and theory. Through this chink, architecture begins to emerge as something that plays a disciplinary and power-constructing role in the structuring of all space, including the spaces of literature, language, philosophy, science, and other apparently non-architectural bodies of knowledge.

It is interesting that even Foucault, whose investigations into the history of knowledge rely extensively on the construction of a history according not



Lebbeus Woods, *Einstein Tomb 6*, Dream Cities, 1985



Lebbeus Woods, *Einstein Tomb 4*, Dream Cities, 1985

7 One should differentiate here between Bentham's Panopticon and Foucault's use of Bentham's Panopticon. Bentham's Panopticon was, for the most part, understood as an unequivocal advance in the architectural organization of institutions. As Foucault remarks in "The Eye of Power," an interview on panopticism in *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), the openness of the panoptic structure found an affinity with the ideals of "openness" aspired to during the later part of the eighteenth century (to which the French revolution and the age of opinion celebrated by Rousseau testify). Foucault's use of the panopticon, on the other hand, has to do with the repressed issues of control and power in the idea of "openness". The panopticon is thus primarily utopic and subject to the critique of the utopic.



Carlo Scarpa, *First design for cable and pulley devices controlling vertical movement of the entrance gate to the pavillion on the water,* Brion Cemetery, San Vito d'Altivole, 1970, pencil on card



Left: Carlo Scarpa, *Alternative design for cable and pulley devices,* Brion Cemetery, 1970, pencil on paper. *Right:* Carlo Scarpa, Banca Popolare, Wall with mechanical device, on the first

only to chronological developments but also spatial demarcations, would prefer to leave the spatial implications of his work amorphous and metaphorical. The spatial metaphors—"position, displacement, site, field . . . territory, domain, soil, horizon, archipelago . . . region, landscape"—that show up everywhere in his work are left unspecified.[8] To name these spatial demarcations as *architectural*—not only in Foucault, but also in multiple other discourses that employ these metaphors—seems, on the surface, to make architecture a privileged table of operation separate from, although related to, the forces of domination and control that ultimately interest Foucault. This is to simply circle back to the totalizing place of a transcendental and continous history that Foucault himself is dedicated to unravelling. And yet, if we are to believe Foucault's own account of his attitude toward space, which he describes as allowing one to grasp the strategic points at which discourses are transformed in, through, and on the basis of relations of power, then these spatial demarcations seem more architectural than anything else. They seem more architectural than geo-political, for example, because they depend on a tension that belongs only to architecture—mainly the tension between design and inhabitation. The political force of the panopticon lies in the impossibility of separating its political "design" from its function and inhabitation. The spatial metaphors that Foucault routinely uses are effective in his dis-

8 Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 68.

course, I would argue, because they have already assumed the (design) framework of architectural typology and propriety that designates proper forms of inhabitation in space. Subsisting beneath, and perhaps anterior to, the spatial demarcations of domain, soil, region, archipelago, are the architectural proprieties of house, office, site, context, and city. These proprieties are themselves interlocked with moral and political systems that emanate from elsewhere, but the very notion of propriety itself—the word *propriety*—is linked to the ownership of property, to the proper inhabitation of that property, and thus, in a circle, to architecture.[9]

While, on the one hand, I want to suggest that architecture is crucial to the spatial composition of power, on the other hand, I believe that architecture cannot, in any direct sense, embody any of the things that we have traditionally thought it could embody, such as nobility, the spirit of the age, social well-being, grandeur, harmony, the grotesque, or fascism. The very idea of "embodiment" is fraught with problems, at least one of which is the idea that there is a unidirectional movement (a translation) from idea to object, whereas the signification of architecture seems to be far more oblique, far more analogical and circuitous.[10] One might say that the idea of embodiment itself has already entered into a contract with architecture—a contract whereby architecture names itself as repository, backdrop, stage, vessel, into which meaning is poured. Here architecture makes a formal alliance with the classical body: body as Platonic envelope into which mind, blood, spirit, are poured. The contract between architecture and the "embodying" mythology has remained in force for centuries of architectural practice, criticism, and history. The character of this contract seems to reveal itself only when something goes wrong, when the embodying act fails in some way, or when architecture performs a reversal on classical ideas of the body. For example, the panopticon is not an embodiment of political ideology but the spatialization of that ideology. The making of ideology as body-in-space is not an act of containment, expressionism, or reification. It is, instead, a finding of spatial proprieties and transgressions in the functions of ideology, that is, a finding of the architectural properties of the ideological. One might call this architecturalization of ideology a construction of the spatial lines of power systems—lines that are themselves revised and masked as they assume the status of architectural object. It is this object that is the very source or wellspring of the architectural lament for its lost social and political body.[11]

From the Renaissance onward, and probably even before, architectural discourse is riddled with lament. It laments the waste of the past, the loss of truth, the loss of power, the confusion of meaning and mission. But the most pointed lament is launched against the waywardness of the object, the failure of the "architectural body," and a loss of control over the signifying object. All disciplines, to

9 In a different way, this cycle of the proper is also linked to the proper name, the individual possession of self, the possession of place, and so forth. Not only does this accord with Foucault's idea that power moves in more local, more "refined" ways than "state" power apparatuses allow, but it also addresses what I might call the "architecture-as-metaphor" problem. A spatial metaphor has the power (indeed, it turns out, the *only* power) to transact a relationship between things (between architecture and an economic system, between architecture and geopolitics, etc.). These metaphorical transactions depend on the operation of metaphor itself (which can travel from here to there in language). But, as Rousseau was perhaps the first to point out, all language is metaphoric, figurative. There is no non-figurative, non-travelling, language. Our ability to "possess" ourselves, as in the assurance of self-identity, is indebted in the strictest sense to the possession of property, which in turn is indebted to the proprieties of possession, and so on. This is not architecture-as-metaphor as opposed to some other sense of architecture. Architecture, like all disciplines, exists only through the force of its metaphoric status (in culture, in language).

10 As Tafuri remarks, ". . . it must be clearly understood that between institutions and power systems perfect identity does not exist. Architecture itself . . . is anything but a unitary ideological block: as with other linguistic systems, its ideologies act in a highly nonlinear fashion. So much so that it is legitimate to suspect that the very criticism of architectural ideology—as it has been conducted up to now—has only reckoned with the most obvious and immediate aspects of that ideology: the refusals, repressions, and introspections, which run through the body of architectural writing." (Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 5). It is precisely these "most obvious" refusals and repressions, these "laments," that interest me here; even as I share Tafuri's own lament for the limitations of ideological analysis of architecture it is, itself, another kind of refusal and introspection.

11 One might read Alberti, in particular, with respect to the power of the "outline," the "lineament" as the quintessential architectural act. I bring up the matter of the line

some degree, have a discourse of lament about the epistemic heritage they must define themselves against—for it is in the nature of the episteme to promise presence and deliver absence. But architecture has an exceptionally interesting relationship to the structure of the lament, since, as we shall see, lament itself is no ordinary nostaglia. Part of its force lies in its linguistic life as a kind of elegiac speech that "actively mourns the past by recapitulating it."[12] This recapitulation is, in turn, a kind of paraphrase, or a "walking alongside and pointing," that, in ways I will eventually discuss, operates as one of the dialects of power in architecture specifically related to spatiality and the architectural object. The lament contains not only the power of nostalgia, with which we are familiar, but also the power of paraphrase—the power of *description*, which is a type of discourse particularly resistant to criticality and self-reflection. Further, paraphrastic discourse, the discourse of lament, is linear, in the sense that as it unfolds it attempts to outline—describe and circumscribe—its object. It attempts to envelop its object in the space of lines. The lament ideally proposes to recount what has taken place in the same order, along the same path, that it has taken place. In a number of architectural treatises—specifically in Le Corbusier—the connection between lament and linearity is quite explicit.[13] One might say that the moment of lament is a moment when architecture reveals its distrust and doubt of its own "object-power" and exposes its desire to be a part of the linearities of time.

The lament, and along with it, the line, circulate through the history of architecture as surely as theories of function or beauty. The problem of the lament, in particular, has been thematized for me in two texts, the tenth book of the *Ten Books of Architecture* by Vitruvius and the "Tenth Duino Elegy" by Rainer Maria Rilke. The reason these two texts initially came to mind was because both are the "tenth" in a series, and because both talk, each differently, about the ways in which the lament reveals a certain kind of architectural power that while related to the ideological status of architecture within culture is also distinct from that status.

In my edition of Vitruvius there is an introduction written by Albert H. Howard about the translator of the book, Professor Morris Hickey Morgan.[14] Professor Howard took over the translation of this text because Professor Morgan died before completing it. Howard apologizes in this introduction for his inadequacy as a translator, and remarks that he has tried to remain true to the spirit of Morgan's translation. Howard apparently took up the incomplete translation at the tenth book, claiming particular responsibility for chapters thirteen through sixteen, although he also made minor grammatical revisions on earlier sections. Thus, one might claim, chapter thirteen in the tenth book constitutes a break of some kind in this particular translation, a place where one translation comes to rest and another begins—

here only to leave it. In the following section, a tacit connection is made between "outline," the paraphrastic character of lament (the descriptive line), and architectural power.

12 These are the words of Carol Jacobs, whose article on Rilke I use in the following section. See note 19.

13 For a discussion of this relationship see Catherine Ingraham, "The Burdens of Linearity," paper (in press) delivered at Theory Conference, Chicago Institute of Architecture and Urbanism, Fall 1988.

14 Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, *The Ten Books of Architecture*, trans. Morris Hicky Morgan, (New York: Dover Publications, 1960). All citations are taken from this volume unless otherwise indicated.

although the honorable attempt of Howard is to sound like Morgan, and my purpose is not really to say that he failed. Neither is my purpose to discern what the proper translation of chapters thirteen to sixteen is, fruitful as that might be, but simply to suggest that what could be taken as a purely technical break may be more than technical.[15]

In Book X of the *Ten Books of Architecture*, Vitruvius proposes to discuss the "elements of motion." The first nine books detail the fundamental principles of architecture, sites, materials, methods of building walls, the virtues of symmetry, classification of temples, the building of theaters and baths, proportions, colors, aqueducts, and the phases of the moon. In Book X, Vitruvius considers the architect as a designer of machines—hoisting machines, climbing machines, water machines, and so on. At the end of chapter twelve in this tenth book, Vitruvius summarizes what remains to be done: "There is left for me, in the matter of sieges, to explain how generals can win victories and cities be defended, by means of machinery." The subsequent section is entitled "Siege Machines." Here ensue several stories about different campaigns and sieges in which war machines, both built and destroyed by architects, play an interesting role. The curiosity of these sections lies in the fact that architects played an active role in the military exploits of the first century B.C., and in the construction details and "look" of these machines. In a manner very close to that with which he delineates the construction of



Cesare Cesariano, ***Building machine on the site***, **Libri Decem. X, 1521**

temples and theaters in earlier sections, Vitruvius outlines the proper heights and widths of the "tortoise"—a slow-moving tower on wheels housing a battering ram, which was probably the earliest version of the armored tank.

> It had . . . a base of thirty cubits square, and a height, excluding the pediment, of thirteen cubits . . . Issuing up and above the middle of the roof for not less than two cubits was a gable, and on this was reared a small tower four stories high, in which, on the top floor, scorpiones and catapults were set up . . . Inside of this was set the machinery of the ram . . . (310)

However, as Vitruvius continues, these machines are only effective as long as some other unexpected

15 It is no longer possible to treat the issue of translation as merely a technical act. No longer possible, that is, since Derrida's "exposure" of translation as yet another iteration, another interpretation, of a text made up only of iterations and interpretations. See, in particular, "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing," and Gayatri Spivak's introduction in *Of Grammatology*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). On the issue of translation in architecture, see Mark Wigley, "The Production of Babel, the Translation of Architecture," *Assemblage* 8, (1989).



Carlo Fontana, *Location and general view of the machine for raising the Vatican Obelisk*, 1590

force does not appear to foil them. It will turn out, more often than not, that this unexpected force is the force of the trojan horse—that is, a form capable of dissimulating itself as gift, benign offering, domestic architecture.[16] Vitruvius offers the example of a Rhodian architect, Diognetus, who received an annuity as a mark of honor, presumably for his military architecture. One day Callias, an architect from Aradus, comes to Rhodes and gives a public lecture at which he shows models of a machine with a revolving crane that can hoist a hostile siege machine inside the wall of a fortification, rendering it useless. The Rhodians were so impressed with this ingenious instrument that they transferred the annuity, and further military commissions, from Diognetus to Callias. In a similar instance, Vitruvius describes how the ram-tortoise, approaching to batter down a wall, was caught by "a noose" that pulled the head of the machine up, enabling its destruction by "glowing fire-darts and the blows of ballistae." By such victories, Vitruvius concludes, "not by machines but in opposition to the principle of machines, has the freedom of states been preserved by the cunning of architects." (318)



Domenico Fontana, *Plan for raising the Vatican Obelisk*, 1590

16 In the case of the trojan horse, it was, of course, precisely its status as gift, as domesticated horse/object/symbol, that accounted for its effectiveness as a war machine.

Vitruvius perhaps means, by the expression "the cunning of architects," that architecture properly responds to the moving siege machine (translated as "engine") by domesticating it, making it static; by slipping a noose around its neck and hoisting it *inside the walls*. The architecture-of-stasis is, in this sense, the trojan horse, the surprise weapon that houses the downfall of forces moving against it. But we cannot ignore another piece of this account, mainly that in Vitruvius the very machines against which architecture wins its victories themselves *look* like architecture, like temples, or houses, or towers. One might say that the tower or temple is morphologically recapitulated in the war machine as a kind of lament for an architecture-of-motion, an architecture of effectiveness and strategic power. And yet, in the end, the victory is had by the architecture-of-stasis.

In this sense, domestic architecture—with its dedication to settlement, site, domain, region, territory, property—signifies the most ingenious war machine of all. Here what gets recapitulated are certain mechanisms of the machine, the noose and the hoist, but not the dynamism of the moving siege tower. These mechanisms act from a static position, inside the walls.

One might say that architecture-of-stasis always harbors the lament for an architecture-of-motion. It is perhaps the cunning of the architect that decides the relation between these two postures—decides where the victory and the yearly grant resides.[17] Yet, this cunning is not a fully intentioned cleverness by the architect acting as a professional, but a more subtle cunning of how, in architecture, the category of the static conceals the dynamic. Through a bit of obliquity, I might construe this as the cunning of presence (the inert fullness associated with the static) concealing absence (the decapitation of the recapitulated morphology—as with the noose); or propriety (singularity of form) concealing trangression (plurality of form).



1

Hegeton's Ram and Tortoise, from Wescher's *Poliorcétique des Grecs*.

17 In some respects, the entire debate between the architect and the engineer (the two "experts") revolves around issues of stasis and movement. In *Nomadology: The War Machine* (New York: Semiotext(e), Columbia University, 1986) Deleuze and Guatteri implicitly take up the problem of architecture/engineering as "Royal" sciences versus "nomadic" (hydraulic) sciences. Vitruvius' discussion of water machines (Book VIII) and war machines (Book X) could be productively read through *Nomadology*. There is a particularly interesting discussion about the "military unit" of the man + horse + spear versus the armored tank.

But how does one thing conceal another in architecture, if this is what is happening? Can architecture, which is static, properly be said to be lamenting the movement that is traditionally denied to it? And, if so, is the force of this lament to provide a kind of surrogate movement—literally a paraphrastic movement, a walking alongside and pointing? Or, as Vitruvius has detailed it, does the infusion of the tower with the power to move against itself have a critical import that is hidden beneath the morphological lament?



Coop Himmelblau, Ronacher Theatre, Vienna, 1985

In the "Tenth Duino Elegy," by the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, a poem about borders—most notably the border between life and death—the relation between lament and power (linguistic, spatial) is revealed not as a condition of opposites where, say, stasis and motion are antithetical to each other, but as a condition of infolding, or sheathing of one within the other. In a sense, one might say that the architectural lament for motion, which issues in the formal *gravitas* familiar to us from Modernism, enforces the virtues of stasis. This lament masks the sense in which architecture is already possessed of consequential motion, of *actual* motion I would say, if this did not instantly suggest an opposition that I want to undo. I am in search, in Rilke's Tenth Elegy, of a way to describe this relationship more pointedly.

The poem was understood until 1974, when Carol Jacobs did a truly staggering rereading of it, to be a Christian allegory of how the landscape of suffering must be embraced in order to be transcended. The first lines of the poem invite us into this idea:

> Someday, emerging at last from this terrifying vision, may I burst into jubilant praise to assenting Angels.[18]

And farther along, the poet writes:

> We wasters of sorrow . . . How we stare away into sad endurance beyond them, trying to foresee their end. Whereas they are nothing else than our winter foliage, our sombre evergreen, one of the seasons of our interior year, not only season, but place, settlement, camp, soil, dwelling. (79)

The force of the place to which the poet summons us is the force of the comfortable home, a place of rest, an end to suffering and a death, which the rest of the

18 Rainer Maria Rilke, "The Tenth Elegy" in *Duino Elegies*, trs. J.B. Leishman and Stephen Spender, (New York: Norton & Company, 1967), 79–85. All citations from this volume unless otherwise noted.



Coop Himmelblau, Ronacher Theatre Complex, Facade

poem traces the path toward. This path takes the reader, guided by angels, through the City of Pain, filled with swaggering "guilded fuss" and "bursting memorials," a "market of comfort." Beyond the city is a fair. Here there are:

> Swings of Freedom! Divers and Jugglers of Zeal! . . . Especially worth seeing (for adults only): the breeding of Money! Anatomy made amusing! . . . Oh, and then just outside, behind the last hoarding, plastered with placards for "Deathless," that bitter beer that tastes quite sweet to its drinkers . . . just at the back of the hoardings, just behind them, it's real! Children are playing, and lovers holding each other . . . The youth is drawn further on; perhaps he's in love with a youthful Lament . . . (81)

Here we reach one of the first borders, for only the ("youthfully") dead can enter this land. The young Lament guides the youth to a land filled with temple columns, "the ruins of towers from which, long ago, Lords of the House of Lament wisely governed the land."(83) From the lowlands the newly dead come to a range of mountains where they must climb to the

urleids, the mountains of originary or primal pain. But in the final upward climbing, seemingly toward the final happiness, toward home and the place, the soil, the dwelling, heaven, the traveler, named as "we, who have always thought of happiness climbing, would feel the emotion that almost startles when happiness falls." (85)

The last line of the poem, the startling fall from the heights, counteracts the first, the jubliant assent/ascent. It is this paradox, or riddle, that leads Jacobs to suggest that despite the "guise of sympathy and gentleness in these verses, they set the scene for a violent paradox in which we ourselves are inscribed." [19]

As Jacobs remarks, and it is her reading that makes it possible for me to imagine this poem next to Vitruvius:

> the topography of the poem is a progressive marking of borders . . . the narration organizes its two descriptions according to a system of contrarities. The difference between the two realms is as pronounced as that between life and death, and the progression of the elegy depends on that absolute line of demarcation separating the two. The scission is radical . . . (983–984)

But, as Jacobs suggests, a certain fraud is taking place. Although the traveler, who is also the reader, appears to transcend the tawdry city and advance into a place where death is embraced, in the ruins and graveyards of great cities, this land of lamentation turns out to be based on an economy that draws profit from the absence of life. "Unable to conceal an irrepressible material desire [the Realm of Lamentation] operates by depreciating the worldly and then borrowing this earthly value in order to displace it and draw profit from it in another realm."(986) Thus the riddle of the first and last line is partially answered. The passage through the land of lamentation is not an unambiguous ascent/assent but a falling back into the (displaced) materiality that this passage proposed to transcend.

There is one more figure in the poem—without continuing Jacobs reading in detail—that I want to address before I circle back to my primary architectural problem. This is the figure of the Sphinx that the youth encounters just before he begins his climb up the mountains of pain. The Sphinx appears as a silent lofty figure bathed in moonlight, "the all-guarding sepulchral stone . . . Twin-brother to that on the Nile . . . the taciturn chamber's gaze . . . [with a] regal head that has silently poised, for ever, the human face on the scale of the stars."(83) The Sphinx is, of course, the classical oracle that posed the question: "What being, with only one voice, has sometimes two feet, sometimes three, sometimes four, and is weakest when it has the most?" If the passer-by could not answer, he was devoured on the spot. In Rilke's poem (and again I am indebted to Jacobs) the Sphinx answers its own question, not with the univocal answer "man," but with a decapitated head, "silently poised" on a hollow chamber and a monstrous body, a condition that parallels the

19 Carol Jacobs, "The Tenth Duino Elegy or the Parable of the Beheaded Reader," in *Modern Language Notes*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 978–1002. All citations are taken from this text unless otherwise noted.

morphology of the poem itself, whose head (jubilant ascent from the realm of the city) is severed from its body (the hollow realm of lamentation).

Using the same images of Rilke's poem and Jacobs' reading, one might suggest that architecture works a similar deception on us when it proposes to exhibit its traditional powers. It promises repose but cultivates the "fall" (from the height, ledge, step, wall). Like the lament in the poem, architecture is a "language that recapitulates" otherness and then acts as its telos. It has no language of its own, and must speak in terms outside itself, the terms of other bodies. In its desire for the material, it profits from these other power structures by using their images. It is a false land of repose. The very act that proposes to transform these power structures into something else is called on repeatedly to use their language to name itself. In this we can understand, in some preliminary way, why the lament is so appropriate to architecture—why it is so much a part of the architectural posture toward the past (the realm that has been left behind). The lament names the kind of power that architecture has traditionally had—the power of recapitulation. And yet, as the poem and its analysis teach us, lament itself is not doing what it appears to be doing. It recapitulates, not in order to (merely) describe and narrate, but also to appropriate, to displace and repossess the material it claims to have left behind.

As the Vitruvian account of war machines suggests, somewhere in the morphological or spatial



A revolving armored cupola operated by hand, **after Hennebert**



A chatillon and commentary disappearing gun turret in the raised position, **from Clarke's *Reports***

composition of all these non-oppositional but infolded doubles (the house that laments the machine; the sublime ruin that laments the material prosperity of the tawdry city; the linear ascent that laments the fall) a certain kind of cunning is at work. Like the Sphinx's challenge, this cunning takes the form of a



I veneziani sbarcano vele e remi a tiro, fresco, Pallazzo Ducale, Venice

riddle that substitutes for the univocal answer "man," a hollow chamber. This substitution is not merely a substitution, but a decapitation of the head and a hollowing out of its psyche. [20]

The "path" of analysis that evolves from paraphrase—the walking alongside and pointing (the outlining) that the Lament begins with, to the infolded and doubling circumspection that we are forced to end with (here, in this essay, and elsewhere)—argues for a view of motion and stasis, of architectural power, of temporality and spatiality, different from the one we started with. To recover the early lines of the poem, the sorrow of lament is not only a "season" (a mood) but also a "place." As a place, a domain, the realm of lamentation is always already framed by the material domain of the city. But the domain of the city is also made known to us, at first, as a place to be transcended, as a place of decay and corruption. It is only when we arrive at the Sphinx, the enigmatic "engine" of our duplicity (speaking stones; decorated with a human face; hollow chamber with a head perched on it; oracle that states the problem of man in terms of his "supports," his posture and elevation), that it becomes clear how architecture (property, structure, monumentality, space) has found its way into all the parts of our apparent passage beyond it. In this sense, one might say that all our attempts at static analysis of architecture (outline, description, recapitulation, lament)—attempts reflected in building practices as well as architectural treatises—are confounded by the fact that architecture problematizes the very differences we depend on for keeping it still and inert: the difference, for example, between movement and stasis, time and space, life and death, subject and object, domestic and military, tower and engine, hollow chamber and war machine.

20 I am reminded here of George Hersey's discussion of the classical column as a reassemblage of sacrificial body parts (of animal, or man). See George Hersey, *The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).

TEMPLE COURT

Freedom & Glue: Architecture, Seriality, and Identity in the American City

GEORGE WAGNER

For America . . . the gridiron plan may for the time being still suffice. Wherever people are concerned merely with colonizing land, live only for earning money, and earn money only in order to live, it may be appropriate to pack people into blocks of buildings like herring in a barrel.[1] —*Camillo Sitte*

I

When Camillo Sitte briefly turned to the subject of American urbanism, he made an association, perhaps obvious, between the technical instrument of American urban speculation, the "gridiron," and making money. He did not suggest that the grid might possess an ideological dimension beyond the functions of subdivision and profit; or that the higher callings of a place (and in America these cries have stood for the myths of democracy and the individual) might be completely intertwined with the practical arts. Instead, Sitte describes the grid as the primitive and archaic tool of a culture still bound by the savage limits of necessity and survival. He describes a city not as a contrived image but as direct and unmediated representation of "earning money in order to live." The technical process of the American city's production provides its image, and that image has a singular reference. The plan of the city is not physically influenced by domains of power outside the economic. Elsewhere in his text, Sitte remarks that the North American city typically has no program, its only function being commercial. Sitte's reluctance to accept the grid plan is a reaction to its lack of "artistry," and he elaborates on the American city's absence of program, either functional or symbolic, by stating that the city exists principally as a commercial venture.

If one accepts Sitte's description of the American city as an accurate registration of its profound differences from the medieval centers he extols, it is not at all difficult to then wonder exactly how the art of architecture figures in this distinction between modes of urbanism. That the grid is an enterprise based on repetition is certainly illustrated by Sitte's reference to packing "people into blocks of buildings like herring in a barrel." This repetition affected the "artistry" of buildings as much as it affected the artistry of city planning. More than that, the relationship between the body of the building and the field of the city acquired radical redefinition. This charge can be examined by juxtaposing two remarks by expected protagonists in any argument about the relationship between works of architecture and the city: the first from Leon Battista Alberti's *Ten Books of Architecture*, the second from Manfredo Tafuri's *Architecture and Utopia*. The quotation from Alberti, of 1452, is quite famous:

1 Cammilo Sitte, *City Planning According to Artistic Principles* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 126.

Charles Sheeler, *Temple Court, New York*, 1920

Left: Sano di Pietro, *Saint Bernardine*, 1590. Right: G. B. Ricci, with L. Scalzo and B. Torrigiani, *Capella Sistina*, Sta. Maria Maggiore, Rome, 1590

> If a city, according to the Opinion of Philosophers, be no more than a great house, and, on the other hand, a house be a little city; why may it not be said, that the members of that house are so many little houses; such as the courtyard, the hall, the parlour, the portico and the like?[2]

And from Tafuri, in 1973:

> In the American city, absolute liberty is granted to the single architectural fragment, but this fragment is situated in a context that it does not condition formally: the secondary elements of the city are given maximum articulation; while the laws governing the whole are rigidly maintained. Thus urban planning and architecture are finally separated.[3]

The contrast between these two texts is fundamental, challenging the way not only the relationship between architectural design and urban design is characterized, but the disciplines themselves. Alberti describes a common formal language for the building and for the city; between them is a shared, continuous vocabulary: a corridor is like a street and a room is like a piazza. This language binds the two realms, so that the same sort of logic might produce the physical forms of a town or a building. In short, one could design a city as one designs a work of architecture. In the tradition of the European city, religious and imperial power found building and city form similarly open to hierarchical expression. The space of the important building, a commanding presence, opens out onto the space of the city in a relationship which Camillo Sitte described as "artistically harmonious."[4] It is assumed that a formal resonance exists between the important building and the city that surrounds it. One inflects to the other. Here buildings possess a physical power projected into the space of the city, for example the Paris Opera's domination of its *quartier*. In Alberti's world architecture and the city are forged by the same power, with a continuity of formal means and interests.

By contrast, Tafuri posits that in the American city this empathic relationship does not exist. Further he states that, "the geometric character of the plan . . . does not seek an architectural correspondence in the forms of the single buildings."[5] Tafuri

2 Leon Battista Alberti, *The Ten Books of Architecture* (New York: Dover, 1986), 13.

3 Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973), 38.

4 Camillo Sitte, *City Planning According to Artistic Principles*, 126.

5 Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 38.

asserts that the two realms are not expressively interlocked; their meanings do not collectively resonate. The plan of the city does not employ the expressive formal tools of architecture (hierarchy, for instance), nor does it become a sympathetic ground for their evocation. To accept the archetypal plan of the American city, the 1811 Commissioner's grid for New York, as essentially non-artistic in its formal characteristics, is to acknowledge that the formal apparatus of the city plan is devoted to the registration and subdivision of land. Tafuri's vocabulary for the city acknowledges the shift from artistry to scientific classification: "a network of arteries," "the urban system," "the urban structure." The building is described as an "architectural fragment," a disconnected piece of the whole, and not a central organ in a larger anatomy. The city plan and the building represent different interests; they neither "formally condition" each other, nor share in a continuous formal vocabulary.

II

The gridded town plan has been the primary planning instrument in the historical development of the



Aerial view, Paris Opera





Left: *American City*, Columbus, Tacoma. Right: A portion of the 1811 *New York City Commissioner's Plan.*

center of North American cities. Typically an orthogonal network of streets subdivides the ground into blocks, and the blocks themselves are further subdivided into contiguous lots. Lots are sold for development, with the specific use to be determined by the buyer. Because the use of the land is not necessarily dictated by the plan, neither is the form of buildings. Aggregation of lots, to affect the size of building sites, presents another variable. The result has been to create a physical structure where various diverse uses are equated by the plan: the subdivision of the block describes an equivalence between parts. Church, post office, hotel, library, office building are similarly served in a formal system that does not favor the manifestation of a hierarchy of position. Interchangeable locations within the plat could serve any function, but those functions were isolated within the block, unable to affect the field. A hierarchy of function could only manifest itself through the process of development, not simply in the fulfillment of a plan. The manufacture of identity giving institutions and their buildings the privileged status of visibility that the plan denied, becomes the task of architecture. Architectural identity is based then on difference, as opposed to specific content—the reading of a piece against a competing field. In a field of similar multiples, strategies that define uniqueness and construct specific identity become important because, within the primary logic of the field, these are so clearly synthetic, and the artifice of representation glaring. Faith in the mechanisms of artifice, in the viability of singular identity, often appears stronger than faith in program or institution. The compulsion for an architecture that speaks overpowers the need for specific content. Architectural ambition is localized and isolated.

The result of this system of development has been a dependence upon the fictions of architecture for the

manifestation of functional expression and building identity, independent of the status of urban location. The expressive license granted architecture must fit the severe constraints of the city's formal structure. When every site in the city is essentially similar, the burden of identity falls on the building's image, on the myths of architectural representation, as opposed to the characteristics of a unique location. The "non-artistic" city plan exists primarily as an instrument of catalogue and subdivision, localizing the domain of representation on the vertical surface, in the visible realm of architecture.

The city is composed of a variety of images—buildings—on a repetitive field of locations and lots. Emerging from this composite is the tension between unity (the city as a whole) and diversity (the individual building). Placeless in the plan (because it is an instrument based on repetition), the building is grounded against the exploitation of the myths of architectural character by the contingencies of its surroundings. The formal architectural problem that emerges in the grid plan is paradoxical: a repetitive structure composed of a diversity of elements. Unity breeds cacophony. Architecture must compensate for the unity of the field and yet seriality breeds competition between the identity of each increment. But no matter how much a building's architecture cultivates a singular identity, this singularity is always qualified by the presence of the rest of the field. As in the multiples of Warhol, an image gains individuality even in the absence of singularity. Identity emerges only in juxtaposition to the "copy," which reveals difference. The remarkable formal constraints of the Chicago School (the development of an architectural logic within a narrow set of constraints dictated by the form of the city) can be seen as a response to these conditions. By reducing the factors of architectural composition to a rigorously defined set of variables, competition between buildings is minimized.

