DESIGN BOOK REVIEW

Orientalism
Issue 29/30 – Summer/Fall 1993

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
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644 2271

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
Front cover: Drawing of the *"sections étrangères"* at the world's fair in Paris, 1878. From left to right: the Annam, Persian, Siamese, Moroccan, and Tunisian pavilions. (From *Displaying the Orient.*)

Back cover: Belly dancers (with props) on display at the world's fair in Paris, 1900. (From *Displaying the Orient.*)

CONTENTS

HISTORY AND THEORY

To the West of the West

While such a place may not truly exist, the West is nonetheless revered as a sacrosanct territory. Where does the West begin? To the left of Istanbul, to the right of Broadway? Above Mexico City, below the "no-fly zones"? Although it is more a state of mind than a stretch of land, it is incontestably located in a fictional geography invented to justify economic appropriation through racist presumptions of ethnic and moral superiority. The West is a patently cultural construct, the most striking instance of language controlling matter; and its most tangible fruit is the built environment. The temple front is the imprimatur of Western culture as surely as the classical orders arrived from somewhere slightly to the east of wherever the West perceived itself to be.

Anyone raised in the Western tradition, regardless of political, social, or ethnic status, inadvertently exerts a linguistic projection onto the condition of "Otherness" found to the East, a cultural phenomenon that Edward Said polemically defined in 1978 as "Orientalism." Many of the reviews gathered in this issue of *DBR* struggle with Said's notion of how the literature concerning things outside the so-called West—in this case, literature about design issues—either reconfirms or challenges a dominant Western self that speaks about or for the dominated, Oriental Other. This issue also coincides with the recent publication of Said's *Culture and Imperialism*, a sequel to *Orientalism*. We have been fortunate to include two extremely insightful pieces into Said's position: one a lecture by Said, and the other an interview, generously submitted by David Barsamian of Alternative Radio in Boulder, Colorado.

It is difficult for a Westerner to imagine what a non-Orientalist treatment of non-Western topics would be like: one could anticipate a careful deconstruction of cultural stereotypes, but how can the categorical structures of one realm pretend to transcend those of another? Conversely, should the conscientious analysis of Orientalism be used as a prophylactic to preserve the so-called Orient from being an inspirational source? Should we deny Le Corbusier his romantic attachment to the forms of the Magreb on the grounds of Orientalism? Certainly his viaduct project for Algiers would have been the most grand, and most tragic, of colonialist artifacts. It seems important to distinguish which aspects of culture become complicit in the structure of oppression.

Meticulous academics and intellectuals may do their best to try to provide accurate information and to redefine the histories of peoples who have been previously denied ontological status, but the real dilemma, the one that Western-educated Said may never be able to satisfactorily resolve, is how to truly instill the subjectivity of those who have been linguistically disenfranchised. Yes, let others speak for themselves, but as long as the West considers itself a discrete entity, it will not hear those others speaking, and will only hear its own voice. Control over bodies, be it spatial or military, then returns in its tragic dimension with a few of "us" (often killed by the euphemistically termed "friendly fire") worth the elimination of many of them. Gratuitous violence, as the latest U.S. administration has unfortunately again demonstrated in Iraq, is always a product of some delusion of moral superiority based on cultural presumptuousness. Until policies are firmly grounded in intersubjectivity instead of discrimination, the West will continue to live in the confines of its painful fiction. As Said proposes, education—the type that creates "a self-conscious, skeptical, democratically minded citizenry"—is the crucial element on both sides of this imaginary divide if any beneficial change is to be achieved.

This double-issue of *DBR* owes a special thanks to Zeynep Çelik for suggesting the theme and for helping us network with a series of authors. We would also like to acknowledge the support of the National Endowment for the Arts for partially funding this issue.

Richard Ingersoll

LETTERS

To the Editors:

In *DBR* 26, Jeffrey Chusid reviews my book, *The Wright Space*, and has some kind things to say; he also notes that the book is "filled with enough inaccuracies to often challenge the argument being presented."

Some inaccuracies are Mr. Chusid's, not mine. An instance: he finds that in my critical stance, "too much gets left out. As one example, Hildebrand asserts that because the [Charles] Ennis House has the most powerful sense of refuge, it is one of Wright's greatest houses—an unbalanced claim at best." I say no such thing. In a quick rereading of the Ennis discussion, I don't find the word "refuge" anywhere; certainly, it plays no major role. What I do say, plainly, is that the Ennis house "introduces not only an unprecedented manipulation of interior prospect but also the phenomenon Stephen Kaplan calls *mystery*." Nothing there, or elsewhere, about refuge; in the ensuing discussion, prospect, vista, and mystery are the terms that actually recur. As for the importance I give it in Wright's career, I do so because, as I clearly say, the characteristic of mystery that it introduces for the first time in Wright's work, plays an important subsequent role, and its origin has not been previously credited to the Ennis House. Mr. Chusid may not agree with the the point, but fairness demands that he present it with a degree of accuracy. This is not an example of my leaving things out: it is either remarkably careless reading on Mr. Chusid's part, or misrepresentation.

He also notes of the Ennis discussion that I "force the argument, [describing] a large inert volume in the Ennis living room . . . as a 'minstrel gallery,' even though the volume is totally inaccessible." In fact, what I said was "the upper part of the living room continues as a kind of deep minstrel gallery," and thereafter put the term "minstrel gallery" in quotes. In each case, a fair reading would surely reveal that I was looking for an easily understood spatial term. Does Mr. Chusid seriously contend that this constitutes the forcing of an argument? Mr. Chusid considers that the presentation of my viewpoint is "rather superficial." Considering his misrepresentation of the Ennis House discussion, I must wonder whether his own reading of the work has been too superficial to justify such a damaging conclusion.

He also faults plan inaccuracies. I'm sure he's right about them, but, as the preface makes plain, I was attempting to produce more accurate plans than are yet available as a group elsewhere, to help readers follow the discussion, and some other reviewers, including William Allin Storrer,

believe I have done so. But this is not a book whose basic purpose is to present as-built or measured drawings of Wright's houses; that would be another book, and a valuable one, but it's not this book. In my book, I note of the plans that "no doubt errors remain; I can only hope they are minor." The errors cited by Mr. Chusid seem minor to me, but reasonable people, of course, can differ on the matter. What seems to me *not* seriously disputable is that the plans represent with useful accuracy the experiential conditions that the book aims to describe. If the errors Mr. Chusid cite, all unrelated to the book's purpose, are treated in the context of its purpose, a fair review would hardly give them the prominence that seems necessary to Mr. Chusid.

Mr. Chusid also calls Bill Hook's drawings "labor-intensive" and faults them for making the houses seem too alike. Both comments, I suppose, could also be made of Marion Mahony's gorgeous drawings. In any case, the drawings were intended to help those who have difficulty understanding the conditions of architectural space from only plans and isolated photos. But the drawings were also, of course, intended to illustrate some characteristics that the houses share. I say "of course" because the point of the book, clearly made at its outset, is that Wright used several spatial and formal relationships repetitively, and those relationships might now be argued as being particularly powerful and appropriate for the human dwelling. Other books may be about other things—how each of Wright's houses differs from one another, for example—but this book is about those particular ways in which the houses are similar.

Of course, no reviewer needs to subscribe to the views or the quality of the work under review. But a reviewer is obliged to attempt a more than superficial understanding of the work's purposes. And, in order to be responsible, a reviewer's citations, paraphrasing, and conclusions must be careful, fair, and accurate. Mr. Chusid's review has some shortcomings on both counts. As such, it is unfairly damaging, and I must protest.

Grant Hildebrand
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

Professor Hildebrand and I must agree to disagree on several of the points in his letter, such as the drawings. I would refer readers to my original review for why I criticized them. He is absolutely correct, however, to note that his argument regarding the Ennis House is more sophisticated than I described. In the interests of being concise in a rather lengthy review, I unfairly elided the book's primary concepts of

prospect and refuge and Hildebrand's particular, rich discussion of the spatial qualities of the Ennis House. The point I was attempting to make, however, was that to describe the Ennis House as "one of the key buildings of Wright's career" calls for a broader analysis than the formal one given in the book. Hildebrand's reading of the plan needs to be placed into the context of the other ideas and architectural strategies being implemented simultaneously to test its relevance and the coherence of the architect's vision. Some of those ideas might include: the strong material and structural properties of the new, experimental, concrete-block construction system; the way the house is organized into pavilions set on a giant deck, linked by the loggia, in an apparent response to its benign Southern California siting; Wright's search for an appropriate historical-style precedent amongst the many romantic visions available in 1920s Los Angeles; the role that Austrian architects such as Adolph Loos and R. M. Schindler played in the development of Wright's more complex handling of space in his California houses; the actual views from the houses' various "prospects"; and even the way in which prospect and refuge is so apposite for the ambivalent urbanism of Los Angeles and Wright's burgeoning vision of the Broadacre City.

Jeffrey Chusid
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

Corrections:

• On page 59 of Robert Twomby's review, "Fragments: In *Festschrifts* and in Exhibition," (*DBR* 26), the sentence that reads, "Similarly the 'city' itself became synonymous with advanced architecture, New York in particular," should have read: "Similarly, the city itself became synonymous with advanced architecture, New York in particular with the *retardataire*, or worse." We regret the error.

• Due to a copyediting error, in Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre's review, "The Two New Sciences of Representation" (*DBR* 27), Hilary Putnam was incorrectly referred to as "she" rather than "he."

EDWARD W. SAID
Culture and Imperialism

Edward W. Said was born in Jerusalem, Palestine. He was educated in his homeland as well as Cairo, and received his B.A. from Princeton and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. He is a professor in the Department of Literature at Columbia University, and is the author of Orientalism, The Question of Palestine, Covering Islam, After the Last Sky, *and* Culture and Imperialism. *He has generously allowed us to reprint a lecture he delivered at York University in Toronto, Canada, on February 10, 1993.*

I want to begin with an indisputable fact, namely that during the 19th century unprecedented power, compared to which the power of Rome, Spain, Baghdad, or Constantinople in their day were far less formidable, was concentrated in Britain and France and later in other Western countries, the United States especially. This century, the 19th century, climaxed what has been called the "rise of the West." Western power allowed the imperial metropolitan centers at the end of the 19th century to acquire and accumulate territory and subjects on a truly astonishing scale. Consider that in 1800, Western powers claimed 55 percent, but actually held approximately 35 percent, of the earth's surface. But by 1878, the percentage was 67 percent of the world held by Western powers, which is a rate of increase of 83,000 square miles per year. By 1914, the annual rate by which the Western empires acquired territory had risen to an astonishing 247,000 square miles per year. And Europe held a grand total of roughly 85 percent of the earth as colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions, and Commonwealth. No other associated set of colonies in history was as large, none so totally dominated, none so unequal in power to the Western metropolis. As a result, says William McNeill, in his book *The Pursuit of Power,* "the world was united into a single interacting whole as never before."

In Europe itself at the end of the 19th century scarcely a corner of life was untouched by the facts of empire. The economies were hungry for overseas markets, raw materials, cheap labor, and profitable land. Defense and foreign policy establishments were more and more committed to the maintenance of vast tracts of distant territory and large numbers of subjugated peoples.

When the Western powers were not in close and sometimes ruthless competition with each other for more colonies—and it's good to remind ourselves that the great Scottish historian of empire, V. G. Kiernan has said, all modern empire imitate each other—they were hard at work settling, surveying, studying, and, of course, ruling the territories under their jurisdiction. The United States experience was from the beginning founded upon the idea of an imperium. The U.S. was founded as an empire, a dominion state of sovereignty that would expand in population and territory and increase in power. There were claims for North American territory to be made and fought over with astonishing success. There were native peoples to be dominated, variously exterminated, variously dislodged. Then, as the American republic increased in age and hemispheric power during the 19th century, there were distant lands to be designated "vital to American interests," to be intervened in and fought over—for example, the Philippines, the Caribbean, Central America, the Barbary Coast, parts of Europe and the Middle East, Vietnam, and Korea.

Curiously, though, so influential has been the discourse insisting on American specialness, altruism, and opportunity, that imperialism in the United States as a word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently in accounts of the United States culture, politics, and history. But the connection between imperial politics and culture in North America, and in particular in the United States, is astonishingly direct. American attitudes to greatness, to hierarchies of race, to the perils of other revolutions—the American Revolution being considered unique and somehow unrepeatable elsewhere in the world—these have remained constant,

have dictated, have obscured the realities of empire while apologists for overseas American interests have insisted on American innocence, doing good, fighting for freedom.