III

Andy Warhol spoke obliquely of the construction of the multiple:

> Tuesday, July 25, 1978
>
> Forgot to say that the night before what I watched on TV was the Miss Universe pageant.
> Miss USA was actually the best, she was from Hawaii and she looked like Jerry Hall, but when it came to the question, "What do you think of the United States?" instead of saying something serious like "It's the most free nation that glues together everything" she blew it and she said something like "Oh, I love the beaches!" Miss South Africa won, she looked like a brunette version of Miss USA but she gave a serious answer.[6]

"It's the most free nation that glues together everything." Warhol's idea of a serious remark is notable for its generality and its insight. While his description of the United States might as likely be read as

6 Andy Warhol, Pat Hackett ed. *The Andy Warhol Diaries* (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 155.



Andy Warhol, *Warren*



Pictorial Map and Guide to Chicago

pertaining to plastic surgery, it can also suggest an essential characteristic of American urbanism: a dominant ordering structure (the grid) has qualified and liberated the identity of the parts (the buildings), even as the assembly of those parts remains awkward and somewhat unconvincing in its artificiality ("glues together everything"). In his discussion of the origins of the American city, Leonardo Benevolo describes these characteristics: "Certain elements are laid down rigidly and invariably, but only in so far as is necessary to provide a common and indisputable frame of reference: everything else is free to vary indefinitely and continually."[7] Certainly Benevolo is attempting to draw a parallel between the organizational structure of the grid plan and the basic tenets of the United States Constitution. What emerges is an understanding of the grid as a powerful ideological tool. Warhol applies some virtue to the idea of "most free". In this context, "free to vary indefinitely and continually" refers to the refusal to control the whole, which exists as a system that accommodates diversity and yet has no content of its own. The system does not begin with an image, but always ends up with one. The image is always marked by conflict, by the anonymity of location within a repetitive structure against the "meaningful" manipulations of identity.

The process of awkward, disjunctive assembly is Warhol's glue. In his vocabulary, the word *glue* is loaded. As a material it is the most transitory, the least permanent, the cheapest; one can never glue without a seam. Usually the thing glued has been broken. For Warhol, glue is not the medium of the authentic, but of the quick, the cheap, the temporary, and the false. These, he suggests, are inherent characteristics of America (and, one could imply, of the American city). Things that are glued are always threatening to collapse; the presence of the seam always suggests broken parts as much as a whole.

The city block is glued together. Recognition of this fact is not new; the work of Charles Sheeler, in particular, has focused scrutiny on the city's compositional seams. Sheeler presented unadorned sides and partial appearances of buildings as the important and heroic images of the contemporary city. In fact, his work prompts acknowledgement of just how artificial the conventions of architectural presentation are in the city. It seems as if the constant juxtaposition of refined formal elevations against crude and unadorned party-walls should more completely challenge the illusions of the coherent architectural object. The first increment of American urban architecture, even in the vacuum of wilderness where builders had little loyalty to artfulness, has long been the false front, that peculiar hybrid which presents the front and the body of a building as if belonging to different beasts. In fact, the compelling reality of urban architecture is to be found in the fragility of such tenuous architectural concepts as "purity" and "completion"; the urban building is chronically violated by the plan of the city and the hesitant convictions of economics.

7 Leonardo Benevolo, *History of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977), 196.

IV

In *Space, Time and Architecture*, Sigfried Giedion compares Daniel Burnham's Reliance Building of 1894 to Mies van der Rohe's Project for a Glass Tower of 1921. The comparison is meant to present the Reliance Building as a harbinger of Miesian purity. He calls the Reliance building a "glass tower," speaks of its "glass body," and describes its "purity of proportion" and "airiness".[8]

Giedion's illustration shows the corner view of the Reliance and presents the two street elevations of the building. What kind of dialogue might he have produced if he had looked at a picture of the Reliance Building's party–wall instead? Quickly, purity becomes a problematic issue. Problematic because the "glass tower" suddenly turns out to be not all glass, and purity becomes an implied, as opposed to an achieved, reality. Recognizing the presence of two brick party–walls, the integrity of the "glass body" is poignantly compromised. The discussion must now turn to the city, and to the physical impression of the city on the body of the building. To see the Reliance Building from this perspective is to become aware of the plat of the city grid—of the ways in which that plat makes the rendering of a formally cohesive object difficult while simultaneously making possible a perceptual continuity between building and city. The architectural concept of purity is challenged, in fact manhandled, by the formal apparatus of the city's plan, the technical system of lot subdivision. Similarly, Mies's Seagram Building, that great icon of purity, only achieves that status after considerable struggle to disentangle itself from the rest of the block.



Left: Street elevation and party–wall, Reliance Building.
Right: Mies, *Project for a Glass Tower*, 1921.

8 Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 387-8.

V

By the end of the nineteenth century, the form of the city was chaotic and unplanned, and architecture, "compromised" by its fusion to the mass of the block, was unfavored by specific locations in the field. This is illustrated by the schism between the plan of New York and its projection, described by Leonardo Benevolo as a problem of analytical, rather than projective, geometry. When an analytic, non-spatial plan is projected, especially irregularly, chaotic form is produced. And yet the individualization

of buildings depended on the development of architectural images to sponsor readings of autonomy and identity for the city's emerging institutions. Not only was the nineteenth century city's form uncontrolled, it also hindered the installation of a freestanding architectural object, the preferred incarnation of the Beaux Arts institution. How did American architects regard the unplanned, chaotic vitality of the laissez–faire city? How compelling could any ideology of "freedom" be for an architect if it sponsored the sacrifice of intentional artistry for city form? And even if the ideological terms of American urbanism were admirable, how did their resulting physical form—the contemporary city itself—compare with the dominant historical precedents to which architects aspired? Daniel Burnham and his followers were certainly opposed to architectural laissez faire, proposing numerous projects to install retrofit hierarchies into American towns. Burnham's urban plans for Chicago and Cleveland imposed hierarchical figures on repetitive grids to allow architecture to once again dominate the city. Monumental Beaux Arts buildings often were installed in the attempt to redefine the scale of institutional occupation. One of the central tenets shared by the City Beautiful movement and the Civic Center movement was to find a location in the city for buildings that would provide visibility for the institutions of power. By inscribing the realm of power into the plan of the city, a sponsor could acquire a sense of historical origin in the untamed field, and begin to construct the illusion of





Before and after Benjamin Franklin Parkway



Hegeman, *"Chaos"*

a building controlling that field. Sited axially within the repetitive grid, the monumental building simulates and inverts the conditions of history, by suggesting, in its command of the field, that the city grew up around it, a product of its benevolent power. Werner Hegeman wrote in his "Introduction" to *An American Vitruvius*:

> One of the foremost aims of this book on civic art is to bring out the necessity of extending the architects sphere of influence, to emphasize the essential relation between a building and its setting, the necessity of protecting the aspect of the approaches, the desirability of grouping buildings into harmonious ensembles, of securing dominance of some buildings over others, so that by the willing submission of the less to the greater there may be created a larger, more monumental unity; a unity comprising at least a group of buildings with their surroundings, if possible entire districts and finally even, it may be hoped, entire cities.
>
> Against chaos and anarchy in architecture, emphasis must be placed upon the ideal of civic art and the civilized city. In the design of individual facades and of individual plans, American architects have created an extensive body of excellent work. What is now required is better correlation of the individual buildings.
>
> Most American cities have fallen victims of a grid iron street arrangement along which buildings of different character are lined up indiscriminately. It is hard under such conditions to place buildings to advantage. The inconsiderate introduction of diagonal streets often made matters worse instead of improving them. How churches and other important buildings were placed and made prominent in former times and how their surroundings and approaches were treated and protected is a study well worth while to the American architect.[9]

The urban ideals of the City Beautiful movement were without question as strongly ideological as they were utopian and nostalgic. Hegeman's text is laced with the language of expansion and control: "securing dominance," "willing submission," "against chaos and anarchy," "the civilized." In fact, one of the main goals of the City Beautiful movement was to remove images of production from the face of the city and to replace them with a theatrical core that offered the scenographic image of centralized power.

There are numerous examples of American city plans that provide for the presentation of important buildings, from the Baroque textuality of Washington D.C., to the refined accretive articulation of Savannah, Georgia, to the minimal inscribed crossing of the courthouse town, Austin, Texas being a particularly grand example. One strategy for securing the expression of a building's importance in the gridded city has been through siting in a park-like the setting of an empty block. New York City Hall is one example where the principal building axis is localized and does not intrude into the city plan. Another strategy for identification has been the use of object-types at corner sites (like the secular

9 Werner Hegeman, *The American Vitruvius* (New York: Architectural Book Publishing Co., 1922), 1.



Top: Burnham, Proposed Civic Center, view looking west, Chicago. 1906–08. Below: Before and after Decatur, Illinois, 1920.



C. Oldenberg, *Proposed Monument for the Intersection of Canal Street and Broadway*, New York, block of concrete, inscribed with the names of war heroes, 1965.

Reliance Building) relieved against adjacent party-walls. Churches are frequent examples. At the turn of the century, the height of the American Beaux Arts and of the international ascendancy of the United States and the city of New York, local adjustments were made in New York's plan to accommodate heroically scaled buildings for the city's growing institutions. The New York Public Library, Grand Central Terminal, Pennsylvania Station, and the Metropolitan Museum introduced a scale of architecture that required exceptional location within the generic grid of the Commissioner's Plan. The use of particular architectural types requiring composite sites transformed the city's plan. The Public Library was sited on two blocks which were previously occupied by a reservoir. The principle axis of the Public Library is received by 41st Street, although 41st Street is just like 40th Street or 43rd Street. Similarly, the Metropolitan faces 82nd Street, Penn Station, 32nd. One would expect these monuments to have spatial resonance and urban effect in the form of a plaza or a significant axial street, but they sit fairly passively in the fabric, their heroism unable to transform the surrounding city. The monument's effect on the city's seriality remains a purely local phenomenon.

To acknowledge a passive relationship between these monumental buildings and the city grid is not to say that they are isolated from the surrounding city. It is as though this inability to make spatial their architectural energy at the urban scale has forced an inward focus that establishes a set of tautly drawn internal spaces reflecting the presence of the



Far West Missouri, 1836.



McKim, Mead, and White, Aerial view, *New York Public Library*

surrounding city and the special luxury of the institution's composite site. The looming presence of New York is seldom as powerful as when it is seen through the clerestory windows of the Public Library's Reading Room, a space of urban proportions, 300 feet long, one and a half times the width of a New York City block. Its dimension (half again as long as the great concourse at Grand Central) is not only an architectural phenomenon, but an urban one. It is this big because it can be this big; it represents the figure of the city within the body of the institution. In contrast to Tafuri's claim regarding the separation of architecture from urban planning, here a realm of interaction and dialogue does exist based on the articulation and inflection of separate identities. Evidence of this interaction, in the face of the city's passivity, is absorbed into the building itself.

The American Beaux Arts monuments have often been presented as moments of arrival for American culture, imperial artifacts symbolizing newly acquired world power. These buildings often have been read simply for their pretensions as paradigmatic of a classic condition: the cultural insecurity of the Americans. This is not to suggest that some homegrown architecture existed as an alternative (Sullivan, for instance, resisted the monument in the city), but to stress that the Beaux Arts was imported, and like many aspects of European culture recreated in the United States, its reconstruction was often awkward and naive. What merits scrutiny are not the aspirations of these monuments, which pale in comparison to the rigor and lucidity of their French models, but their idiosyncrasies and failures.



Third floor plan, New York Public Library

McKim, Mead and White, View from above Copley Square, Boston Public Library

The Beaux Arts is an architectural language invested in hierarchy, completion, and resolution. Surrounded by Tafuri's "network of arteries," adrift in what Hegeman describes as "chaos and anarchy," the Beaux Arts monument becomes isolated. Its significance should rest in the power to command the field from which it has been severed, but unable to address this field it seems to absorb the city's complexity into its own system. In the absence of any meaningful response from the city, the monument appears to sacrifice its purity. The axial thrust becomes implosive.

The Boston Public Library is a good example of this self infection. This great public palace has two prototypes, each with starkly different morphological characteristics: the palazzo (courtyard surrounded by building of even depth), and the linear bar (specifically, Henri Labrouste's two-storied *Bibliotheque Ste. Genevieve* with its reading room above and its principle circulation penetrating service spaces to a rear stairway). The Boston Library manifests both diagrams. Its site is the catalyst for this instability; it fronts toward Copley Square, but Copley Square is a space made by the penetration of a diagonal street into the grid. As a result, the sides of the Public Library are not equivalent; one fronts Boylston Street, one of the major city streets, and the other sits on the very minor Blagden Street. The functional organization of the building is essentially diagonal from opposite corners, with the public rooms on principle streets, and stacks and services to the rear. The building's formal organization—the symmetrical axes which order its Copley Square and Boylston Street elevations—also has the power to relocate a subway entrance from the corner of the Boylston Street elevation to the center, where it acts



Reading Room level plan, Boston Public Library, 1898

as a symbolic, yet detached, entry. Large arched windows that appear on all three elevations are partially blind on the sides, where mullions subdivide marble (not glass), and rectangular openings are superimposed within the arches to the interior. All of these readings—historical precedent, morphological type, functional organization based on site characterization—coexist, as do several explanations for their lack of resolution. McKim produced simpler plans for the site, but these were less responsive to context, precedent, and typological issues. They were resolved, but blank.

It is significant that the lack of one dominant reading of the library is a result of its place in the city, that the actual site complexities and program have contaminated the logic of the architecture. The Boston Public Library is not a typologically pure design isolated from its context. It neither sacrifices nor adopts its identity from the particularities of site location and character. Again, in argument with Tafuri's position on the "separation" of architecture and urban planning in the American city, the Boston Public Library exemplifies how the important work of architecture in the city can begin to bridge such "separation" by addressing it in a rhetorical way, by allowing the problem of the building in the city, and that of the reading of the building in the city, to become the agency of dis-idealization.

VI

While the promoters of the City Beautiful movement were interested in hierarchy (as Hegeman stated, "securing dominance of some buildings over others"), there were others who found the status quo of the American city desirable. Louis Sullivan, a member of this opposition, states at the beginning of "The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered": "It is not my purpose to discuss the social conditions;



Blagden Street elevation, Boston Public Library

I accept them as the fact. . . ."[10] However, little propaganda or real resistance came from the defenders of the American city. Their tracts, principally in response to the extravaganza of 1893, (Montgomery Schuyler's "Last Thoughts about the Fair," or Sullivan's "Retrospect"[11]) were mostly defensive without offering a particular alternative vision. Usually the discussion centered on the rational values of contemporary architecture, implying that the virtue of the city was accessible through its buildings rather than by corrections to its plan. Sullivan and his contemporaries had little to say about urban reform, or even about the place of the building in the city. From this, one could infer that city form itself, particularly the form of Chicago at the end of the century, was so powerful and vivid that the forces it embodied were understood as more than compositional. The city itself was growth, change, diversity, and freedom. Its physical form was understood to embody these attributes, and these attributes were understood as emblematic of the virtues of capitalism and democracy. Political, economic, cultural, and political forces so controlled the form of Chicago that an artistry at the urban scale would seem inappropriate. Yet the ecstatic spectacles of Burnham are seemingly of another empire, perhaps even another economic system.

It is a central myth of capitalism that constant change is progress. Somehow the American city was able to represent not only the virtues of capitalism and democracy, but the virtues of nature as well. If the gridded city can "vary continually and indefinitely," as Benevolo states, why can't this constant movement be shaped by a Darwinian conception of progress? (I suggest that it was easier to imagine this "progress" in 1889 than in 1989.) The theories of Darwin meet those of Marx in the American city. Natural analogies have long been used to describe the city; it has been understood as a cell, or an organism, or, for Laugier, a forest.[12] This natural city has a life of its own: walls of the historical city have offered limits to make the city knowable, to objectify it as architecture, as a finite beast. The grid has the opposite effect. As an organism it is like a virus, always spreading, not easily contained.

If the American city is "natural," then it is wild and untamed. Louis Sullivan described it as a monster:

> There it is! For you to see! For you to hear!—in the Great City! In the Great City where you and I are walking side by side, looking into the faces of the passers-by; observing the traffic in the streets, and over the streets, and along the streets; dropping in here and there and everywhere, by day and by night, only to hear the same song with its endless, teeming variations in pitch and key and intonations and volume—in smooth flow, in rabid discord—in fine words and ribald words and crude prayers and in strings of oaths—It is always with the same, always with the same refrain—The Dance of Death and the Song of Death! For we are indeed a busy

10 Louis Sullivan, "The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered", in *Kindergarten Chats* (New York: Wittenborn, 1947), 202.

11 Montgomery Schuyler, "Last Words about the Fair", in *American Architecture and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) and Louis Sullivan, "Retrospect" in *The Autobiography of an Idea* (New York: Dover, 1956).

12 Marc-Antoine Laugier, *An Essay on Architecture* (Los Angeles: Hennessey and Ingalls, 1977), 128.



Printing House Row, from Van Buren Street

people—none busier—We have no time—we are greatly occupied—And business is business—so we say.

And do you think the Great City really is alone, in a gloomy isolation? Alone in its murk and jargon? Not so. There are filaments. They go forth from its engorged and inflamed nerve centers:—Ganglions quivering with incessant messages that flick out to the land and come in from the Land—Ties to other great cities, to smaller cities, to every village in the far-flung Land—Ties to the whole great World of Land and the Isles of the seas. The Great City! It is a man-created Monster—shuddering with the load of traffic in and the burden of traffic out; traffic following the gleaming, parallel threads, far, far throughout the Land, and coming far, from everywhere, constantly approaching, nearing, and arriving. And the monster groans and sighs. Ever pregnant, as it were, with its one darkling need, it brings forth, every day, the infinitude of things of which it dreams—such as they are, and they live for an hour or a day, or they are absorbed and elaborated into its tissues and further irritate and engorge and impoverish and congest, and dull its semi-consciousness; as it grows and waxes huger, and becomes heavier and heavier upon the Land and the People:—Broadening, elongating and holding within itself multitudes—a fantastic and passionate mass.[13]

One gets the impression that this monster, this Great City, was no easy kill, and Sullivan did not even try to challenge it. He accepted the city as an expression of the principles of democracy, the free market, and the powers of the individual. The single building is seen as a place of refuge, its formal isolation provides redemption. As Sullivan said: "Behind the screen of each building is a man."[14] For him, the true place of nature in the metropolis is in its purity, and as ornament. The form of the individual building, especially the commercial building in Chicago, is circumscribed by the monster's lack of creative flair, the single mindedness of the city's plan. "Always the same, always the same refrain," said Sullivan, as if referring to the inevitability of the city's structure. The very rigor of Chicago architecture, the formal restraint of the sober frame at the consistently held streetwall, manages to reinforce the austerity of the grid as it provides a foil to the congested life of the streets.

13 Louis Sullivan, "The Great City", in *Democracy: A Man-Search* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), 108-9.

14 Sullivan, *Kindergarden Chats*, 110.



Adler and Sullivan, Section, Auditorium Building

VII

Colin Rowe, in his essay "Chicago Frame," wandered briefly into the dialogues of American architecture to the remarks of Montgomery Schuyler on the reduced, inexpressive form of Chicago buildings. According to Rowe, Schuyler

> noticed that its (Chicago's) architectural expressions were twofold only—"places of business and places of residence." The image of Chicago which remained in the mind he found to be "the sum of innumerable impressions made up exclusively of the skyscraper in the city and the dwellings in the suburbs. Not a church enters into it," he says, "Scarcely a public building enters into it. . . . Chicago has no more a Nouvel Opéra than it has a Notre Dame." It was a relatively uncomplicated situation which Schuyler recognized, a situation dominated by two building types—the commercial structures of the Loop and their suburban complement.[15]

Setting aside the suburbs, for Rowe and Schuyler, only one building type remains in Chicago: the commercial structure. Rowe describes the form of the Chicago School buildings, but he avoids acknowledging that this type housed a diversity of functions in similar forms. While Sitte criticized the American city for its lack of program, Rowe finds the same faults in this city's buildings. Seriality levels. Enforcing this myth of similarity, Rowe fails to include any plans or sections in his essay, as if the elevation alone is able to portray the characteristics of Chicago buildings. Apartments, stores, offices, churches, theaters, and banks all were to be found in the reduced form that Rowe describes as the "commercial structure." If one accepts that the form of Chicago architecture was imposed by the rigidity of, and a loyalty to, the constraints of the city plan, then it should be no surprise to find section and plan as the arenas of intense development and even deformation. Rowe is as unimpressed by Chicago building plans as he is uncurious; of Sullivan he says, ". . .one finds it hard to believe that for him the significance of their plans was other than a negative one."[16] It is, however, the rational efficiency of the



Left: Adler and Sullivan, Wirt Dexter Building plan, South Wabash Avenue, Chicago. Right: Jenney, 1st and 5th floor plans, Leiter Building, Chicago, 1891.

15 Colin Rowe, "Chicago Frame" in *The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and Other Essays* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 91.

16 Ibid, 98.

building plans that is remarkable; these urban buildings display a form of composition as free of "axial duty" or "artistic completion" as the city itself. It is the logic of the city, not the formal armature of classical composition, that resonates through Chicago School architecture.

In certain Sullivan buildings one can trace a process of hybridization, that simulates the "natural" growth of urban form. Buildings made from parts of differing scales and logics seem to mirror the accretive processes of the city, a process that Sullivan attempted to represent through a naturalized assembly based on an understanding of morphology:

> All things in nature have a shape, that is to say, a form, an outward semblance, that tells us what they are, that distinguishes them from ourselves and from each other.
>
> Unfailingly in nature these shapes express the inner life, the native quality, of the animal, tree, bird, fish, that they present to us; they are so characteristic, so recognizable, that we say simply, it is "natural" it should be so. . . . Unceasingly the essence of things is taking shape in the matter of things, and this unspeakable process we call birth and growth.[17]

Sullivan's Chicago Stock Exchange (1893-4) punctuated by its great arch, has complex multiple scales. While its style is similar to the rest of the building, the arch also possesses a formal autonomy that allows it to be read separately. Its height, equivalent to two and half floors, is subtly disjunctive to the repetitive modules of the facade. The arch is the exceptional element against a field of bays which "look all alike because they are all alike." It has a formal purity sufficient to "distinguish" it from the rest of the building. The arch stands at the edge of the streetwall joining sidewalk and building, but it does not completely belong to either realm.

The Schiller Building (1891-92) displays a similar assembly, but at a much larger scale. Its parts are clearly wrought: a commercial block of nine stories that spans between party walls; a tower of seven-

Adler and Sullivan, Chicago Stock Exchange, 1893–94

17 Sullivan, "The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered", 207.

Clockwise from top left: Adler and Sullivan, Schiller Building, 1891–2; Section; Two views; Perspective drawing.





Below left: Adler and Sullivan, Fraternity Temple, Chicago, 1891.
Below right: Sullivan, *Skyscraper City*.





teen stories with a cupola; and emerging from the back of the tower, perpendicular to the street, a fourteen story slab. By setting the tower back from the property line, Sullivan was able to articulate the tower on all four sides. Freestanding, the tower can be read as belonging both to the entire block and to the Schiller Building. Sullivan's hybrid building simulates the random juxtaposition of forms in the city as a whole; its idealized form avoids the compromising struggle between building and city which marks the Reliance Building. This morphological compression results in a section of great intensity and compression.

The most exaggerated example of Sullivan's process of assembly is the Fraternity Temple project of 1891. The base of this building is an orthodox, ten story commercial block, a double H in plan, with two light courts. Straddling this is a twenty–two story, cruciform tower that ingeniously appears to be extruded from the entry arches of the base. Emerging from the crossing of the cruciform slabs is a tower ascending an additional fifteen stories. The tower's chamfered corner is articulated by a vertical line of windows at the crossing of the slabs. The building is remarkable for its very awkwardness, the deliberate irresolution of the grafts. For while the three parts, roughly, base, middle, and top, make a whole, this is only by virtue of their coexistence on the same ground at the same time. This is no column. It is not a whole fabricated from harmonious and subservient parts. The Fraternity Temple's disjuncture is as much a response to the section of the city as the struggle of the Reliance building is a response to the plan.

VIII

The advent of tall buildings greatly complicated the legibility of building form in the city. Visibility and importance were no longer functions of privileged plan locations such as the sites cleared for the Beaux Arts monument. Sheer height gave an importance to buildings that program or site might not merit. The Custom House in Boston, with its tower addition of 1913, is a particularly vivid example of a shift in the realm of the civic monument from plan to section, marking a shift in perception of city form. To counter this change, zoning ordinances limiting building height were used in Washington, and until recently, Philadelphia, to maintain the plan dominion of the civic monument. In the 1930's, skyscraper city halls emerged as an attempt to maintain basic legibility for the civic realm. It is paradoxical that the means adopted required the public appropriation of a commercial typology.

Skyscrapers are like mountains, their apparent size is related to distance. By divorcing a building's shaft from the street wall the 1916 zoning law in New York set up a strange perception. Two buildings could exist on one site: the streetwall building and the extruded central tower. The closer one gets to the streetwall the smaller the skyscraper appears. Frequently skyscraper architecture has been a negotia-

The Empire State Building from 5th Avenue

tion between this disparity. At the Empire State Building, for instance, the base does not share the formal system of the tower; its dimensions and materials are too different to be read as part of an integrated whole. And yet it is also not a pedestal. The most precise reading of this base might be: "The building which the Empire State is stuck into." Walking on Fifth Avenue or 34th Street one confronts two buildings in the same place. This is not an architectural intention, simply a response to the convention of the Manhattan streetwall. That convention, and a cursory nod to the zoning law, placed the world's tallest tower in the middle of the block. Different readings from different points in the city—the shaft and crest from a distance, the base from the immediacy of the street canyon—alienated the two elements of the building from one another.

In 1891 Sullivan published "The High Building Question," an attempt to address how the tall building would effect the space of the city. His proposal, illustrated by a rendering for a setback skyscraper city, suggested deriving sidewalk building height from the width of the street, and then allowing the bulk of the building to rise from the center of the site in a series of setbacks. The formula is similar to the New York zoning law of 1916, and promises, at least

from the evidence given by Sullivan's illustration, to produce clumsy and awkward buildings. Sullivan was direct in setting forth the plan's virtues, which he saw as more than remedial:

> Here in Chicago the freedom of thought and action of the individual should be not only maintained, but held sacred. By this I surely do not mean the license of the individual to trample on his neighbor and disregard the public welfare, but I do just as surely mean that our city has acquired and maintained its greatness by virtue of its brainy men, who have made it what it is and who guarantee its future. These men may be selfish enough to need regulation, but it is monstrous to suppose that they must be suppressed, for they have in themselves qualities as noble, daring, and inspired as ever quickened knights of old to deeds of chivalry.[18]

The plan for the setback skyscraper city was one of the few proposals Sullivan actually made for the city as a whole. His effort was notable for the very strict limits he imposed on the design. Rather than propose a critical revision to the form of the city, Sullivan was interested in the introduction of minimal constraints to a specific end—the penetration of light to the street. In case Chicago builders were to take his suggestions as personal criticism, he leavened the text with flattery.

IX

If the price of Burnham's dream empire was the destruction and renewal of the city, Sullivan, in the years immediately preceding the Colombian Exposition hallucinations at Jackson Park, made it clear that a pragmatic alternative existed: business as usual. Sullivan saw architecture as being transformed by the forces of the city, which were understood broadly and comprised an odd list: technology, freedom, progress, traffic, the crowd, light, capitalism, the individual, and so on. Adhering to this view, Sullivan is one ancestor of the school of American urbanism invested in the progress and mutation of the real: the reification of the forces of production. His compatriots include Raymond Hood, Hugh Ferriss, Harvey Wiley Corbett, Victor Gruen, and maybe even Paul Rudolph, who all saw the city growth not as a function of planning, but as a function of architecture's reaction to the forces of urban development. This sort of change—transformation of existing typologies and morphologies—was slow and subtle (even if the effect over time might be finally revolutionary).

In the speculative conditions of the American city, the languages of architecture and urbanism are different and they serve differing interests. Unable to formally affect or control its field, architecture has turned inward. The complexity of the city has so contaminated the logic of the building that the condition of artistic harmony between building and town proposed by Sitte becomes difficult to achieve. Architecture's logic is complicated, its formal readings multiplied by its absorption of the facts of the surrounding city.

18 Louis Sullivan, "The High Building Question," cited in Donald Hoffman, "The Setback Skyscraper City of 1891: An Unknown Essay by Louis H. Sullivan" in *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* (May: 1970), 181.



Ferriss, Illustration showing pedestrians over wheel-traffic

Buildings are usually imagined as a part of the city. The city opens out from the building's doors. The "power" of architecture has been invoked to inscribe itself in the city's plan. Buildings have power; the city is a field. In Scamozzi's section of the Teatro Olimpico that relationship is inverted. The building has captured the city and disturbed its form. The hierarchy is reversed. The city, deformed by its captivity, becomes a part of the building; here the building is not a microcosm of the city, rather it fosters an awareness of its difference from the city. The value of acknowledging difference is not to stabilize identity, but to reveal the conventions—technical and artistic—that allow fictions of identity and autonomy to appear coherent.

Speaking of Chicago, Colin Rowe has written:

> There, where the frame served as no more than empirical convenience, it was scarcely to be invested with ideal significance. It could predicate no city of tomorrow. Indeed, by the nineties, it predicated a city of yesterday.[19]

What does Rowe mean by "ideal significance"? Surely it describes a property that can only be manifest by the purifications of an idealized geometry. It is surely the absence of geometrical virtue which prevents Rowe from seeing the potency of the Chicago Frame's ideology; or keeps him from recognizing that, while the frame was purely "commercial," it was often typologically and functionally diverse; or prevents him from considering "empirical convenience" as an ideal condition in the heartland of a strange democracy. For it was here, in the American heartland, that ideology never sought to purify itself through adoption of sacred forms. Instead, out of a cunning and convenient equation of nature and commerce, growth and mutation became the realm of the positive. American cities have never been modern because someone tried to make them modern. If the Chicago frame "could predicate no city of tomorrow"—more power to it. The *City of Tomorrow* was an attempt to make the city like architecture again, to control its form by making its processes invisible.

19 Rowe, "Chicago Frame", 107-8.



Scamozzi, Section, Teatro Olimpico, Vicenza



Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 1933







HOUSE AT HALFWAY HOUSE, TRANSVAAL

The site is a six acre piece of highveld. The owners and builders, Scott and Linda Brebnor. The house began as the simulation of the act of habitation on a piece of paper. A circle, beginning at the rocks, is marked out on the ground. The contours, man's abstracted interpretation and dimensioning of the landscape, are terraced into the circle, and planted in two alternating strains of grass. The terraces are continuous and sweep up along the rim of the circle as roofs, weaving the ground into the sky, containing in its thickness the sheltered habitable part.

The circle of the buildings walling the oasis are, beginning at the rocks, workshop and garage, the cottage, three huts loosely woven with the earth, and the horselike stables. The house extends the originally most habitable part of the site, the rocks. The roof steps down to the ground to be walked on. The living landscape is an eddy in the space run through . . . . . The bedroom is snug between the rocks. The kitchen leads out to the land. The original ground focussed by the imprint of buildings, geometric clearing, dimensioned with pathways, reaching to its limits.



Geological Architecture

STANLEY SAITOWITZ

The site of **ARCHITECTURE** is the horizon, the crust of the earth, the edge between ground and sky. The act of Architecture involves reorganizing matter to form space. All material originates with the ground. Our remaking the crust of the earth, our efforts to capture space on the horizon, can be viewed as geological. In this process, the chance evolution of nature over aeons of time is abbreviated with purposeful acts guided by thought. Architecture occurs at the juncture of site and mind.

GEOGRAPHY as the study of physical processes reveals growth and form to be reciprocal; the process of becoming is the shape. Erosion, crystallization, sedimentation, deposition, thrust, decomposition: these geological mechanisms display their gritty reason. Human intervention introduces an abridgement, guided by an idea, which must be equally transparent. Architecture becomes a description of its own making.

PSYCHOGEOGRAPHY is the terrain of observation which deals with the action of natural forces, as in geography, on the structures of society, and the corresponding conception such societies have. It involves the laws and effects of the geographical environment, natural and constructed, on the emotions and behavior of individuals. It is the influence of material conditions on human feelings. Architecture is psychogeography. *Architecture is* space modulated with matter, engendering dreams in accordance with a spectrum of human desires. *Architecture is* the construction of situations, ambiences of life transformed into passional quality. *Architecture is* a conduit for knowledge and action.

SPACE is the medium of architecture. Space is emptiness, absence, anti-matter. Space is absolute and homogeneous. Architecture is the purposeful demarcating of particular space.

A **SITE** is a particular place in space. In relation to the central pivot the sun, each spot on the globe has a specific climate and geography,a unique culture in action. Common characteristics enable us to recognize uniqueness between them. Two palm trees planted in two different regions will develop the

characteristics specific to each site. So should two houses. In this way architecture becomes a lens, a focus of the unique spatial circumstance. Architecture as human geography, concordant with site—resonant, dissonant, amplified, harmonic.

MATTER is the means of delineating space. Matter has the properties of displacement, continuity, mass, energy. All material originates in the ground, and obeys the tendency of gravity to return to it. Matter is a finite entity which cannot be created or destroyed; only energy can transform its state. Matter is a receptacle for energy which it stores in its transformation. One feels the power in an Egyptian statue centuries later. The discontinuous object in the continuous present stores the energy captured in its making. Recent discoveries indicate the possibility of unlocking sound energy trapped in ancient objects. We will be able to listen to the voices of Egyptian potters as we do with records and tapes. Matter implies dimension and hence structure.

STRUCTURE is the formation of relationships, the dialogue between parts and whole. The whole, as everything, is cosmos, the state of order that is. Structure is a connection to this order. Structure involves geometry.

GEOMETRY is a normative system of ideal generality. Geometry is the form that describes the numerical properties of space. Geometry's normative value, its unity, is beyond history. It bridges the production of form through the ages.

FORM is formation, presence itself, visible and conceivable of the thing in general. Form is growth, guided by idea, a display of transformation—evolution. The palm tree's form describes its growth; new leaves sprout out at the top, turn brown, break off and solidify to become the trunk.



SUN HOUSE, PALMINO LAKES

The form of the house is generated by the path of the sun; the location of its functions follows the spinning of the earth around it. Sunrise, at the beginning of the day, in the east, is the location of the entrance. Breakfast, in the morning, is in the east, with the rising sun. Dining, in the evening, is in the west. The living room is south, in the sunshine. The bedrooms are north, in the night, where the sun never goes. The arcs of the roof are the arcs of the sun, moving across the sky. Three gluelam trusses trace out its path. The columns which support them mark the cardinal points. The three columns on the east mark sunrise at summer solstice, equinox, and winter solstice. Dining is in the west watching sunset. In summer, eating peaches and plums, the sun sets with the red column and the yellow colonnade. In winter, eating apples and oranges, the sun sets with the mauve column and green colonnade. As with seasonal time, the house demarcates the time of day. The roof is the arc of the sun moving across the sky. It is 48' with rafters at 2' centers, or every half hour, supported on painted joist hangers which are the face of the dial. Time is marked by a shadow which is cast on the rafters, and displays the time on the face of the house. The house is a lens, focussed on the universal circumstance of the sun moving around this particular place of habitation.

















LIVE/WORK SPACE: SCULPTORS LOFT, SAN FRANCISCO

This project investigates the landscape of the city. The site is a warehouse building South of Market, north of the 9th and 10th Street freeway ramps, at the edge of the city. The structure is a thin 2-story storefront building, with two barrel vault sheds behind. There are three empty lots at the rear. The project is to reinhabit the space as a studio, house, and garden. Lessons from the site, the overlay of use, the freeway superimposed on the grid, provide the method for transforming the warehouse. A house and studio inhabit an industrial shed. Domestication of the warehouse begins with a pathway from the garden which threads through the building becoming a ramp to the second floor bedrooms. Front and rear, work and live, are divided by an interlocking wall which intersects with the trusses, separating these two aspects of the inhabitants' life. Work as 'storefront', living behind. The exterior cityscape is modestly changed. The corner is differentiated by carving out an entry to the gallery, a glass canopy announces arrival at the house on the side street. Slits reveal the bowed roof beyond.

IDEAS are the forces that move matter, that produce form. A design begins with the merging of thought and feeling in an idea that is genetic in nature. Once set up it begins to run itself. An idea is an essential extraction, the condensation of the unique character of a site, the abstraction of an aspiration.

DESIGN is conceived in the mind. In the act of design, the site is the page, aspiration is drawing. Pencil dreaming short circuits reality, giving existence to other strata of connection, inventing through projection, layering, omission—tracing recurring elements in a process which begins to form new unities. This method is analogical, as well as analytical; the purpose is creation. Metaphor enters; giving a name that belongs to something else; this improper naming invites a movement of interpretation, and the creation of a third thing. Metonym emerges; the construction of a work as a world, with a spirit that gives life to the parts, a synthesis making a whole—creation. Creation rescues memories and brings to light forgotten desires by creating entirely new ones.

POETRY is the creation of marvels. Poetry, art, imagination are the spirit of life itself, the real power to change the world. Poetry is not part of a system, like politics. It is created instantly, through experience. Experience is total. Process and form one, like the weather, without beginning or end. Architecture's realization is its form; form is its realization. Architecture is a perceived presence, an object that portrays its logic through being.

LIBERTY is the motive. The search for a new way of life the impassioning. The aim is to extend the exuberant parts of life. Modernism is a belief in progress, in the transcendendent bringing to life of the new, the unthought, in the pursuit of freedom.

CODA

The medium of Architecture is space. Space is universal and homogenous. A site is a unique place in space. Architecture further particularizes site with matter. Matter is formed by ideas. Ideas emerge from thought and feeling. Matter traps energy's ideas, engendering space, creating architecture.









MCDONALD HOUSE, SEADRIFT, STINSON BEACH

The site is a tract on the Seadrift Lagoon, adjacent to Stinson Beach. Seadrift is a narrow slice of water, parallel to the beach, lined with buildings on both sides. The house is an amplification of its setting. The roof, a wave, reflecting the nearby but absent ocean. The space a cave carved by water. Shell like, the outside is a driftwood crust, protecting an iridescent interior charged with sunlight. A weekend house, the journey from the city is a winding trip by road to a carport of shifting columns. Escape is from a flat projecting jetty by boat. The house connects the mountains behind with the water it surveys from the deck. A triangular window in the bedroom watches the sun rise over a mountain peak. A triangular window in the living space frames sails gliding by at sunset. Remembering ships and boats, a prowl protects the deck from the winds, and alludes to the open sea.













GREWAL RESIDENCE, OAKLAND, CALFORNIA

The site is a wedge of sloping land in the Oakland hills. The clients an extended family of three generations, grandparents, son and wife, and children. Three platforms follow the contours down the hill. The top platform is for the grandparents. The lower platform for the son, wife and children. The middle platform connects the generations and is the kitchen, family room and eating. The roof falls down the hill. The trusses counter the contours and point to the view. Glimpses of the Bay appear over the treeline from the decks which slide down the hill connecting to the ground as a playspace. Arrival by car is to the top of the hill. The figure of the house echoes the form of the site.









GOLDSMITH RESIDENCE, SAN MATEO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA.

In the Skylonda area of San Mateo County, at the crest of the Santa Cruz mountains, is a clearing in a forest of giant redwood trees. The house is a wall which preserves the clearing, carving out a court of light in the dark forest. The court traps the southern sun which filters through layers of windows. The house is a connection between the light and the forest. On the forest side decks lean out into the trees. The house presents wood framing as its image: timber construction of 2×6's on 2′ centers, sometimes glazed, sometimes wrapped in redwood board and batten. A roof joins the garage in front of the well. A bridge cuts through the forest and connects to a grotto.



DINAPOLI HOUSE, LOS GATOS, CALIFORNIA

In the hills above Los Gatos is a promontory which points to San Jose in the distant north. On the east is a ravine, on the west a canyon dividing the promontory from a cleft mountain, and in the south, the hill continues. Several old oaks remain on the flat clearing. The clients specified rectilinear rooms. Two walls secure the open space of the promontory. A pavilion joins these walls and divides the promontory into two courts, an entry court, and a garden court. The pavilion is a hollow space, folded out of itself. The walls are thickened to contain the accommodations of the house. They track the contours, remaking the ground as their roof. This roof is the elevation of the building, approached from above. It is also a promenade surveying the garden court, pool, canyon, and mountain. From the edge is a view of San Jose. The walls act to conceal and reveal views of the surrounds. They divide and provide varying experiences of the site from rooms, different views along promenades and passages. The east wall has a guest wing and eating area. Living is in the pavilion. The west wall is the master suite with library and gym. Below the garage is a caretaker suite. Above the house in the hill the barn for a car collection, with a studio apartment and a deck viewing the house riding the promontory below. The house is a symphonic tracking of the landscape through intersecting vertical and horizontal planes.







BYRON MEYER RESIDENCE, SONOMA, CALIFORNIA

The site is 360 acres of sloping woods on the Sonoma County line, off the old Santa Rosa Road, near St. Helena. Three geographies exist at the house; a hill, a valley, and a flat promontory. The building comprises three structures. An entertainment house, a master suite, and a guest wing. They are joined by two paths, a bridge, and a porch tying the buildings to the landscape. Entry is below the bridge which frames a view of a folded valley with Santa Rosa in the distance. The flat promontory extends the living spaces of the main house bounded with the pool which allows swimming to the edge. The guest rooms look across the promontory to the valley. From the mastersuite is a path to the top of the hill and a 360 degree view of the acreage.



CACERES RESIDENCE, ALMADEN, CALIFORNIA

The site is a flat 4 acre parcel in Almaden, farmlands turning into suburbia. Soon it will be surrounded by ugly houses. The edges of this valley are defined by two mountains, one east, and one south of the site. Two mounds are constructed to act as selective blinders, eliminating the foreground of suburban houses and acting as borrowed scenery, bringing the mountains to focus as the edge of a square court. The cruciform wings of the house point at the mountain and form four courts—entry, living, back, and yard. The wings contain: living and eating with parents above; cooking and cleaning with gym above; a dormitory for eight daughters; and granny's house, a studio over the garage.



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

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

The office building is a house of work of organization of clarity of economy.
—Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, 1923

Spatial Narratives

MARK RAKATANSKY

There is no mute architecture. All architects, all buildings "tell stories" with varying degrees of consciousness. Architecture is permeated with narratives because it is constituted within a field of discourses and economies (formal, psychological, and ideological), to any one of which it cannot be reduced, from any one of which it cannot be removed.

If we examine, for example, any type of domestic architecture we will find already inscribed *within* the architecture a complex array of mentalities and practices concerning the relations between genders,[1] between parents and children, between "inside" and "outside", between what is supposed to be "public" and what is supposed to be "private", between what is supposed to be seen, smelt, or heard, and what is not, and so forth. The hierarchy and degree of definition of spaces, their relative size and location, and the sub-architectural apparatuses of each space (furniture, appliances, media devices)—all are defined by and give definition to the social and psychological narratives that influence the behaviors (encouraged, allowed, discouraged, or forbidden) associated with each space. The elements of this field are polyvalent: each aspect will be influenced by mentalities and practices already established (perhaps already in decline) and newly emerging (perhaps not fully articulated)—and thus each will conflict with, reinforce, or ignore the others.[2]

Yet to speak of narrative strategies in architecture plunges one immediately into difficulty. Between those who would insist upon (or call for) the intrinsic nature of a "non-rhetorical" architecture (claiming that a brick is just a brick, a wall just a wall, a room just a room, that stone and steel, metal studs and gypsum board can not or should not "speak") and those all too eager to "add meaning" to buildings through the "telling of fables," there seems barely enough space to suggest another position.[3] The seemingly opposed positions of a "non-rhetorical" architecture and a "story-telling" architecture converge in their belief that rhetorical meaning does not reside in buildings other than in the most general sense, either as a "timeless expression" of Classical (or vernacular) ideals or as a "*zeitgeist* expression." Both of these positions posit that if architecture could tell a story, that story would need to be designed *into* the "mute" and empty vessel of architecture as an *additive* feature.[4]

But rather than conceiving of narrative architecture as arising from an addition of a singular story-

1 I am referring to mentalities and practices to avoid collapsing two related but distinct historiographic approaches. Regarding the former, see Jacques Le Goff, "Mentalities: a history of ambiguities," in *Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology*, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 151-165. Regarding the latter, see Michel Foucault, "History of Systems of Thought" in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 199-204 and his *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972). On the relations between the two approaches see, Lynn Hunt "French History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise and Fall of the *Annales* Paradigm," *Journal of Contemporary History* 21 (1986): 209-224 and Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929-89* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

2 This multiplicity is further enlarged by several other constitutive elements. Whether a "new" project or a renovation, the architectural work takes its place within a physical site with its own field of discourses and economies. All these forces are "filtered" and added to by the attentions and intentions (again at various levels of consciousness) of the architect, the succession of subjects who observe and inhabit the building, and the institutional programs under which they are managed.

For a discussion of the collision of forces under which architecture is constituted, and the concomitant "collision" necessary in historiographic analysis, see Manfredo Tafuri, "The Historical Project," in *The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 1-21.

3 The confusion that surrounds the term "narrative architecture" is exemplified in the following attempt at a "definition" by the editors of *Oz* (the journal of the College of Architecture and Design at Kansas State University) in their 1988 issue dedicated to this theme:

"Many architects have something to say in their architecture, a story to tell. There are a variety of means architects employ in expressing their own, or their clients values, thoughts, wishes, beliefs,

line, it would be critically more constructive to speak in the plural, of narratives—of exposing and re-working certain repressed narratives within the field of discourses and economies already at work in architecture.

I

Before proceeding further it will be necessary to address the so-called linear structures of both narrative and temporality, as these related issues inevitably arise as arguments that are supposed to keep narrative wholly distinct from architecture. There is still a tendency to conceive of narrative in terms of what was assumed to be the conventions operative in nineteenth century realist fiction—a linear development from origin to end. And thus any strategy that opposes the "naturalness" of these assumed conventions is thought to be "anti-narrative."

There are two problems with this view. On the one hand, recent literary theory has shown that the conventions of realism operate in much more complex and indeterminate ways than had been previously thought: beginnings do not constitute definitive origins, development is never seamlessly continuous (as transitions are inevitably disjunctive), endings do not provide definite closure.[5] And while it has been claimed that a book (unlike a building) can exert total control over its sequential unfolding, there are in fact no definitively linear readings. Each time we re-read a book we encounter relations between aspects or relations between aspects that we remembered differently or not at all. Our attentions and inattentions are different with each passage through a book. The hegemonic claims of "conventional" narrative for naturalism and stability attempt to mask these disjunctions, as Roland Barthes noted:

> . . . our society takes the greatest pains to conjure away the coding of the narrative situation: there is no counting the number of narrational devices which seek to naturalize the subsequent narrative by feigning to make it the outcome of some natural circumstance and thus, as it were, 'disinaugurating' it. . . . The reluctance to declare its codes characterizes bourgeois society



Starts and Stops Instantly at Your Touch

not studied the mechanism, tested it, used a little patience and followed well-worked-out rules for its operation.

I am quite sure that when somebody told your grandmother that finer, and more even, and perfect stitches could be taken in cloth with a needle set in a strange machine operated by a wheel and belt, than she could make by hand, that *she too, said that this new sewing machine "won't work"*—and it probably took some time for her to be convinced.

But you to-day know the perfection of sewing machine work, and

and desires. They often communicate a unifying theme elaborated throughout the "plot." Some of the storytellers of our discipline choose to relate the entire story in a single building while others "write" continuing sagas in which each building is a sequel to the last. Others, whether consciously or not, allude to earlier work by masters or to vital vernacular traditions. The architect's tale can be as captivating and powerful as the writer's. The best narratives give building added meaning and encourage people to become involved with and to cherish works of architecture." (3)

4 The limits of these positions become quickly apparent if one considers, for example, the matter of the so-called appropriate character for a given institutional type (houses "homey", museums "stately", prisons "foreboding"). Is this character supposed to be understood as an additive feature or as residing in the building?

5 See, for example, Peter Brooks, *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative* (New York: Knopf, 1984); Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); D.A. Miller, *Narrative and Its Discontents: Problems of Closure in the Traditional Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Edward W. Said *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

functional...

and the mass culture issuing from it: both demand signs which do not look like signs.[6]

On the other hand, "anti-narrative" strategies (montage, meta-narrative, and so forth) always continue to narrate, can not avoid narrating—even as they problematize and resist certain conventional practices precisely in order to reveal the seams of narrative, to reveal how narrative is constructed from a discontinuous series of effects. "Anti-narrative" strategies, in other words, are not non-narrative.

It is within this struggle, between the inability to narrate in a seamless and definitive manner and the inability not to narrate, that narrative is constituted. This is the way, as it were, that narrative narrates, within this field of disability and ability.

There has been a similar misunderstanding with regard to the temporal dimension of architecture. It is commonly claimed that temporality does not exist *within* architecture (the way it supposedly exists within—and thus makes possible—literary narrative), that buildings are "frozen in time," that temporality exists only in the experience of a building through time. Given these claims it is not surprising to find the current interest in "processional" buildings and building complexes that appear to be the only architecture to develop a linear "narrative" with a "proper" beginning, middle, and end (Giuseppi Terragni's *Danteum* project, Giacomo Barozzi da Vignola's *Villa Lante*, and the *Sacra Monti* are frequently cited examples). My previous comments regarding narrative extend to procession in architecture: that is, on the one hand, all so-called processional architecture operates in much more complex and indeterminate ways than is generally assumed,[7] and on the other hand, all architecture is processional (in other words, it can not be non-processional).

When I say that all architecture is processional, I mean that whether a building maintains the conventional relationships between spatial units for a given institutional type or attempts to disrupt such conventions, in both cases the subject will experience a procession through the various units of institutional space: from street to lobby, to stairs or elevators, to

6 Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," *Image-Music-Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 116. That certain postmodern practices seek to create signs which only look like signs is merely the flip side of the same coin, merely another attempt to posit a comforting separateness of "coding" and "narrative".

In my use of "hegemonic" here, I am referring not to a unitary power, but again to a diverse field of discourses and economies. As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (in their *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Practice* (London: Verso, 1985), have noted, "the hegemonic formation . . . cannot be referred to the specific logic of a single social force. Every historical bloc—or hegemonic formation—is constructed through regularity in dispersion, and this dispersion includes a proliferation of very diverse elements . . . . The problem of power cannot, therefore, be posed in terms of the search for *the* class or *the* dominant sector which constitutes the centre of a hegemonic formation, given that, by definition, such a center will always elude us. But it is equally wrong to propose as an alternative, either pluralism or the total diffusion of power within the social, as this would blind the analysis to the presence of nodal points and to the partial concentrations of power existing in every concrete social formation." (142)

7 So, for example, what is particularly interesting about Terragni's *Danteum* project is the numerous ways in which a strict linear narrative cannot be maintained, the ways in which gaps, slippages, breaks appear in the project, the ways in which Terragni's stated intentions (and the subject's experiences of the project) lose their linear grip, turn back on themselves, cross paths, dead-end, and are subsumed by the problems of translation, not merely from book to building, but from intended (and non-intended) meaning to geometry, from metaphysical architecture to State architecture, and vice versa. Thus, understandably linear readings—"The progression from dense to framed to open—Inferno, Purgatory, Paradise—following a scheme of ascent to the most holy and sacred space leads finally to the room dedicated to the New Roman Empire"—also cannot be maintained. (Thomas Schumacher, *The Danteum*

other lobbies or reception spaces or corridors or rooms, to other anterooms or corridors or rooms, and so forth. Even in the unlikely case that one's route through a building would differ each time, it would always be a sequence through a series of spaces. This is not merely an arbitrary procession along a "neutral" continuum that has been characterized as "public" on one end and as "private" on the other end.[8] We need only imagine a typical procession through the various spaces of a domicile, an office, or a governmental building, to be aware not only how each space is deeply saturated with a complex field of social and psychological narratives, but also how the effects of these narratives accrue (not necessarily in a unified way) in the procession from space to space.

Thus one could argue that the most significant temporal dimension of architecture is not given by the physical experience of moving through a building, but rather by the temporality of institutional practices inscribed in architectural space. Our understanding of the (seemingly stable) types of institutional space (the domicile, the office, the school, the museum, and so forth) is such that, once we experience these types, we need not physically traverse a given building to have a sense of the temporal dimension of inhabitation likely to be found there. We know even before we enter a domicile in our culture, whether it is a suburban tract house or an "open" loft, the forms of inhabitation that we can expect to find: the processional ordering and temporal use of the spaces, and the temporal and spatial ordering of the institutional rituals that take place there. But perhaps it is in the relationship between these two temporalities (the temporality of physical procession and the temporality of institutional practices) that the temporal dimension of architecture is best described.

II

Thus I will be arguing that *the ways in which human subjects are constituted and managed in institutional space* may provide one of the more productive themes for a narrative architecture.[9] In fact, all designed space functions as institutional space.[10] Institutions are the principal sites through which ideologies work, and thus, as in the case of ideologies (and conventional narrative, as Barthes noted) it is in the interest of institutions to effect (or at least give the illusion of) stable conditions. And like narrative, both institutions and ideologies are constructs—they are neither natural, nor universal, nor timeless, but artificial structures created through shifting historical circumstances, discontinuous series of effects working within a field of ability and disability. The function of ideology, as Slavoj Žižek notes, "is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel."[11] It is the very inconsistency of the social field, the impossibility of its seamless constitution, its gaps and residues, that ideology has to mask, conceal, screen. And it is in such gaps—

(Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985), 32). For example, the Paradise space can be read as more cage-like and less open (with its slitted walls and field of glass columns and trellis) than the Purgatory space. And the room dedicated to the New Roman Empire, the Impero, is a narrow passage that gives no passage, a dead-end that requires the visitor to double-back and pass again through Paradise. One might also ask why Terragni releases his otherwise tight theatrical control in a number of locations: in the opening between Purgatory and Paradise, and in the arcades in Inferno and Purgatory that allow an avoidance of the direct thematic experience of those spaces.

8 In fact, it may be suggested that there is no such thing as pure "public" or pure "private" space, considering, for example, the degree to which the interventions of social values (from table manners to sexual manners) have shaped domestic practices.

9 I am using the term "management" here in a similar manner as Foucault has used the terms "power" or "power relations," that is, to refer to *the entire range of its manifestations*, not solely the negative and repressive ones. His definition of the term "subject", although brief, is also useful here: "subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge." (Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Art After Modernism: Rethinking Representation*, ed. Brian Wallis (New York: The Museum of Contemporary Art, and Boston: Godine, 1984), 420).

10 For a discussion of how urban parks are involved in the constitution and management of subjects, see Galen Cranz, *The Politics of Park Design* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1982).

11 Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 45.

at the level of the subject, the institutional program, the building, the site, and so forth—that certain critical architectural narratives might emerge.

The institutional program is one professional mask that architecture wears in the service of ideologies. Generally the ideological and social shifts that have affected architectural shifts in the built form of institutions (given rise to, been barriers to) have been given little attention by architectural historians and critics in favor of formal analyses. However it is difficult to comprehend the shift in Western domestic space—from commonly unspecified spaces prior to the eighteenth century to the subsequent development of specialized rooms—unless this shift is read in relation to the history of domestic mentalities and practices: shifts in the concepts of family, gender, privacy, hygiene, the place of the child (as well as servants and non-family) in the house, the relationship of the family to the "outside" society, relations between classes, as well as the partial transfer of education and moralization from the religious to the secular and familial domain.[12] Similarly, a number of developments in domestic, other institutional, and urban spaces beginning in the eighteenth century can be related to the "need" of the State for the surveillance and management of social space (the policing of the social body) instigated by a "concern" for hygiene. Beyond the official stated intentions, these hygienic programs involved the "surveillance, analysis, intervention, and modification" of populations as a means of providing finer and more adequate control mechanisms, as well as the maintenance of bodies as usable labor.[13]

But there are also moments when seemingly contradictory ideologies coalesce. One such moment, as Foucault has pointed out, is that of the French Revolutionaries' embrace of Bentham's *Panopticon* project as an instrumental model for a "transparent" society, which they linked to the Rousseauean vision of a totally unobstructed collective communication that would eradicate the darkness where injustice and unhappiness breeds.[14] Yet even in Rousseau it is already clear that this transparency is not to be equally distributed: Rousseau's desire for people to be able to look freely into each other's hearts was not, for him, a matter of abolishing social differences, but merely a way to give the "sense" of social fraternity in order to maintain the existing social order.[15] These contradictions, within and between ideologies, would become visible in the architectural form of the Panopticon, which is not specifically a prison (being equally useful for hospitals, factories, or schools) or even a building type. The Panopticon is a system of management—an instrument for the control of the visible and the invisible, of bodies, of power. The theme of instrumental transparency in architecture, which the Panopticon exemplifies, circulates around the problems of management, of the illumination of some darknesses and the preservation of others, of efficient communication and productive labor, and of the maintenance of the physical

12 See Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Vintage, 1962). See also Robin Evans, "Figures, Doors and Passages," *Architectural Design* (Autumn 1978): 267-278 and his "The Developed Surface: an Enquiry into the Brief Life of an Eighteenth Century Drawing Technique," *9H* 8 (1989): 120-147.

13 Michel Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 166-182. Regarding the effects of hygienic movements on domestic and urban spaces see Georges Teyssot, "The Disease of the Domicile" in *Assemblage* 6 (1988): 72-97. Regarding other institutional spaces, in addition to Foucault's studies of the clinic, the asylum, and the prison, see Anthony Vidler's essays on factories, hospitals, and prisons in *The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987) as well as his *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux: Architecture and Social Reform at the End of the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990). See also Robin Evans, *The Fabrication of Virtue: English Prison Architecture, 1750-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

14 See Michel Foucault's comments in "The Eye of Power" in *Power/Knowledge*, 146-165. Foucault refers to the discussion of the theme of social transparency in the writings of Rousseau by Jean Starobinski (see Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) and *The Invention of Liberty* (Geneva: Skira/Rizzoli, 1964, New York: 1987), 100ff). Also see Jacques-Alain Miller's extensive reading of utilitarianism through the body of Bentham's work in "Jeremy Bentham's Panoptic Device," *October* 41 (1987): 3-29.

15 Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 92-101.



DIAGRAM 1—UNPLANNED CLEANING ORDER

Method.—Worker gets tools from tool closet (1), and walks down hall and begins on living room (2); returns with trash to kitchen (3), and walks to dining room (4); after cleaning it, again returns to kitchen with trash, and proceeds to clean the study (5); she walks back to kitchen again, and last cleans hall (6), ending by bringing back tools and last refuse to kitchen again, before taking the final walk back to tool closet (1). This is not an exaggeration, but the method used by a so-called "good worker."



DIAGRAM 2—PLANNED CLEANING ORDER

Method.—Worker gets tools from tool closet (1), and proceeds direct to study (2); from study through door to parlor (3); across parlor hallway to dining room (4); she then begins at upper end of hallway (5), and cleans its length back to the door opening on rear porch, carrying all waste and tools back directly to service porch (6). Note that this method eliminates *all tracking to kitchen* and results in about two-thirds less unnecessary steps and walking.

and moral "health" of the "social body." This theme will return again and again: in the social hygiene movements, in the infiltration of Taylorism and Scientific Management in the work place and the home,[16] in many of the urban proposals and architectural polemics of the Modern Movement.[17] What is often constituted as, or presented under the guise of, progressive reform or democratization or social health, harbors the technologies of management and surveillance either as its means or its ends.[18] A more recent manifestation of instrumental transparency can be found in the "open office" system (which has been refered to as a "managerial tool"), where a shift away from earlier forms of the spatial repressiveness of hierarchization and compartmentalization of the subject in the office environment would result in just other forms of hierarchization and compartmentalization—as well as an increased lack of privacy which comes with an increased efficiency of institutional management and surveillance.[19]

III

It should be clear however that architecture cannot control behavior in some absolute manner. Architecture participates in the managing of subjects because its own structuring is not dissimilar, at many levels, to the structuring of the programs/institutions that it "houses"—in terms, for example, of the or-

16 On the shifts in practices of the management of domestic space, see Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of Experts' Advice to Women* (Garden City: Anchor, 1978); Dolores Hayden, *The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, Neighborhoods, and Cities* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981); and Gwendolyn Wright, *Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic Architecture and Cultural Conflict in Chicago 1873-1913* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). For a discussion of the ways in which women's picture magazines played a mediating link between the social spheres of "industrial production and . . . domestic reproduction," reinforcing the scientific management lessons of order and efficiency, see Sally Stein, "The Graphic Ordering of Desire: Modernization of A Middle-Class Women's Magazine, 1914-1939," *Heresies* 18 (1985): 7-16. For a discussion of Le Corbusier's embrace of, and subsequent disillusionment with, Taylorism see Mary McLeod, "Architecture or Revolution: Taylorism, Technocracy, and Social Change," *Art Journal*, 43, 2 (Summer 1983): 132-147. Other aspects of Le Corbusier's production related to the themes of spatial management and instrumental transparency are discussed briefly in Brian Brace Taylor, "Technology, Society, and Social Control in Le Corbusier's Cité de Refuge, Paris, 1933," *Oppositions* 15-16 (Winter-Spring 1979): 169-186. For an extensive reading of the work of Le Corbusier and Adolf Loos with regard to the construction of the subject in the domestic interior see Beatriz Colomina, "The Split Wall: Domestic Voyeurism" in Colomina, ed., *Sexuality and Space* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1991).

17 Laszlo Moholy-Nagy's comments (from his Bauhaus Book, *Painting, Photography, Film)* contain a remarkable summary of these themes: "Men still kill one another, they have not understood how they live, why they live; politicians fail to observe that the earth is an entity, yet television (Telehor) has been invented: the 'Far Seer'—tomorrow we shall be able to look into the hearts of our fellow-man, be everywhere and yet alone; illustrated books, newspapers, magazines are printed—in millions. The unambiguousness of the real, the truth in the everyday situation is there for all classes. *The hygiene of the optical, the health of the visible is slowly filtering through.*" Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, *Painting, Photography, Film* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969), 38, emphasis in original text. (The first edition of this book was published in 1925; the second edition, from which this translation was made, was published two years later). Another example is Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's 1923 comments on office buildings (that appeared alongside his well-known statement "Architecture is the will of the age conceived in spatial terms") in the first issue of the avant-garde publication *G*: "The office building is a house of work of organization of clarity of economy. Bright, wide workrooms, *easy to oversee*, undivided except as the organism of the undertaking is divided. The maximum effect with the minimum expenditure of means." (from *Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-century Architecture* trans. Michael Bullock, ed. Ulrich Conrads, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970), 74; spacing emphasis in original, text emphasisis mine—although further emphasis could be given to the equation of office and house, as well as to the spatial aspects of work, organization, clarity, economy, and division).