Graham Greene's character Pyle, in his novel of 1951, *The Quiet American,* embodies this cultural formation with merciless accuracy. Yet for citizens of 19th-century Britain and France, unlike in America, empire was a major topic of unembarrassed cultural attention. British India and French North Africa alone played a tremendous role in the imagination, the economy, the political life and social fabric of British and French society. If we mention names like Edmund Burke, Eugène Delacroix, John Ruskin, Thomas Carlyle, Henry James and John Stuart Mill, Rudyard Kipling, Honoré de Balzac, Nerval, Gustave Flaubert, or Joseph Conrad, we would be mapping only a tiny corner of a much larger reality than even their immense collective talents cover. There were scholars, administrators, travelers, traders, parliamentarians, merchants, novelists, theorists, speculators, adventurers, visionaries, poets, and every variety of outcast and misfit in the outlying possessions of these two imperial powers, each of whom contributed to the formation of a colonial actuality existing at the heart of metropolitan life.

As I shall be using the term—and I'm not really too interested in terminological adjustments—"imperialism" means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center that rules a distant territory. "Colonialism," which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory. As the historian Michael Doyle puts it, "Empire is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, economic, social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire."

In our time, direct colonialism such as that of the British in India or the French in Algeria and Morocco has largely ended. Yet imperialism lingers where it often has

been in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as its specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices. The point I want to make is that neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. It's not just a matter of going out there and getting a territory and sitting on it. Both of these practices are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive cultural formations that include ideas that certain people and certain territories require and beseech domination. For example, if you look at some of the writings about India in England from the middle to the end of the 19th century, you realize that India existed in order to be ruled by England. As Kipling represented in his novel *Kim* principally but also in some of his short stories, he has Indian characters say that without the English, India would disappear. It would just not the same place.

So these people and territories required domination as well as forms of knowledge that are affiliated with domination. The vocabulary of classic 19th-century imperial culture England and France is plentiful with words and concepts like "inferior" or "subject races," and notions of "subordinate people," "dependency," "expansion," and "authority." Out of the imperial experiences, notions about culture were clarified, reinforced, criticized, or rejected. As for the curious but perhaps allowable idea propagated about a hundred years ago by the English historian J. R. Seeley, that some of Europe's overseas empires were originally acquired by accident, it doesn't by any stretch of the imagination account for their inconsistency, persistence, and systemized acquisition and administration, let alone their augmented rule and sheer presence. As David Landes has said in his book, *The Unbound Prometheus,* which is about the industrial expansion of Europe in the early 19th century, "the decision of certain European powers to establish plantations, that is, to treat their colonies as continuous enterprises, was, whatever one may think of the morality, a momentous innovation."

The primacy in the 19th century and through most of the 20th of the British and French empires by no means obscures the quite remarkable modern expansion of Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan and, in a different way, Russia and the United States. Russia, however, acquired its imperial territories almost exclusively by adjacency, that is to say, taking territories that are east or south of the actual borders of Russia. Unlike Britain or France, which jumped thousands of miles beyond their own borders to other continents, Russia moved to swallow whatever lands or people stood next to its borders, which in the process kept moving further and further east and south. But in the British and French cases, the sheer distance of attractive territory summoned the projection of far-flung interests. That is my focus here, partly because I'm interested in examining the cultural forms and structures of feeling which it produces, and partly because overseas domination is the world I grew up in and we still live in.

The Soviet Union's and America's superpower status, which was enjoyed for a little less than half a century, derives from very different histories and from different imperial trajectories than those of Britain and France in the 19th century. There are several varieties of domination and responses to it, but the Western one, along with the resistance it provoked, is in part the subject of my lecture. In the expansion of the great Western empires, profit, and the hope of further profit, was obviously tremendously important, as the attractions of spices, sugar, slaves, rubber, cotton, opium, tin, gold, silver, over centuries amply testify. But so was inertia, the fact that if you got there you would have to stay: investment in already-going enterprises, tradition, and market or institutional forces kept the enterprise going.

But there's more than that to imperialism. There was a commitment to imperialism over and above profit, a commitment in constant circulation and recirculation which, on one hand, allowed decent men and women from England or France, London or Paris, to accept the notion that distant territories and their native peoples should be subjugated and, on the other hand, replenished metropolitan energies so that these decent people could think of the empire as a protracted, almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, or less advanced peoples. We mustn't forget, and this is a very important aspect of my topic, that there was very little domestic resistance inside Britain and France. There was a kind of tremendous unanimity on the question of having an em-

The colonial world in 1900.

By the end of the 19th century, the facts of empire had touched most of the world; economies were hungry for raw materials, cheap labor, and profitable land. Advertisement depicting a Ceylonese tea plantation, 1896.

pire. There was very little domestic resistance to imperial expansion during the 19th century, although these empires were very frequently established and maintained under adverse and even disadvantageous conditions. Not only were immense hardships in the African wilds or wastes—the "dark continent," as it was called in the latter part of the 19th century—endured by the white colonizers, but there was always the tremendously risky physical disparity between a small number of Europeans at a very great distance from home and a much larger number of natives on their home territory. In India, for instance, by the 1930s, a mere 4,000 British civil servants, assisted by 60,000 soldiers and 90,000 civilians, had billeted themselves upon a country of 300,000,000 people. The will, self-confidence, even arrogance necessary to maintain such a state of affairs could only be guessed at. But as one can see in the texts of novels like E. M. Forster's *Passage to India* or Kipling's *Kim*, these attitudes are at least as significant as the number of people in the army or civil service or the millions of pounds that England derived from India.

For the enterprise of empire depends upon the idea of having an empire, as Joseph Conrad so powerfully seems to have realized in *Heart of Darkness*. He says that the difference between us in the modern period, the modern imperialists, and the Romans is that the Romans were there just for the loot. They were just stealing. But we go there with an idea. He was thinking, obviously, of the idea for instance in Africa, of the French and the Belgians, that when you go to these continents you're not just robbing the people of their ivory and slaves and so on. You are improving them in some way. I'm really quite serious. The idea, for example, of the French empire was that France had a *mission civilisatrice*, that it was there to civilize the natives. It was a very powerful idea. Obviously, not so many of the natives believed it, but the *French* believed that that was what they were doing.

The idea of having an empire is very important, and that is the central feature that I am interested in. All kinds of preparations are made for this idea within a culture and then, in turn and in time, imperialism acquires a kind of coherence, a set of experiences and a presence of ruler and ruled alike within the culture.

To a very great degree, the era of high 19th-century imperialism is over. France and Britain gave up their most splendid possessions after World War II, and lesser powers also divested themselves of their far-flung dominions. That era clearly had an identity—for example, Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Empire,* the third book of his *History of Civilization* trilogy, talks about the latter part of the 19th century. Yet, although the age of empire clearly had an identity all its own, and historians talk about it roughly from 1878 through World War II, the meaning of the imperial past is not totally contained within it, but has entered the reality of hundreds of millions of people. Its existence as shared memory in a highly conflicted texture of culture, ideology, memory, and policy still exercises tremendous force. Frantz Fanon says, "We should flatly refuse the situation to which the Western countries wish to condemn us." This was in 1961. "Colonialism and imperialism have not paid their dues when they withdraw their flags and their police forces from our territories. For centuries the foreign colonists have behaved in the underdeveloped world like nothing more than criminals." A proper understanding of imperialism must also take stock in the present nostalgia for empire, which you still find in the writings of French and English historians, for example, who regret the day and the idea that we had to give up India, or that we had to withdraw from Algeria. That still exists. And what also exists is the anger and resentment it provokes, the memory of empire, in those who were ruled and who see in empire nothing but an unmitigated disaster for the native people.

So we must try to look carefully and integrally at the culture that nurtured the sentiment, the rationale, and above all the imagination of empire. And we need also to understand the hegemony of the imperial ideology, which by the end of the 19th century had become completely embedded in the affairs of cultures whose less regrettable features we still celebrate.

Thus I come to the present. Imperialism did not really end, did not suddenly become past once decolonization had set in motion the dismantling of the classical empires. A

legacy of connections still binds countries like Algeria and India to France and Britain, respectively. A vast new population of Muslims, Africans, and West Indians from former colonial territories now resides, for instance, in metropolitan Europe. Even Italy, Germany, and Scandinavia today must deal with these dislocations, which are, to a large degree, the result of imperialism and colonialization as well as expanding European populations. Also, the end of the cold war and of the Soviet Union has definitely changed the world map. The triumph of the United States as the last superpower suggests that a new set of force lines will structure the world, which were already beginning to be apparent in the 1960s and 1970s.

What are the salient features of the representation of the old imperial inequities, "the persistence," in Arno Mayer's telling phrase, "of the old regime"? One certainly is the immense economic rift between the North and the South, between the poor and the rich states whose basically quite simple topography was drawn in the starkest terms by the so-called Willy Brandt Report, which is entitled "North-South: A Program for Survival." It was published in 1980. Its conclusions are couched in the language of crisis and emergency. It says that the poorest nations of the southern hemisphere must have their priority needs addressed. Hunger must be abolished, commodity earnings strengthened. Manufacturing in the northern hemisphere should permit the genuine growth of southern manufacturing centers. Transnational corporations should be restricted in their practices. The global monetary system should be reformed. Development and finance should be changed to eliminate what has been called the "debt trap." The crux of the matter is, as the report phrases it, "power sharing," or giving the southern countries a more equitable share in power and decision making within monetary and financial institutions.

It's difficult to disagree with the Willy Brandt Report's diagnosis, which is made more credible by its balanced tone and its silent picture of untrammeled rapacity, greed, and immorality of the North, or even with the recommendations of the report. But

how will the changes come about? The postwar classification of all nations into three worlds, the first, second, and third worlds, originally coined by a French journalist in the 1950s, has largely been abandoned. Willy Brandt and his colleagues implicitly concede that the United Nations, an admirable organization in principle, has not been adequate. It doesn't seem today as if it is adequate, even now, to the innumerable regional and global conflicts that occur with increasing frequency: in Yugoslavia the United Nations is powerless, largely because of the will of the so-called permanent members of the Security Council, principal among them the United States.

The U.S. does not want to be perceived as an imperial power like its predecessors, the British and French, preferring instead the notion of "world responsibility" as a rationale for what it does.

With the exception of the work of small groups, for example, the World Order Models Project, global thinking tends to reproduce superpower, cold-war, regional, ideological, or ethnic contests of old, which are even more dangerous in the nuclear and post-nuclear era, as the horrors of Yugoslavia attest. The powerful are likely to get more powerful and rich, the weak less powerful and poorer. And Africa, of course, is living testimony to this fact. The gap between the two, the North and South, overrides the former distinctions between socialist and capitalist regimes that, in Europe at least, have become less significant. Noam Chomsky concludes that during the 1980s "the North-South conflict will not subside." I think that's true also of the 1990s. "New forms of domination will have to be devised to ensure that privileged segments of Western industrial society maintain substan-

tial control over global resources, human and material, and benefit disproportionately from this control. Thus it comes as no surprise that the reconstitution of ideology in the United States"—and I would say especially after the cold war—"find echoes throughout the industrial world. But it's an absolute requirement for the Western system of ideology that a vast gulf be established between the civilized West, with its traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination, and the barbaric brutality of those who, for some reason, perhaps defective genes, fail to appreciate the depth of this historical commitment, so well revealed by America's Asian wars, for instance." Chomsky's move from the North-South dilemma to American and Western dominance is, I think, basically correct. Despite the decrease in American economic power, the urban economic and cultural crisis in the United States, for example, I think a lot of the discussion recently in America about the "canon," what is Western literature, is connected to the reconstitution of ideology. The decrease in American power and these various crisis in the United States, as well as the ascendancy of Pacific Rim states, like Taiwan and Japan, and the confusions of a multipolar world have muted the stridency now of the Reagan and Bush period. For one, it underlines the continuity of the ideological need to consolidate and justify domination in cultural terms that has been the case in the West since the 19th century and even earlier. Secondly, it accurately picks up the theme, based on repeated projections and theorizations of American power, sounded in often very insecure and therefore overstated ways, that we live today in a period of American ascendancy.

Studies during the past decade of major American personalities of the mid-20th century illustrate what I mean. Take the case of Walter Lippman, the most famous pundit and journalist of the middle years of the 20th century, with the most prestige and power—he represents the mind-set of American ascendancy. The extraordinary thing about Lippman's career is not that he was correct or especially perspicacious in his reporting or his predictions about world events. He

wasn't. Rather, from an insider's position—that is, as a man who stood near power and always tried to talk as if he was an insider—he articulated American global dominance without demurral, except for Vietnam, when he disagreed with Lyndon Johnson. He saw his role as a pundit to be that of helping his compatriots to make "an adjustment to reality," the reality of unrivaled American power in the world, which he made more acceptable by stressing its moralism, realism, and altruism with a remarkable skill for not straying too far from the thrust of public policy.