18 As Foucault notes (in "An Interview with Michel Foucault," in *History of the Present* 1 (1985): 2): "As soon as a power infinitely less brutal and less extravagant, less visible and less ponderous than the big monarchical administration became necessary, greater latitudes for the participation in power and in the decision-making process were given to a certain social class. But at the same time and in order to compensate for it, a system of training was elaborated, essentially aimed at other social classes, but also at the new ruling class—for the bourgeoisie has in a way worked upon itself, it has developed its own type of individuals. I do not think that the two phenomena are contradictory: one was the price paid for the other. For a certain bourgeois liberalism to become possible at the level of institutions, it was necessary to have, at the level of what I call "micro-powers," a much stricter investment in bodies and behaviors. Discipline is the underside of democracy."

19 This is not to suggest that transparency as such is repressive,

daptable...

ganization, hierarchization, and systematization of order, activities, behavior, movement, and visibility. One could examine how the obsessive rationality—obsessive to the point of irrationality—of both architecture and institution is woven through and through the space of, say, the office: from the regularized architectonic systems of structure, to the hierarchical "space-planning" of subjects (managers, staff, and visitors), to the standardized body registers of office practices (under the "rigors" of ergonomic "science"), right down to the compartmentalization of subjects and objects via various filing systems. These systems exemplify the capillary action of Foucault's "micro-technologies of power," the "circulation of effects of power through progressively finer channels, gaining access to individuals themselves, to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions."[20] It is in this manner that architecture functions both *as and under authority*. Architecture both structures and is structured by institutions.[21] It is a commonly held notion of our "postmodern" time that different programs can inhabit the same space because programs are completely independent from architectural spatiality. But it is the similarity, not the disparity, between institutional structures and between the structure of institutions and architecture, that allows for this interchangability of inhabitation and management.

From the preceding discussion it should also be clear that the play of ideologies in architectural form is so complex that it would be pointless to expect a unitary ideology to be reflected in a building (even at the moment it is actualized as a design project or in built form). The conceptual gaps and temporal lags between ideologies and built forms are analogous to the gaps and lags between ideologies and "material" conditions.[22] To trace this ideological drama one would need to examine how the object, in Manfredo Tafuri's words, "reaches compromises with regard to the world and what conditions permit its existence," and thus consequently what conditions govern the object's relationship to production and use.[23]

It would be equally pointless to imagine that any architectural project could be reduced, either in analysis or design, to a definitive map that could

even less to suggest that we return to earlier forms of cellular management.

20 Foucault, "The Eye of Power," 151-152.

21 As Denis Hollier notes (in his *Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 33): "There is consequently no way to describe a system without resorting to the vocabulary of architecture. . . . Architecture under these conditions is the archistructure, the system of systems. The keystone of systematicity in general, it organizes the concord of languages and guarantees universal legibility. The temple of meaning, it dominates and totalizes signifying productions, forcing them all to come down to the same thing, to confirm its *noologic* system. Architecture is a compulsory loan burdening all of ideology, mortgaging all its differences from the outset." For a further discussion of architectural metaphor in philosophical thought, see Mark Wigley, "The Production of Babel, the Translation of Architecture," in *Assemblage* 8 (1989): 7-19. For a discussion of the structuring and counter-structuring of architecture and culture see Catherine Ingraham, "Lines and Linearity: Problems in Architectural Theory," in Andrea Kahn, ed., *Drawing/Building/Text* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1991).

22 By temporal lag between ideologies and built form I am referring to the time between for instance the height of the "open classroom" pedagogical movement and the appearences of the first built examples, and to the degree to which these built examples may even have assisted in the movement's decline.

As George Duby notes (in "Ideologies in social history," in Le Goff and Nora, *Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology*, 158-9) ideologies indicate changes in "the lived reality of social organisation . . . slowly and reluctantly, because they are by nature conservative. They are the locus of a process of adaptation, but this is sometimes very slow and always remains partial. Moreover, in a subtle dialectical process, the weight of ideological representations is sometimes such as to hold back the development of material and political structures . . ."

23 Tafuri, "The Historical Project," 17.



96 HOUSEHOLD ENGINEERING

QUESTIONS ON HOUSEHOLD ENGINEERI

II

PLANS AND METHODS FOR DAILY HOUSEWORK

1. Make out a schedule of your present plan of
   Study to see where it can be improved. Try th
   schedule two weeks. Revise and try anothe
   weeks, and report.
2. Time yourself for at least a week on the same tas
   washing dishes, peeling potatoes, making bed
   cleaning the bathroom. How long does it take
   you find the time varying from day to day?
   down two complete "time-studies" on these
   showing the first record and the last.
3. "Standardize" some household task so that you c
   it every day in an identical manner without
   mental attention. Does this not make it seem
   difficult?
4. What are your worst "interruptions"? Make a sch
   which will take care of them as much as possible
5. Do the same task with two different tools, and no
   difference, or do the same task with two dif
   methods, or do it under two different sets of c
   tions. Find out the way that seems the best
   shortest for your particular case and report.

account for all the forces at play, to a totalizing diagram of formal, psychological, and social relations. The convergence of discourses and economies at the nexus of subject, space, site, or program provides an opportunity not to resurrect an ultimate truth-value of "Site" or "Program," but to utilize each force against itself, against the other forces, and against the entire project. The nostalgia of current "contextualism" can be interrogated by architecturally utilizing past or present aspects of the context to simultaneously problematize the object by the site and the site by the object. The naive problem-solving of Sixties behavorialism can be similarly interrogated by architecturally utilizing the program to question certain institutional practices. In all cases, any representation of these forces will always be one of many possible representations.

IV

Thus far I have been discussing some of the ways subjects are constituted and managed in institutional space. To demonstrate the deep pervasiveness of these structurings and mechanisms it will be necessary first to examine how they are involved in a kind of a repressed architectural unconscious, and second, how the examination of this architectural unconscious reveals certain gaps and inconsistencies within the social field from which critical narratives and strategies might emerge.

The architectural project, like the social field, is never without some slippage, some gap, some residue that cannot be sheltered, institutionalized, concealed. In fact, one definition of architecture could be *the management of what can and cannot be "concealed."* One could speak, in this light, of many things that refuse to remain concealed: anomalous behaviors, sexuality, certain odors,[24] domestic violence (in the broadest sense), displaced social groups, and so on—as well as the social and institutional ideologies and mechanisms that attempt to manage the visibility of their own as well as others' practices. Yet it is because all that is supposed to be concealed refuses to remain concealed that it must be managed through the constant presentation of

24 For a discussion of the historical shifts in cultural practices related to various odors, see Alain Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) and Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners* (New York: Urizon, 1978).

25 For a discussion of the relationships of propriety, property, and the proper name see Ingraham, "The Faults of Architecture: Troping the Proper" in *Assemblage* 7 (1988): 7-13.





versatile...

certain conventions of architectural order and propriety.[25]

The *unheimlich* is one word that has been used to refer to that which refuses to remain concealed. As several writers have noted, Sigmund Freud, in his essay "The Uncanny," puzzles over the strange confluence of meaning between two words that should have entirely opposite meanings: *heimlich* (the homey, the canny) and *unheimlich* (the unhomey, the uncanny). Freud, in the beginning of the essay, says that the ". . . German word *unheimlich* is obviously the opposite of *heimlich*, *heimisch*, meaning 'familiar,' 'native,' 'belonging to the home'; and we are tempted to conclude that what is 'uncanny' is frightening precisely because it is *not* known and familiar." In the course of the essay what is revealed is another meaning of *heimlich*: ". . . concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know about it . . . to behave *heimlich*, as though there were something to conceal . . . *heimlich* places (which good manners oblige us to conceal)." Thus the "uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old-established in the mind which has been estranged only by the process of repression." It is through this understanding that the force of Friedrich Schelling's definition of *unheimlich* as ". . . the name for everything that ought to have remained . . . hidden and secret and has become visible" becomes evident to Freud. The *unheimlich*, far from being the opposite and outside of the *heimlich*, *is* the *heimlich*—it is what is already inside, the homey that returns as the unhomey.[26]

Let me go further with this already established elucidation. First, it is worth noting that it is not only in the German language that words related to the concept of home reveal an uncanny meaning. For example, the English verb "to dwell" is derived from the Middle English *dwellen* (from the Old English *dwellan*) which means "to lead astray, hinder," and is akin to the Middle Dutch *dwellen* which means "to stun," and the Old High German *twellan* and the Old Norse *dvelja* which mean "to delay, to deceive" —which in turn are all derived from the Indo-European base **dh(e)wel-* which means "to mislead, to deceive, to obscure, to make dull."[27] And

26 All the quotations in this paragraph are from Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny'," in Freud, *On Creativity and the Unconscious* (New York: Harpers, 1958), 122- 161. For two other discussions on the uncanny in architecture see Vidler, "The Architecture of the Uncanny: The Unhomely Houses of the Romantic Sublime," in *Assemblage* 3 (1987): 7-29 and Wigley, "Postmortem Architecture: The Taste of Derrida," *Perspecta* 23 (1987): 156-172.

27 *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) and the *Webster's New World Dictionary* (New York: William Collins and World Publishing, 1978). I would like to thank James F. Gramata for pointing out this etymology to me.

WEDNESDAY

6:00– 6:30	Rise and dress; start water heater
6:30– 7:00	Prepare breakfast
7:00– 7:30	BREAKFAST
7:30– 8:30	Wash dishes; inspect icebox; plan meals; start lunch
8:30– 9:00	Make beds; light cleaning
9:00–12:00	Ironing
12:00– 1:00	LUNCH
1:00– 2:00	Finish ironing; put away clothes
2:00– 3:00	Wash dishes; straighten kitchen
3:00– 4:00	*Rest period*
4:00– 5:00	Market; walk
5:30– 6:00	Prepare supper
6:00– 7:00	SUPPER
7:00– 7:30	Wash dishes

THURSDAY

6:00– 6:30	Rise and dress; start water heater
6:30– 7:00	Prepare breakfast
7:00– 7:30	BREAKFAST
7:30– 8:30	Wash dishes; straighten kitchen; plan meals
8:30– 9:00	Make beds
9:00–11:30	Bedrooms and closets cleaned
11:30–12:00	*Rest period*
12:00– 1:00	LUNCH
1:00– 2:00	Wash dishes; prepare vegetables toward supper
2:00– 3:30	Upstairs windows cleaned (Up and down stairs windows alternately each week)
3:30– 4:00	Silver polished
4:00– 5:30	*Rest period*
5:30– 6:00	Prepare supper
6:00– 7:00	SUPPER
7:00– 7:30	Wash dishes

FRIDAY

6:00– 6:30	Rise and dress; start heater
6:30– 7:00	Prepare breakfast
7:00– 7:30	BREAKFAST
7:30– 8:30	Wash dishes; straighten kitchen; plan meals

for the Sakalava, a tribe in Madagascar, among whom "no one would refuse another entrance into his house *unless he were hoarding or hiding something*," the word *mody*, which means "at home" or "heading home" also means "to pretend what one is not."[28]

It is precisely the uncanny connotations of dwelling that Martin Heidegger repressed in favor of more *heimlich* ones (in his etymological "derivations" from Old English and High German) in his late essay "Building Dwelling Thinking." It is interesting in this light to reconsider one of Heidegger's most famous statements: "Language is at once the house of Being and the home of human beings."[29] Heidegger claims that it is our highest "summons" to try "to bring dwelling to the fullest of its nature,"[30] but fails to acknowledge that this fullness includes both the *heimlich* and *unheimlich*. Such a failure of acknowledgement, Freud suggests, is what causes the *unheimlich* to return.

The *unheimlich* meanings of "dwelling" suggest what in architecture is "familiar and old-established" that would return in the uncanny. The very constitution of architecture reveals, in Žižek's words, a "traumatic, real kernel." I am referring to a condition that is confined neither to recent times nor to Western cultures but, as the anthropologist Peter J. Wilson notes, at the very least an aspect of all cultures that inhabit "permanent" dwellings:

> When people adopted settlement and domestication as a permanent feature of their lives, they did not impinge directly on their drives of aggression and sexuality, but they did impinge directly on the *conditions of attention*. That is, they impeded their sensory ability to monitor, stimulate, and govern these drives. Living behind walls affects the various aspects of attention, and people so affected must respond. This occurs in part by specializing attention, by developing modes of surveillance, supervision, and inspection, and by evolving stratagems of evasion and display.[31]

Architecture constructs this evasion and at the same time is in constant flight from acknowledging its part in this construction. This evasion is the trauma of architecture, the "antagonistic kernel" that always

28 Gillian Feeley-Harnik, "The Sakalava House (Madagascar)," *Anthropos* 75 (1980), 580, quoted in Peter J. Wilson, *The Domestication of the Human Species* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 98. Emphasis in original text.

29 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 239.

30 Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper, 1971), 145-161.

31 Wilson, *The Domestication of the Human Species*, 182. Emphasis in original.



lexible...

prevents the closure of the architectural field.[32] Thus it should not be so surprising that language returns to us this uncanniness of inhabitation, this duplicity, this doubled concealment. And it should also not be surprising that the mechanisms and conventions masking the trauma of this uncanniness should themselves attempt to remain hidden and repressed so that they, like the ideologies they mask, appear natural, stable, unalterable.

I am suggesting that the constitution and management of subjects through the types, or rather stereotypes, of institutional space, that is, through the *compulsion to repeat* these stereotypes without examination, is one means by which the uncanny returns in architecture. In psychoanalytical terms, as Peter Brooks notes "repetition is a way of remembering brought into play when recollection in the intellectual sense is blocked by repression and resistance."[33] It is not the past as past that is recollected, that is, as "something belonging to the past . . . in a bound state";[34] what is repeated is repressed material brought into the present as an active force, as a defense against the direct examination of complex and potentially dangerous psychological relations.

Architecture, for the most part, abandons itself to the unconscious repetition of stereotype—of the house, the office, the museum, the hospital, the library, and so forth—to such an extent that few architects think to re-examine the fundamental assumptions implicit within the conventional program. (As Freud says: "The patient abandons himself to the compulsion to repeat, which is now replacing the impulse to remember."[35]) The basic functions of institutional stereotypes—regardless of how their configuration varies from culture to culture or of formal shifts that may occur within a given culture through time—are as *mechanisms of management*, to reinforce "proper" social and psychological relations, and as *mechanisms of defense*, to guard against potentially dangerous social and psychological relations, that is, all "that ought to remain hidden and secret." Architecture, according to Georges Bataille, is the expression of the very soul of society, but "it is only the ideal soul of society, that

32 Žižek (in *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 162-4; emphasis in original) is using the term "the Real" in the Lacanian sense, that is, not to refer to an "transcendent positive entity" but an entity, like the Freudian example of the primal parricide, which "although it does not exist (in the sense of 'really existing,' taking place in reality), has a series of properties—it exercises a certain structural causality, it can produce a series of effects in the symbolic reality of subjects." In fact it is only in a series of effects that this entity is present, but "always in a distorted, displaced way. . . . Laclau and Mouffe [in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*] were the first to develop this logic of the Real in its relevance for the social-ideological field in their concept of *antagonism*: antagonism is precisely such an impossible kernel . . . only to be constructed retroactively, from a series of its effects, as the traumatic point which escapes them; it prevents a closure of the social field."

For the same reasons as Žižek has noted with regard to the primal parracide, it would be pointless to search for the "traces" of the built *unheimlich* in "prehistoric reality, but it must none the less be presupposed if we want to account for the present state of things." In addition, we should not expect that architecture would need to blatantly and continually enunciate its *unheimlich* side (as it does in the rare example, say, of the panoptic prison) for its effects to be felt. In other words, direct suppression is not the only or principal means of control, as Jacques Lacan notes (in Lacan, "Television" in *October* 40 (1987): 31-2; emphasis in original): "Freud didn't say that repression *comes from* suppression: that (to paint a picture) castration is due to what Daddy brandished over his brat playing with his wee-wee: 'We'll cut it off, no kidding, if you do it again.'" That this enunciation is repressed and masked not only does not take away from its pervasive power, it assures it.

33 Peter Brooks, "Psychoanalytic constructions and narrative meanings," in *Paragraph* 7 (1986): 57.

34 Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York: Norton, 1959), 12, 30.

35 Freud, "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: Recollection, Repetition and Working Through" in Freud, *Therapy and Technique* (New York: Collier, 1963), 161.

enough ideal to force her *to subordinate housekeeping routine to the attainment of the higher ends of personal and family happiness and success.* What shall the homemaker do with her leisure time? Here are some suggestions:

TEN THINGS TO DO IN LEISURE TIME

1.—Take time to read more about her own specialty, as government and state food bulletins, books on household management, child care, house planning, equipment, etc.
2.—Take time for actual correspondence course in homemaking subjects; attend special classes in cooking, food conservation, budget making, which her community may offer.
3.—Take time to interest herself in and understand her husband's business, so that she can aid, sympathize and be a comrade in his work.
4.—Take time to supervise her children's school work, play, friendships; take them to museums, zoos and places of interest on their holidays.
5.—Take time for daily grooming, hygiene and physical exercise.
6.—Take time for reading and making personal thought-out decisions on the problems of life, ethics, immortality, philosophy of life, etc.
7.—Take time for music, art, language, business, hobby or interest beyond housekeping.
8.—Take time to "keep up on" some specialty or pursuit in which she excelled before marriage, or by which she used to earn her living, so that she can relieve herself of some phases of housework for which she is not fitted, and so that, in case of death or disability, she would be more able to take upon herself the burdens of family support, if occasion required.

which has the authority to command and prohibit, that is expressed in architectural compositions properly speaking. Thus great monuments are erected like dikes, opposing the logic and majesty of authority against all disturbing elements: it is through the form of cathedral or palace that Church or State speaks to the multitudes and imposes silence upon them."[36]

The conservative cry within the architectural discipline to "remember" and repeat past formal, typological, and institutional models with the claim that these will shore us up, will make us safe and *heimlich*, is thus only the most vocal, *only the most apparent*, indication of this widespread compulsion to repeat. This architectural cry is similar to another current cry—to the "Great Books"—a claim for connoisseurship as a defense against the critical examination of the classical canon. Such conscious cries for "remembering" share with obsessional neurosis a "forgetting" that "consists mostly of a falling away of the links between various ideas, a failure to draw conclusions, an isolating of certain memories."[37] This isolating of certain memories—literally in architecture an isolating of elements, institutional forms, "typologies", and styles from the past—seeks to bring back the past, to repeat what is "remembered" as pleasurable, as *heimlich*. But, as Jacques Lacan observes, the object is not retrievable, what is recalled is never the object itself: "The object is encountered and is structured along the path of repetition—to find the object again, to repeat the object. Except, it never is the same object which the subject encounters. In other words, he never ceases generating substitutive objects."[38]

It is because the past is irretrievable (as only substitutive objects are generated in lieu of that past) and because, most importantly, truly conscious remembering requires a remembering not only of forms but of their repressed significance, that what is recalled in this repetition is repressed trauma.[39] Thus the most significant repetition that these conscious cries for "remembering" mask is a behavioral repetition—*the resistance to critical analysis* as a mechanism of defense. As Freud states:

> The crux of the matter is that the mechanisms of defense against former dangers recur in analysis

36 Hollier, *Against Architecture*, 46-7. Bataille continues: "It is, in fact, obvious that monuments inspire social prudence and often even real fear. The taking of the Bastille is symbolic of this state of things: it is hard to explain this crowd movement other than by the animosity of the people against the monuments that are their real masters." Hollier commenting on this passage says (49, 55): "[Architecture's] job . . . is to serve society to defend itself against that which is its basis only because of its threat. . . . Architecture functions as the fantasy that man identifies with to escape his desire (to escape it is to control it). Man is confined: *conformed* within himself."

37 Freud, "Recollection, Repetition and Working Through," 159.

38 Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955* ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1988), 100.

39 As Joan Copjec notes (in "*India Song/Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert*: The Compulsion to Repeat" in *October* 17 (1981): 42-43): "The compulsion to repeat is definitely not, according to psychoanalysis . . . an attempt to return to a previous state of satisfaction; rather it is the return to a trauma, which is conceived, psychoanalytically as it is medicosugically, as a wound, a break in the protective skin which triggers catastrophe, misfortune through the whole of the organism."



in the shape of *resistances* to cure. It follows that the ego treats recovery itself as a new danger. . . . The patient now regards the analyst simply as an alien personality who makes disagreeable demands upon him and he behaves towards him exactly like a child who does not like a stranger and has no confidence in him. If the analyst tries to explain to the patient one of the distortions which his defence has produced and to correct it, he meets with a complete lack of comprehension and an imperviousness to valid arguments. We see then that there really *is* a resistance to the discovery of resistances and that the defense mechanisms . . . are resistances not only to the bringing of id-contents into consciousness but also to the whole process of analysis and so to cure.[40]

V

Freud, in his discussion of defense mechanisms, states that they are "in fact, infantilisms" that "share the fate of so many institutions which struggle to maintain themselves when they have outlived their usefulness." He continues this passage with a quote from Goethe's *Faust* summarizing the potential danger of both defense mechanisms and institutions, "*Vernunft wird Unsinn, Wohltat Plage.*" (Reason becomes unreason, kindness torment.)[41]

It is, of course, as impossible to escape the framework of institutions as it is to escape the framework of ideology. What is possible is an unending task—the development of abilities to perceive and examine the structuring of institutions, to reveal those conditions where reason becomes unreason, kindness torment. In opening our institutions up to questioning, we reveal their artificial, and therefore alterable, construct. Bertolt Brecht, whose work was based on revealing the changeable character of that which presents itself as familiar and immutable, has already noted the difficulty of breaking into the repetitive cycle of society:

> For it seems impossible to alter what has long not been altered. We are always coming on things that are too obvious for us to bother to understand them. What men experience among themselves they think of as "the" human experience. A

40 Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" in Freud, *Therapy and Technique* (New York: Collier, 1963), 256-8.

41 Ibid., 255-6. Freud continues: "The adult ego with its greater strength continues to defend itself against dangers which no longer exist in reality and even finds itself impelled to seek out real situations which may serve as a substitute for the original danger, so as to be able to justify its clinging to its habitual modes of reaction. Thus the defensive mechanisms produce an ever-growing alienation from the external world and a permanent enfeeblement of the ego and we can readily understand how they pave the way for and precipitate the outbreak of neurosis."



BUSINESSLIKE EQUIPMENT FOR THE HOME

(1) Sample Card from the Home Record Cabinet
(2) The Time and Worry Saving Home Record Cabinet
(3) A Vertical Letter File for Receipts
(4) A Tickler Which Reminds the Busy Housewife
(5) A Vertical Filing Envelope for Saving Large Clippings
(6) A Book of Handy Labels for Home Use

> child, living in a world of old men, learns how things work there. . . . Even if he realizes that the arrangements made for him by "Providence" are only what has been provided by society, he is bound to see society, that vast collection of beings like himself, as a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts and therefore not in any way to be influenced. Moreover, he would be used to things that could not be influenced; and who mistrusts what he is used to?[42]

Conventions, as representations of that which "has long not been altered," are blocks both to awareness and to potential change. "The past," as Freud says, "is the patient's armory out of which he fetches his weapons for defending himself against the progress of the analysis, weapons which we must wrest from him one by one."[43] What are the means by which the defenses of the past might be wrest from the patient? To ignore them, to proceed as if they did not exist would, of course, be useless. However paradoxical it might at first appear, it is precisely by utilizing the compulsion to repeat against itself—by allowing it to display itself in its principal form (as a resistance to examination)—that progress is gained within the analysis: "We render it harmless, and even make use of it, by according it the right to assert itself within certain limits . . . to display before us all the pathogenic impulses hidden in the depths of the patient's mind. . . . Only when it has come to its height can one, with the patient's cooperation, discover the repressed instinctual trends which are feeding the resistance; and only by living them through in this way will the patient be convinced of their existence and their power."[44] As Brooks observes:

> Repetition is both an obstacle to analysis—since the analysand must eventually be led to renunciation of the attempt to reproduce the past—and the principal dynamic of the cure, since only by way of its symbolic enactment in the present can the history of past desire, its objects and scenarios of fulfillment, be made known, become manifest in the present discourse. . . . The narrative discourse—like the discourse of analysis—must restage the past history of desire as it exercises its pressure toward meaning in the

42 Bertolt Brecht, "A Short Organum for the Theatre," in *Brecht on Theatre*, ed. John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), 192.

43 Freud, "Recollection, Repetition and Working Through," 161.

44 Ibid., 164-5.



present. . . . At issue . . . is not so much the history of the past, or at least not the history of the past directly, as its present narrative discourse. This is a space of dialogue, struggle, construction.[45]

A restaging of the past history of desire as a construction requires a methodology able to distance itself enough from the past to perceive it as a construct—and therefore not just reproduce it. As Brecht suggests, such a methodology would treat "social situations as processes, and . . . regard nothing as existing except in so far as it changes, in other words is in disharmony with itself."[46] But to create this distance it is necessary to denaturalize, to defamiliarize the past. For Brecht this involved a strategy he termed *Verfremdungseffekt*, most commonly translated as "alienation effect": "A representation that alienates is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar," in order to "free socially-conditioned phenomena from that stamp of familiarity which protects them against our grasp today."[47] As in the psychoanalytical model, this involves a two-fold process: a restaging, a working on the past (on what is repressing and what is repressed), and in this process a swerving, a distancing from any direct repetition in order to allow for analysis and the potential for a different construction. The point is not to reproduce the restrictive nostalgia of memory but to develop the critical possibilities of counter-memory.[48]

Earlier I suggested that it might be possible to pursue an architecture that would be critically productive in the sense of exposing, critiquing, problematizing, and re-working certain repressed narratives already at work in architecture. Rather than avoid sites of ideological and psychological saturation, such an architecture might draw out some of this saturation. This drawing out, this thematizing, is one method by which the obsessiveness and irrationality of the "normal" and "rational" may be revealed, may "display before us all the pathogenic impulses" circulating around the repressed doubleness of inhabitation. One could characterize this inhabitation in the terms suggested by

45 Brooks, "Psychoanalytic constructions and narrative meanings," 57, 62, 67.

46 Brecht, "A Short Organum for the Theatre," 193.

47 Ibid., 192.

48 On the concept of counter-memory see Friedrich Nietzsche, "History in the Service and Disservice of Life" in Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, ed. William Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale, 1990), 87-145 and Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 139-164. It is also interesting in this regard to note Jacques Derrida's comments on architecture and "memory" (in "Jacques Derrida in Discussion with Christopher Norris," *Deconstruction in Architecture II Architectural Design Profile* 74, (London: St. Martins, 1989), emphasis in original:

"Now as for architecture, I think that *Deconstruction* comes about—let us carry on using this word to save time—when you have deconstructed some architectural philosophy, some architectural assumptions—for instance, the hegemony of the aesthetic, of beauty, the hegemony of usefulness, of functionality, of living, of dwelling. But then you have to *reinscribe* these motifs in the work. You can't (or you shouldn't) simply dismiss those values of dwelling, functionality, beauty and so on. You have to construct, so to speak, a new space and a new form, to shape a new way of building in which those motifs are reinscribed, having meanwhile lost their hegemony. The inventiveness of powerful architects consists I think in this reinscription, the economy of this reinscription, which also involves some respect for tradition, for memory. Deconstruction is not simply forgetting the past. What has dominated theology or architecture or anything else is still there, in some way, and the inscriptions, the let's say, *archive* of these deconstructed structures, the archive should be as readable as possible, as legible as we can make it." (73)

THE *HOW* IN THE HOME

SYMBOLS FOR THE ELEMENTS OF THE MOTION CYCLE

Symbol	*Name*	*Color*
	Search	Black
	Find	Gray
	Select	Light Gray
	Grasp	Lake Red
	Transport Loaded	Green
	Position	Blue
	Assemble	Violet
	Use	Purple
	Dis-assemble	Light Violet
	Inspect	Burnt Ochre
	Pre-position for Next Operation	Sky Blue
	Release Load	Carmine Red
	Transport Empty	Olive Green
	Rest for Overcoming Fatigue	Orange
	Unavoidable Delay	Yellow Ochre
	Avoidable Delay	Lemon Yellow
	Plan	Brown

115

Wilson (in the developed modes and stratagems of surveillance, supervision, evasion and display) or in the somewhat more general terms I suggested earlier: the organization, hierarchization, and systematization of institutional practices.

The architectural operations addressing these themes could occur not only in the traditional realms of the architect (spaces, walls, windows, doors, and so on) but also at the level of what I have called the "sub-architectural." It is this level—of the office desk, or the filing system, or the household cabinet—that one might argue has at least as immediate, if not a more immediate, impact in terms of the structuring of institutional ideologies, but it is at this level that architects mostly specify out of manufacturers' catalogs or leave to others to select. Even given the task of designing, say, a reception desk, most architects would architecturally repress its obvious social and psychological aspects. Inscribed through and through with a libidinal and ideological economy, the reception desk is a site of institutional desire in the broadest of senses—as an apparatus of control, as a site that receives and keeps out, as an implicit participant and frame for the ubiquitous gender and class stereotyping of the "receptionist" position. Architects are of course not inattentive to institutions; on the contrary they occasionally custom design everything from spaces to furniture. It is just that their "deepest" attention tends to reside in the *decorative* design of lobby spaces and executive desks, rather than designing these spaces and furnishing—or utilizing standardized objects—in a critical manner.

VI

The limits of these critical narrative strategies are when they become another conceit, another way for architects to feign interest in extra-formal issues. It is clearly of little value to make a casual reference to these themes in a project, or to use them to mask merely aesthetized objects. What becomes crucial is not the arbitrary or casual evocation of conceptually or politically current concerns but the critical act of selection, processing, and re-working—not to further mystify the object, nor to reduce the object to a

tractive...

diagram of social forces, but as a way to expose and examine the whole architectural enterprise. This, of course, includes the play of form through the architect, which is as much a theme to be explored and problematized as other psychological or social forces, and is thus subject to the same examinations and disjunctions within a narrative operation. In fact, the very act of architectural narration is not only *not* exempt from similar examinations and disjunctions, but requires that such a technique be turned on itself in order to expose the complexity and contingency of its own operations. There is however always a difficult balance between a discourse which fails to examine its own constitution and one that becomes self-consumed in privileging its own constitution, between, one might say, naive realism and unrelenting metafiction.

It only remains in this regard to suggest that the interventions that attempt to expose and problematize institutional narratives might also expose and problematize, rather than merely reproduce, the tedium of an absolutist rationality. In fact, it is from the gaps and slippages of that rationality that these interventions may emerge: "Something that exceeds the thinkable and opens the possibility of 'thinking otherwise' bursts in through comical, incongruous, or paradoxical half-openings of discourse."[49] As Brecht never tired of pointing out, this involves pleasure—the pleasure "felt when the rules emerging from this life in society are treated as imperfect and provisional,"[50] the pleasure of "the instability of every circumstance, the joke of contradiction and so forth: all these are ways of enjoying the liveliness of men, things and processes, and they heighten both our capacity for life and our pleasure in it."[51]

However successful these narrative strategies may be at the level of the object, one still needs to acknowledge the limits of architectural practice to directly affect widespread social change, as well as the abilities of the hegemonic culture to absorb critical strategies. As Brecht has noted, "Capitalism has the power instantly and continuously to transform into a drug the very venom that is spit in its face, and to revel in it."[52] It is thus always necessary for critical strategies—and this includes the strat-

49 This is Michel de Certeau's characterization of the method of investigation of Foucault. de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 194.