What I'm trying to suggest is that the role of American power in the world really depends not just on the raw military power of the United States, whose crises in health, the economy, the universities, etc., flood the country. There is still a very powerful ideological, cultural consensus in the country that suggests in the career of people like Lippman that America's role is to be the leader of the world. A similar view is found in the influential writing of George Kennan, the author of the containment policy that guided U.S. policy for much of the cold war period. Kennan believed his country to be the guardian of Western civilization. For Kennan, such a destiny in the non-European world implied no effort to be expended on making the U.S. popular. He called it "rotarian idealism." But what it depended on was what he called "straight power concepts." Since no formerly colonized people or state had the wherewithal to challenge the U.S. (this is all after the end of the classical empires), and nobody had the power to challenge the U.S. militarily or economically, he cautioned restraint. Yet, in a memo written in 1948 for the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, he approved of the recolonizing of Africa. In something he wrote in 1971, he also approved of apartheid in South Africa. He didn't approve of its abuses, he said, but he thought the idea was a good. Although he did disapprove of the American intervention in Vietnam, generally he approved of what he called a "purely American kind of informal imperial system." There was no doubt in his mind that Europe and America were uniquely positioned to lead the world, a view that

caused him to regard his own country as a sort of adolescent growing into the role once played by the British empire.

Other forces shaped postwar U.S. policy besides Lippman and Kennan. Both of them were lonely men who were alienated from the mass society they lived in, who hated jingoism and the cruder forms of aggressive American behavior. They knew that isolationism, interventionism, anticolonialism, free-trade imperialism were related to the domestic characteristics of American political life, which was described by the historian Richard Hofstadter as "anti-intellectual and paranoid." These produced the inconsistencies, advances, and retreats of U.S. foreign policy before the end of World War II and certainly after it. Yet the idea of American exceptionalism and leadership is never absent. After the British and the French disappeared, and certainly in the period after World War II, when the empires disappeared, America took over. No matter what the U.S. does, these authorities often do not want it to be an imperial power like the others it followed, preferring instead the notion of "world responsibility"—in my opinion the same thing—as a rationale for what it does. Earlier rationales, the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny and so on, lead to world responsibility, which exactly corresponds to the growth in the U.S. global interests after World War II and to the conception of its enormous power as formulated by the foreign policy and intellectual elite.

In a very clear account of what damage this has done, Richard Barnet notes that a U.S. military intervention in the third world has occurred every year between 1945 and 1967. Since that time, the U.S. has been impressively active on the world stage, most notably during the Gulf War of 1991, when 650,000 troops were dispatched 6,000 miles away to turn back an Iraqi invasion of a U.S. oil-producing ally. Such interventions, says Barnet in his book, *The Roots of War*, have "all the elements of a powerful imperial creed: a sense of mission, historical necessity, and evangelical fervor. The imperial creed rests on a theory of law making, according to the strident globalists like LBJ and the muted globalists like Nixon. The

goal of U.S. foreign policy is to bring about a world increasingly subject to the rule of law. But it is the United States which organizes the peace and defines the law. The United States imposes the international interests by setting the ground rules for economic development and military development across the planet. Thus the U.S. sets rules for Soviet behavior in Cuba, Brazilian behavior in Brazil, Vietnamese behavior in Vietnam. Today, America's self-appointed writ runs throughout the world including the Soviet Union and China, over whose territory the United States during the cold war asserted the right to fly military aircraft. The U.S., uniquely blessed with surpassing riches and an exceptional history, stands above the international system, not within it. Supreme among nations, she stands ready to be the bearer of the Law." Although these words were published in 1972, they even more accurately describe the U.S. during the invasion of Panama and the Gulf War, which continues to try to dictate its views about law and peace all over the world. The amazing thing about this is not that it is attempted, but that it is done with so much consensus and near unanimity in a public sphere, constructed as a kind of cultural space expressly to represent and explain this policy. In periods of great internal crisis, for example, a year or so after the Gulf War, this sort of moralistic triumphalism is suspended and put aside. Yet while it lasts, the media play an extraordinary role in "manufacturing consent," as Chomsky puts it, in making the average American feel that it is up to us to right the wrongs of the world, and the devil with contradictions and inconsistencies. The Gulf intervention was preceded by a string of interventions in Panama, Grenada, Libya, all of them widely discussed, most of them approved, or at least undeterred, as belonging to "us" by right. As Kiernan puts it, "America loved to think that whatever it wanted was just what the human race wanted."

To complete this rather bleak picture, let me add a few summary observations about conditions in the third world. Obviously we can't discuss the non-Western world as distinct from developments in the West. The ravages of colonial wars in Africa, Latin

America, Asia, the protracted conflicts between nationalism and imperialist control, the disputatious new fundamentalists and nativist movements nourished by despair and anger, the extension of the world system over the developing world—these circumstances are directly connected to actualities in the West. On the one hand, as Eqbal Ahmad says in the best account of these circumstances that we have, the peasant and precapitalist classes that predominated during the era of classical colonialism have dispersed in the new states into new, often abruptly urbanized and restless classes tied to the absorptive economic and political powers of the metropolitan West. In Pakistan and Egypt, for example, the contentious fundamentalists are led not by peasant or working-class intellectuals, but by Western-educated engineers, doctors, and lawyers. Ruling minorities emerge with the new deformations in the new structures of power. These pathologies and disenchantment with authority they have caused run the gamut from the neofascist to the dynastic and oligarchic, with only a few states retaining a functioning parliamentary and democratic system.

For all its apparent power, this new overall pattern of domination—which is, in my opinion, a replication of the old imperial order, which developed during the era of mass societies commanded at the top by a powerfully centralizing culture and a complex incorporative economy—is basically unstable. Now I come to the part about the counter-discourse to imperialism. As the remarkable French urban sociologist, Paul Virilio, has said, this polity [the world in which we now live] is based on speed, instant communication, distant reach, constant emergency, insecurity induced by mounting crises, some of which lead to war. In such circumstances, the rapid occupation of real as well as public space, colonization becomes the central militaristic prerogative of a modern state, as the United States showed when it dispatched a huge army to the Arabian Gulf and commandeered the media to help carry out the operation. In other words, it's so unstable that if you feel threatened, if your interests feel threatened, then you dispatch a huge army

In India, fewer than one hundred thousand British civil servants, soldiers, and civilians managed to control a country with a population of three hundred million. British daily life in India relied on local labor; 1896.

with this tremendous logistical capacity and you occupy and fight a war. As against that capacity of a modern imperial state like the U.S., Virilio suggests that the modernist project of liberating language and speech has a parallel today in the liberation of critical spaces: hospitals, universities, theaters, factories, churches, empty buildings. In both, the fundamental transgressive act is to inhabit the normally uninhabited. As examples Virilio cites the cases of people who are a counter to the imperial invader, whose current status is the consequence either of decolonization (like migrant workers, refugees, *gastarbeiter* in Germany), or of major demographic and political shifts (blacks, immigrants, urban squatters, students, popular insurrectionists). They are the counter to imperialism because you have people coming from the southern world into the Western metropolis and causing an instability at the center. These cases constitute a real alternative to the authority of the state. If the 1960s are now remembered as a decade of European and American mass demonstrations, the 1980s must surely be the decade of mass uprisings outside the Western metropolis. Think of the places where there were mass uprisings: in Iran, the Philippines, Argentina,

Korea, Pakistan, Algeria, China, South Africa, virtually all of Eastern Europe, the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. These are some of the most impressive crowd-activated sites, each of them crammed with largely unarmed civilian populations, well past the point of enduring the imposed deprivations, tyranny, and inflexibility of governments that had ruled them for too long.

The two general areas of agreement are that personal freedom should be safeguarded and that the earth's environment should be defended against further decline. Democracy and ecology, each providing a local context and plenty of concrete combat zones, are set against a cosmic backdrop. Whether in the struggle of nationalities or in the problems of deforestation, global warming, the AIDS epidemic, the interactions between individual identity embodied in minor activities (like smoking or the usage of aerosol cans) and the general framework are tremendously direct, and the time-honored conventions of art, history, and philosophy don't seem well suited to them. Much of what was so exciting for four decades about Western modernism and its aftermath seems almost quaintly ab-

stract, desperately Eurocentric today. More reliable now are the reports from the front lines, where struggles are being fought between domestic tyrants and idealist oppositions, hybrid combinations of realism and fantasy, cartographic and archaeological descriptions, exploration in mixed forms, the essay, the video or film, the photograph, the memoir, the story or aphorism of unhoused, exilic experiences.

The major task, then, is to match the new economic and social dislocations and configurations of our time with the startling realities of human interdependence on a world scale. If the Japanese, East European, Islamic, and Western instances express anything in common, it is that a new critical consciousness, a kind of counter-discourse to empire, is needed. This can be achieved only by revised attitudes to education. Merely urging students to insist on their own identity, their tradition, their history, their uniqueness, may initially get them to name their basic requirements for democracy and for the right to an assured, decently humane existence. But we need to go on and to situate the identities of our students and ourselves in a geography of *other* identities, people, cultures, and then study how, despite their differences, they always overlap with each other through unhierarchical influence, crossing, incorporation, recollection, deliberate forgetfulness, and, of course, conflict. We are nowhere near the end of history, but we are still far from free of monopolizing and imperial attitudes towards it.

These haven't been much good in the past, notwithstanding the rallying cries of the politics of separatist identity, multiculturalism, minority discourse. And the quicker we teach ourselves to find alternatives, the better and safer. The fact is, we are mixed in with each other in ways that most national systems of education have not dreamed of. To match knowledge in the arts and sciences with these integrated realities is, I believe, the intellectual and cultural challenge of our time. The steady critique of nationalism from the standpoint of real liberation should not be forgotten. For we must not condemn ourselves to repeat the imperial experience, although all around us

it is being repeated. How, in the redefined and yet very close relationship between culture and empire which enables disquieting forms of domination, can we sustain the liberating energies released by the great decolonizing resistance movements and the mass uprisings of the 1980s? Can these energies elude the homogenizing processes of modern life? Can they hold in abeyance the interventions of the new imperial centrality?

> **We need to situate the identities of our students and ourselves in a geography of *other* identities, people, cultures, and then study how, despite their differences, they always overlap with each other through unhierarchical influence, crossing, incorporation, recollection, deliberate forgetfulness, and, of course, conflict.**

"All things counter, original, spare, strange." That is a line from a poem by Gerald Manley Hopkins, *Pied Beauty*. The question is, Where are all these things? And where, too, we might ask, is there a place for that astonishingly harmonious vision of time intersecting with the timeless that occurs at the end of the last of the four quartets of T. S. Eliot's "Little Gidding": "Easy commerce of the old and new, the common word exact and without vulgarity, the form of word precise but not pedantic, the complete consort dancing together"? To recall Paul Virilio and his notion of how you can live in a world that is counter, original, spare, strange, in which there are many different identities, not yours alone, and where you don't want to impose one domination on everyone—Virilio's idea is what he calls counter-habitation, to live as migrants do in habitually uninhabited but nonetheless public spaces. We can perceive this on the political map of

the contemporary world, for clearly it is one of the unhappiest characteristics of our age to have produced more refugees, migrants, displaced persons, and exiles than ever before in history, most of them as a corollary to, and ironically enough as afterthoughts of, great colonial and imperial conflicts. As the struggle for independence produced new states and new boundaries, it also produced homeless wanderers, nomads, and vagrants, unassimilated to the emerging structures of institutional power, rejected by the established order for their intransigence and obdurate rebelliousness.

Most recently, the image of that obdurate intransigence of not being accommodated to the old status quo is the four hundred Palestinians on that hill in Lebanon. They were kicked out to a country that is not welcoming them, and they haven't been able to return to their own country. Insofar as these people exist between the old and the new, between the old empire and the new state, their condition articulates the tensions, irresolutions, and contradictions in the overlapping territories shown on the cultural map of empire. There is a great difference, however, between the optimistic mobility, intellectual liveliness, and the logic of daring, and the massive dislocations, waste, misery, and horrors endured in our century's migrations and mutilated lives, most of them as a result of empire.

Yet it's no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of empire, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, whose incarnation today is the migrant and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile—the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages. From this perspective then, all things are indeed counter, original, spare, strange. From this perspective, one can also see, as Eliot says, "the whole consort dancing together." And while it would be the rankest Panglossian dishonesty to say that the bravura performances of the intellectual exile and the mis-

eries of the displaced person or refugee are the same, it is possible, I think, to regard the intellectual first as distilling and articulating the predicaments that disfigure modernity: mass deportation, imprisonment, population transfer, collective dispossession, and forced immigrations.

For example, the tentative authorization of feminine experience in Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own,* or the fabulous reordering of time and character that gives rise to the divided generations in Salman Rushdie's novel *Midnight's Children,* or the remarkable universalizing of the Afro-American experience as it emerges in such brilliant detail in Toni Morrison's *Tar Baby* and *Beloved.* The push or tension comes from the surrounding environment, the imperialist power that would otherwise compel you to disappear or to accept some miniature version of yourself as a doctrine to be passed out on a course syllabus.