50 Brecht, "A Short Organum for the Theatre," 205.

51 Brecht, "Appendices to the Short Organum," in *Brecht on Theatre*, 277. Theodor Adorno's critique of Brecht, even given "its partiality" (Jameson's apt expression (*Aesthetics and Politics* (London: New Left Books, 1977), 209)), would not be the first nor the last to comment on the distance between theory and practice, and the difficult relationship between direct social content and ambiguity, in the work of Brecht. I would suggest that, although on the one hand, the danger of social content in an aesthetic work that lacks a degree of ambiguity is overly simplistic didacticism, on the other hand, the danger of ambiguity from without—rather than from within—specificity of content is easy and empty seduction (as witnessed by the success of such politically questionable artists as Joseph Beuys and Anselm Kiefer). Closer examination of Adorno's position reveals, again in Jameson's words (in *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic* (New York: Verso, 1990), 223), a "subtle appreciation of his great adversary, Brecht," even in the aggressively critical essay "Commitment" (in *Aesthetics and Politics*, 177-195) but particularly in the more balanced *Aesthetic Theory*: "Still it is Brecht in large measure to whom we owe the growth in the self-consciousness of the art work, for when it is viewed as an element of political praxis its resistance to ideological mystification becomes that much stronger." (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, 344.)

52 Bertolt Brecht, "Rauschgift," in *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967), vol. VIII, 593, quoted in Yve-Alain Bois's essay (on the work of the artist Hans Haacke) "The Antidote" in *October* 39 (Winter 1986), 143. Bois continues: "This recuperative power undoubtedly complicates Haacke's preparation of the antidote. His strategy is to convey his awareness of this in the work itself."

egies that might emerge from the theoretical positions of this essay—to be constantly reevaluated and renewed.

Having stated certain critical limits of the architectural object I would nevertheless maintain the productiveness of an architectural narrative that is *constituted within and through these limits*. I would therefore disagree with the conclusions that Tafuri has drawn from his many years of analyzing the *naiveté* and bitter betrayals of avant-garde utopian dreams and progressive ideologies: "To the deceptive attempts to give architecture an ideological dress, I shall always prefer the sincerity of those who have the courage to speak of that silent and outdated 'purity'; even if this, too, still harbors an ideological inspiration, pathetic in its anachronism."[53] But what may be, for some, sincerity and courage, for others will be indifference, fatigue, business as usual. At the risk of conveying, again in Tafuri's words, "impotent and ineffectual myths, which so often serve as illusions that permit the survival of anachronistic 'hopes in design',"[54] I would suggest that if we, with our lowered "postmodern" expectations, can distinguish between direct political action and critical representations, we may be able to practice some means of both resistance and proposition within our work. In acknowledging the ineluctable rhetorical aspects of our discipline, we might critically examine within the limits of our practices (in ways that need not be, on the one hand totalizing or utopian, nor on the other hand conciliatory or reactionary) the complex relationships between architecture and social practices.

I would like to thank the Chicago Institute for Architecture and Urbanism for providing me a fellowship that allowed the initial development of this text. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Inaba for his considerable editorial attentions.

53 Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1976), ix. Also see his *The Sphere and the Labyrinth.*

54 Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia,* 182.

If this wonderful new "scientific management" brings such result in other businesses, why couldn't it do the same in my business of home-making?

—Christine Frederick, 1926





Architecture and Evil

JOHN WHITEMAN

"Human reason has the peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer."

—*The Critique of Pure Reason*, from the preface to the first edition. Immanuel Kant

"Every sentence that I write tries to say the same thing." — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Fredric Jameson begins his essay "Architecture and the Critique of Ideology" with the question, "(h)ow can space be ideological?" It is the apparent impossibility of the question that guides the structure and teleology of his essay toward a forlorn plea for a politics of space. Similarly, I shall start with the (impossible) question, "how can architecture be ethical?"; although, in the wake of such an interrogation, my conclusion will not be a forlorn plea for an ethical architecture, but instead a desperation for architecture to inscribe a space within itself in which a perpetual *question* of the ethical can be sensed, architecturally.

1. Architecture: From the Allegories of Power to the Questions of Ethics

A characteristic feature ascribed to architecture in the modern period has been a failure to meet the monumental cultural aspirations that have apparently been assigned to it, and a simultaneous failure to articulate and embrace architectural forms that can exist without the "heavy weight" of these aspirations. Something inexplicable has changed in the culture, it is said, such that architecture can no longer perform its traditional symbolic function. Yet it is unclear whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. It is only clear that it is inevitable, or that something has irrevocably happened (so it is claimed, for example, in Nietzsche).[1]

This recurrent failure, especially with respect to the problems of architecture, is tragically and subtly stated in Hegel's writing on art. Hegel saw clearly the fundamental ambiguity of our architectural aspirations—that the very materiality of architecture would, when set within the context of contemporary

1 See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. Marion Faber (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), remark 218. "We have outgrown the symbolism of lines and figures, as we have grown unaccustomed to the tonal effects of rhetoric, no longer having sucked in this kind of cultural mother's milk from the first movements of life."

strategies of theory and explanation, subvert the spiritual burden that we place upon brute stone. The future of architecture in such an age cannot, he foresaw, be anything other than a futile search for rhetorical gestures or mystifications. A work of architecture must obfuscate or hide its fundamental incapacity to bear the cultural burden assigned to it; it must turn its (internal) torture to the wall. Architecture, "the highest form of all the symbolical arts," cannot, according to Hegel, but fail as symbol.[2] Architecture, in its very self, becomes therefore a poignant form of the modern tragedy.

Following Paul de Man, I feel that the persistence of the modern tragedy (here, the tragedy of/in modern architecture) originates ironically in our inability to recognize the movements of symbolic form in the currency of use—the tropological dimension of language and symbolic form. As a symbol is used within a culture so it is altered, and this alteration is both self-conscious and pathological. Yet as moderns, we feel ourselves, with false pride, to be free of the rhetoric's pull, moving, so we think, in a language of plain words and a world of plain forms. Refusing to admit to the constant flux of symbolic exchange, while simultaneously denying the power of rhetoric on the impulse of our iconoclasm, we lose ourselves in a sea of persuasions. Our schemata of stability hide from us the ever shifting movement of meaning.

Underlying and indeed generating Hegel's prophecies on the tragic future of art is a romantic overvaluation of the pure sign, of symbol and metaphor as symbols of deliverance from the cruel fatigue of time. And also in his writing on art there is an implicit devaluation of more awkward, less sublime, but also less mystifying forms of rhetoric, such as allegory and metonymy. Seeing, however, the inevitability of time's ruin in its progress of modernism, better not to pursue the seductive purity of the symbol as an idealized form, so the advice from Paul de Man might run: better to face simultaneously the doubled appearance of the meaning and its mechanism. Do not hanker for the complete persuasion.[3]

Thus "the unhappy consciousness" of the modern period can be seen not as the timeless metaphysical malaise, but as an ironic consequence of an impatient intelligence that idealizes the symbolic forms by

2 See G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen Uber Die Aesthetik*, trans. Bernard Bosanquent, *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art*, (London: Routledge and Paul Keegan, 1905), 160.

3 The collapse of the Romantic desire for the pure symbol leads directly to a form of modern mannerism. Less obvious, however, is the inevitable return of that self same desire as the architectural project is worked out in its newfound mannerist guise.

which sense is rendered intelligible. Idealization induces the agonies of an impossible completion, all the while keeping the prospect of completion intact.[4]

Yet, unlike Paul de Man, I feel that much of the contemporary difficulty of the arts, particularly architecture, result from a refusal (either explicit or implicit) to acknowledge, let alone act on, the questions of ethics within a philosophy of (architectural) action. De Man is perhaps a victim of the impatience that he so carefully describes, when he quickly aligns his skepticism about the possibility of pure symbols with a parallel skepticism about the efficacy of philosophically guided actions. Sense is always produced within the gambits of rhetorical strategy, a situation which generates both the opportunity and the need for skepticism. However, I am less sure that the skepticism of sense allows an immediate transfer to, or invocation of, a skepticism concerning the understanding of our own actions. Such a complete and totalizing skepticism would only be warranted in a world where action is fully a-posteriori to thought and plays no part in thinking's own formation.

De Man, invokes such a world when he claims that language always and inevitably "disassociates cognition from act;" and uses this observation to support his contention that it is unthinkable for historically situated agents to change the material conditions of their existence, even (especially) by the most radical of intellectual strategies, by translating thought into action through a sustained effort of ideological critique.[5]

Reasons for the prevalent obviation of the ethical question in architecture are not as obvious as might at first be thought. An obvious argument runs thus: if architecture is conceived *merely* as the construction and representation of a world that is beckoned into being by power, then, to be sure, architecture itself is placed in a fully subordinate and passive role to the mutually reinforcing, twin configurations of social necessity and morality. In such a conception, architecture can only be the transparent conduit for a regime of necessity, and a morality that is already fully formed. In such an instrumental version no question can subsequently be raised concerning the ethics of architecture itself. Architecture is conceived as mere instrument, presenting itself simultaneously as idealized structure and representation.

4 A sentiment bemoaning the impossible deliverance which is currently desired of symbolic form is well expressed by Samuel Beckett:

"You weep, and weep for nothing, so as not to laugh, and little by little . . . you begin to grieve."

Samuel Beckett, *Endgame: A Play In One Act*, (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 68.

5 For the essentially political reasons on why Paul de Man does this, see Jacques Derrida "Like the Sound of the See Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War." Critical Inquiry 14, (Spring 1988): 509-652. See also Christopher Norris, "On de Man's early Writings in LE SOIR," *Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology*, (London: Routledge, 1988), 177-198.

But there is a clear fallacy in this conception; a fallacy that, once recognized, immediately construes architecture as a domain of the ethical. As de Man has persuasively argued and as every poet knows, no medium of thought or instrument can be transparent. Every medium has its fascination, which rudely interrupts the idealist's picture of a free flow, or translation of, say, a moral notion from one cultural formulation to another. No medium is merely an empty vessel, waiting to be filled up with content. Such a conception therefore implies a fundamental contradiction in the concept of "structure" and "morality": each is fully formed in the sense of being already determined, and yet formless in the sense of being without, and in search of, incorporation. Both structure and morality have been idealized within the conception of the medium (of architecture) as an empty vessel. Because architecture cannot perform such a seamless representational act, it must consequently be seen as a participant in the shaping of the very structures of necessity and morality that it is said only to represent.

Admit to the fascination of the medium and architecture thereby becomes a formulation of the ethical itself. Architecture is unavoidably contaminated by, and perhaps even originates, ethical concerns.

And yet, there arises here a less obvious argument for the obviation of ethical concerns in architecture, because the formulation of the ethical in architecture remains problematic. To ask, " How can architecture be ethical?" is to once again raise the very question we have been trying to lay to rest. Can a reasoned answer be given, in words, without once again constraining the ethical to be but a particular and determined system of morality, and in turn conceiving architecture to be but its form or conduit?

The question of the ethics of architecture, Pugin notwithstanding, is not ultimately a question of style. Instead the very question strikes at the heart of any (potential) definition of architecture, and must be addressed to any material formation that we might be tempted to call architecture, or even architectural.

The question, "How may architecture be ethical?" arouses a deep anxiety of its own impos-

sible completion. The question seems to imply an answer that must keep clear and distinct the realm of the architectural (the physicality of what we are talking about), the ethical (an apparently abstract value ascribed to the material formation of architecture), and logic (the circuit or configuration of concepts by which the first two may be described or argued). The immediate problem is that these separations cannot be maintained. For architecture, ethics, and logic contaminate and (not only as metaphor?) construct one another.

Without a sure footing based on clear and distinct ideas, what possibly could be the form of an answer? "How can architecture be ethical?" It is a treacherous question indeed.

2. The Bewitchment of Philosophy and City Alike: Art, Architecture, and the Practicum of Human Affairs

The space and form of the city is itself the confounding of architecture, ethics, and logic, because the city is not merely a result, or an illustration, of the (instrumental) theory that may be thought to create it. There has appeared, therefore, within philosophy itself a radical disjunction between thought, action, and value precisely at the point of its interest (the city), where, with a moment's reflection, we know these to be irrevocably conjoined in a material formation that is of our making.

Architecture is undeniably a form of action, to a degree self-conscious, and therefore it requires thought for its execution. (Thought is required before and during the execution of the work; although recently we have tended to premiate the former in the sense that architecture is conceived merely as a plan to be executed: the act of building is subordinated). As a cultural formation, architecture is also the (re-) construction of the very space and forms in which our lives are held; it implicates itself within the structure of human value, while at the same time re-creating it in part. In architecture, the situation where thought, action, and value, are most intimately intertwined as culture (they may be disjoined in the critical distance of skeptical thought), we dramatically lose the ability to hold any threads of their continuity together in our thinking.

It seems (at first) that Walter Benjamin, for example, is inescapably correct when he asserts that

> "Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art, the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction."[6]

A logical extension of Benjamin's statement, taken in its strong form, is that there can be no theory of architecture in general, and, more pertinent here, no understanding of the ethical situation of architecture in particular. Part of what is meant by the term "distraction" is that no individual in the collectivity can remove him/herself from the matrix of dead metaphors within which, through the devices of architecture, we have woven our existence. Lacking such "distance," no "level-headed" formulation of the relations between architecture and value can be made. Architecture confounds the distinction between itself, the realm of the ethical, and the circuits of logic by simultaneously being (and also, paradoxically, appearing to be "underneath") all three.

At first apparently more fundamental than any other art, we become, in a way, unwillingly subject to architecture. Architecture envelops us, and controls our experience extensively. Novels, paintings, and plays occur in spaces and times set aside, leaving the mind room to wander, to disassociate itself from the experience of the art. Architecture is much more compulsory, and works on us even when we are not looking. This is not to say that architecture is all of life, merely that it pervades life. And because architecture is so involved in the practicality of human affairs, it cannot (so easily as other arts?) create an autonomous realm that allows it the critical distance necessary for reflexive comment within, and about, itself.

The reason for the impossibility or the disjunction of discourse and object lies, however, as much in the classical system of representation under which we produce our objects as it does in the objects themselves (for example, the city).[7] By the "classical system of representation" I mean the unstable circuit in which the imagination, merely by thinking itself so, is constrained to function within a hierarchy of signs: that the raw materials of the imagination are images; that images are of things, externally intuited particulars first taken inward from the "outside world" and stored in the reservoir of private memory; that images are a (relatively) concrete kind of representation (i.e., their content is

6 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" *Illuminations,* ed. Hannah Arendt, tr. Harry Zohn (New York: Schoken, 1969), 239.

It is possible that Benjamin meant the term "distraction" only in the weak sense that people simply tend not to notice the architecture in which their lives are led, as they pursue their interests and passions. The architecture "naturally" becomes a background taken for granted. I think that there is also in Benjamin's writing more than a hint of a strong sense of the term "distraction" in that, following Marx, such a contained consciousness can be readily construed as a false one, but one from which escape is a great hardship. This "strong sense" thesis of architectural distraction is developed more fully below.

7 More carefully, the dichotomy between a thing and its representation will be relaxed below. The two inevitably contaminate one another.

given); that images are only the first step in the elevation of the intelligence; that being more universal than the single intuition, the image is a first generalization, the more complete version of which is the concept associated with a name; that the name involves a greater estrangement from the "external world" than does the image; and that this whole system functions as a epistemological relay from word to image to thing which fixes an ontology. One fundamental assumption of such a system of representation is that the objects of thought are just that: objects; they are not themselves the symbolic constructs possessing, or being determined by, a play of significance—they exhibit traces of the thoughts that historically determined them.[8]

This system of representation, which in one form or another is our inheritance from Plato, deftly achieves two problematic isolations, the untruth but inescapability of which provoke the difficulty of an ethical discourse about architecture. The first is a distinction between thought and thing in a dimensionality that excludes from the sober and majestic depiction of reality the mischievous free play of symbolic sense. This is the distinction which we re-describe as the dichotomy between the literal and the metaphoric. The second, arising from the first, is a bifurcation of the spheres of human activity into the serious and practical affairs (of men) and the displaced realms of art—the opposition between art and practicality. The situation is one that we have inherited from the Greece of Plato, which right down to the present day we merely play out in some disguised from—disguised from ourselves, that is.

This then is the world that architecture is supposed to sanctify and "keep in place." But here, in the twisted tale of our logic, a number of problems arise within the logic necessary to architecture itself in such a world. Architecture seems always to belong to both sides of every Platonic divide. For example, it is at once a practical construction with the instrumental purpose of providing the space and representation of social order. Yet, the very "gravity" of its task (anchoring the social order) demands that it constitute itself as an art, as something beyond the traceable logic and skills of men. (Otherwise its achievements could be undone, because its secrets could be exposed and its power lost.) Architecture participates in both the artistic and the practico-philosophical spheres of human life. By this token it is robbed of any possible explanation of its value.

8 I am here summarizing the system of signs described by Hegel. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Philosophy of Mind*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), sec. 455 *et seq.*, 207-213.

Or again, the same divide can be found within architecture's own strategies of configuration. A work of architecture, as a composition, seems always to demand two kinds of explanation. On the one hand, it is born of the logic of scheme and number; it is formal, rational, and calculated (or at least this impulse can always be felt in the architectural gesture): architecture is fundamentally a product of the urban sphere of interest. Most importantly, architecture attempts to be available for public debate and explanation, the intensive scene of the contest of competing and divided human interests. But, on the other hand, architecture is also conceived as symbol, as a form of significance that, by mysticism or awe (or, more benignly, by evasion), secures the very rational world of human interest and calculation in which it so fully partakes. Architecture in the West is therefore always sly and duplicitous—it is always a double strategy.[9]

In explicit terms, the logic of architecture is always divided against itself. This is because the portion of architecture's logic that submits itself to the practico—philosphico sphere of debate and explanation (its rationalism of scheme and number and its corresponding fictions of function) is derived from a logic that continuously places the artistic sense of architecture as being beyond the confines of sense, and therefore inadmissible as explanation.

Philosophy has traditionally employed two methods of keeping art and its effects at bay, both of which secure the place of art in a realm of disinterest.[10] The first is to describe art as ephemeral, as a gesture that, while undoubtedly of "great significance," is at the same time trivial, because it does not participate in practical affairs (which are more "real"). The second is the strategy of (corporate) takeover, in which philosophy continually refines its own self and strategies until it too can do what art does, but in a way that is amenable to debate and instrumental replication (i.e., by evading the supposed dangers of art, the revisions art may provoke). Since art produces knowledge "in the one case," as Wittgenstein might have said, in the singular and unique instance of the individual work, this strategy on the part of philosophy is doomed to failure and ever escalating violence.

Precisely because it cannot function with the (apparent) disinterest that we have come to ascribe to the

9 This is why architecture might always be understood as a form of dialogism—one meaning of dialogism being that of speaking in two veins simultaneously. See for example, Paul de Man's essay on Mikhail Bakhtin, "Dialogue and Dialogism" in *The Resistance to Theory,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 106-114. " It (dialogism) can . . . mean double-talk, the necessary obliqueness of any persecuted speech that cannot, at the risk of survival, openly say what it means to say."

10 These strategies are described more fully by Arthur Danto in *Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 1-22. See especially 5-9.

work of art, there can be no clear formulation of the ethical dimension of architecture within the present philosophical system. But, by the same token, to develop a theory of architecture, especially in relation to problems of its ethical status, is perhaps the site of the greatest challenge to what passes for classical philosophy in all of its contemporary guises. Architecture, it seems, may have more—or, more cautiously, as much—to teach philosophy as vice versa. Philosophy can no longer be as Plato wished, the self-appointed tutor to architectural actions and urban formations.

3. Architecture and Evil

Rather than push a suspect question toward an impossible answer ("How can architecture itself be ethical?"), I would like to conclude with some remarks on the consequences of an architecture that proceeds directly to "the good"—the consequences of short-circuiting the difficulties of making ethical ascriptions to architectural forms, of reaching for premature meanings and methods.

The realms in which architecture moves seem to demand that it take a stance, that it make an ethical assumption. And, further, architecture appears to demand that the architect, as the author of forms, be implicated in the situation by his/her intentions. This is surely part of what we mean when we are tempted to describe architecture as irrevocably positive or optimistic, as inevitably drawing a certain horizon around, and making a commitment to, a particular version of "the good." Quite apart from the tortuous circuits of intentionality surrounding this assumption (which I shall not attempt to trace here), there seems to be a much more difficult and disturbing notion lurking within architecture's inevitable optimism (so called)—its complicity with, indeed even its adoration of, that which, subsequent to the work of architecture being over or completed, is described as evil.

I do not mean this in the trite sense—the sense in which "being evil" possesses the deliciousness of disobedience, or the pure love of cruelty (in the way the reading of Sade has become so popular of late). Rather, I mean it in the sense that any assumption of "the good" is intimately entangled with what it must

subsequently (because it already has) describe as evil: "the good," in the process of perfecting itself, must bring "evil" into being. To a certain extent evil is not only the dream of the wicked, but also the dream of the good. Insofar as a particular version of "the good" has a sovereign value, then so does its corresponding version of "evil." My point is that this observation does not exclude the concept of morality; on the contrary, it demands a super–morality, which, in the sublation of the terms "morality and "evil," Hegel has described as ethics.[11]

In part the architect's conceit, that she/he structures a portion of human experience, is true. Naive readings of Rousseau notwithstanding, where is the life that can be lived outside the material and rhetorical strategies of architecture? At the very least, architecture is, as Hegel describes it, our first "defense against the threatening storm . . . and (the) wild beasts."[12] But the problem with architecture is that it does so much more than this; so much more, in fact, that it has been described in awe of its accomplishment as a "second body for the mind."[13]

Such a circumscriptive act, the act of architecture that remains its essential and problematic gesture, does indeed demand of the architect a certain loyalty—but a loyalty to what? My argument is that knowledge of moral conduct in the achievement of significant architecture can only come from a complicity in the knowledge of what that architecture will exclude. First among the many exclusions of architecture is the tragic domain of evil. Knowledge of this domain, I suggest, is the basis of architecture's intense communication and the architect's authenticity.[14]

Insofar as architecture clears a space for the social order, creating in part a reasoned polis that allows the calculations of interest, then it will permeate its own form of rationality and exclude the free play of innocence. The polis, so it is thought, could not survive if the raw and untrammelled instincts of the innocent were allowed to surface and dominate. But, by this act, by being the horizon of inclusion and a filter on the presentable, architecture places itself at a limit and also in torment—a torment that is, among other things, the revolt of evil against the declared good. Thus, despite its pretense at rationality in scheme and number, there is (even formally) a wild irrationality within architecture.

11 For similar remarks made in the realm of literature see Georges Bataille on Emily Bronte, in *La Literature et le Mal*, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1957), 15-30.

12 Hegel, *Vorlesungen Uber Die Aesthetik*.

13 Attributed to George Santayana.

14 It is worth noting here that the Greek etymology of the word authentic, in addition to its more common meanings, includes the meaning "to have murdered."

The effects of architecture have a certain affinity to Greek tragedy: the subject within architecture is at pain of limitation on the potential of his/ her own subjectivity, in tragic violation of the circumspection of his/her existence, and in part always outside social form and the law. As human beings we cannot quite acknowledge that our selves are encompassed by the totality of configurations that are of our own making. The Greek author agreed with the law (at least in the most overt of first readings), but he based all emotional impact on communicating the sympathy he felt for the transgressor. In architecture, as in Greek tragedy, it is neither the law, nor is it social or architectural form that is denounced. What architecture forbids, and therefore requires that we reserve a little sympathy for ourselves, is the necessary but tragic domain of the evil (necessary to the effusions of life, that is)—the "domain" antithetical to life itself, the inhabitation of which may, of course, end prematurely and tragically in death. It is inhabitation of this other world that is denounced.

Architecture banishes the domain of evil: sometimes, in sophisticated works, it does so "admittedly," betraying its exclusions. Yet the only consequence of banishment is a magnification of the significance of the excluded. And further, the banishment must beautify, within the architecture itself, that to which it prevents access.[15]

Yet this banishment, like all banishments, is no less an invitation than an obstacle. The limit of architecture lies, then, at the limit society writes around the instinctive tendency toward divine intoxication, the attraction of evil, and the consequent risk of death that the rational world cannot bear. This tendency is the opposite of the good. The good is based on common interest; it entails consideration of the future. Divine intoxication is entirely in the present; and death, so it is said, forecloses mortal time altogether.

To make architecture is to work the limits of architecture: to work such a limit is to move in the twin realms of the possible and the impossible, in the reality of architecture and the unreality of its beyond. Architectural performance requires a hypermorality in which the arbitrary judgments of petty moral

15 Rilke has said that beauty is "nothing but the beginning of a terror we're still just able to bear." Rainer Maria Rilke, *Duino Elegies*, trans. J.B.Leischman and S. Spender, (New York : Norton, 1939).

systems are avoided. The act or gesture of architecture and its associated judgments require a severity of renunciation.

But the severity of modern architecture differs from the severity of the Greek tragedy. Greek tragedy is on a level with basic religious taboos (like murder and incest), which cannot be justified rationally (or are all too easy to justify rationally).

In a sense architecture has emancipated itself from the terror of this kind of taboo to include another peculiarly modern concern. With the enlightenment, architecture (in its rational vein) required strict fidelity to "the good" based on reason: the ambitions of an architecture within the limits of reason alone.[16] But the temptation of intoxication enjoyed by architects in designing, expressed in architecture itself, and, felt deeply in the experience of good work, is the violation of the law of reason itself. Beyond architecture, in the landscape lacking line and measurement, there is the dream of a sacred violence that no settlement with organized society can attenuate.

Architecture, like the infringement of moral laws, is dangerous. It tells of exclusions at the time of making them. Its immediate repressions may deny this fact, but its pleasures are the pleasures of taboo, and particularly in the modern period, the pleasures of un-reason, even to the point of death.

Architecture both represses and expresses our attraction towards death; that is the phantom in its beauty.

4. The Introduction

Thus, returning to the remarks from Kant at the outset of this essay, it is not merely an inevitable and internal property of reason that it must keep open certain questions about itself, it is also an ethical position that it should do so. Hence the dream of an architecture—when guided by reason alone—that within its own intensive configurations continually avoids foreclosure.

If, in search of an avoidance of premature meaning and method, an architecture and its discourse should be haunted by the very images of loss that it seeks to overcome; and it it should be overburdened

16 To coin a phrase.

with a certain pathos originating in a failing optimism that it cannot shake off; perhaps an awareness of this fact is the risk of tragedy that an ethical architecture must assume in the wish for material form in the modern democracy.

Not to assume this risk, and not to delight in its avoidance while at the same time accepting it, is not to be an architect—but then, nor, for that matter, is it to be a person.



The Caryatids of the Erechtheum on the Acropolis

Educating Architecture as a "Total Woman"
Programmata for an Architecture of *Mêtis*

ANN BERGREN

"OPENING STATEMENT"

This article attempts to pursue some topics and proposals first presented in a Plenary Debate at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture in Chicago, March 1989. The organizers of the event indicated that they wanted debates in the "Oxbridge" style: two teams of two speakers for and against specifically phrased propositions, each speaker makes timed opening statements before free debate, the audience votes for one of the two teams by exiting through one of two designated doors—and serious points are "clad" in humor. In that spirit, I made the following "Opening Statement."

AGAINST: Architectural education can proceed only from previously established architectural forms.

> *This house should vote against the proposition because it represents a false totality—a false circumscription of the architect's universe, and a false confinement of architectural form itself.*
>
> *Architectural education can pro-ceed—it can go forward, it can move at all—only if it proceeds from philosophical and political power. Education that proceeds only from previously established architectural forms will keep architecture pregnant, but barefoot—or with her feet bound.*
>
> *Ancient Greek thought made architecture a "female" in relation to political and philosophical power. In the realm of politics, Greek myth points to a parallel between the function of the architect in the* ***polis*** *'city' and the function of the female in the* ***oikos*** *'household'. Zeus, father and ruler of gods and men, swallowed Metis, a goddess whose name* ***mêtis*** *means 'transformative intelligence,'*[1] *a power attributed in Greek thought to the female and to every* ***dêmiourgos*** *'artisan', including the architect.*[2] *Bound within the belly of Zeus, "Metis" can build only Zeus' political designs. Just as the architect must fabricate the power and values of the* ***polis*** *'city' (the sole client, until the Hellenistic period for major works), although the political and economic status of* ***dêmiourgos*** *'artisan'*

1 For the work and the intelligence of the artisan as **mêtis**, see P. Vidal-Naquet, "A Study in Ambiguity: Artisans in the Platonic City." *The Black Hunter. Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World.* trans. A. Szegedy-Maszac. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.), 224-245.

2 On the problematic status of the architect in the ***polis***, its local and historical variations, and the lack of scholarly consensus on the evidence, see J. Coulton, *Ancient Greek Architects at Work. Problems of Structure and Design.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 23-9. On the architect as ***dêmiourgos***, see Z. Petrie, "Trophonius ou l'architecte. À propos du statut des techniciens dans la cité grecque." *Studii Clasice* 18 (1979): 23-37 and M. M. Austin, and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*, trans. and revised by M.M. Austin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univeristy of California Press, 1977), 12, 190-193, 246-248 with bibliography. The architect of the Parthenon was a ***dêmiourgos*** 'he who does the people's work, artisan'. Among ***dêmiourgoi***, the architect rates relatively high by virtue of a particular closeness to the political function. The ***dêmiourgos*** is, in general, an ambiguous category in relation to political power. At Athens the word denoted a worker of low, non-land owning status, whether slave or citizen, while elsewhere in Greece, the term ***dêmiourgos*** was used for a political office, of high status and great antiquity. But the architect in Athens combines both vectors of meaning, receiving the low pay of a carpenter, but being paid by the year like a magistrate and, unlike other artisans, building not private but public works that symbolize the power of the ***polis***. The orders of the architect are obligatory, like those of the magistrate. These orders refer to the "plans" as well as to the project itself. They are understood as a graphic entity and thus denoted by the term ***sungraphé*** 'a writing down, a contract'. Inscriptions record the name of the architect just after that of the magistrate and a repeated phrase indicating the architect's authority: "however the architect orders . . ." (Petrie, 26-7). In the Homeric world, ***dêmiourgoi*** were "travelling specialists who offered their services to the community [***dêmos***]" (Austin and Vidal-

is uncertain. And just as the woman, denied citizenship and in Athens, the right to own property, must confine within the ***oikos*** *'household' her capacity for creative and procreative production.*

Platonic philosophy presents the same structure of incorporation and subordination: as Zeus swallowed Metis, so Plato appropriates the architectonic power for his cosmic philosopher, the ***dêmiourgos*** *'artisan' who "constructs" the world in the* ***Timaeus***.[3] *And in the ideal city plan of the* ***Laws***, *Plato bars* ***dêmiourgoi*** *'artisans' from land ownership and citizenship, since they must move from place to place, but binds them within their own ghetto, the "artisan suburb" outside the city.*[4]



Plan of the ideal city of Plato's *Laws*

A STUDY IN AMBIGUITY

1. The Acropolis
2. The urban center
3. Artisan suburb
4. Inner and outer rings of cultivated areas
(– – – – – the border between the two)
5. Villages inhabited by artisans
→ Shows the monthly movement of the twelve troops of young men around the territory in an annual cycle (with the circuit switching direction year by year)
(from P. Vidal Naquet, *The Black Hunter. Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World.*)

In the same way, women must be mobile, so that men can exchange them in marriage, but once moved, a female is supposed to stay put within the walls of the father-ruled ***oikos*** *'household'.*

Politics and philosophy have not yet stopped swallowing and binding and confining architecture. In the words of the historian of architectural pedagogy, Lian

Naquet, 45-46; cf., 201). Compare *Odyssey* bk. 17. 384-386: "... those who are ***dêmiourgoi***—the prophet, the healer of sicknesses, the builder with beams (***tektona dourôn***), or the inspired bard, who delights by his singing—for these are the mortals invited from place to place upon the limitless earth."

3 See, e.g., Plato *Timaeus* 30b4-5: "Having constructed (***sunistas***: ***sun***—'together, with' + ***istas*** < ***histêmi*** 'make stand, set up') intelligence (***nous***) in the soul and the soul in the body, he built together (***sunetektaineto***) the totality (***to pan***)." On the architectural theory of the *Timaeus*, with its divine philosopher/architect who builds the material world by copying the Forms in the ***chôra*** (as one moulds an object in gold), on the relation of this theory to early Greek thought linking the architect and the female via the shared property of ***mêtis***, and on the collaboration between Peter Eisenman and Jacques Derrida using the ***chôra*** of the *Timaeus* as program, see A. Bergren, "Architecture Gender Philosophy" *Strategies of Architectural Thinking*. eds. J. Whiteman, J. Kipnis, R. Burdett. (Cambridge: Chicago Institute for Architecture and Urbanism/MIT Press, 1992).

4 Plato *Laws* 8.846d. See Vidal-Naquet, above n.1.

Hurst-Mann, "the unfolding history of architecture is the constant re-devouring of this feminine aspect by the political and the philosophical . . . the classical periods, with all their variety, followed by all the mannerist phases, that then are totally re-consumed."[5]



The Total Woman, Cover


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Companion, Not Competition

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The Total Woman, "Table of Contents"

So if architectural education proceeds only from "previously established" architectural forms—the forms that reflect its feminization by male politics and philosophy—it will produce the architectural equivalent of "the total woman" of Mirabel Morgan's 1973 book. This book attempts to teach a woman how to make her marriage come alive. Compare its "Table of Contents" to architecture's traditional function to ornament, to embody, and to memorialize male political and philosophical power. Note especially, in part II, ***Man Alive,*** *"Accept Him, Adapt to Him, Appreciate Him," and in part II,* ***Sex,*** *"Painting the House, Rocks in the Bed, Super Sex," and the subsection entitled "Companion, not Competition." Here is a curriculum that "proceeds only from previously established forms" and here is the "total*

5 Lian Hurst-Mann, "Architecture as Social Strategy: Structures for Knowledge for Change," (Ph.D diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1990), 219.

Frederick's of Hollywood Catalogue 1987, Cover



Frederick's of Hollywood Catalogue 1987, Detail

woman" it produces. An architecture that "can proceed only from previously established architectural forms" produces architecture as a "total woman" who is bound in both her mid-section and her arms, a woman with all the allure and all the restriction of "foot binding"—an architectural fantasy of philosophical and political domination.

But this architectural female is a false totality. She lacks knowledge, her own knowledge, of the political and philosophical value that she designs and builds. Like the female, architecture must—from within her own perspective—learn and reappropriate the discourse of political and philosophical power. While retaining her decorative, "tropic" function, architecture must become an indeterminately total female, a female giving birth to the world under her legs and her cushioned, but un-bound feet. This is the "total woman" that architecture can be.

Marilyn Monroe giving birth to the world

Architectural education today must make it possible for the goddess Metis to re-swallow—to "re-devour"—both Zeus and Plato, both political and philosophical power. With her own political and philosophical knowledge, architecture can proceed not from, but toward the critical transformation of "previously established" architectural forms, toward articulating the politics of previous formalization, toward exposing what has been repressed in her own history.

As an indeterminately total woman, architecture's first exposure will be the rhetoric of temporality in the notion of "previously established" architectural form itself and the politics of that rhetoric.

She will expose the fact that for her no form is "previously established." No form is "made stable beforehand," except in the mind of the Platonic philosopher, who claims to see unchanging Forms of which every object is a material copy—a

philosophy whose politics would restrict architecture to the symbolization of Forms "architected" outside of herself. But for architecture released from philosophical bondage, there is no fixed architectural form to which to return, from which to proceed.

The architectural establishment of any form—formation in and as material—takes place only in and for the non-existent present. In the moment it is submitted to material construction, every form has participated in a process of formal change. There is no previous establishment, but only prior alteration.

An architectural form can be only (re)established by virtue of being reconstructed in the trace of the present. It can be only (re)built out of a particular political desire—which must always be analytically released—to create a particular cover, a particular instance of an inside closing an outside, a given exclusivization.

But the closure does not remain. There is no formal repertoire, stable and fixed in the past. In architectural, rather than philosophical, form, the present moment is a print of its future movement. The notion of a stabilization beforehand is exposed as a fantasy, a repression in the bound woman of architectural materiality and mobility. Another false totalization.

The exposure of repressed materiality and mobility in architecture can remove the stricture of "previous establishment" from the field of architectural education. It can release an indeterminately totalized universe of possibility to architectural form.

This analysis of the "previous establishment" of architectural form derives from the model of mental and material transformation provided by the Greek concept of ***mêtis***. In the semantic field of ***mêtis*** lies an imperfectly repressed Classical inheritance for the education of architecture as an indeterminately "total woman" now to reclaim.

PROGRAMMATA FOR AN ARCHITECTURE OF *MÊTIS*

Greek noun: ***programma***, plu. ***programmata***
< ***pro*** *'for, before'* + **gramma** *'writing, drawing'*
(**gramma** < **graphô** *'write, draw'*)
'public proclamation, placard, agenda, title of prescription or letter, injunction'
> English: **program** *'descriptive notice of series of events, definite plan of intended proceedings'*

Before "architecture" was invented as a discourse and institution of Western culture, there was a Greek term ***mêtis***—concept, practice, and object, that captures the range and exposes the restriction of the Classical model. It has suffered a philosophical exclusion inside Platonic philosophy,[6] remaining thereby repressed within the Platonization of European architectural theory.

In the English translation of the book that has released ***mêtis*** for the modern world, the word is rendered as 'cunning intelligence'.[7] ***Mêtis*** is both the working and the work of this intelligence. It means both the transformative process common to every ***technê*** and the products of ***technê*** as well. ***Mêtis*** embraces mind and hand, language and material. It integrates powers and activities separated in aesthetic traditions that draw a hard line between the verbal and the visual, the linguistic and the plastic, the written text and the building.[8]

The semantic field of words and themes associated with ***mêtis*** composes the analytic vocabulary of a comprehensive and critical program of architecture. The program of ***mêtis*** might seem to exceed the bounds of architecture proper, but in fact it reaches no wider than the ramifications and over-determinations of actual practice—from the deceit of the joint to the ambiguities of ornament, from unarrestable transformation to economic entanglement, political expediency, and philosophical service.

6 See Sarah Kofman, *Comment s'en sortir?* (Paris: Galilée, 1983).

7 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, trans. J. Lloyd (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978).

8 For example, English 'draw' vs. 'write' (though 'draw' means 'write' in "draw a contract"), French '***dessiner***' vs. '***écrire***', German ***schreiben*** vs. ***zeichnen***, Italian ***scrivere*** vs. ***disegnare/i***. On the glossary of drawing (and the drawing of caskets—compare ***sêma*** 'sign, tomb', below p.12), see J. Derrida, "Cartouches," *The Truth in Painting* trans. G. Bennington and I. McLeod (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 185-247, esp. 191-193. For painting (***zôgraphia*** 'writing/drawing living things') as a special case of writing (***graphé*** 'writing'), since in both cases, the graphic object remains silent when questioned, see Plato *Phaedrus* 275d4-7.

pantoie *'multiple'* ***poikilé*** *'variegated'* ***aiolé*** *'shifting'*

"all qualities of a kind of intelligence which, to render itself impossible to seize and to dominate fluid, changing realities, must always prove itself more supple and more polymorphic."[9]

shape-shifting

imitate the enemy (or lure him to imitate you) to beat him at his own game

tropos *'turning'*

reversal

complicity of formal opposites: reversal and circle as polymorphous doubles

circle

in rotation mobile and immobile, moving in both directions at once[10]

bond

"the net is a composition of woven or plaited links and its structure marks it out as the epitomy of the bond for it is both bound together and, at the same time, its effect is to bind; it is therefore ***apeiron***, without limit, and circular."[11]

"***mêtis*** cannot be deployed without this fundamental combination of the bond and the circle. To exercise all its powers the intelligence of cunning needs the circular reciprocity between what is bound and what is binding."[12]

joint

plekein *'to knot'* ***strephein*** *'to twist'* ***sumplekein*** *'to interweave'*

octopus' architecture

"a knot made up of a thousand arms, a living, interlacing, network, a ***poluploktos*** *'of many twists'* being—the same adjective used to describe the labyrinth, with its mazes and tangle of halls and passages"[13]

"they have neither front nor rear, they swim sideways with their eyes in front and their mouth behind, their heads haloed by the waving feet. When these creatures mate, they do so mouth to mouth and arm to arm. Thus closely linked, they swim along together: the front of the one is the rear of the other. They are oblique creatures, the front of which is never distinctly distinguished from the rear, and in their being and in the way they move, they create a confusion of directions."[14]

9 See Detienne and Vernant, 26

10 See Detienne and Vernant, 46: "The ultimate expression of these qualities is the circle, the bond that is perfect because it completely turns back on itself, is closed in on itself, with neither beginning nor end, front nor rear, and which in rotation becomes both mobile and immobile, moving in both directions at once. . . . the circle unites within it several opposites each one giving birth to its opposite, it appears as the strangest, most baffling thing in the world, ***thaumasiötaton***, possessing a power which is beyond ordinary logic."

11 See Detienne and Vernant, 294-5.

12 See Detienne and Vernant, 305.

13 See Detienne and Vernant, 37.

14 See Detienne and Vernant, 38.

mechané *'artifice'*

"the sleights of hand and trade secrets which give craftsmen their control over material which is always more or less intractable to their designs"[15]

techné *'craft, skill'*

metal work and carpentry

tektaineto mêtin *'build a* ***mêtis***'[16] (***tektainein*** *'to build'* cf. ***archi-tecktôn***)

weaving

the goddess Metis: mother of Athena, who teaches women to weave

'weave a ***mêtis***' *'weave a* ***dolos***'[17] reversal: warp and woof

dolos *'trick, trap, lure'*

'hunting and fishing[18]

mêtis of hunter vs. ***mêtis*** of hunted

the "fox-fish" turns its body inside out: interior becomes exterior and the hook falls out[19]

imitate defeat

fox reverses itself, plays dead, and turns into a trap for the hunter[20]

foxy architecture

"The dwelling that it [the fox] digs itself has seven different entrances linked by as many corridors and the openings are situated a long way from each other. Thus it has less cause to fear that hunters, laying a trap at its door, will make it fall into their snares. . . . The misleading, enigmatic, polymorphic earth of the fox is matched by the animal's equally impenetrable mind."[21]

lure

"fishing-frog"

"The fleshy appendage growing on the fishing frog is a true fishing bait and as such has a double character: to the little fish it looks for all the world like food but it is food which soon changes itself into a voracious maw. With this type of ligament dangling from its neck which it can stretch out and draw back at will, the fishing frog sets up a manoeuvre which equals the art of line fishing."[22]

15 See Detienne and Vernant, 48.

16 See Homer *Iliad*, bk. 10. 19.

17 For 'weave a ***mêtis***', see Homer *Iliad*, bk. 7. 324; bk. 9. 93-5, 422; bk. 13. 303, 386; *Odyssey* bk. 4. 678, 739; Hesiod, *Shield of Heracles*. 28. For 'weave a ***dolos***', see *Iliad* bk. 6. 187; *Odyssey* bk. 9. 422.

18 Plato *Laws* 823d-824a. Compare Vernant and Detienne, 33: ". . . when, in the *Laws*, Plato violently condemns line fishing, the hunting of aquatic creatures, the use of wheels, the hunting of birds and all forms of hunting with nets and traps, he does so because all these techniques foster the qualities of cunning and duplicity which are diametrically opposed to the virtues that the city of the *Laws* demanded from its citizens."

19 See Detienne and Vernant, 37.

20 See Detienne and Vernant, 35-37. "There is no positive evidence based on observation to corroborate the amazing behavior which so many writers attribute to the fox—be it the actual fox or the fish. It was not in nature that the Greeks found this type of reversal behavior in animals, but rather in their own minds, in the conception that they formed of ***mêtis***, its methods and effects. The fox, being the embodiment of cunning, can only behave as befits the nature of an intelligence full of wiles. If it turns back on itself it is because it is, itself, as it were, ***mêtis***, the power of reversal." (p. 37)

21 See Detienne and Vernant, 35, quoting Oppian, *Treatise on Hunting*, bk. 3, sec. 449-460.

22 See Detienne and Vernant, 29.

apaté *'duplicity, deceit'*
simulation / dissimulation: "the art of seeing without being seen"[23]
octopus

takes the shape of the bodies to which it clings[24]

secretes a cloud of ink to elude its enemies
and to capture adversaries

"These creatures so rich in ***mêtis*** can only be taken by their own traps: to catch them, fishermen throw them as bait a female of their own kind which they then grasp so tightly that nothing but death can make them let go."[25]

dokeuein *'to look with keen discernment, foresight'*

"Engaged in the world of becoming and confronted with situations which are ambiguous and unfamiliar and whose outcome always lies in the balance, wily intelligence is only able to maintain its hold over beings and things thanks to its ability to look beyond the immediate present and foresee a greater or lesser section of the future."[26]

kerdos *'profit-gaining scheme'*
commercial: ***mêtis*** *architecture knows how to make a profit*
kairos *'opportune moment, bull's eye'*
haimulioi logoi *'wily words'*

"Eumetis, [the daugher of a philosopher] who knows how to resolve ambiguous words as well as twist them skillfully together, is like Hephaestus and Hermes in that she possesses the double power of acting both as a bond and as a circle. Through her riddles she unfolds the endless cycle of her changing forms and with her subtle solutions she weaves around her questioners the same impassable circle that the hero who triumphs over the enigma binds about the elusive gods."[27]

As the transforming form common to every work of architecture, ***mêtis*** is not the invention of any period or the mark of any style. Within (post-)Classical western architecture, it is to be found imperfectly hidden—within Vitruvius, for example, in the ***abaton*** of Artemisia.

23 See Detienne and Vernant, 26: "Wily intelligence possesses the most prized cunning of all: the duplicity of the trap which always presents itself as what it is not and which conceals the true lethal nature beneath a reassuring exterior."

24 See Detienne and Vernant, 40: "It is this ability of the octopus and the ***polutropos*** one, the man of a thousand tricks, to assume every form without becoming imprisoned within any, that characterizes supple ***mêtis*** which appears to bow before circumstances only so that it can dominate them more surely."

25 See Detienne and Vernant, 39

26 See Detienne and Vernant, 37.

27 See Detienne and Vernant, 305. For Eumetis, see Plutarch *Banquet of the Seven Sages*, 148c-d.

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Artemisia and the *abaton*

abaton

a + ***baton*** (< ***bainô*** *'step'*) *'not* + *stepped upon'*
'not to be stepped upon, impassible (mountains), *unfordable* (rivers), *inaccessible, desolate, pure* (holy places, tombs), *not ridden* (horses, female animals)' = ***adyton*** *'innermost sanctuary, shrine'*

what architecture constructed the ***abaton***?
what is inside?

to breach the ***abaton***

Vitruvius, *De Architectura* Book II, Chapter 8, Sections 13-16. "On Walling."
[*walls*] *: weaving* Penelope Semper

Vitruvius describes the walls and city of Halicarnassus as built by King Mausolus, brother and husband of Artemisia. From the royal palace, the king could see to the right, the forum, the harbor, and the whole circuit of walls, and to the left, a secret harbor lying hidden under the mountains, where no one could see what was going on in it.

Artemisia was a builder. After the death of Mausolus, she built his tomb, the Mausoleum.[28] It was praised as one of the Seven Wonders of the World. She also built a memorial to her own constructions. It was walled over.

tomb: ***sêma*** *'sign'* *Zeus'* ***mêtis*** *stone* [*trophy*] *Odysseus' scar and bed*

28 On the tomb in the Hegelian theory of architecture, see, G. Hegel, *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art.* trans. T. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) Vol. 2, 630-700, esp. 650-654 on the pyramids and the mausoleum, the latter demonstrating "the special purpose of architecture, namely to furnish an enclosure merely." See also D. Payot, *Le philosophe et l'architecte.* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1982), 29-50 and J. Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology," *Margins of Philosophy,* trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 69-108. On Artemisia and Mausolus, see S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). On the Mausoleum and Artemisia's building, see K. Jeppersen, *The Mausoleion at Halikarnassos. Reports of the Danish Archaeological Expedition to Bodrum,* 2, *The Written Sources,* Jutland Archaeological Society Publications 15.2. (Copenhagen: Aarhus University Press, 1986).

Here is a stratagem that exemplifies Artemisia's ***mêtis***.[29]

So-called Artemisia and Mausolus. 160-130 B.C.



Halicarnassus

"When, after the death of Mausolus, his wife Artemisia began to reign, the Rhodians considered it unworthy (***indignantes*** *'unbecoming, shameful, intolerable, harsh'*) that a woman should rule over the cities throughout Caria. So they armed a fleet and set out to invade and occupy that kingdom.

When this was reported to Artemisia, she ordered the fleet to be hidden in that harbor, equipped with concealed rowers and marines, and the rest of the citizens to be in the wall (***in muro esse***).

But when the Rhodians had landed with their fleet splendidly equipped (***ornata***), she ordered the citizens to give them applause from the wall (***ab muro***) and to promise that they would hand over the town.

When the Rhodians had penetrated within the wall (***intra murum***) with their ships left behind empty,

29 Compare Vernant and Detienne, 296 ff. for the ***mêtis*** of navy strategems as directly inspired by the techniques of fishing. For the Artemesia of the Battle of Marathon (ancestress of the wife and sister of Mausolus) as their exemplar, see Herodotus *Persian Wars*, bk. 8, 87ff.

Artemisia suddenly—through a trench she had made into the sea—led her fleet out from that smaller harbor and thus sailed into the greater one. The Rhodians had no place to retreat. Closed up (***conclusi***) in the middle, they were butchered in the forum itself.

Then Artemisia put her own rowers and soldiers in the Rhodians' ships and set out for Rhodes.[30] When the Rhodians saw their own ships coming wreathed with laurel, they thought their citizens were returning victorious and admitted the enemy.

After capturing Rhodes and killing the leading citizens, Artemisia set up a trophy[31] of her victory in the city and made two bronze statues, one of the Rhodian state and the other in her own image. She formed it (***figuravit***) placing the brands of slavery (***stigmata***) on the state of Rhodes.

Afterwards the Rhodians were impeded (***impediti*** *'bound at the feet'*) by religious scruple, because it is an impiety to dislocate (***removeri*** *'move back again'*) a trophy, once it has been dedicated. So around that place they constructed a building. And they protected (***texerunt*** 'covered') that by the erection of a Greek guardhouse so that no one could look upon it. And they ordered it to be called ***abaton***.

contest of *wallings [enclosures]*

genders, ornamentations, figurations, impediments

what architecture constructed male sovereignty?

what is inside male sovereignty?

30 With Artemisia's disguising of her troups, compare the strategy of the Argive poetess, Telesilla, who drove out the invading Spartans by ordering the women of Argos to take up arms and man the walls, a victory commemorated in a yearly festival called ***Hybristika*** "The Acts of Hybris" for which women wore men's clothes and men wore women's dresses and veils (see Plutarch *Moralia, "On the Bravery of Women,"* 245) and Odysseus' return home disguised as a beggar to test the loyalty of his house and to defeat the Suitors.

31 On the trophy and the trope (< Greek ***tropos*** 'turning') in the formation of Classical architecture, see George Hersey, *The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture,* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988.) 1-10, 69-75.

Mêtis makes transforming form.

Consequently, there can be no Platonic Form of ***mêtis***, as there can be no Form of matter, no Form of the *Timaeus*' ***chôra***. A Platonic Form is unitary, unchanging, and immobile, forever ***homoion*** 'like to itself'.[32] There can be no Form of the multiple, the constantly "other." There can "be" no Being of Proteus.

Mêtis, in fact, resists the Platonic story of being. By insisting that the constructive power of mind as well as of matter lies in its irreducibly material property of changing form, ***mêtis*** operates that *renversement* some sons of Plato have desired.[33] ***Mêtis*** would aggrandize philosophy with architecture by according to non-material meaning, the power of transformation.

No wonder, then, that the only overt place for ***mêtis*** in the Platonic scheme is as the grandmother of Eros in the *Symposium* (203b ff.).[34] Indicating causal relations through genealogy, Socrates' speech in praise of Eros includes the story of his birth. Among the guests at the banquet celebrating the birth of Arphrodite was Poros (***poros*** 'way through, passage, resource, contrivance'), son of Metis. After the dinner, Penia (***penia*** *'poverty, lack'*) took advantage of the time of feasting to beg around the door. Drunk with nectar, Poros went into the garden and passed out. Penia "planned on account of her resourcelessness (***a*** + ***poria*** 'lack of ***poros***') to create a child from Poros." And so (resourceful sexually, at least) she lay down beside him and conceived Eros. But just as ***mêtis*** is never successfully repressed within Platonized architecture, so this genealogy imperfectly excludes ***mêtis*** from philosophy. For as "love" (***philos***, ***eros***) of "wisdom" (***sophia***), philosophy itself is Metis' offspring.[35]

Indeed the Platonic account of Metis is part of a larger system of mythic thought that shows the material mobility of ***mêtis*** to be the matrix of political as well as philosophical sovereignty. This paraphilosophical mythology of ***mêtis*** exposes the irony, the perversity, and the ironic appropriateness whereby the philosophy and politics of perdurant verity try to embody their (claim to) transcendent truth in "previously established architectural form." The mythology of Metis delineates the relation—a relation of gender—between architecture and power.

32 For the Form as unitiary and unchanging, see Plato *Symposium* 211a. In Platonic idiom to be 'true to yourself' is to be 'like' or 'same'; see *Symposium* 173d4, *Republic* 549e2. For the collocation of 'like' and 'true' as synonymous, see *Sophist* 252d1 and *Philebus* 65d2-3, as reciprocal, *Phaedrus* 273d1-6. The basis of this relation is the 'likeness' or 'sameness' of the sensible particular and the intelligible Form or paradigm; see *Republic* 472c9-d1, *Parmenides* 132d1-4 (where the participation of the particular in the paradigm is precisely the relation of likeness), and *Sophist* 264c-268d.

33 See G.Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. M. Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 253 ff.

34 See Vernant and Detienne, 45, 47, 316-8. Plato's exemption in *Philebus* 55 ff. of the art of building from his condemnation of ***mêtis***-arts assumes an architecture that is an exclusively Platonic institution, held in checked imitation of Formal rectilinearity by "impressive tools: the rule, ***kanon***, the lathe, ***tornos***, the compass, ***diabetes*** and the line, ***stathmé***" (315).

35 See Kofman, *Comment s'en sortir?* 13-28, for the ways in which the many modes of ***mêtis*** infiltrate Platonic philosophy.

ARCHITECTURAL PARA-THEORY IN THE MYTH OF METIS

Greek preposition: ***para*** *'beside'*
beside = **at** (replacement of) presumed origin
beside = **beyond** (addition to) presumed origin
para: point or line of contiguity
dissolving and/or determining a boundary
place of deviation in identity

Metis and Zeus

The policy of Zeus toward Metis becomes a paradigm—a sort of Form—in which Platonic philosophy and politics attempt to participate.

Hesiod, *Theogony lines* 886-900 + Apollodorus, *Library* Book I, Chapter 3, Section 6.

Zeus made Metis his first wife, because she had the greatest knowledge among gods and mortals. He had intercourse (***meignutai*** 'mixed') with her, although she turned into many forms to avoid being joined with him. When she became pregnant, Zeus acted first.

He seduced her wits by a trick of cunning words[36] and swallowed her down into his own belly. For Earth said that after the daughter then in her womb, Metis would bear a son who would be the ruler of gods and men. From fear of that, Zeus swallowed her down, so that the goddess would devise evil and good in his interest alone.

When it was time for Metis to give birth, the head of Zeus was struck with an axe and the virgin goddess Athena leaped out in full armor.

36 As Detienne and Vernant observe (57-130, esp. 67-8, 109), Zeus "attacks Metis with her own weapons," the ***haimulioi logoi*** 'wily words', and the text calls Zeus 'endowed with ***mêtis***' even before his defeat of the goddess. Such chronological inconsistency is not only typical of myth, but also contributes to the goal of Hesiod's *Theogony*, the validation of Zeus' rule: Zeus is able to acquire ***mêtis*** and the sovereignty it brings because he has already always possessed it. In fact, the need to appropriate ***mêtis*** through the prior possession of ***mêtis*** is an inconsistency at the heart of the "myth" of valid sovereignty or "right to rule"—the ruler takes what has always been inherently his own.

contest of *enclosings* [*walls*]
genders, transformations, tricks
inside Zeus is Metis will she [stay put] ?
Penelope did [*?*]

how does Zeus know his rule depends upon the possession of ***mêtis***?
his life depended upon it

Rhea's *mêtis* and Zeus

mêtis is attributed to the female—why? *it goes with her gender*

The female has the power to manipulate truth and imitation where it counts most in the institution of "father-rule," the reproduction of children. The woman can present a man with his own son or a supposititious child. True paternity, only the woman knows for sure. Rhea, the mother of Zeus, is a founding instance.

Hesiod, *Theogony*, lines 453-506.

Rhea's husband Cronus, king of the cosmos, had swallowed all of her children so that none could usurp his sovereign power. So when Zeus was born, Rhea gives him not the baby himself, but a ***mêtis***—a stone wrapped in swaddling ("swallowing") clothes, a morphological imitation of his desire for an inanimate child.[37] Cronus swallows the trick, literally.

Grown to adulthood, Zeus forces his father to vomit his siblings and the stone, and takes over the kingship. He sets up the ***mêtis*** stone to be a ***sêma*** *'sign, trophy, tomb'* and a marvel to mortals.

37 The trick of the stone is termed a ***mêtis*** at Hesiod *Theogony*, line 471. Compare the importance of the *Bekleidung* 'dressing' in Gottfried Semper's theory of architecture. See, for examples, *The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings*, trans. H. Mallgrave and W. Herrmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24, 34, 36-40, 103-110, 240-3.

contest of

swallowings [*walls*]

dis / dys placements, sub / in stitutions

"previous establishments"

genders, architectures

inside / outside Zeus is the ***mêtis*** *stone as* ***sêma*** [*tomb, trophy*] *of male sovereignty*

dys- *'bad'*

sub- *'under'*

stablio *'make stand fast'*

statuo *'place, set, stand'*

status *'standing'*

The female's ***mêtis***—her control over legitimacy, propriety, ownership, and the "own" itself—is a power of (dis / dys)placement. It is the power to place (or not to place) one child, both value and sign, in the place of the other.

This power is ***para***doxically a construction of gender she did not build. It mirrors and derives from the necessity to change place imposed upon the female by marriage exchange. In order for men to communicate with one another in systems of kinship and symbolic thought, they must—says Levi-Strauss—prohibit incest, that is (to describe incest in its positive form of marriage exchange), they must move women from one ***oikos*** *'household'* to another, as they exchange signs in language and commodities in trade.[38]

Once placed, however, the female is then (like a building) supposed to stay put. Like a coin exchanged only once, she is supposed to drop out of circulation and become the sure foundation of her husband's ***oikos***. But the placement of the female is unstable. The legitimate wife can turn ***porné*** *'vendible female, prostitute'* (< ***pernêmi*** *'export for sale'*),[39] a coin in unrestricted circulation, and, like Helen, re-exchange or re-place herself.[40] Diathetic ambiguity incarnate, "speaking sign" that she is, the female can re-occupy her own place, by moving it or by allowing an alien to enter and "build" within it.

38 C. Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. trans. J. Bell, J. von Sturmer, R. Needham. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1969), 478-497.

39 Porno-graphy: ***porné*** ('prostitute') + ***graphé*** (writing/drawing).

40 For Helen as the figure of such female placement, see A. Bergren, "Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought" *Arethusa*. "Semiotics and Classical Studies." 16.1-2 (1983): 69-95.1983 and "Helen's 'Good Drug'" *Odyssey* IV 1-305" in *Contemporary Literary Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Classical Texts*, ed. S. Kresic (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981), 200-214.

inside Zeus is Metis

will she stay put? what [ ] regulates female ***mêtis***?

Penelope did [ ]

what is inside the ***oikos*** of Odysseus?

Odyssean architectural ideal

Penelope and Odysseus

The *Mêtis* of the Web

the weaving [*vertical space-enclosure*]



Woven wall of a Japanese house

of immovable re-marriage

and the *Mêtis* of the Re-Marriage Bed

+ the bed [roof with columns]

Arata Isozaki's tree-trunk columns in the Musashi-kyuryo Country Clubhouse

The **Dolos** *'trick' of the Weaving*

weaving as ***mêtis***

weaving as female art

[*Freud*][41]

41 "Femininity," S. Freud *Standard Edition*, Vol. 22, 132), "It seems that women have made few contributions to the discoveries and inventions in the history of civilization; there is, however, one technique which they may have invented—that of plaiting and weaving. If that is so, we should be tempted to guess the unconscious motive for the achievement. Nature herself [sic] would seem to have given the model which this achievement imitates by causing the growth at maturity of the pubic hair that conceals the genitals. *The step that remained to be taken lay in making the threads adhere to one another,* while on the body they stick into the skin and are only matted together. If you reject this idea as fantastic and regard my belief in the influence of a lack of a penis on the configuration of femininity as an ***idée fixe***, I am of course defenceless." [emphasis added] In a nice stroke of irony, Freud hits upon a certain truth in the aetiology of architecture, namely the lack—lack of shelter, protection, beauty, meaning, value—that it attempts to supplement. And in naming that lack, the female lack of a penis, Freud repeats, against the will of his text which would downplay the woman's construction (compare Semper's definition of building: "the joining of material into organized form"), the Greek attribution of the female gender to ***mêtis*** and thus to architecture.

Homer, *Odyssey* Book 2, lines 93-110. One of Penelope's suitors complains.

> And this is another strategem she devised. She set up a great loom in the halls and was weaving a web both delicate and symmetrical. And then she said to us: "Young men, my suitors, since shining Odysseus has died, wait, although you are pressing for marriage, until I finish this mantle, so my spinning will not be wasted and in vain—it's a shroud for Odysseus' father Laertes—so that no one of the Achaean women in the community can criticize me because he who acquired much, lies without a sheet to wind him." So she spoke, and the proud heart within us was persuaded.

weaving as origin of architecture

[*Semper*][42]

42 See, for example, "Structural Elements of Assyrian-Chaldean Architecture," ch. 10, "Comparative Building Theory" (*Vergleichende Baulehre*, 1850), trans. Wolfgang Herrmann, *Gottfried Semper. In Search of Architecture* (Cambridge: The MIT Press. 1984), 204-218, esp. "It is well known that any wild tribe is familiar with the fence or a primitive hurdle as a means of enclosing space. Weaving the fence led to weaving movable walls. Using wickerwork for setting apart one's property and for floor mats and protection against heat and cold far preceded making even the roughest masonry. Wickerwork was the original motif of the wall. It retained this primary significance, actually or ideally, when the light hurdles and mattings were later transformed into brick or stone walls. The essence of the wall was wickerwork. Hanging carpets remained the true walls; they were the visible boundaries of a room. The often solid walls behind them were necessary for reasons that had nothing to do with the creation of space; they were needed for protection, for supporting a load, for their permanence, etc. . . . Even where solid walls became necessary, they were only the invisible structure hidden behind the true representatives of the wall, the colorful carpets that the walls served to hold and support."

The ***Sêma*** *'sign, trophy, tomb'* of the Re-marriage Bed

Homer, *Odyssey* Book 23, lines 107-110. Penelope speaks.