From another perspective, the exilic, the marginal, the subjective, migratory energies of modern life, which the liberation struggles have employed when these are too resilient to disappear, have also emerged in what Immanuel Wallenstein calls "anti-systemic movements." Remember that the main feature of imperialist expansion historically was accumulation, a process that accelerated during the 20th century. Wallenstein's argument is that, at bottom, capital accumulation is irrational. Its additive, acquisitive gains continue unchecked, even though its costs are exorbitant and not worth the gains. Thus, Wallenstein says, "the very superstructure of state power, and the national cultures that support the idea of state power, put in place to maximize the free flow of the factors of production in the world economy, is the nursery of national movements that mobilize against the inequalities inherent to the world system." Those people compelled by the system to place subordinate or imprisoning roles within it emerge as conscious antagonists, disrupting it, proposing claims, advancing arguments that dispute the compulsions of the world market. Not everything can be bought off. All these hybrid counter-energies constitute a counter-discourse, at work in many fields; individuals and moments provide a

community or culture made up of many anti-systemic hints and practices for collective human existence that is not based on coercion or domination. They fueled the uprisings of the 1980s. The authoritative, compelling image of the empire, which crept into and overtook so many procedures of intellectual mastery central in modern culture, finds its opposite therefore in the renewable, almost sporty discontinuity of intellectual and secular impurities, mixed genres, unexpected combinations of tradition and novelty, political experiences based on communities of effort rather than classes, or corporations of possession, appropriation or power.

Lastly, no one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian or Canadian or woman or Muslim or American are no more than starting points which, if followed into actual experience for only a moment, are completely left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a world scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively white or black or Western or Oriental. Just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities. No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies. But there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. Survival, in fact, is about the connections between things. In Eliot's phrase, reality cannot be deprived of the "other echoes that inhabit the garden." It is more rewarding and more difficult to think concretely and sympathetically about others than only about "us." But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly to reiterate how our culture or country is number one, or not number one for that matter. For the intellectual there's quite enough of value to do without that.

CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, for a cassette copy write to Alternative Radio, 2129 Mapleton, Boulder, Colorado 80304.

Dialogue with Edward Said: The Pen and the Sword

David Barsamian: Where does *Orientalism* factor in *Culture and Imperialism*?

Edward Said: *Orientalism* did something fairly limited, although it covered a lot of ground. I was interested in Western perceptions of the Orient and in the transformation of those views into Western rule over the Orient. I limited myself to the period from about 1800 until the present, looking at the Islamic Arab world. I only looked at it from the point of view of the West, with the understanding, which has been greatly misconstrued by critics of mine, that I was talking about an aspect of the West, not the whole West. I wasn't suggesting that the West is monolithic. I was discussing those departments of the West in England and France and America that were concerned, as a matter of policy and rule, with the Middle East.

Culture and Imperialism is in fact a sequel to *Orientalism* in that, first of all, I look at other parts of the world besides the Middle East; in fact, I don't spend much time talking about the Middle East. I look at India, the subcontinent generally, a lot of

Africa, the Caribbean, Australia, parts of the world where there was a major Western investment, whether through empire or direct colonialism or some combination or both, as in the case of India. That's one difference. And, secondly, although I cover the same time period, the end of the 18th century to the present (and the second aspect of the book is to a certain degree dependent on but goes further than *Orientalism*), I look at responses to the West, resistance to the West in the places I'm discussing. That is to say, unlike *Orientalism*, where I looked only at European and American writers and policy, in this case I look at the great culture of resistance that emerged in response to imperialism and go into what in the 20th century is called "nationalism." I look at the poets and writers and militants and theoreticians of resistance in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

DB: So it's not primarily through the prism of literature.

ES: Or of the West. Although literature is given a certain privilege because my argument is that many of the attitudes, the references to the non-European world were in a certain sense fashioned and prepared by what you could call cultural documents, including literary ones, and preeminently narratives. In my view, the novel plays an extraordinarily important role in helping to create imperial attitudes towards the rest of the world. Interestingly enough, I'm not really concerned with the kind of imperialism that one finds in Russia, where the Russians simply advanced by adjacents. They moved east and south, whatever was near them. I'm much more interested in the way the Europeans, the British and French preeminently, were able to jump away from their shores and pursue a policy of overseas domination. So that England could hold India for three hundred years at a distance of eight or nine thousand miles from its own shores, with 100,000 people. That's an astonishing fact. Even though, in some cases, there were important geographical separations between the metropolitan center and the distant colony (for example, France and Algeria), that distant colony was ab-

sorbed and became a department of France, as Martinique and Guadelupe are to this very day in the Caribbean. I look a great deal also at Ireland because it is the last major European colony. In the book I look at the way in which Britain and France pioneered the idea of overseas settlement and domination. After 1945, with the era of decolonization, when the British and French empires were dismantled and the United States took over, you have a continuation of the same qualities.

DB: You argue in the book that culture made imperialism possible. You cite Blake: "The foundation of empire is art and science. Remove them or degrade them, and the empire is no more. Empire follows art and not vice versa, as Englishmen suppose."

ES: I think one of the main flaws in the enormous literature in economics and political science and history about imperialism is that very little attention has been paid to the role

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
This 1853 cartoon shows the relationship between a European colonist (who wants to build a mansion of the sort typically associated with landed gentry in Western nations), and the locals, who will build it.

of culture in keeping an empire maintained. [Joseph] Conrad was one of the most extraordinary witnesses to this. He understands that central to the idea of empire isn't so much profit, although profit was certainly a motive. But what distinguishes earlier empires, like the Roman or Spanish or Arab empires, from modern empires, of which the British and French were the great ones in the 19th century, is the fact that the latter ones are systematic enterprises, constantly rein-

vested. They're not simply arriving in a country, looting it, and then leaving when the loot is exhausted. And that requires, as Conrad said, an idea of service, and idea of sacrifice, of redemption. Out of this you get these great, massively reinforced notions that we're not there to benefit ourselves, we're there for the sake of the natives. Or, in the case of people like John Stuart Mill, that we are there because India requires us, that these are territories and peoples who beseech

domination from us and that, as Kipling demonstrates in some of his work, without the English India would fall into ruin.

So it's that complex of ideas that particularly interests me. What was to me an especially great discovery was that these ideas were largely unchallenged within the metropolitan centers. Even the people whom we admire a great deal, like Alexis de Toqueville and Mill, and the women's movement which began at the end of the 19th century . . .

DB: And Jane Austen.

ES: Jane Austen is a separate case. She's much earlier. But I'm talking about organized movements, the liberal movement, the progressive moment, the working-class movement, or the feminist movement—they were all imperialist by and large. There was no dissent from this. The only time that there began to be changes inside Europe and the United States was when the natives themselves in the colonies began to revolt and made it very difficult for these ideas to continue unchallenged. Then people like Jean-Paul Sartre, in support of the Algerians, demonstrated on their behalf. But until then, there was a widespread complicity, although there were some rebels, oppositional figures like Wilfred Scawen Blunt in England.

DB: But behind the facade of culture, wasn't the glue that held the empire together bound by force, coercion, and intimidation?

ES: Yes, of course. But what we need to understand is how very often the force of, say, the British army in India was very minimal in a way, considering the vast amount of territory that they administered and held. What you have instead is a program of ideological pacification whereby, for example, in India the system of education, which was promulgated in the 1830s, was really addressing the fact that the education of Indians under the British should teach the Indians the superiority of British culture over Indian culture. And of course when there was a revolt, as in the case of the famous so-called "Indian Mutiny" in 1857,

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
Writes Anthony King in *The Bungalow*, "The unsuccessful outcome might be read as resulting from the application of an inappropriate technology to a culturally unfamiliar design."

then it was dealt with with force, mercilessly, ruthlessly, definitively. Then the facade could be re-erected and you could say, We're here for your sake and this is beneficial for you. So it was force, but, in my opinion, much more important than force, which was administered selectively, was the idea inculcated in the minds of the people being colonized that it was their destiny to be ruled by the West.

DB: Don't you point out that in the case of India in the early 1800s the English novel was being studied there before it was being examined in England?

ES: Not so much the English novel, but modern English literature was being studied in India. This was the discovery of a former student of mine, now a colleague, Gauri Viswanathan, in her book, *The Masks of Conquest*. What she argues is that the study of modern English literature begins in India well before it becomes a subject for university research and instruction in metropolitan England. Matthew Arnold understood that culture was important, not only for its own sake but because it was a form of mental pacification. If you didn't have culture and ideas about culture, the best that is thought and known, you'd have anarchy. You'd have, in effect, a lawless society. Those ideas came out of the Indian context, where his brother served for many years.

DB: How do you account for the enduring interest in Joseph Conrad and his work? You often refer to *Heart of Darkness*.

ES: It's not just *Heart of Darkness* that I'm interested in. *Nostromo*, which I think is an equally great novel, published somewhat later, about 1904, is about Latin America. Conrad seems to me to be the most interesting witness to European imperialism. He was certainly in many ways extremely critical of the more rapacious varieties of empire—for example the Belgians in the Congo. But more than most people, he understood how insidiously empire infected not just the people who were subjugated by it, but the people who served it. That is to

say that the idea of service had in it an illusion that, for example, in the case of the figures in *Heart of Darkness*, but especially in *Nostromo*, could seduce and captivate one, so that in the end it was a form of universal corruption. The trouble with Conrad, in my opinion, and I point this out several times in the course of the book, is that although he was in many ways an anti-imperialist, he also thought imperialism was inevitable. He couldn't understand, as no one else in his time could either, that it was possible for natives to take over the governments of their own destiny. He lived in essentially a Eurocentric world. For him, although imperialism was in many cases bad—it was full of abuses, it hurt and harmed people both white and non-white—nevertheless there was no alternative to it. When it came to what is now called liberation, independence, freedom for people from colonialism and imperialism, Conrad simply couldn't go beyond that. That I think is his almost tragic limitation.

DB: But ultimately his work gives assent, gives affirmation to imperialism.

ES: Yes, and it's more complicated than that. In a certain sense, what he does in his novels is recapitulates the imperialist adventure. His novels are about people going out, in many cases, to the hinterlands, to the "heart of darkness" in the case of Africa, to Latin America in *Nostromo*. There they imbue themselves with an idea of service, that they are there to help the people. But of course, they are in the process enriching themselves. But I wouldn't say that he endorses that. He sees it as inevitable. He doesn't criticize it as something that can be replaced by a different idea. More than most people, he had the outsider's sense that Europe was doomed in a certain sense to repeat this cycle of foreign adventure, corruption, and decline.

DB: When you're examining these novelists, Flaubert, Balzac, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Dickens, et al., you open yourself to the criticism of putting the filters of the present on the lenses of the past.

ES: I try not to do that. What I focus on exclusively is extremely precise indications in the texts where these writers, only a fraction of whom you've mentioned, actually say the things that I say they're saying. I'm not blaming them retrospectively. I say quite clearly in the beginning of the book that I'm not interested in the politics of blame. This is the way the world was. Those people and their views lost. They were defeated in the great wave of decolonization which forms the third chapter of *Culture and Imperialism*. But what I also say is I think it's wrong for us to exonerate the cultural archive of any association with this sordid expanse of imperialism. In fact, I say that many of these writers are more interesting by the fact that they understood and took for granted the presence of overseas colonies for the British. For example, in *Mansfield Park* by Jane Austen, I comment on the fact that Sir Thomas Bertram, the proprietor of the estate, called Mansfield Park, has to go to Antigua where he owns a sugar plantation that is obviously run by slaves, in order to replenish the coffers of Mansfield Park. So there's a certain dependency of a beautiful estate in England—signifying repose, calm, beauty—on the sugar produce of a colony run by slaves in Antigua. People like myself, who teach literature, have historically allowed ourselves to be curtained off from politics and history, looking only at the work of art. I'm second to none in my appreciation of works of art and I only deal with writers whom I like and admire. But I also believe that it's not enough to say, They're works of art, and try to reinsert them in their own history and show—this is the important part—how many subsequent writers, for example, a whole slew of African writers writing after Conrad, rewrote *Heart of Darkness*. What we're talking about is a process of writing back that took place. So rather than say, Austen is really only about England, I say no, it's about the Caribbean. In order to understand it you have to understand the writing of Caribbean history by other Caribbean writers. It's not just Austen's view of the Caribbean that we need. We need the other views as well. I establish what I call a reading that is based on counterpoint, many voices producing a history.

I guess the main point is that the experience of imperialism is really an experience of interdependent histories. The history of India and the history of England have to be thought of together. I'm not a separatist. My whole effort is to integrate areas of experience that have been separated both analytically and politically, which I think is wrong.

DB: E. M. Forster is another writer you mention. In *Howard's End* there's a reference to a plantation in Nigeria.

ES: It's not just a reference. The Wilcoxes, the people who own Howard's End, own the Anglo-Nigerian rubber company, and their wealth is derived from Africa. But most critics of that novel, for example, Lionel Trilling, simply don't mention this. What I'm trying to do is to highlight these aspects of the great cultural archive of the West, as I'm also trying to look at the cultural archive of places like Australia, North Africa, Central Africa, and other African countries, in order to say, They're all there. We have to deal with this body of material. It's tremendously important. You may remember that the epigraph to *Howard's End* is "only connect." It's important to connect things with each other. That's what I'm trying to do in *Culture and Imperialism*.