> If he is truly Odysseus, . . . there are secret signs (***sêmata***), we two know hidden from others.

When he returns home in disguise, Penelope elicits signs of Odysseus' unique identity. First, the scar.[43] Then the bed. She asks the nurse to make up for him outside the bedroom the bed he once made. Odysseus protests. He insists upon the bed's resistance to lateral dis /dys—placement.[44] Metonymic of such stability, he stresses his unique architectural authorship.[45] And finally, he declares the details of construction, first of the bedroom and then of the bed.

Homer, *Odyssey* Book 23, lines 190-204. Odysseus explains.

> A long-leafed trunk of an olive tree grew inside the enclosure, blooming to the topmost. Its thickness was like that of a column. Surrounding this, I built the bedroom until I finished it, with close-set stones, and I roofed it down from above well. I put upon it compacted doors, jointed closely. And then I cut off the foliage of the long-leafed olive, and trimming the trunk from the root up, I planed it around with the bronze well and with knowledge, and I made it straight to a chalkline, thereby constructing a bed-post. I bore through it all over with an auger. Beginning from this I kept carving my bed, until I finished it, and decorating it with gold and silver and ivory. And I stretched inside the thong of an ox, shining with purple. So I have articulated for you this sign (***sêma***). But I do not know whether the bed is still firmly fixed (***empedon*** *'in the ground'*), woman, or whether now some other man put it elsewhere, by cutting under the stump of the tree.

what is the bed a sign *of*?

43 Penelope claims first that the returned Odysseus is a god. This claim elicits from the nurse Eurycleia the 'very clear sign' (***sêma ariphrades***, line 73) of Odysseus' scar. This ***sêma*** of the scar—this scar as a ***sêma*** - is the first architectural component of Odysseus' identity as Penelope's testing elicits it. The ***sêma*** in Homer is most often a three-dimensional construction, in particular the funeral mound. Embedded into the body, a scar is a sort of funeral mound in relief. It is an instance of the graphic as architectural, that is, as a three-dimensional trace. The scar is a construction of individuality as mortality, as something that is born with (and with the structure of) the writing upon the body of the body's death. The sign of Odysseus as a living organism shares the structure of every architecture, of every object constructed by incision.

44 Who put my bed *in another place* (***allose***, line 184)? Not a god himself could easily put it *in another place* (***allêi eni chorêi***, 186). No mortal could *move it to the other side* (***metochlisseien***, 189), "since a great sign has been built into the constructed bed" (***epei mega sêma tetuktai en lechei askêtôi***, 188-9).

45 "I myself made it and no other" (***to ego kamon oude tis allos***, line 189).

Of architecture as immovable support, because it is at once natural and constructed, because it is (like the ***sêma*** of the scar) nature turned into mortal material without leaving behind its natural force. By planing off the bark of the tree, Odysseus removes the only part of the tree that is alive, its only source of movement either lateral or vertical. Now the tree will petrify, turning into the material of monumental building. Now the tree is a column (its model) with roots of stone.[46]

Of gender as a building, a building of sexual difference in divided spaces and places, just as stable as the support of a column with roots of stone.[47] *Of* the female as immovable, once moved to (construct) the place of the bed. *Of* female mobility limited to the movement of ***(re)*** 'again'. *Of* 'again' within the walls [ ] of the ***oikos.*** Built by the man for himself, the immovable bed is a sign of the architecture of (re) marriage as the male construction and containment of the female's pharmacological movement (***pharmakon*** *'cure, poison'*). The female must be able to move, so that men can communicate. She must be able to constitute a place and space, so that men can build an ***oikos***. She must be an architect, so that he can be an architect. But if the female is able to move, the stability of her construction is uncertain. What makes marriage possible, just by making it possible, makes its certainty ultimately impossible. So this construction of the female architectural capacity as the weaving and unweaving of space and place is both health and harm, and requires its own (attempted) architectural antidote, the immovability of the (re) marriage bed.

Of philosophy as the construction of meaning as unique identity. The architecture of the bed is a sign that, like its maker, cannot be replaced with its representative, its equivalent, or its imitation.[48] If the bed could have been moved outside the bedroom, then there could be no "home of Odysseus" intact and no "Odysseus" to be known.

But the bed has not been moved. And Odysseus has spoken "architectural" signs.

Homer, *Odyssey*, Book 23, lines 205-206.

> So he spoke, and her knees and her dear heart were unstrung, as she recognized the signs (***sêmata***) firmly fixed (***empeda*** *'in the ground'*) that Odysseus had spoken.

46 Petrified, the tree "sublates" the question of whether wood or stone is the aboriginal architectural material. On this question in architectural history see Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 663-665, and on column (as derived from the already rectilinear tree) as the chief instance of the beauty of Classical architecture, that is, the pure display of architectural purpose, 665-669.

47 Susan Walker, "Women and Housing in Classical Greece: The Archaeological Evidence," *Images of Women in Antiquity*, eds. A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983.), 81-91.

48 Deleuze, 254-259.

The ecstacy of architectural (re) marriage, collaboration of the woven enclosure and the supporting column.

The *Mêtis* of Odyssean Architectural Para-Theory

[***para***] *Penelope*

female dis / dys—location housed in the re–marriage of Penelope and Odysseus

Actoris *'she who leads'* < ***ago*** *'lead, carry, manage'*

Homer, Odyssey, Book 23, lines 225-230. Penelope speaks.

> But now, since you have now spoken very demonstrative signs (***sêmata***) of our bed, that no other mortal man has seen, but only both you and I, and only one handmaiden Actoris—whom my father gave to me when I was coming here, who guarded the doors of our firm bedroom—you indeed persuade my heart, even though it is very unfeeling.

Here in the person of the maid Actoris, who could have told what she knows to others,[49] is a potential for "slippage" in the semiotics (the system of ***sêmata*** *'signs'*) of the Odyssean architectural ideal. It is a remote possibility, but remains possible—even here.

what is inside the ***abaton***?

It is a possibility that Odysseus overlooks. In the consummate image of the Odyssean architectural ideal, he weeps and holds the wife with whom he is joined architecturally, the ***alochon*** *'wife'* who is ***thumarea*** *'jointed to his heart'*.

FOR: Architectural education can proceed only from building Actoris's designs.

This paper was written with the support of a Fellowship from the Chicago Institute of Architecture and Urbanism.

49 Actoris may be compared with Penelope's disloyal maids who revealed the ***mêtis*** of the web (bk. 2, 106-9) to the Suitors (who then compelled Penelope to finish it) and with Clytemnestra (whom the text blames as foil for its praise of Penelope) who uses her ***mêtis*** to dis-/dys-locate the place of her husband Agamemnon by killing him rather than "re-marrying" him, when he returned from Troy. But the text's drive to divide the space of female ***mêtis*** into blameworthy and praiseworthy examples serves to dis-/dys-locate the division, even as it constructs it. For the blame of Clytemnestra, it is said (bk. 24, 200-2), "will forever bestow a harsh word upon female women, even if there is one who is virtuous"—even, that is, upon Penelope. With this blame of Clytemnestra, the *Odyssey* confesses the vulnerability of its own architecture (of division of the female into exclusive opposites, with the praiseworthy woman co-constructing immoveable re-marriage) to independent female practice.



Salginatobel bridge 1930 by Robert Maillart, Schiers, Switzerland

The Decisive Text: On Beginning to Read Heidegger's "Building, Dwelling, Thinking"

CLIVE DILNOT

What follows is essentially the prologue to a longer paper on Heidegger's essay. What appears here is only that portion of the paper which deals with how we might think about reading Heidegger's essay. Such an effort might be deemed irrelevant save that the one clear truth about Heidegger's essay is that it is not read—if by "reading" we mean something other than the uncritical reproduction of a text, something nearer to the work of thinking the text beyond its own means, beyond the limits (and the limitations) of its own awareness (and hence beyond the limits of our awareness). If Heidegger's text is not read then the question of how Heidegger's text is to be read in relation to building—that is, as a provocation to our thinking about architecture—is central. In itself it allows us to read, and thus to think and this is its value.

THE DECISIVE TEXT

1. An Essay about Thinking, An Essay about Building

We can begin very simply, with a claim in regard to the significance of Heidegger's essay. It concerns the manner in which what is forced into view through this text is the very condition, the peculiarity even, of the situation of architecture with respect to the work that the latter achieves and the conditions under which architecture "is"—let us say, in total, to the conditions of existence of architectural work.

Since this is fundamental—for it opens the very possibility of adequate knowing in architecture—we can call "Building Dwelling Thinking" a *decisive* text for architectural knowing. The force of this claim is emphasized if we consider that few other essays within the corpus of philosophy, with the possible exception of certain moments in Bachelard's *Poetics of Space*, or some sentences in Bataille's critical fragments on architecture, are as revealing of the potential work of building. Fewer still permit an indication of the surpassing of conditions presently inimical to both the practice, and the self-consciousness, of architecture.

For a text to be said to be decisive implies that it works an act of demarcation. From out of the total field of a subject area something is separated off, decisively, as essential. What is essential in this case, in the forms of demarcation enacted and of the foundation constructed, is that a structure of questioning is

established and set into being which touches on two moments of acute significance for architecture—first on the relations between and amongst the three terms of Heidegger's title (Heidegger is perhaps the first philosopher to begin to think this relation: hence, whatever view we come to regarding the adequacy of his answers, on these grounds alone the essay commands our attention) and, second, on what Heidegger describes as the "crisis of dwelling" in the present.

It is in "answering" this crisis, as a response to the profound questioning which reflection upon it has induced, that Heidegger creates the field of reconstructive work set out in the essay. Here Heidegger achieves, beyond the limits of his own ambition (or indeed of his capacity to deploy it) a new formulation in regard to the ground of being, one located, as we shall see, in the non-teleological and propositional work of "building-dwelling." This is key. At once for philosophy, though this revolution is yet still-born; but also for architecture. For the latter, this "metaphoric" language provides the possibility of thinking the effective grounding of architectural work in an act of originary significance ("building-dwelling") that de-centers, *but does not wholly destroy*, the architectural project—which indeed (potentially) allows the latter its recuperation *outside* of the need expressed by modern architecture to seek its condition in autonomy (the fetishization of architecture), inversion (the reduction of "building" to technique and the simultaneous valorization of architecture), and distinction (the pathological separation of architecture from building on categorical grounds).

We can begin an elucidation and recovery of the text by focusing on the moments of the title. Encompassed in the simultaneous presentation of the terms *Building Dwelling Thinking*, the title is both the point of announcement from which the work of the text begins and key to understanding the potential force of Heidegger's argument. The text, indeed, is nothing but the elucidation of the situation in which we presently find ourselves with respect to the structure of this relationship—that is to say, the situation of being forced to confront, and take full measure of, the consequences of the fact of its dislocation, of the *non-relation* currently existing between the moments of the title. Everything hinges on this point. For Heidegger, the analysis of this relationship, precisely because of its breakdown, its non-identity in the present, becomes the royal road to grasping both the character of our culture as a

whole with respect to the forms of our "dwelling," and the nature of building–dwelling. Hence the essay "Building Dwelling Thinking."

The breakdown in the relationship of the moments of the title finds its most general embodiment in the engendering of a historical present characterized by the loss of relation to "dwelling"—in the particular and acute form of the failure to understand that this loss has actually occurred. This, at least, is Heidegger's case. To it corresponds the argument that our unhappiness with respect to our "homelessness" follows *directly* from the failure to grasp the nature of this plight—from our failure, in other words, to permit the moments of the title to "listen" (and thus to inflect, to belong) to one another.

"Dwelling" *is* this listening. In the "failure to listen" to one another in respect of each moment the meaning of "dwelling" is obscured. It is then that building-as-dwelling retires behind the (historical) forms that building takes; behind its name, and, in fact, in our time, behind the twin forms of *cultivation* and *construction*, *aedificare*—the first which we could translate here as politics–without–dwelling, in which political activity ceases to touch on the true components of establishing culture; the second, worked in our time in the techniques of autonomous building practices, in construction science, the "profession" of architecture, the practice of "property development," and the like.

Heidegger's charge is essentially as follows: that in both cases—with the former in regard to the erosion of an organic relation to dwelling, with the latter in terms of the development of all those techniques that reduce ends to means, and through fetishism (inversion), autonomy (hypostatization), and fragmentation, cause these to dominate, and to occlude, the nature and reality of *building-dwelling*—there is a loss of perception and knowing, of understanding, to such an extent that despite the "progress" of modern rational knowledge, despite differentiation, rationalization, and the division of labor applied to the field dwelling, we "forget," or occlude, the nature of building as dwelling.

The charge is acute. Yet for all that we might ask: Does this still matter—for architecture? Is not architecture the practice of this overcoming? Is that not what the architectural professions profess? Is it not on the claim of the provision of "dwelling" that the legitimacy, status, and work of architecture within the community is secured? Undoubtedly so.

Hence the temptation to refuse, for architecture, Heidegger's (implicit) charge. But however tempting, however much, as itself an expression of architectural alienation, we are persuaded to deny the centrality of this concern, to place it as marginal to an architectural thinking theoretically transcendent of it, the charge is actually crucial. It describes all too well architecture's displacement, our displacement: "architecture's", and thus our own, true marginality with respect to the culture at large.

What is lost here, in architecture—but architecture does not know of its loss—is a relation: the understanding of the relation *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*. But this is "also" the relation which is determinant for, is a condition of, the work of architecture, and its understanding. Thus, behind the occlusion of the relation *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (and of *building—dwelling*) lies the occlusion of architecture. Architecture's invisibility to itself: the baffling counterpart to its evident visibility and materiality is grounded here, in the occlusion of this relation.

This three-fold occlusion is key. It is the three-step means whereby the "sense" of architectural work is lost. To put it more mundanely, but to follow the steps of this occlusion: understood only as a moment of "construction-as-cultivation," architecture has problematically erased from its consciousness, and thus from its practice, the terms of the relationship between building, dwelling, and thinking. But since architecture is peculiarly suspended in its underlying structural condition between these moments (as non-identical to any, but as part inhabitant of each), it cannot be thought if the *relation* of the moments of this relation cannot be thought. Through its pretension to autonomy, the manner in which it participates in the schema of means-ends relations, and through the fear of the endless ambiguity involved in this necessarily oscillatory condition of architecture caught within these conditions, "Architecture" inverts its relation to the three moments of the title; it hypostatically declares itself independent of each, going so far as to constitute itself, in terms of self-identity, by defining itself *against* these moments—particularly, of course, "against" building. But, in so doing, architecture defines itself as an impossible condition—as building which is yet not building, as dwelling which is yet not dwelling, as thinking which is yet not cognition. If all of these differentiations contain a truth—for architecture *is* non-identical to each—still it is so *differently* to how architecture usually thinks this relation. To use a familiar language:

architecture stands as differentiated from each of these moments, not as distinction–from, but as supplement–to. Architecture's difference from building, from thinking, is not based on distinction. Above all, architecture is not, or should not be, different from dwelling. But distinction describes the relations of self–knowledge through which the professional discipline of architecture locates itself relative to these other moments.

Indeed, here is the irony; even though architecture exists in and through these (negative) definitions—i.e., building activity exists, a profession exists—it does so fugitively, without theory, without consciousness, without self–knowledge.

The parallel is with Kantian aesthetics. Defined negatively, aesthetics exists, for Kant, largely in terms of what it is not. The real marginality of the "aesthetic," as Kant defines it, is expressed not only in the marginality of aesthetic experience to life itself (its closure into a special realm), but also in the inability of post–Kantian aesthetics either to specify more fully and adequately the positive nature of that experience, or to come to terms with those conditions of aesthetic experience where, as in architecture, the "aesthetic" moment is only one moment of an integral complex; one moment of a real object whose conditions include, but also exceed, the purely aesthetic realm. Defined negatively, in terms of opposition, such conditions cannot be thought (well) by aesthetic thinking. The form of the integral complex object involved here (in the work of architecture) escapes aesthetic theory. This lacuna is seen in every attempt to write an architectural "aesthetic." But as the latter cannot grasp the peculiar fold of aesthetic and non–aesthetic moments in architecture, so the differentiating character of modern architectural thinking similarly defines architecture in equally impossible terms. Hence there is a sense that just as "aesthetics" both does and does not exist, so architecture does and yet does not exist. Architecture exists, as a profession, but it cannot be thought because we think architecture now largely as Kant thought aesthetics, that is, negatively.

The result is a paradox. "Architecture" can only be thought fugitively. In the margins. The categorical structure that is architecture turns its back on the relations or moments that, in actuality, sustain it. *But this means that architecture cannot be thought*. If it cannot be thought, then it cannot fully exist, it cannot

fully realize itself. Despite protestations to the contrary, this is architecture's condition. It is not that architecture does not exist because architecture is "dead." Conservative obituaries are here premature. Rather, not yet realized, i.e., not yet thought relationally, architecture has not yet come into being; it has not yet reconciled itself to itself as *an event occurring between or within the relation Building, Dwelling, Thinking*. Thus architecture has not yet dared to think itself in this manner. Thus architecture awaits being thought.

The fact that we do not yet have architecture has consequences for dwelling. The crisis of dwelling occurs because, while we have "architecture," we cannot yet think an architecture that does not stand *against* dwelling (or *against* building, *against* thinking). Thus we can now understand that the "crisis of dwelling" is no more than a symptomatic (but structural) expression of the dislocated relations between the moments of the essay's title—which are also, as we have said, the moments of architecture's determination. In other words, both the relationship between these moments and the crisis induced by the drama of the "forgetting" of this relation stand on the problematic relationship, in our present situation, between the moments of the essay's title This means, of course, that the centering of the essay on these moments is not arbitrary. It is essential. The significance of the text lies, then, in the way the mapping together of these moments occurs, more particularly in terms of the description of the coming–to–be of our present unhappiness with respect to "dwelling," and in regard to how Heidegger attempts to think past the limitations these conditions give for dwelling (and by implication, for architecture).

2. The Unsurpassable Structure of the Essay

The essay is concerned with delineating the internal relations which occur between the terms of the title. It deals with three propositions or three questions: that of *dwelling* (asking "What is it to dwell?"); that of the relation of "*building to dwelling*" (asking "How does building belong to dwelling?"); that of the relation *building, dwelling, and thinking* (asking "How does thinking belong to dwelling?").

Concerning *building–dwelling* the essay deals with these questions in terms of understanding the work of building in relation to dwelling. Heidegger's innovation here is to transform the structure of this

relation from two terms exterior to one another to *an internal relation of equivalence* (though not of identity). Concerning *building*, *dwelling*, *thinking*, which as the active moment of the text is key and determinant, the questions put up for meditation are two-fold: "how do we *think* about *building–dwelling?*" and "how do we think about the relationship between *building–dwelling* (and being) and *thinking*." But the fact that we *think* about these questions brings us back to building. If how we think about *building–dwelling* is carried on the back of posing the question of "dwelling" (what it means to dwell, how it is that we attain to dwelling), then, as Heidegger somewhat reluctantly concedes, we find that since we attain to dwelling "so it seems, only by means of building" it is building which necessarily becomes the object of concern.[1] Thus, "Building Dwelling Thinking," logically enough, announces itself as, first of all, *a meditation on Building*.

On building note—*not* architecture. And this is essential. For if the subject of the essay is building, the function of this meditation is not to think building in relation to construction, or in regard to architecture (as we already think we understand these terms), but it is rather, as Heidegger puts it, "to trace building back into that domain to which everything that is belongs." (145) To trace building back into this domain is to trace it back into the domain of being: it is to place building back into relation to that question which Heidegger calls the founding question, "What is being?"

We will see later what it means to place building in relation to the question "What is being?" For the moment we can simply note that the essay examines a three-fold relation thought in terms of this, its fourth, and essentially determining, relation. Heidegger uses this relation as the "medium" through which the autonomy of each moment of the title is questioned. The question, "What is being?" is therefore, at least in its first incarnation, the critical question. It enables critique to occur; it is the question that forces the moments of the title to concede both their limits (when these moments are considered autonomously, in fragmentation), and their potential force (once they are re-united with, or at least placed in relation to, the "founding question").

The passage of thinking the moments of the title through this question, yields the attempt to think past (if only schematically and by implication) our present antinomy with respect to building and dwelling.

1 Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, Harper & Row, 1971), 145. All page references are from this volume unless otherwise noted.

This "thinking past" is key for the attempt to escape the present crisis, to give an indication of the conditions (or means through which) we could perceive a potential historical and practical overcoming of our situation; it establishes the essay as not only decisive (for architecture) but unsurpassable.

That a text should be deemed unsurpassable does not mean that it is transcendent (or, that it necessarily proposes a transcendent viewpoint—although Heidegger's does, but this is not where the unsurpassability of his text lies). Nor does it mean that the text necessarily stands outside of history (Heidegger's does not). On the contrary, if Heidegger's text is unsurpassable now, it is because it delineates (through telling a particular kind of story) a historical condition, an actuality in regard to the condition of dwelling in our time. This condition of "crisis" and "loss" cannot be wished away by thought (transcendence), nor even finally overcome in the realm of practice (positivism). No matter how much we may wish it away, or however many moments of innovative practice may genuinely and wholly transcend it, the condition of "crisis" and "loss" remains.

This assertion may surprise. It is based on the proposition that an overcoming in practice—for instance, an architectural overcoming of the modern conditions of the displacement of dwelling as Heidegger describes them in his essay—cannot be fully an overcoming if the new actuality that is proffered does not enter consciousness, if it is not understood in its originative or natalic force, if it is not understood in terms of the creation of a space, or location, for dwelling. It is thus the effective argument of "Building Dwelling Thinking" that practice cannot in itself overcome this crisis. For this crisis is not only one of practice, of building, but of our self-consciousness (our thinking) with respect to the relations between our understanding and the moments—the spheres of action—of building, dwelling, and being. The loss of the relation *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* is the loss *in thought as well as in actuality. Because this relation cannot be thought, practice, in general, cannot come to consciousness of its achievements, or its failures.*

To put this another way, Heidegger's essay is unsurpassable because the form of its anticipation of the crisis of dwelling, together with the form of its description of the conditions for overcoming this crisis, describe an actuality of relations that can only be surpassed *fully* (in practice) when these conditions are

overcome in thought—something that can occur only by first, paying attention to the overt and latent implications and meanings for building and architecture contained within the text; and second, by developing adequate means whereby the process of overcoming the actualities Heidegger describes are made available, publicly and pedagogically, to consciousness.

Such is the first and most profound claim that the essay makes with respect to architectural understanding.

3. The Question of Architecture

The claim that Heidegger's text has a specifically cognitive function with regard to architecture arises, or is based, in the essay's position with respect to the question of the self–understanding of architecture. Unlike other works which might be said to bear on, or aspire to, philosophical explanations of architectural meaning, Heidegger's essay functions critically to open the cognitive condition of architecture. Yet, at the same time, the fact that the text addresses these issues (and not simply in a conservative, and weak, or wholly affirmative manner, the issue of "dwelling") accounts for the resistance that it encounters (a resistance best caught by Mark Wigley when he points out in a recent interview that while architects know they are obliged to read this essay, they also understand "that while [they] must refer to Heidegger, they must not observe Heidegger's work too closely"). In other words, the argument goes, the essay must indeed be read, but read in order to resist the threat (the questions) that it contains. But this resistance to the text, or better, to its questions and implications, merely represses a question that in the final analysis will have to be faced. It is not only Heidegger's essay that cannot be thought. Architecture too cannot be thought—and that is our problem.

One fact illustrates this point. We know we do not have architecture, do not possess in mind its essential characteristics, when we realize that much of the knowledge we have about building is registered in works of architecture. But under the modern conditions of thinking architecture this knowledge remains effectively unavailable for thought. (The proof of the latter assertion is given by the obvious fact that such knowledge as is embodied in building remains almost wholly unavailable either for

the profession in general, or for architectural pedagogy). Simply put, the knowledge of architecture contained in building is not replicated in consciousness. Above all, it is not replicated in the concept "Architecture." We might even say that it is the very presence of this term which blocks consciousness of what building achieves and what the *work* of architecture *does*. Architecture, broken from dwelling, is broken from itself. Hence the paradox: that in architecture, architectural possibility is repeatedly lost—and is so because in architecture, architecture can no longer be thought.

How it *can* be thought paradoxically is by declaring it "impossible." This does not mean that architecture does not exist. Architecture exists, just as building exists. The questions are rather: how does architecture exist in the modern period? In particular, how does it exist now, cognitively? How is it thought? How is architecture conscious of itself? How does it understand its own role and purpose? How does it know its own practice?

If we fail, as we will, to find an adequate answer to these questions, then we begin to understand all too well how the one and the other (architecture and Heidegger) correspond. For these are the determining questions, those at the heart of the issue. They ask how a practice exists in terms of its self–understanding. They ask how a practice is possible. They confront the difficulties of establishing practice under conditions where self–conceptualization (or adequate self–consciousness) is extremely difficult, and achieved only through strategies—such as autonomy, or the "borrowing" of a conceptual language from other arts or the sciences, (strategies that are ultimately counter–productive to both architectural practice and its self–understanding).

To speak of the impossibility of this practice is not to suggest that it cannot be thought because architecture *necessarily* lies beyond thought, or is forever doomed to be outside of thought in some ontological fashion. This impossibility arises because architecture is situated in this place outside of consciousness: architecture in the modern period lies *outside of our historically limited modes of consciousness*. Architecture lies outside of our patterns of thought not intrinsically but historically. This means that architecture is neither endemically nor necessarily outside of consciousness *per se*, but that it is necessarily outside of *our* consciousness. That architecture cannot be thought is a product of the fact

that our (historically determined and limited) modes of thought are inimical to thinking architecture.

Thus architecture, as we know it, is a practice without a thought because it is a practice outside of *this* thought, *our* thought. To draw a picture of architectural understanding today would be to show an architecture unable to describe to itself (or to be described in terms of) what it "achieves", ideally or in actuality (an architecture that does not know its own practice, or fully understand the meaning of its own configurative and constructive work). Heidegger's essay addresses this problem, if elliptically.

Now, it is true that this second claim for the cognitive work of Heidegger's essay is paradoxical in the extreme. The essay begins, after all, by renouncing all claims to deal with architecture. In the opening paragraph Heidegger explicitly denies that "architectural ideas and rules of building" belong to the scope of the work and goes on, immediately, to place dwelling at the center of the enquiry and remove architecture altogether from the field it would presume to reign. In the full version this reads: "In what follows we shall try to think about dwelling and building. This thinking about building does not presume to discover architectural ideas [. . .] rather it traces building back into the domain to which everything that is belongs. We ask: 1. What is it to dwell? 2. How does building belong to dwelling?" (145)

We can already intuit why Heidegger might do this. But the question remains: is it possible to claim the text for architecture? Especially when the force of the essay appears bound up in this displacement? Are not all the substantive theoretical and performative implications of the work grounded in (and do they not flow from) this first denial of architectural centrality? The answer can only be affirmative. And we can only reinforce it. For the point of the essay lies in the fact that it *critically forces apart* architecture and dwelling. It is through this separation and displacement that the text works, critically, to open a thinking in regard to the foundations of architecture. To take one example: This displacement enacts a reversal of the natural focus of other philosophical works on architecture (which begin from, but also remain within, the presupposed orbit of architecture). Architecture in Heidegger does not appear as an essential datum, a given, or a historically justified and present phenomenon which *must* be spoken about; it is displaced, constructed as superstructural to and a "distorted" production of an earlier and more foundational infrastructural condition (that of building-dwelling).

This is scarcely insignificant. It describes Heidegger's essay as apparently wholly antithetical to architecture. The only question that remains, therefore, is whether Heidegger's text does not leave architecture wholly behind through this act of moving outside the given, or contingent, limits of architectural self-consciousness, outside the realm of "architectural ideas and rules for building."

But this question is itself "historical." There is no absolute point at which we could say that a discourse has "left architecture behind," for the sense of how we draw limits to what architecture "is" remains a contingent, even a political issue. It is certainly historical. In any case, this question does not even lie on a spectrum of distance from some essential moment: there is no "near to" or "far from" an architectural center. The question of limits, and thus of "applicability," is a point of contestation and perception, not essence. It is not a matter of thinking the history of architecture (understood as a practice, a profession, an "art," a value), but the effective history of the relational coming-to-be of a category.

Thus if the crucial work of Heidegger's essay is to re-phrase architectural thinking at its foundational level, and if one moment of that work is to place the thinking of architecture back into a deeply historical context, this context must be wider than the one architecture normally allows itself. The historical reading of what has occurred, categorically speaking, must be re-situated, placed in a "new" context. The occlusion of the relation *building-dwelling* gives, to thinking, a series of severe limitations on what may and may not be thought as "architecture." The work of critical thinking is to overcome these limitations. Thus, for example, if one of these limitations on thinking is given by the way that the question "what is being" is not allowed to be asked in relation to questions of building and dwelling, then one necessary moment of the overcoming of the limits to thought in architecture is the restoration of this relation. Indeed, this is the minimum condition of adequate thinking in this area. In Heidegger, this overcoming takes the form of a simultaneously radical and conservative reading of the relation of *building, dwelling, and being*.

What figures in this text, in the place of "rules and ideas" for building architecture, is the attempt to understand building in relation to being—and to enable architecture, as building, to be thought as an

occasion to open the question of being. The re–opening of this latter question, in particular, displaces "traditional" architectural discourse and has the radical or disturbing function of "shaking" the limits of architecture. Indeed, the question delineates the artificiality of these limits and shows that such limits render architecture "impossible." In effect, the question predicts the difficulty architecture will have with thinking this alternative reading of its "work." But only an architecture that had forgotten its purpose on earth, "in relation to mortals" could consider the question "what is being?" as lying outside of the central concerns of the discipline. Only a blindness to implication could mistake the contents and nature of the essay's address—the *critical* concern for the relation of *building, dwelling, and being*—as something marginal to, or ultimately distanced from, architecture. The attempt to recover a sense of how building could be re–located within the domain of dwelling such that architecture–as–building could once again belong, explicitly, to the answering of the question "What is being?" is the "alternative" Heidegger's text offers.

Accepting this, we can see that Heidegger might actually reveal something of the necessary (but non-foundational) grounding of architectural work through its decentering. The bracketing of the condition of architecture "itself" is thus essential. Heidegger's denial of architecture brings about a re–description of the conditions under which, or within which, architecture exists: this redescription, or potential space of re–description, achieves a clearing for architecture to re–think its relation to questions of existence.

4. The Revolution(s) Enacted in Heidegger's Text

If we accept this methodological move, what do we now confront, both "for itself" and in relation to architecture? The question is significant because what we are attempting to read here is, first and foremost, a philosophical text. If Heidegger's essay stands in its own right as a meditation in relation to the "domain to which everything that is belongs" (145) obtained through the moment, or the metaphor of building-dwelling (which is here much more than a metaphor), still the work remains a fragment of a much larger discourse (a part of Heidegger's life-long enquiry the question "What is Being?": "Philoso-

phy seeks what being is, insofar as it is. Philosophy is *en route* to the Being of beings, that is, to being with respect to Being").

In the philosophical texts of the nineteen-thirties Heidegger calls "What is being" *the* question of philosophy, understanding that all thinking that makes a claim to serious reflection on the character of existence proceeds within "the vast orbit of [this] guiding question." The essay "Building Dwelling Thinking" manifests a similar consciousness. In it Heidegger is again concerned with thinking the "ultimate factum to which we come"—with thinking being. But in *this* essay he is asking about the "house of Being," asking indeed how mortals ("beings") stand concretely to Being with respect to how they dwell on earth. The revolution enacted in Heidegger's text, a revolution whose force or potential cannot be denied, is simply this: in this essay Heidegger, in thinking in what way being stands to Being, *thinks being through the concept of dwelling—and thus arrives at the argument that dwelling (or Wohnen, "to dwell in," "to in-habit") is "the fundamental being–structure of Dasein,"* the privileged mode of access to being.

This is doubly significant: for architecture (in the first place for building–dwelling), and for Heidegger's philosophy. In the essays and lectures following "Building Dwelling Thinking," while Heidegger almost immediately abandons direct reflection on questions of building and dwelling in favor of postulating the absolute primacy of language as the new site of being, he nonetheless continues to think of language in terms of dwelling: he defines language as the "house" of being, speaks of man "dwelling" in this house, says of those who think and create poetry as the "custodians of this dwelling." Even more directly, he defines poetic creation in terms of dwelling, and speaks of it as coming to pass "Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building." Thus, even though Heidegger turns to language as the home, the abode, the location, of being (all these metaphors are at work in the late essays), the language of dwelling has nonetheless become indispensable for Heidegger's thinking. This is necessarily so because the relationship of being to dwelling is more than metaphoric. In linking being and dwelling (and through these, building and thinking) Heidegger has established not exactly an "ontological" framework, but the originary framework of human existence: of being coming–

to-be. *Building-Dwelling* is the enactment of being. In other words, the (non-given) factum with which being can be identified is dwelling.

For both philosophy and architecture, the prime innovation of Heidegger's work in "Building Dwelling Thinking" lies first and foremost in linking the question of being to the question of dwelling, and then linking both, through dwelling, to the question of building.

The consequences of this revolution are profound. "Dwelling," thought of as the privileged mode of access to being, grounds our relationship as thinking-subjects to the founding question "What is being?" *in the actuality of our modes of dwelling.*

We can now go further and suggest that since dwelling cannot be separated from building then each moment of the equation can potentially be transformed. ("To build *is* to dwell," is one of the central propositions of "Building Dwelling Thinking"—and asserted as such on the first page. "We attain to dwelling so it seems only by means of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling, as its goal.") On the one hand, building is now bound irrevocably, at least in thought, to the question of dwelling. This not only transforms how we think of building, it implies that we say adieu to all concepts of essential, rather than historically contingent, autonomy. On the other hand, the relation of *building-dwelling* to being implicitly transforms the character of the "founding question." A concrete moment now enters with the potential to transform the abstract and ontological question of disclosure, "What is being?" into the constitutive-constructive question, "How are we, through dwelling (-building) to *construct*, or to establish on earth and in relation to conditions of existence before which we stand, the mode of our being?" Thus, to read "Building Dwelling Thinking"—to think it and think through it—is to move from understanding the "founding question" as one about existence understood in terms of the disclosure of the true nature of things (the revelation of the relation of being to Being) to one about how (not-determinable, non-teleological) existence is to be shaped.

Although Heidegger (for reasons obvious to the internal political thrust of his thinking) does *not* pursue the implications of his own argument along this line of enquiry, and although in pursuing the logic of this issue we have gone well beyond the conclusions Heidegger wished to draw from his insights,

he nonetheless notes their presence, as implication, at every point of his later thought. We shall have to further examine the reasons why Heidegger can neither continue the incipient non–representational insights opened in the essay "The Origin of the Work of Art", nor pursue the notion of the relation *building–dwelling* (why he must therefore transpose the question of dwelling into that of poetics). The more pressing question now concerns the indispensability of the concept of "dwelling."

"Dwelling" is indispensable for Heidegger because it stands for a mode of establishing relations that are "ontological" yet without either teleological or a unique originary form (amongst mortals, relations to nature, ie., to "earth and sky," and to the sense of Being established amongst all modes of existence). If thinking is the commitment of Being by and for Being, dwelling is the establishing of the relation on earth between being and Being. Or, more prosaically, dwelling is the mode of presentation of being; the other place of being's openness to, and mode of establishing relations with, the manifest moments or conditions of existence of Being in general. Put yet another way, "Dwelling" is an event of establishing (building) relations that exist within history, for instance, within culture; but it is an event that, in its thinking, in its being thought, can break with imbedding, including our imbedding in the limitations of the "forgetful" modern world. The form of the "simple event" of dwelling is determined by specific historical modalities or conditions, but it is yet not *so* determined as to merely reproduce these conditions. In other words, its reflexive presence is never wholly so; it is never wholly caught into presence no matter how much we may treat it as such (and in theorizing form, generally do). In that sense dwelling is prime. It simultaneously describes our "standing to," and establishing of, relations on earth, amongst mortals, etc., and the very possibility of the "clearing" into which we are thrown, and through which we establish relations to Being (hence "saving ourselves" from nihilism, from lack of meaning).

Heidegger does not stop at the insight that the (non–given) factum with which being can be identified is dwelling. At the end of the essay, in lines pregnant with implication, he sets in motion a second revolution by placing "thinking" into the relation between "building" and "dwelling": "But that thinking itself belongs to dwelling, in the same sense as building, although in a different way, may perhaps be attested to by the course of thought here attempted. Building and thinking are, each in its own way,

inescapable for dwelling. The two are however insufficient for dwelling so long as each busies itself with its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one another. they are able to listen if both—building and thinking—belong to dwelling." (160-161)

In these sentences Heidegger is establishing a triangular relationship of necessity and inter-implication between the three terms of the title. Although he holds back from stating the final moment of the triangle (the inter-implication of thinking and building such that thinking, as thinking "for" dwelling, is also thinking for building: that indeed to think is to think *for building*) he has nonetheless dissolved the axiomatic autonomy of thinking with respect to building, thus paving the way for a genuine reciprocity between the three moments.

Here is the second revolution in thinking (and thus in practice) that Heidegger's essay offers. We sense what is involved here when we understand the astonishing series of propositions—astonishing, that is, at least in terms of architectural thinking—which Heidegger produces from his move and which we can describe, in this first summary, as the guiding propositions of his text.

- *First*: Heidegger establishes a relation between being and dwelling by grounding being as dwelling: "the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is [. . .] dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal it means to dwell." (147)
- *Second*: Heidegger argues, dwelling is achieved by building: "We attain to dwelling" Heidegger says in almost the opening sentence of the essay, "only by means of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling as its goal." (145)
- *Third*: This means that the usual separation between building, dwelling, and being, cannot be sustained. Particularly if we read this relation merely in terms of a means-ends schema, Heidegger says, "we block our view of the essential relations. For building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—to build is already to dwell." (146)
- But then, *fourth*, we must also say that being (as dwelling) lies in building.
- *Fifth*: But this in turn provokes the further proposition or implication that if being (as dwelling) lies in building then to think about building is necessarily, even in the case of the explicit absence of this sense in such thought, to reflect upon being (i.e., reflection on being is always contained in building: only its active repression causes it to disappear from view, beneath the surface of building-thinking).

- *Sixth*: Conversely, if being (as dwelling) "lies in," that is, comes to visibility, to emergence through building (as dwelling), then to think about being (the very question of philosophy) is, in at least one of its moments, to need to think about building: i.e., philosophy (thinking) is incomplete if it does not think about building.
- *Finally:* Heidegger places this incipient relation (between *building, dwelling, thinking*) in a historical context by establishing the argument that in the modern period the relation *building: dwelling* (and perhaps even more the relation *building, dwelling, thinking*) has been sundered, such that the original, internal relation, between building and dwelling is occluded, and in two dimensions:
  —first, in that we no longer recognize how building belongs to dwelling "and how it receives its nature from dwelling" (160) nor understand that the unhappiness in the present with our mode of dwelling (building, thinking) can be traced directly to this occlusion, that is to the forgetting of this relationship between building and dwelling;
  —second, in that as "forgetting" takes place in consciousness, forgetting must therefore be understood as a loss of thought, or, better, as a loss of a relation in thought. Forgetting is thus the forgetting of how thinking too belongs to dwelling, and thus also to building—that both building and thinking are, "each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling." (160-1) (Moreover, it is a forgetting that thinking is also the thinking for building—as that which instantiates dwelling—which sets in motion a mode of being on earth). The tragedy of human dwelling, then, is the occlusion of the relation between *building, dwelling, thinking* and our mode of being on earth; it is the loss of the sense that both building and thinking "belong to dwelling." (161)

5. Answers Resting on a Bedrock of Questions

We have said that the "crisis of dwelling" induces, in Heidegger, the project of re–describing (affirmatively) the foundational condition of dwelling. It is the latter which is of course the most well–known, if also bafflingly opaque, aspect of the text. It is, in large part, where the "meaning" of the text can be said to lie; it is here, through an exercise of thinking itself nearer (as George Steiner puts it), to an act of collecting and re–collecting (re–membering) dispersed vestiges of being than to traditional philosophical analysis, that Heidegger attempts to give us a structure of cognition with regard to thinking what it is that *building-dwelling* achieves. This memoration, presented in the form of a narration on and

about dwelling, has the task of bringing dwelling, and thus the folded relationship of the title, into radiant illumination, into "disclosure"—itself understood as the inculcation, in thought, of the process whereby the object of a thinking (in this case) dwelling, has been attended to, "followed upon." (If Heidegger's text is at all mimetic it is in the form of this narrative of disclosure, mimetic not of the condition of dwelling, but of the process of its thinking by Heidegger).

In this act of memoration—the disclosure of the mode of *thinking* of dwelling—occupying the central portion of the essay, Heidegger attempts to name and describe the essential pattern of relations accruing to building-dwelling. But even if this is ostensibly the central effort of the text we need to keep in mind, reading Heidegger, or in thinking about his text, that the attempts to name and describe the essential patterns of relations accruing to building-dwelling are themselves a *symptom*, a response to the first and prior condition of crisis from which his work begins (and from which derives his essentially speculative insights into the "origins" or foundation of building-dwelling). As Reiner Schurmann has pointed out, one of Heidegger's prime motivations in the essays of this period is to "extend an appreciation of the situation in which we find ourselves today." It is from this position that Heidegger launches both his ruthless summary judgments of the history of our situation, of its coming to be, and his forceful reparative impulse. But this uniquely Heideggerean impulse rests on twin pillars; first, on Heidegger's perception of the "crisis" in dwelling, and second, *on the structure of questioning that Heidegger's critique of the present has induced into being.*

This structure of questioning is the essential and (non-foundational) "ground" that provides for a different basis from which to understand architecture's work; different, that is, in the decisive pattern of its relations from that given in the self–understanding of contemporary architectural practices. *Read correctly, then, it is the structure of questioning that proffers the real meaning and force of Heidegger's essay.*

Heidegger confirms this when, toward the end of the essay, he notes, "Perhaps this attempt to think about building and dwelling will bring out somewhat more clearly that building belongs to dwelling and how it receives its nature from dwelling. Enough will have been gained if dwelling and building have become worthy of questioning and thus have remained *worthy of thought.*"

One of the difficulties, for criticism, in coming to terms with Heidegger's text is that it in effect performs its own respiratory commentary. Heidegger all to easily gives us the answers to the questions opened by his critique, thereby obscuring (at least to an un-critical commentary) the force of his enquiry. We have already seen this occur with the very formulations which Heidegger discloses to us. In essays written immediately afterwards, Heidegger transposes the metonymical and contiguous nature of the relations explored in "Building Dwelling Thinking" into the realm of poetic and theological metaphor. In the final essay in the English book, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, this transposition between the realms of dwelling and the poetic is actualized in acute form. This move is important because it reverses the observation made earlier regarding the unsurpassability of the categories of dwelling and building for Heidegger's later thought. Here, we need also be aware of the extensive and real transformation that has occurred in the meaning of these concepts. If "poetry" is now the "primal form of building"; that "first of all admits man's dwelling into its very nature, its presencing being," and that is the "original admission of dwelling," then the transposition of building, dwelling, and being is certainly acute. It is emphasized when Heidegger continues the refrain in lines toward the end of the essay ". . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .":

> The statement, *Man dwells in that he builds*, has now been given its proper sense. Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on earth beneath the sky, by raising growing things and simultaneously raising buildings. Man is capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of poetic taking of measure. Authentic building occurs so far as there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the structure of dwelling.[2]

The fact of this poetic transposition cannot be dismissed. Reclaiming the relations held within the essay depends upon arguing that the level of quasi-poetic, or analogical metaphor which Heidegger turns to after "Building Dwelling Thinking" (also already anticipated in the rendering metaphorical of the description of "dwelling" in the "Building" essay itself) is the philosopher's strategy for contending with—for hiding from—the radically materialist implications of his own thought. The argument must be

2 Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 227.

that such a transposition—which Heidegger presents as possessing ontological necessity—is not *necessary* to the relations which he is describing.

This means that to grasp the essay "Building Dwelling Thinking" is not to grasp Heidegger's own formulations of the problem, especially as these appear to us in the guise of his terminology. The latter stands as a snare. Its lure is poetic and theological. The lure of tradition. Therefore, to reproduce Heidegger's language in commentary means nothing. Far from revealing the relation between being, dwelling, building, and thinking, Heidegger's categories may serve, at various moments, as much to obscure as to open the potential understandings that this essay is ostensibly designed to achieve. One cannot get to the relations between *Building*, *Dwelling*, *Thinking*, simply by accepting the terms we are given. If we must begin with Heidegger's words, we still must read *through* his terminology; we must read through Heidegger himself, let alone through his commentators and readers in architecture. (To speak of Heidegger's text as decisive for architecture is to claim that it is necessary in terms of the issues it raises. But this is not to claim that the text possesses the final word in respect to these issues).

Methodologically speaking, this point is crucial. Without making a distinction between reading Heidegger's text *critically* and allowing a Heideggerean, or ontological, reading to hold sway, it might seem inevitable that what is offered here could only be the Heideggerean agenda re-packaged for architectural consumption. But this is scarcely my ambition. Even less is it to reproduce the "architectural" readings of Heidegger.

If we follow the transpositions Heidegger makes with the insights that his thinking collects, it is hardly surprising that in the usual reading of Heidegger in architecture, a structure of questioning is taken for a body of answers: a non-determinable, foundational, or originative opening that metaphorically uses the relation *building*, *dwelling*, *thinking* to critically establish another space for thinking these moments and their relation is taken for a series of determinable, grounded and locatable datum "about dwelling."

This is precisely what occurs in some of the more recent seizures of Heidegger's name in architecture, conducted, apparently, in order to force into being an "ontological" conception of an architectural ground, or to press on us yet another phenomenologically, or hermeneutically, justified invocation of

"dwelling." But neither of these essentially reproductive strategies of "working" what is involved in this text are adequate to what is at stake here, either with respect to the modes of reading they offer, or to the conception of "dwelling" they produce. On one hand, the second tends to force us back to the ideology of the "return," and to the myth of an ontological foundation for building practice (for phenomenology or hermeneutics, read in this context, the recourse to tradition and to the mythology of the "return"). On the other, the former (the "Heideggerean" or conservative readings) *produces* a concept of dwelling that could scarcely have *less* categorical, tactical, or critical force with respect to engaging the recalcitrant mindlessness of the property market or the perversions of an architectural practice in a commodity economy.

The moment we look in detail at architectural readings of "Building Dwelling,Thinking," it becomes obvious that reading Heidegger is a problem for architecture. (By reading we mean something more than a simple acquiescence either to the structures and (wholly misleading) vocabulary of Heidegger's language, or to the given structures and presuppositions of architectural theorizing.) Suspicion of its pragmatic viability (based on its apparent self–exclusion from the architectural field), together with an unthinking, simplistic, and even totemistic usage already confines the article to the margins of architectural theory (or delivers it into the ghetto of "place theory"). The reading of the essay in the terms outlined above further obscures and dissipates the radical force of Heidegger's formulations to disturb architectural self–understanding.

If this last point implies a way out of the problem (since it seems to suggest that the only adequate reading of Heidegger is one which begins from, or even celebrates, the condition of disturbance) it is perhaps because it is endemically critical. To see the text as a source of disturbance for architecture is to emphasize its value not as the container of a series of propositions, to be extracted and "applied" (in a recuperative manner) to the problems of contemporary architecture (not as re–assurance), but as a structure of questioning—*as a structure to be forced, if necessary, into revealing the questioning potential, the disturbance which it endemically contains.*

Another methodological point is revealed by this statement. The situation where Heidegger's text is not read in any meaningful sense—when the reading is still informed by a suspicion that the essay is of

marginal interest to the discipline of architecture, or when its provocations to consciousness and (architectural) performance are ignored—can be structurally compared to Heidegger's description regarding the reception of Nietzsche's thought. In the first volume of the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger complains that while in philosophy Nietzsche has long been either celebrated and imitated or reviled and exploited, "the confrontation with [this thinking] has not yet begun."[3]

The parallel is worth pursuing because it offers up a structure of reading that may be useful in dealing with Heidegger. Against the failure to read Nietzsche, Heidegger evokes the notion or strategy of "confrontation," Heidegger's term for the form of genuine criticism —"the only way to a true estimation of a thinker." By confrontation Heidegger means a twofold engagement with the text. On the one hand, this engagement is a comprehensive reflection on a text, or thinker; a tracing out not only of a work's weakness (simple critique), but also through the genuine "taking on board" of a thinker, a thinking through of the effective force, "the *project* of what is thought, or constructed here, its implications, [and] the power of its disturbance to our own circle of customary expectations." On the other hand, this engagement implies that one undertake such a confrontation precisely in order to "become free for the supreme extortion of thinking," to use the engagement with a thinker (text, object) in order to learn how to accomplish *the (free) work of thought*. Confrontation is then a three–fold working of a text: the doubled "confrontation" with the thinking pursued in the text, and the "thinking about" the relation of the text to what it "applies to" (here, for example, to the thinking about architecture).

But confrontation presupposes that the text is indeed a structure of questioning. This view stands as a negation of the attitude of simple "application" of text to practice, the attitude that maintains that there is one thing, "the words of Heidegger," and another, "architecture." In terms of the latter syndrome, the job of "thinking architecturally" involves applying the one (as a given) to the other (also a given) to obtain the maximum pragmatic benefit from such a "confrontation"; the benefit is defined, however, by the implicit stipulation that neither side of the relation be touched, affected, transformed, or above all, put into question, by the other.

Such is the way theory often enters the architectural field. It is by and large how Heidegger has entered

3 F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power as Art*, Vol.1, trans. D.F.Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 5.

architectural discourse thanks to readers who look to Heidegger's text for the "solution" of problems, above all searching (as for a talisman, or a fetish) for a "grounding" for architecture. This is, itself, already a problem. If Heidegger's essay is "decisive" for architecture it is not because it supplies this form of decisive knowledge. If it has, in the end, pragmatic consequences, they are not the kind of consequences one might at first sight expect as the architectural "meaning" of the essay.

But the more fundamental problem invoked here concerns what this form of positivist (and utilitarian) reading of Heidegger "achieves"—that is, with the occlusion of the essay's structure of questioning.

A parallel might be made here with Derrida's recent remarks on "deconstructivist architecture." Just as the readings of Heidegger common to current architectural theory and pedagogy have neutered the disturbance to architecture that his text contains, so too "architectural" readings of Derrida have failed to elicit serious reflection on architecture, but have been used instead to legitimate a late, essentially tradition-bound, and now politically regressive, avant-gardism. These readings, far from deconstructing architecture, have simply sedimented some of its more obscene aspects. They have managed to *reverse* all of the truly disturbing implications contained in the deep structure of Derrida's work, and thus work to *deny* the real force of its deconstructive impulse.

This process of mis-reading Derrida exhibits precisely the same movement of appropriation described above, namely a structure of *questioning* is appropriated (literally, transformed) and in its place is substituted (stripped of all critical force) "a body of answers." In the case of deconstruction, "theory" (the framework and terminology of Derrida's essays) is used in a highly traditional role (in terms of architectural theory), as a device to legitimate a mode of representation of architectural problems, or a desired aesthetic; or, what amounts to the same thing, as a way to produce a semantic field within which purely formal (as against genuinely syntactical) manoeuvres can be semantically justified.

Given the pragmatic and appropriative traditions in architecture, there is a point where such "use" of a text is not only legitimated, but expected. If we reflect briefly on the nature of the text-as-question we can demonstrate that no necessary warrant, no general or structural necessity, exists for this enforced transmutation.

If the distinction between the *structure of questions* contained in a text and the *answers to its own questions* that the text proposes seems, from the outside, critically essential; and if the blurring of this distinction seems to signal that the work will be misunderstood spuriously, that is, affirmatively, in terms of the "answers" it provides; then this might arise because we intuitively recognize that the answers are induced into being by a fear of the questions. The answers are scarcely integral to the work; they are, instead, the mere consequences of the original structure of questioning.

As Barthes reminds us in the introduction to *On Racine*, if the act of writing, be it artistic or critical, issues in a form, it not only provides or produces (a) meaning (thereby placing meaning–in–general in the world) but inevitably and necessarily, also puts a *question* to the world: "To write," Barthes says, "is to jeopardize the meaning of the world" (in however tiny (or colossal) a manner). In every act of writing (of configuration), a rend is made in the metaphysical—the given fabric of the world; this is inevitable, and *is without the possibility of answer*. In Barthes' felicitous phrase, to write is "to put an indirect question [to the world] that the writer, by an ultimate abstention, refrains from answering."[4]

To put this another way: *Artefacture induces doubt, and this is inevitable.*

This condition has important consequences for how we think of works (whether as works of art, criticism, or theory). The act of writing, which turns ostensibly on the act of giving or supplying an answer (to a question which lies outside of the text), can now be seen to necessarily itself induce a questioning. Thus, the act of form–making turns, in actuality, on the provision of the question. We might even say that the work is constituted as a form is by structuring itself as a question, or a state of questioning (putting a meaning in question). Only such designation "of putting a meaning in question" bestows on the work its status as work, thus giving it the capacity, in the respiration it then induces, to live as a form, capable of inciting from us the attempt of response, the attempt to give an answer.

To place "an indirect question to the world" brings its own terrors. This is why in so many cases, the work stands in fear of its work of un–doing, in *fear* of the unanswerable gesture it has made, and therefore rushes to complete the tear that the thrust of its own questions has opened in our world. Such work "works," in effect, to a formula powerfully acceded to and encouraged by weak criticism and pragmatic

4 R. Barthes, *On Racine*, trans. R. Howard (New York: Performing Arts Journal, 1983), ix.

desire: The "answers" given by the text provide the ostensible rationale for its coming–into–being—the answers *are* the text. This formula accords with our common and "information–bound" sense of reading to obtain "the facts about things," but it does not detract from the structural fact that any work—an academic essay no less than a novel—in any instant is inevitably a complex and unstable fold of these two conditions, opening up and closing its own question.

Moreover, since the answers contained by the text are largely the consequence of the questions it opens, that is, they are derived from the abyssal fear of plunging the world into essential doubt, then a hierarchy is discernable; the questions by and large precede the answers. Furthermore, if the answers are "supplemental" (this said in full knowledge of the enigmas it opens up), then far from being the "clearest thing," the most obvious aspect of the text, they are quite the opposite. The conditions of the production of answers would suggest the perennially enigmatic and problematic quality of all "answers"—for what was written and formulated as a question "beyond hope of an answer," as Barthes says, is scarcely redeemable in a single answer, a simple platitude, a cliché.

The answer then, read as an answer, is incomplete, and radically so, vis–a–vis the question opened by the text, or the work—for all of what is said here applies also *ipso facto* to the work of art. No matter how assertively the answer is given, no matter how much the author (or critic) "endows with [his] own substance the meaning proposed," the work (or the critical text) lives—has its transhistoric being—in its *incapacity* to be finally "redeemed" in terms of a (single) answer. It lives, by the formula "the meanings pass, the question remains." Thus, in the game of question and answer (of respiratory commentary) played by author–critic, and by author as reader–critic, the questions remain ultimately victorious—and the text's significance remains with the form of the direct and indirect questions that it contains.

To be sure, as Derrida points out at the beginning his discussion of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the question scarcely appears as such: "the question is always enclosed; it [. . .] appears only through the hermeticism of a proposition in which the answer has already begun to determine the question. The purity of the question can only be indicated or recalled through the difference of a hermeneutical effort."[5] The question, then, must be won; it is not evident. The text will dissemble on this point. But

5 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), 79-153. See esp. 79-81.

this dissembling is essential. For if the effort at holding open the question, at allowing it a space to come into being when it "has not yet found the language it has decided to seek," seems "very little—almost nothing," it is still to work at keeping open "a community of the question" and preserving the space within which the ethical is founded. To remind ourselves of the question, to keep it open, is thus to bring into view "that fragile moment when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated itself beneath the mask of the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already and fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of the question". Also, in this act "is sheltered and encapsulated an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. An unbreachable responsibility," that of the foundation of the ethical. Thus to think the question is to keep open the possibility, and disallow the premature enclosure of the ethical moment. Philosophically, this is the difference between the discipline "as a power and adventure of the question itself and philosophy as a determined event or turning point within this adventure." If "philosophy" (i.e., thinking in general)—and let us now say the relation *Building Dwelling Thinking* is to live this adventure, to remain alive at all, to remain alive to, and for, the ethical, then the power, the force, the space, the delicacy, of the question "must be maintained. As a question. The *"liberty of the question* [. . .] must be stated and protected." This is the work of thought.

This argument reveals that the force of the work lies not in the answers it gives—which the critic then submits to a questioning, an interrogation—but rather in the manner in which, within it, or by it, meanings are put in question. To be sure a work, a successful work, puts forward what we might call a "transcendent and compelling vision." A work, it is said, "might set out an agenda." Yet it is an illusion to think that this capacity stems primarily from the "answers" that the work gives. The truth is that the successful concept, far from naming an "answer" rather, the more intelligently, or the more originally, or the more adequately, names a problem. What is compelling in the concept–question is the depth of answer that it obtains from us, who must respond to its call.

Sigurd Lewerentz, Malmö Eastern Cemetery, view from the main entrance

On Immediacy

WILFRIED WANG

Landscapes, settlements, and buildings are inhabited and used. As far as they have been realized by societies, they are manifested culture. They mediate between cultural values and particular intentions on the one hand and use on the other. They are elements in an exchange of ideas, in a multivalent discourse. Built edifices form a corpus of knowledge, that, like any other form of knowledge, has accumulated over time. They structure large parts of social relations by gathering and sheltering, separating and excluding. Some of these edifices display aspects that are more part of a convention of norms,of a venacular; other aspects are more part of a development of such conventions. Together, landscapes, settlements, and buildings embody a logic of form and space, constituting a universal medium—with a morphology—that bears accumulated knowledge and patterns of relations. Thus, those cultural values that give rise to such edifices may be understood.

Aspects of built edifices may manifest cultural values that are common to a given society, other aspects may bear particular intentions that go beyond such common cultural values. Conventions, norms, and cultural values could be said to be general, beyond the need for active recognition as they may no longer be regarded as distinctive. They are intuited, not apprehended. Particular intentions, that may be specific to an edifice, that may be original to it, could require a preparatory process for their understanding. This process could either take a form of a didactic immanent to an edifice, or that of an external interpretation, exposition, or exegesis. Such particular intentions require for their understanding the sympathetic and open-minded user of edifices.

Given this range of aspects from cultural values to particular intentions within a built edifice, there is a corresponding range of mediation: some are mediated through edifices themselves, others need additional mediation. The direct, immediate understanding of an edifice is constituted by the proportion, syntactic, and semantic relations of intuitable norms, conventions, cultural values to particular intentions, original ideas.

As edifices can be seen in terms of a range of morphological categories (for example in the case of buildings, from constructional, tectonic, compartmental, configurational to contextual), general norms and particular intentions may have differentiated presences amongst each edifice, within each and every

morphological category. The degree of differentiation, similar to the notion of counterpoint in music, determines the nature of an edifice's coherence to be diverse or singular. The more diverse an edifice's coherence, the greater the breadth of required sensibilities on behalf of the user for the edifice's mediation. Conversely, the more singular its coherence, the narrower the range of necessary sensibilities on behalf of the user for the edifice's mediation. Thus, if an edifice's singular coherence is dependent on particular intentions, it may require additional, possibly external, mediation for its understanding.

As for the dimension of time in the direct understanding of an edifice: the more diverse an edifice's coherence, the more likely it is that the process of understanding will occur gradually. Users of the edifice might begin to understand the cultural values and particular intentions after a number of uses over a period time. This is distinct from an edifice with a singular coherence, whose cultural values and intentions may be grasped more rapidly, provided that the intentions do not require separate mediation.

The understanding of an edifice, whether rapid or gradual, may be confined to that of the edifice itself. Landscapes, settlements, and buildings though may make users aware of more than their inherent cultural values and particular intentions; an edifice may make users conscious of their own states of existence, allowing them to discern and judge not only the edifice that mediates such cultural and particular intentions, but also underlying values and intentions themselves. Edifices that refer to the constitution of culture and concepts, that engage in a process of ontological reflexion, would attempt to rely as far as possible on the medium of the built edifice itself, would attempt to be as direct, as immediate as possible.

Accompanying this process is the transcendence of the medium itself. The morphological categories and elements of edifices that engage in processes of ontological reflexion tend to be constitutively and materially constructed abstractions. The complex balance of a composition from one morphological category to an element of an ensuing morphological category requires precision. Apparent conventional elements may exist within each morphological category, their composition may have been radically reinvestigated and reconstituted. The medium is necessarily transcended to enable an edifice of

Sigurd Lewerentz, Malmö Eastern Cemetery, view of waiting room in the Chapel of St. Knut

constitutively and materially constructed abstractions, which might result in apparent conventional morphological elements, to defer to cultural values and particular intentions outside the edifice's own values and intentions. In transcending the medium, particular intentions may become distributed within conventions and norms, enabling such edifices to be appropriately characterized. This opens up the subject of conscious composition, with issues of the character of reality, that is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that the precise disposition and composition of morphological elements in relation to the morphological categories of an edifice does not necessarily determine a precise response on behalf of the users.



Sigurd Lewerentz, Malmö Eastern Cemetery, view of porches and groves to the Chapels of St. Gertrud and St. Knut





THE CAPACITY OF ABSORPTION

The first room: water precedes word, the hum of spinning liquid, 150 vortexes scoring the beeswax walls, from a megaphone of flax, twisted and braided, a mouthpiece invites speech, speech stills the spin of the water, blocking the end of the horn, the image of an ear flooding with water.

The middle room: below an algae—encrusted water line, the sound of crickets, a table surfaced with flowing water, a figure stands with fingers absorbed through holes in the table, a heavy canvas suit ends in a formless cord.

The last room: walls dark with a surface of rubbed graphite, the floor, a bed of text, ten tons of linotype, a buoy etched with the lines of a phrenology chart, tied to the canvas tail, on the wall, a stick figure jerked by turning calipers.

Ann Hamilton, Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles 1988-1989

Form and Meaning

The real ideas of a poem are not those that occur to the poet *before* he writes his poem, but rather those that appear in his work *afterward*, whether by design or by accident. Content stems from form, and not vice versa. Every form produces its own ideas, its own vision of the world. Form has meaning; and, what is more, in the realm of art only form possesses meaning. The meaning of a poem does not lie in what the poet wanted to say, but in what the poem actually says. What we think we are saying and what we are really saying are two quite different things.

—*Octavio Paz*

Octavio Paz, "*Form and Meaning,*" Alternating Current, trans. Helen Lane, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1990),6.

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



PARALLEL LINES

The first room: a floor lined with copper tokens, numbered, make a road, bordered by gutters of soot stained wax. Walls, smoked licked, marked by the hand of candle flame. A 40' cradle bed of tapered candles burned and extinguished.

The second room: a copper lining numbered tokens, floor, walls and ceiling, steel and glass vitrine, turkey carcasses eaten clean by colonies of dermisted beetles.

Ann Hamilton, Sao Paulo Bienal 1991