DB: So you accept the zeitgeist, you're not critical of it.

ES: The criticism comes in the great resistance movements, which in the end defeated the empire. The fact is that the empires didn't survive World War II. The Congress movement, which started in 1880 in India, was the very same party that took power in India after the British left in 1947. One of the points I tried to make here is that all of the great resistance movements of Africa, Asia, and Latin America traced their history back to the first people who resisted the white man coming. There's a continuity of resistance.

For example, the Algerian FLN [Front Libération Nationale], which defeated the French and achieved independence for Algeria in 1962, saw themselves as continuing

Most 19th-century paintings of the Orient, with their stereotypically mystical and exotic representations, were made by artists who had never been to the Middle East. *The Snake Charmer*, by Jean-Leon Gerome, ca. mid-to-late 1800s. (From *The Orientalists*.)

the resistance begun in 1830 by Emir Abdel Kader in Algeria. They saw themselves as part of the same history. There's a continuous history of struggle. Imperialism is never the imposing of one view on another. It's a contested and joint experience. It's important to remember that.

DB: Talking about Algeria, let's move on to Albert Camus, who you find a "very interesting figure." A Nobel Prize winner, celebrated as a universalist writer with some special insight into the human condition. A symbol of decency, resistance to fascism. But under your scrutiny, a very different Camus emerges.

ES: No less a considerable writer, a wonderful stylist, certainly an exemplary novelist in many respects. He certainly talks about resistance. But what bothers me is that Camus is read out of his own context, his own history. Camus' history is that of a *colon*, a *pied-noir*. He was born and grew up in a place very close to a city in Algeria on the coast, Annaba in Arabic, Bône by the French. It was made over into a French town in the 1880s and 1890s. His family came variously from Corsica and various parts of southern Europe and France. His

novels, in my opinion, are really expressions of the colonial predicament. Meursault in *L'Etranger* (The Stranger) kills the Arab, to whom Camus gives no name and no history. The whole idea at the end of the novel where Meursault is put on trial is an ideological fiction. No Frenchman was ever put on trial for killing an Arab in colonial Algeria. That's a lie. So you construct something.

Secondly, in his later novel *La Peste* (The Plague), the people who die in the city are Arabs, but they're not mentioned. The only people who mattered to Camus and to the European reader of the time, even now, are Europeans. Arabs are there to die. The story, interestingly enough, is always interpreted as a parable or an allegory of the German occupation of France. My reading of Camus, and certainly of his later stories, starts with the fact that Camus, in the late 1950s, was very much opposed to independence for Algeria. He in fact compared the FLN to Abdel Nasser in Egypt, after Suez, after 1956. Far from being an impartial observer of the human condition, Camus was a colonial witness. The irritating part of it is that he's never read that way. My kids recently read *La Peste* and *L'Etranger* in school; in both cases, my son and my daughter, they were

Miseries in India, etching from the book *British Social Life in India 1608–1937*, published in 1938.

made to read Camus outside the colonial context, with no indication of the rather contested history of which it was part.

DB: In Camus' *Exil et Royaume* (Exile and Kingdom) there is a very interesting story called "The Adulterous Woman." You make a point about language.

ES: It's not only language. The point I tried to make about it is that what he does in this late story, after 1955. It's about a woman, Janine, who's married to a salesman. They go on a bus trip to the south of Algeria. She comments, as probably Camus felt at the time, that she was in a country that was hers, but there were these strange people. She doesn't know Arabic. She treats them as if they are a breed apart. They finally get to their destination, a dusty town in the south of Algeria. They spend the night. She can't sleep. She goes out at night. In a moment which has to be understood as a moment of sexual fulfillment, she lies down on the Algerian earth and engages in a ritual of communion with the land, which Camus says in a later note is a way of renewing the self, by drawing energy from the country. This is often read as a kind of existentialist parable, whereas in fact it is an assertion of the colonial right of French people, because Janine is French, to the land of Algeria, which they think is theirs to possess. I read it in that context, whereas normally it isn't read that way.

I associate that with Camus' refusal to give up the idea of an Algeria that's special to France, *l'Algérie française*. What he is frequently quoted as having said—Michael Walzer for example quotes it all the time—is that "if in a war I have to choose between justice and correct ideas and the life of mother if she's being threatened by terrorists, of course I'll pick my mother." But those are false choices. The choice is between the the responsibility of intellectuals to justice and the truth and lying about it, which many of Camus' admirers fail to see.

DB: You mentioned the responsibility of intellectuals. Who is the class that is making these representations of the literature that you contend are missing all these things, who are looking at Camus and occluding essential points? They're interpreting something that you say is there, that demonstrably is there, and they're not seeing it.

ES: I can't really generalize in terms of class. But I can certainly say that one of the things that enables a reading of these things, that makes you pay attention to them, is the experience of decolonization. I think that if you have lived through a period of colonial struggle, you can return to these texts and read them in a way which is sensitive to precisely these points that are normally overlooked. If, on the other hand, you feel that literature is only literature and has nothing

to do with anything else, then your job becomes to separate literature from the world and, in a certain sense, I believe to mutilate it and amputate from it those aspects which make it much more interesting and more worldly and more part of the struggle which was going on. I don't advocate, and I'm very much against, the teaching of literature as a form of politics. I think there's a distinction between pamphlets and novels. I don't think the classroom should become a place to advocate political ideas. I've never taught political ideas in a classroom. I believe that I'm there to teach the interpretation and reading of literary texts.

DB: But it is political.

ES: Only in one sense: it is a politics against the reading of literature that would denude it and emasculate what in the literature is profoundly contested.

DB: But as a teacher you're making certain choices.

ES: Of course. We all do. I wouldn't deny that. It's a choice that proposes a different reading of these classics. I don't by any means say it's the only reading. I just say it's a relevant reading, and it's the one that hasn't been addressed. I certainly don't intend to impose my reading on students and tell them that if they don't read it this way they'll fail the course, because I think academic freedom is essential to the issue. Quite the contrary. I want to provoke new and refreshing investigations of these texts in ways which will have them read more skeptically, more inquiringly, more searchingly. That's the point.

DB: There have been a couple of pieces about the responsibility of intellectuals, Noam Chomsky's being one, about speaking truth to power, and Julien Benda, in *La Trahison des Clercs* in 1928. He says, "The treason is their acceptance that intellectual activity could be harnessed to political, nationalist and racial ends." I would ask, Why not? They're well rewarded and celebrated by playing ball with the dominant culture.

ES: One of the great tragedies is what happened in the third world: the onset of nationalism. There's a difference between the nationalism of the triumphalist sort, which we see in America today as we go around proclaiming our victory in the cold war, the right to intervene in Iraq and Panama; and that of which Frantz Fanon spoke in *The Wretched of the Earth*—the nationalism that resists colonization and imperialism. But what interests me is that when nationalism is triumphant, and independence is achieved, too often nationalism can sink back down into a kind of tribalism, atavism, statism, and along with that becomes, for example in many parts of the Arab world today, a neoimperialist state, still controlled by outside powers and in which the ruling elite are in effect agents and clients of one of the dominant powers. This I think was quite carefully prophesied by many of the early nationalist writers in the third world. This is often forgotten. It's always argued by people like Elie Kedourie and others in the West that nationalism is a Western invention. What you have in places like Algeria and India are imitations of the West. But what is interesting is that when you look carefully at the history of the kind of resisting nationalism that I discuss in the book, you find that many of its earliest adherents warned against the abuses of nationalism. For example, Fanon says, We aren't going to fight this revolution against the French in order to replace the French policeman with an Algerian policeman. That's not the point. We are looking for liberation. Liberation is much more than becoming a mirror image of the white man whom we've thrown out and replacing him and using his authority. I'm very interested in that distinction, between liberation and a kind of mindless nationalism.

DB: You also point out that the imperial theory that underlies colonial conquest continues today. How does it manifest itself, in culture particularly?

ES: In the book I talk mainly about the public sphere in America. First of all there was a fairly pronounced sense of international mission after World War II where the United States thought of itself as being the inheritor of the British and French, the great Western empires. That was certainly the case in Latin America and Southeast Asia, where the United States in effect followed other colonial powers. In the case of Vietnam it followed the French and went through the same disastrous course. One cycle of imperialist history follows another. Second, it began to circulate in both the media and academia that there was a whole theory of American developmental science. Developmental theorists of the 1950s and 1960s promoted the idea that we have to go into the world and develop the nondeveloped. We have to provide them with models for economic takeoff, the Walt Rostow notion. It was very brilliantly parodied in the case of Graham Greene's novel, *The Quiet American*, which is really a satire of the cold war, and whose character, Pyle, the American in Vietnam, is really providing the third way. Neither the old colonial way nor the communist way (the ideology of the cold war is very important here), but there's a new way, which is ours. That produces many of the policies and revolts—one thinks of Indonesia, the Philippines, the Middle East and various parts of it in 1958, the earliest American postwar interventions, which really began in Greece and Turkey right after World War II—and the idea that America is the world's policeman. Third, you find it in the public rhetoric of the U.S. State Department and the intellectual elite in this country. We have a mission to the world. It's echoed and re-echoed by the media. The assumptions of the media are that we are the impartial observers of the world and that there's a sense in which being a newspaper person is being a witness of power and an emissary of the United States in these places, like Baghdad, et cetera.

The result is a very powerful ideological system, which Chomsky has talked about brilliantly, that I think is central to the education of every American. It's based upon a great deal of ignorance about the rest of the world and very little geographical knowledge of what the rest of the world is all about. My work is very concerned with geographical knowledge. One of the interesting distinctions between America and the classical empires of the 19th century is that, first of all, there was contiguity. There was a sense in which France was close to North Africa. There was a connection between England and the empire of the East through Suez, the Gulf, etc. There was a colonial establishment. America has none of that. There is abstract expertise, people who learn social science techniques, who can manipulate numbers, computers, etc., and a tremendous geographical ignorance. The United States is extremely insulated, a very provincial country in many ways. It produces these experts who are retooled for service in Vietnam, in Latin America, in the Middle East. The result is a policy of violence and a kind of incoherent lurching around with tremendously damaging results. It's forgotten by most Americans: many of my students don't even know about Vietnam, that the United States cost a million Vietnamese lives. Jimmy Carter said it was a case of "mutual destruction." There's no comparison between the destruction of Vietnam and the losses sustained by the United States as an invading imperial force.

Last, and most important, there's been a banishment, a kind of intellectual exclusion of the notion of imperialism. The imperialists are the British and the French. We're something different. We don't have an empire. We don't have an India. But the reality is, through transnational corporations, through the media, through the military, the United States has what Richard Barnet calls "global reach." It's the last remaining global power.

DB: People like V. S. Naipaul say, That's all over. Imperialism is over. We're now in a new era, and look at the mess. In his often-quoted work, *Among the Believers*, here is Naipaul the novelist posing as Islamicist, sociologist, and psychologist. He travels to Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. He describes Muslims: "Their rage, the rage of a pastoral people with limited skills, limited money, and limited grasp of the world, is comprehensive. Now they have a weapon, Islam. It is their way of getting even with the world. It serves their grief, their feeling of inadequacy, their social rage, and racial hate."

ES: Naipaul is an interesting figure. First of all, he's a very gifted writer. He's also, being a man of color, a wonderful case in point. As Irving Howe said in his *New York Times* review of Naipaul's novel *A Bend in the River* when it came out in 1979, this is a man who's from the third world. He's Indian, from the subcontinent, but his family lived in Trinidad and he grew up there. He's cited along with people like Fuad Ajami as witnesses. They know what they're talking about. And they say that the place is a filthy mess. Naipaul encourages that.

I have no problem with Naipaul saying the things that he wants to say. Everybody's entitled to say what he sees. And of course the evidence of his senses are such as it is. We know, however, that he's a very lazy traveler, whose information about the countries he visits is extremely incomplete. He should write and publish, and people should read him and criticize him, but one should be aware of two things that he does that are particularly pernicious. First, he doesn't give a full picture of the history that produced in many cases the real mess that is found in countries like Iran. Iran is not just a place where there's a gratuitous emergence of Islam. It comes after a particular history with the West, a prolonged, losing encounter that includes the opium wars, the oil concessions, the reign of the Shah. What we have now in Iran is a response to it. He leaves those things out. Second, and much more important, is that Naipaul never gives us any indication that there's anything else in these countries except what he writes about. Islam is now the bogeyman of the West. Last summer there was a headline in the *Washington Post* that said that Islam replaces communism as the enemy of the West. This idea of some monolithic, finally undistinguished and undistinguishable form called Islam becomes a repository for all evil in the world, without an awareness that within Islam and the Islamic world there are many currents, many oppositions. There are secular people who are trying to fight the brotherhoods, the jihads, Hezbollah, Hamas. These are quite different people from each

other. Hamas is very different from Hezbollah. The movement in Sudan run by Hassan al-Turabi is very different from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and so on. There's very little attention paid to the other forms of fundamentalism that exist. For example, there is Jewish fundamentalism. Israel is a fundamentalist country, in many ways as terrifying to me, as a non-Jew, as Iran is. That invidiously is never discussed. If one is going to talk about Islam the way Naipaul does, he ought to talk about it in a much fuller and truer context than the one he engineers. For in the end it is a kind of opportunism, because it will sell and it's easy to do.

DB: To what do you ascribe the appeal of Islam in such countries today as Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and especially in Egypt, where there are some very serious problems?

ES: I think first of all it's a failure of the secular modernizing movements that came to power after World War II in reaction to imperialism. These brought very few solutions. They were unable to face the demographic explosion. They were unable to face the democratization and empowerment of the population that occurred after liberation. For example, in Egypt, for the first time in Egyptian history, every Egyptian was entitled to a full education. What is often forgotten is that the Islamic revival comes on the heels and as a result of a tremendously successful campaign against illiteracy. These are movements not run by illiterates, but by doctors and lawyers. These Islamic movements, which are very different in each place, are very often

contested by a quite vibrant secular culture. And crucially they are occurring in countries like Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, whose rulers are considered to be allies of the West. The alienation felt by people in Egypt who saw Anwar Sadat coddled by the United States, making peace with Israel, selling his integrity, admittedly with a great deal of panache and a great mastery of public relations, but nonetheless giving up Egyptian priorities to those priorities set by the United States—this induces a sense not only of hopelessness and desperation, but of anger, which fuels these Islamic movements.

Last and most important, the Islamic revival in the Arab world largely occurs in countries where democracy had been abrogated by virtue of the priorities of the national security state. Here Israel plays a very important role, which is often forgotten. The presence of Israel, a theocratic, military state, a Sparta, that is imposed upon the region—I'm not talking just about the Palestinians, whose society it destroys, its country, its land, having been in occupation for over twenty-five years—but its invasions, its incursions in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia. It has overflown Saudi Arabia many times, it has attacked Iraq—this is a regional superpower. This sense of Israel and the United States as victimizing at will the Arab heartland has forced people to go back to nourishing roots in the native culture, which is Islamic.

DB: Kind of an autochtonous, indigenous response.

ES: It's a response to that. It's deeply flawed, in my opinion. In many cases it's reactionary. But it has objective causes. It's not some evil essentialism, as it's often portrayed in the press here. You read Bernard Lewis and he talks about the "Roots of Muslim Rage" in the *Atlantic Monthly*, and you get the sense that Muslims are just mad at modernity, as if modernity were some vague force that they want to attack and revile and ultimately go back to the 7th century. That is part of the picture.

An Orientalist painting of Cleopatra trying out poisons on her lovers; Alexandre Cabanel, 1887. (From *Femmes Fatales*.)

The descriptions of Islam in the West are part of the very same problem that Muslims throughout the Arabic world and the Islamic world generally, whether in Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Iran, are fighting. There's been very little attention paid to an understanding of Islam and a sense of wanting to have a dialogue with it. But there *are* vast legions of reporters, and here's where the laziness and mediocrity of the Western media is very much to blame, as well as the so-called intellectual experts, who lend themselves to this sort of thing through normal television documentaries and news programs that foreshorten, compress, reduce, caricature even, in order to produce a sound bite. [Problematic depicitons of Islam in the West also occurs] through films. I remember a week before Christmas I saw at least three movies, *Delta Force* was one, on television which were all about killing "terrorists" who were Muslim and Arab at the same time. The idea of killing Arabs and Muslims is legitimized by the popular culture. This is part of the atmosphere which we need to examine.

DB: In addition to being totally incompetent, Arabs as portrayed in popular media never have a normal conversation. They scream at one another. They bark and shout.

ES: It's all probably put down in the popular mind, such as it is, to Qur'anic imprecations, Qur'anic curses. That's all they ever speak. The word "Qur'anic" is wonderful, because it includes almost everything you don't like.

DB: There have been some middle-brow films as well, *Lawrence of Arabia* and *The Sheltering Sky*. The pattern continues. *Patriot Games* is a recent film with Harrison Ford in which IRA terrorists are trained by Libyans in the desert. You've commented that there are only a few Arabic words that have entered the English language in the 20th century, such as *jihad, intifada, harem,* and *sheikh.* I think that really shows the contrast: one is violence and the other is sensuality.

ES: Although *intifada* is a recent word associated with a particular political uprising, which I think on the whole is positive, a re-

volt against colonial occupation. It was taken up all through some of the great uprisings in the third world and the second world, Eastern Europe, and the non-European world in general during the late 1980s. People in Prague were wearing *intifada* T-shirts in the Velvet Revolution. When I was in South Africa last year, one of the striking things was that, largely because Nelson Mandela made the connection, there was a very warm sense of association between Palestinians fighting against Israeli occupation and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The *intifada* was really the crucial point.

DB: In the process of preparing for a talk at the University of Colorado during what is curiously called "Arab Awareness Week," I went to the public library to do some research. Boulder is a fairly progressive, liberal town. I examined what they had in the public library. I discovered they had 257 books on Christianity, 160 on Judaism, 63 on Islam. Given the fact that there are very few Muslims in Boulder, I'd say that's a pretty generous selection of books on Islam. But then you look at some of the titles and come to some other conclusions. Some of them are: *The Islamic Bomb, March of Islam, Militant Islam, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terror, Sacred Rage, The Crusade of Modern Islam, Among the Believers,* the Naipaul book, and my particular favorite, *Banditry in Islam.* I then looked at the Christian and Judaic titles, expecting to find *The Judaic Bomb, Banditry in Christendom.* Not one.

ES: There needs to be an effort made by Arab intellectuals or Islamic intellectuals to address the West. The books you referred to should be refuted, of course. But there should also be an attempt to put forward an alternative view of Islam which not only refutes these but embodies the reality of Islam, which is very various and on the whole quite benign. I was interested during the 1492–1992 commemorations of the past year that there was very little effort made by the Arab countries in the West to describe Andalusian civilization, which is one of the high points in the human adventure because

of its ecumenism, the splendor of its aesthetic and intellectual achievements, but also because it provided a kind of countermodel to the Islam that is argued today as being the essential one, namely an Islam that is not only tolerant but actually encourages coexistence of the various communities. This is the model. Against it, I think largely because of the struggle between the Palestinians and Israel, a new view of Islam has emerged as centrally intolerant, reactionary, and above all a chauvinist religion which cannot tolerate the outsider. But there's a difference between an outsider in the general sense, which is the way Bernard Lewis always speaks about it, and the outsider as represented by Israel. Israel is after all an incursion against not an Arab territory but a territory that was ecumenical. When I grew up in Palestine it was a place in which the three faiths lived, perhaps not perfectly, but better than they lived in Europe at the same time. I was born at the end of 1935. During that time, as the Jews were being slaughtered in Europe, there were small Jewish communities in Palestine. At the time one didn't know that they were to become much larger communities, and in fact take over the country from the original inhabitants, the Palestinians. But instead you get an image of Islam that is bent upon the destruction of the Other. This continued portrait of Islam has never really been responded to by Muslims themselves in the West, who think it's all just propaganda. I'm very critical of the Arab states, for example, in their information policy. But I'm an optimist. I think people can be made to change their minds and that experiencing a different, alternative view of the Islamic world can in fact open people's minds in the West to another perspective.

DB: Wasn't it you who told me that in many Arab colleges and universities there are no departments that study the United States?

ES: There isn't a single one in any Arab university today that is exclusively devoted to the study of the West, particularly the United States. I mentioned this in Bir Zeit University on my trip in June of 1992. I was

told, Not only do we not have a department of American Studies here, given that the United States is the most powerful outside force in the region, we don't even have a department of Hebrew and Israeli Studies. After all, Israel is an occupying country. Some attention should be paid to the systematic study of the state and its society as it impinges on Arab life. These are all parts of the legacy of imperialism.

DB: There's a certain chauvinism there, too.

ES: It's not only chauvinism, but there's a certain sense that you shouldn't defy it. The absence of defiance bothers me a great deal. What distinguishes people in the contemporary Arab world from those in the 1950s and 1960s and certainly in the 1930s and 1940s is an attitude of wanting to challenge imperialism. Now there's a great fear. The Palestinians and others run to the United States as if it were the court of last resort and the true friend of justice. There's very little sense of the history in the United States. There was Baker, who said, Oh, yes, we really want you in the peace talks—something that could be taken at face value, and that proved to be a tremendous disappointment.

DB: Let's move to your December 1992 *Harper's* article, "Palestine: Then and Now." It was very moving. There was a strong sense of sadness and sorrow permeating the piece. You used such adjectives as "mournful, gloomy, and melancholy." "Acre is a very sad place." It was a kind of "bury the dead" journey. It was like a testimony linking your children with your past.

ES: I thought it was important for them to see it. They've never been to Palestine. They've never seen where I was born and grew up. I'm not a great believer in roots, to be honest. I think roots can be overstated. But Palestine is an unusual place. Whether you are from there or not, it's certainly something that affects you. There's been a tremendous amount of attention given the Middle East, alas, much of it due to Israeli propaganda. So my kids grew up knowing about Palestine essentially through these sec-

ond-hand reflections of it that you get from the media, and having been, as they had been, to countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. They had a sense of belonging to a community but no sense of the particularity of a community to which their father belonged. So in that sense it was very important. I found writing about the experience very difficult. I think I got about ten or fifteen percent of the barrage of impressions I received and memories that were stimulated by that trip. We were there for about ten days, and we went everywhere, so it was difficult to choose. There were two contradictory feelings that I had overall. One was a sense of pleasure at coming back to a place which in a certain sense I could still recognize. I was aware of the extent to which Palestine had been transformed into Israel. I'm not from the West Bank, but from what became in 1948 Israel, West Jerusalem, Talbiya. My mother's from Nazareth, which is also part of Israel. I remember Haifa, Jaffa—that's the geography of my childhood. To see that it survived and that there was a recognizable Arab presence there, despite the enormous upheavals and transformations of the last forty years, was heartening. On the other hand, it was very difficult for me not to note the way in which the place had become another country, in some instances a kind of ersatz European country. Talbiya looks like an elegant Zurich suburb. There were no Arabs there. The last time I was in Safad, which is where my uncle used to live, a place we used to visit, was in 1946. When I visited it again in 1992, forty-six years later, there wasn't a single Arab in sight. They had all been driven out. So these are sites of catastrophe for me. Of course, in the general political economy of memory and recollection that exists in public culture in the West, there's no room for the Palestinian experience of loss. So it was very hard. Interestingly, I might add that the article you saw in *Harper's* brought forth a number of responses from friends who wrote telling me how much they enjoyed reading about it and how they were stirred and saddened by it. But the thing I was unprepared for was that it seemed to infuriate a lot of pro-Israelis, who wrote the most angry, ap-

palling letters. After all, I was only describing a trip. They were angry that I should even say anything like this. One person who claimed to be a psychiatrist, for example, prescribed a psychiatric hospital for me, that I should be locked up. Others accused me of lying. The most extraordinary propaganda, hysterical, rabid letters to *Harper's* and to me. It shows the extent to which in the official Zionist discourse the presence of a Palestinian voice or a Palestinian narrative is simply unacceptable. It should be noted that a presence still isn't allowed, even though this discourse is responsible for the destruction of Palestine and the horrors meted out onto a population of almost five million people today. There's no responsibility taken for it. I find that very disheartening.

DB: I think you might also be underestimating your own position. I remember when you came to Boulder in 1990 and you were astonished that your talk was being picketed and people were handing out leaflets denouncing you. You are a significant figure, and you will attract this kind of attention.

ES: But even so, it strikes me as inhumane and intolerant. If Muslims did this, as they have done, for example, to Salman Rushdie, there's a chorus saying, You cannot prevent somebody from speaking. But this continues against Palestinians. There are constant attempts to silence, to vilify, to blackmail, to make life miserable for anybody who dares speak out. I find that absolutely appalling. Especially since a lot of the time it's accompanied by moralistic piety about the necessity to remember the horrors of the past and the Jewish experience, with which I completely agree. But if you dare say something about an attendant holocaust, perhaps not a holocaust but a catastrophe, we call it the *nakba*, the destruction of Palestine that occurred for us as a result of the Holocaust, that's not permitted. And the violence and the anger and the poison that's spewed out is terrifying.

DB: Stephen Daedalus in James Joyce's *Ulysses* talks about history as "a nightmare from which I am trying to awake." When you're awake what do you see?

ES: I don't think history's a nightmare, unlike Stephen Daedalus. I think history is a place of many possibilities. I don't think in the present political setup, either in the Middle East or in the United States, that any real change going to happen. It can only happen very slowly and as a result of education. Education is a central instrument in all of this. Without a self-conscious, skeptical, democratically minded citizenry, there's no hope for any political change for the better, in this country or in the Middle East. That is occurring only very slowly.

DB: In the conclusion of your *Harper's* piece you write, "I would find it very hard to live there. I think exile seems to be a more liberated state. But I can feel and sometimes see a different future as I couldn't before." I was thinking of a T. S. Eliot line you've quoted elsewhere: "Here the impossible union of separate spheres of existence is actual. Here the past and future are conquered and reconciled." That's the kind of vision you have.

ES: Absolutely. And I think it's possible through vision. That's why I think culture is so important. It provides a visionary alternative, a distinction between the this-worldness and the blockage that one sees so much in the world of the everyday in which we live, which doesn't allow us to see beyond the impossible odds in power, in status that are stacked, for example, against Palestinians, and the possibility of dreaming a different dream and seeing an alternative to all this. I learned this many years ago from a great English critic, Raymond Williams, who more than anyone else taught me the notion of always thinking the alternative. Not so much only the dream, which is rather otherworldly, but to every situation, no matter how dominated it is, there's always an alternative. One must train oneself to think the alternative and not the accepted status quo or to believe that the present is frozen.

BARBARA HARLOW
Culture and Imperialism

Edward W. Said

The emergence of almost a hundred new decolonized, post-colonial states after 1945 is not a neutral fact, but one which, in discussions of it, scholars, historians, activists have been either for or against.

—Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 1993

The United Nations World Conference on Human Rights met in Vienna, Austria, from June 14 to June 25, 1993. Nearly one hundred and seventy governments were represented in the official meetings which were also attended by spokespersons and observers for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) whose interests and commitments ranged from those of Amnesty International, women's associations, War Resisters International, to the International Lesbian and Gay Association. These latter groups, the NGOs, were, despite their protests, excluded from the meetings and deliberations of the drafting commission that was to prepare the conference's final report and recommendations. According to China, one of the governments that insisted on the exclusion of the Dalai Lama of Tibet (and also argued for the refusal of his right to speak), the issue of national sovereignty was at stake. Addressing the conference on June 15, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister maintained that, "such practices as bringing groundless charges against other countries and forcing the human rights criterion of one country or one region upon other countries or regions are acts aimed at encroaching upon the sovereignty of other countries and interfering in their internal affairs, and are likely to cause political instability and social turmoil in the countries concerned. There are certainly no human rights to speak of on the part of the citizens of a country whose sovereignty is at stake."

However, Pierre Sane, head of Amnesty International, argued the following week that "the first week of the World Conference on Human Rights was a week of shame. It was a week of political arrests. A week of abductions. A week of 'disappearances.' A week of torture. A week of executions. Above all it was a week of political killings. And the people who have the torturers and the killers on their payroll were there in Vienna mouth-

An etching from an 1859 traveler's account shows how Indian servants kept the British comfortable. (From *British Social Life in India 1608–1937*.)

Tiananmen Square, a "crowd-activated" site, if briefly; May 15, 1989.

ing phrases about human rights. Almost half the governments of the world spoke at the conference. Their speeches added up to almost half a million words. But there is no evidence that any of those words saved a single life." For, as Edward Said has argued in the last pages of his most recent book, *Culture and Imperialism*, "it is one of the unhappiest characteristics of the age to have produced more refugees, migrants, displaced persons than ever before in history." But even at the 1993 U.N. Conference on Human Rights, with armed clashes between U.N. peace-keeping forces and Somali civilians, and the persistent debates on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia as the immediate background, the relationship between national sovereignty and humanitarian assistance remained a contested one.

Along with the "non-neutral fact" of the escalating emergence of new nations in the decolonizing period from 1945 (incremented again in the post-Soviet period of the last three years) there has developed the no longer neutral challenge of a series of international covenants and conventions on human rights; economic, civil, and social rights; treaties against torture and genocide; documents protecting the rights of indigenous

peoples; and anticolonial struggles. Most of these human rights instruments have since been signed by most of the U.N.'s member states, but far fewer indeed have yet to be ratified by their governments. *Culture and Imperialism* provides an important, literary political history—a "non-governmental" critique—of that extended collision course, from imperialism to anti-imperialism, that has culminated in a contemporary global crisis fraught with critical imperatives and cultural urgencies. The argument that the "emergence of almost a hundred new decolonized, post-colonial states after 1945 is not a neutral fact" is crucially positioned midway through Said's book, in "There Are Two Sides," the opening section of the third chapter, "Resistance and Opposition." It marks perhaps a decisive turning point in Said's own narrative. The fictional supports, props, and endorsements of empire are forced to give way to the works of nationalist struggles and liberation movements that have challenged the very premises of imperialism.

Culture and Imperialism began formally as the Eliot Lectures, which were delivered in England in 1985 and then developed in North American universities over the next several years. The book has other "begin-

nings" as well (to cite the title of another of Said's works)—in particular the still controversial but consequential 1978 book, *Orientalism*, a study of Western constructions of the "Orient" and "Orientals." According to Said in *Culture and Imperialism*'s introductory lines, "About five years after *Orientalism* was published in 1978, I began to gather together some ideas about the general relationship between culture and empire that had become clear to me while writing that book." And more than one contributor to the 1992 anthology, *Edward Said: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), delineated expectantly the critical trajectory of Said's work, from Joseph Conrad through *Orientalism* and including his Palestinian projects (*The Question of Palestine* [1979], *After the Last Sky* [1986], and *Blaming the Victim* [1988]), toward the "contrapuntal" methodologies and "overlapping territories" elaborated in this latest critical endeavor. In his analysis of the historical conjunction of culture and imperialism, Said's focus is on narrative exempla, as literary genre and as cartographical paradigm: "The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course, but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans the future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative." But *Culture and Imperialism* transcribes a narrative and a map in its own right and on its own terms: the developments and devolutions of three modern self-styled empires—the British, the French, and finally, the American (under which he has lived)—and their attendant disciplinary contributions from literature and literary studies (within which he works).

The first two chapters, "Overlapping Territories, Intertwined Histories" and "Consolidated Vision," examine the reciprocating constructions of imperial practices and ideas—the "*idea* of *having an empire*" (emphasis in original)—in the British and French metropolitan and colonial arenas. Working by way of textual example—Joseph Conrad, Jane Austen, Rudyard Kipling, Giuseppe Verdi, Albert Camus—Said argues that novelists and politicians were

much in need of each other's collaboration and of the several territories that they oversaw, in order to maintain their respective vocations and pursuits. For example, in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, the Congo gave Marlow a place to find himself in—and purge himself of—Kurtz, without having to dispute King Leopold's atrocities against the "natives"; without the slave plantation in Antigua, Austen's *Mansfield Park* could hardly have supported itself; and Kipling's *Kim* in India could be enlisted from the poverty of the streets to participate as a sahib in the Great Game without disturbing the imperial power relationships. With these pedagogical examples, such readings can be extended into a more composite cultural critique and a new reading of the classic 19th-century-novel syllabus: Charles Dickens would have had to bring to trial, even punish, Tom Gradgrind in *Hard Times* were there not the colonies available in which to dispose of him otherwise; there would have been no drama to the romance, perhaps no romance at all, for Margaret Hale and Mr. Thornton in Elizabeth Gaskell's *North and South* if scab labor from Ireland had not been brought in to break the millworkers' strike; even Emily Brontë might have had to be more explicit in *Wuthering Heights* about Heathcliff's mysterious origins. But Said insists further that these very structural elements in the 19th- and 20th-century novel, reliant on the credibility of territorial imperialism, in turn fortified the ideology of empire itself within an increasingly assenting, metropolitan, reading population.

According to *Culture and Imperialism*, the relative coherence of that assent is, however, eventually but relentlessly undermined by the "resistance and opposition" that were developing as nationalist assertions of political autonomy and cultural identity within the colonized spaces of overseas dominion. Importantly, in the chapter "Resistance and Opposition," the generic focus of the critical narrative is redisposed, from the novel to the cultural "work of intellectuals," thus implicitly refusing the sway of an "international division of (intellectual) labor" that has historically located the manufacturing and processing plants on the metropolitan side of

the core-periphery divide. From writers and poets E. M. Forster, André Malraux, Tayeb Salih, Ngugiwa Thiong'o, W. B. Yeats, Rabindranath Tagore, Leopold Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and Pablo Neruda, Said turns to "intellectuals" as diverse as C. L. R. James, George Antonius, Ranajit Guha, S. H. Alatas, Frantz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral, who have their own collective "awareness of culture as imperialism" and its resulting "propulsive infusion of theory and sometimes armed, insurrectionary militancy." Nationalism, through the flourishing of the "pantheon of Bandung," had likewise "permanently change[d] the internal situation of the Western powers, which divided into opponents and supporters of the imperial policy." With this same "resistance and opposition" that led eventually to decolonization and new nation states, however, evolved those very contentious issues of national sovereignty and human rights that still riddled the U.N. Human Rights Conference in June 1993.

The official United States representation to the human-rights assembly responded piously, righteously even, and without a trace of self-criticism to the questions at stake. If China argued that the West should not interfere in the name of human rights in the sovereign affairs of other nations, the United States, for its part, insisted just as mightily on the "universality" of those rights—and its own peculiar purview in their oversight and administration. While government officials from around the world met in Vienna to discuss human rights, the U.S. Congress was debating the country's budget and the aid package that it contained. J. Brian Atwood, President Clinton's new director of the Agency for International Development (AID), proposed that U.S. third-world aid be directed toward new targets: "human rights, democracy, and 'sustainable development'" (*The Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1993). But as Beth Stephens of the Center for Constitutional Rights observed, "Our government's moral position may be exemplary, but its hypocrisy reflects a short memory. The U.S., no less than countries we criticize, claims the right to pick and choose which rights to defend and international laws

to uphold." The United States, for example, which has been particularly recalcitrant in ratifying human-rights conventions generally, has not banned the death penalty, "claiming, in effect, our culture gives us the right to go our own way," in Stephens' words. Nor does the United States observe international law requiring that refugees be given the right to apply for political asylum. What government representatives at the U.N. Conference on Human Rights then determined as an West-East, first-world-third-world difference, is construed otherwise by the many NGOs representing popular franchise and an emancipatory social politics—from Puerto Rican independence, to critiques of violence against women or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, to the right of conscientious objection. Although such alternative views were excluded from the official debates and conference recommendations, they represent perhaps what Said refers to in the final chapter of *Culture and Imperialism*, "Freedom from Domination in the Future," as the "underlying map" of an "internationalist counter-articulation."

In this chapter, Said elaborates on the differences that distinguish the American empire from its exemplary predecessors, those of England and France: "Strangely, and despite both its intercontinental range and its genuinely various elements, American domination is insular. The foreign-policy elite has no long-standing tradition of direct rule overseas, as was the case with the British and the French, so American attention works in spurts; great masses of rhetoric and huge resources are lavished somewhere (Vietnam, Libya, Iraq, Panama), followed by virtual silence." *Culture and Imperialism* was very much in progress, indeed nearing completion, during the long months of the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, the most massive of recent (at least since Vietnam) United States "interventions" (Said quotes Richard Barnet that a "United States military intervention in the Third World had occurred every year between 1945 and 1967 [when he stopped counting]"). If it had been novels that, throughout the 19th century, had in significant part buttressed the "idea of having an empire," it was the media, Said argues, cit-

ing Noam Chomsky, that "manufactured consent" in the late 20th-century United States—at the expense of a tradition of "dissenting literature." He writes, "Consider how the Gulf War was made acceptable" and proceeds with a probing inquiry into the role, at once complicitous and duplicitous, played by both print and broadcast media. From the "unexamined moral mission" to the "trafficking in 'expert' Middle East lore," Said contends that the public role of the United States has been conscripted by its foreign policy priorities and the professionalization of an intellectual class whose will is to "please power in public."

The emphasis on foreign policy in this provocative reading of "culture and [United States] imperialism," however, stops the narrative discursus just short of the "resistance and opposition" reemergent within the United States itself. Despite an abiding concern with the contemporary culture of exile, represented by such cosmopolitan figures as Salman Rushdie, or the "anti-systemic movements" of economic migrants and political refugees, *Culture and Imperialism* does not cite the U.S. imperial imperative of policing its internal as well as its external borders. For if the United States is not ready to intervene in Haiti but remains satisfied with offshore cordons and liminal holding camps for Haitian refugees, it did not hesitate to send its troops to Los Angeles in spring of 1992—or to redesign and redeploy its anachronistic war against the second world as a war against its own "inner cities." There are stories being told, narratives written, from there/here as well. In two recent works, for example, *Rebellious Lawyering* by Gerard Lopez and *Words That Wound*, "outsider lawyers" argue precisely for the need for narrative and literary strategies in contesting the discriminatory prosecution of the police, legal, and penal systems of the United States.[1] As Lopez describes the counter-practice: "Contrary to popular belief, law is not a set of rules but a set of stories and storytelling practices that describe and prescribe social reality and a set of conventions for defining and resolving disputes." Thus, as Said argues (to the dismay of some disciplinary territorialists),

there is much promise in the intersection or overlapping of cultural work and political determinations; the NGOs and the "rebellious lawyers" are, for their part, mobilizing to liberatory purposes the literary tactics that departmental prerogatives and curricula have long sequestered as autonomous arts.

It is to the "liberation of critical spaces," the "crowd-activated sites"—of the Palestinian *intifada*, or the Los Angeles rebellion/uprising, or even the NGO protest for a public hearing from the draft commission of the U.N. Human Rights Conference—that *Culture and Imperialism* looks for "freedom from domination in the future." If the "emergence of . . . new decolonized, postcolonial states after 1945 is not a neutral fact," neither is *Culture and Imperialism* a neutral book.

NOTES

1. Gerard P. Lopez, *Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, *Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

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The Planners' Dilemma: What to Do with a Historic Heritage

Planners of cities blessed with rich architectural heritages have a twofold responsibility. On the one hand, they must maximize the efficiency and "livability" of existing quarters. This means that they must modernize archaic portions of the urban fabric, once so uniquely suited to earlier patterns of technology and social organization, in order to adapt them to the convergent needs of 21st century life. At the same time, however, they must try to preserve the unique architectural heritage that symbolizes the special history and cultural character of the place. If one accepts this simple formulation of irreconcilable opposites, one posits a relentless zero-sum battle between universalism and particularism, between internationalism and nationalism, and between technical efficiency and symbolic meaning. Put in this way, the conflict appears unresolvable. Such a scenario pits the engineering expert/planner against the conservationist/historic preservationist in a struggle whose outcome will probably be decided by neither. The conflict is likely to be resolved more by the economics of investment and the politics of power, which are the true "makers" of urban policy, than by the technical designs of planners.

So crude a specification of the dilemma cannot address the heart of the issue because it sets the terms of debate within a falsely specified dichotomy and leaves unexamined the complexity of the potential conflict. Furthermore, such a formulation is not very useful in the real world, which is less Manichean than minimaxing. The answers to most policy questions come additively, as each successive decision yields a temporary resolution. And in those sequential decisions, the pressing specifics of the case at hand often override ideological, and therefore seemingly unresolvable, oppositions. Policies, as opposed to ideologies, are far more dialectic than diehard.

The first term that requires a more com-

plex definition is historic heritage itself. Ten years ago Eric Hobsbawm and R. Ranger published a book entitled *The Invention of Tradition* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Their title is a good place to start because, just as history can only be constructed backwards from the present, so tradition can only be defined from where we stand. The past is continuously restructured or reinvented in our minds, and we in the present can only interpret it by our needs. Given that, we must ask what we mean *today* by a given traditional heritage. Only after we have answered that question can we determine what responsibilities urban planners might have toward its preservation.

If we are not to take the unrealistic view that the past is unchanging, and if we are to address the question of defining the "traditional" in ongoing societies, especially those with long, written or excavatable records, we are in much the same position as the archaeologists who excavated Troy. Assuming change as well as continuity, we must always be deciding *which* level to save, and, unavoidably, which levels must be destroyed in order to reach it.

Do we concentrate on the stratum closest to the surface (the most recent past) or on the one associated with the period of "highest" cultural achievement, regardless of when that occurred? Should we focus on the level we prefer aesthetically or the one that "costs the least" in terms of destruction and dislocation? The resolution of this dilemma is not easy nor is it by any means determinate. In the last analysis it can only be resolved insofar as the past is not only reinvented but put to some *use*.

So it matters very much, then, to *what* use the past is to be put. Is the reinvented past intended to enhance national pride and to unify residents along a given dimension of identity? And if so, who decides among the multiple identities that are possible?[1] Is preservation intended primarily to attract invisible export hard-currency funds through tourism? If so, then one of the criteria invoked will be the choice of something sufficiently exotic to draw moneyed foreigners. And finally, is the invented past being reconstituted for visual consumption only, or

Along the *qasabah* in Cairo in the early 19th century (left), and today (right). (From *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious*.)

is it intended to be used by today's residents to fulfill their contemporary needs? These are important questions whose answers can seldom be provided by planners alone.

In cases where monuments are simply to be restored for visual consumption (for example, not only European cathedrals but also certain nonfunctioning mosques and palaces in the Middle East), planners play limited roles. They may be asked to reorder the approaches and spaces around the monuments, but it is usually art and architectural historians who are assigned primary responsibility for achieving an authentic restoration. Planners are much more likely to be involved when a government has determined that the built environment of the past should do more than serve a symbolic function—that it should also serve the practical needs of citizens. In such cases, two strategies are possible. An area can be upgraded to better serve its current residents, which is what we call rehabilitation. Or an area can be recycled to serve a "better class" of new users, which is what we call gentrification.

Cities in the Middle East have not done very well with either of these approaches. Rehabilitation calls for a commitment to the poor and powerless, a commitment which

has been notably absent in most Middle Eastern countries, and gentrification requires perhaps the full three-generational cycle of Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks.[2] The elite of the oldest generation (the *true* traditionalists) may remain in their old-fashioned palaces and dwellings in the historic quarter because of a mix of inertia and psychological comfort. The second generation, newly modernizing, tends to reject the past and to seek instead a more Western style of life in new quarters. By the third generation, however, the romantic appeal of the past begins to entice some to return. Only then can renovated historic structures constitute an attractive prospect for (often wealthy *arriviste*) moderns, for only they are sufficiently liberated from the need to reject the past in order to embrace it. They are ready to reaffirm their heritage, but by then it is often too late to save it.

It is ironic to note that when attempts are made to restore old *medinas* (medieval quarters) in the Middle East, the houses appeal mostly to foreigners. One thinks of American heiress Barbara Hutton's house in Tangiers, or the house of the French physician in the Casbah of the Oudaia at Rabat, Morocco. It has always seemed strange to

me to go through the "museum house" of Al-Kritli near the Ibn Tulun mosque in Cairo, knowing that it was an eccentric Englishman who provided that city with its only "living" traditional house!

Rehabilitation, i.e., the renovation of traditional quarters for the (mostly) poor people who now inhabit them, has had an even sadder history. In the Middle Eastern "filtering down" system, wonderful quarters often reach bottom precipitously. One can point to the truncated remnants of Saudi cities that now serve as barracks for Pakistani guest workers! It appears as though neither governments nor landlords are at all interested in preserving or upgrading traditional forms of housing, especially for tenants who cannot pay for such improvements. The real question is who is to pay for better housing for the poor. It is inadequately recognized that in order to keep historic quarters from collapsing or having the life drained from them, *someone* must pay to restore the structures, and if the current, usually poor residents are not to be displaced, it cannot be them. Throughout the world, under such circumstances, owners of old buildings that yield low returns are the last to support "historic preservation," especially when such restoration will limit rather than enhance their opportunities for profit.

One thinks immediately of the medieval quarters of Cairo, which, for more than a generation, have been crumbling progressively, from top floors to bottom. The districts are filled with multifamily structures, some built according to the old *rabb* pattern (a building originally constructed for multifamily use), some constructed on the pattern of the open-court compound. Their rehabilitation could, if sensitively executed, help keep alive the physical and social fabric of the old quarters. However, many of these properties are still in the hands of the Awqaf Religious Trust Administration or have been recently privatized. Like inner-city areas in American cities that have filtered down to low-income tenants, the

buildings themselves are "in the way of progress." Given its accessible location, land is more valuable when it is empty and can be built upon than when it is already occupied by structures. And under conditions of rent control, empty structures are more valuable than those filled with tenants whose low rents and secure tenure are protected by law. This is a prescription for disinvestment and, wherever possible, abandonment, whether it occurs in New York or Cairo.[3] Hence, rather than being maintained or rehabilitated, the old structures are encouraged to burn or collapse.

An alternative scenario might occur. In a paper I prepared for the Aga Khan Foundation many years ago, I outlined a plan for how such structures could be sequentially and collectively restored and revitalized by their occupants.[4] However, this would require the active involvement of the government and the transfer of ownership from landlords to cooperatives of tenants. Such innovative methods are even less likely today than they were when I first proposed them, given the current thrust of privatization, geared as it is toward maximizing individual profit. Architectural control ordinances are another possible alternative. These have been employed with some success in a few American cities (the Vieux

Old and new facades intermix in Cairo. (From *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious*.)

Carré of New Orleans is the case that comes most readily to mind), but they are seldom effective in the Middle East. An architectural preservation ordinance for Gamaliya (the oldest medieval district of Cairo), for example, has for decades prohibited the construction of tall modern buildings in this historic quarter, but the law has often been ignored or bypassed through the exchange of monetary or political favors. At this late stage in the destruction process, only draconian government enforcement of land-lord responsibilities and/or the infusion of new public or private-foundation subsidies on a massive scale would be able to stem the loss of this irreplaceable heritage. Instead, whatever funds that have been available are being devoted to restoring isolated mosques and houses. Such restorations often convert living structures to dead objects.

Where commercial rather than residential districts are involved, the choices are even harder. Is the past form to be preserved, with newer types of manufactured goods circulated within it, or are "old" goods to be sold (mostly to tourists) in an appropriate setting that contextualizes them in order to enhance their value? The type of historic preservation selected for commercial districts very much determines a number of other consequences.

The case of Tunis offers intriguing evidence for the dilemmas that can be involved in answering such questions. The old *medina*, oval shaped and formerly walled, is still served by its two original commercial arteries. One of these arteries approaches the great Zaytuniya Mosque from the newer French-built colonial city. The entry portal, renamed Port de France (!), is the one used by tourists. The old *suq* (bazaar) that stretches from the gate to the mosque has been "restored," its flanking columns and overhanging arches gaudily tinted. The shops that line the street sell goods designed to appeal to tourists. Visually, the Arabian Nights has been recreated to lure and to delude—to create an ambience that context-

ualizes the past as exotic for the purpose of making the "traditional" objects (mostly machine-tooled replicas) seem more valuable. Plaintive melodies, issuing from nose flutes and electronically amplified, complete the sensual illusion. For whom is this *suq*? Only for tourists.

The second artery is joined at the mosque, whose perimeter is encircled by a bustling but uneasily mixed market. To the left remains Disneyland, but to the right and around the mosque is an architecturally less evocative but far more realistic bazaar—the Suq al-Grana. This zone is packed with Tunisians, but hardly those of yesteryear. *These Tunisians are busy buying blue jeans, soccer balls, nylon slips, audio and even videocassettes from the pushcarts that line the crowded passageway.* Boom boxes blare the latest European hits.

As night falls, the contrast between the zones intensifies. No one lives in the hollow zone of restoration; it is shuttered and dead. However, in the vicinity of the Suq al-Grana children play or run errands to small convenience shops, tailors tailor, men confer, women slip along. A hushed buzzing of life goes on. Yet this zone of the *medina* contains some of the worst and most overcrowded housing of Tunis; it is a proletarian quarter of degraded quality. Would not its preservation be more secure if it could be upgraded to better meet the needs of its inhabitants?

One must ask which of these districts could provide a superior model for historic preservation. And for whom is this preservation to be achieved? The Tunisian situation can be contrasted with the case of Aleppo in Syria, where a single *suq* has remained unified, preserved, and vital, although new goods have been introduced.

Farther uphill in old Tunis is the governmental zone where considerable recycling of architecturally attractive (but not necessarily very old) palatial structures has been taking place. Cultural institutes and mini-

A 17th-century German etching of Tunis. (From *La Medina de Tunis*.)

ministry offices occupy these restored buildings, their filing cabinets and rickety bookshelves incongruously tilted away from the beautifully tiled walls. Here, it seems, is certainly one way to retain the street fabric and external facades of the historic quarter. This illusion is rudely crushed, however, by the fact that many of the buildings, especially those located just outside the formerly walled city, were actually built by the French colonial administration. To what extent do we wish to preserve such symbols? Granted, the buildings are more attractive than their modern replacements might be, but doesn't authenticity count for something?

A parallel development is now taking place in Cairo to preserve the architecture of "Islamic-type" buildings in Heliopolis, a suburb that was built in the first decades of the 20th century by a Belgian entrepreneur. The arabesque decorative style of some

groups of apartment houses that date back to the 1920s is certainly attractive and would appeal, as a compromise, to gentrifying middle-class families seeking modern accommodations in "historic" buildings. But is this what we mean by historic preservation? This brings us to our central question.

Do we wish, when preserving a historic heritage, to evoke authenticity or illusion? And if we choose the former, then what exactly is authenticity? I would define authenticity as the congruence between the built form and the ways of life that gave rise to it. If authenticity is our goal, then must we also embrace the value of those ways of life, even when they no longer seem defensible?

Beginning with the social scientist's most basic assumption, namely that the built environment, especially that which has evolved without the intervention of foreign (either cultural or professional) agents, is intimately related to the social structure and lived-life of the group producing it. One does not have to be a "functionalist" to acknowledge the intimate connection between life ways and architecture.[5] The question must be raised, then, of how much a defense of traditional forms for building houses and cities also commits one to defending associated patterns of social interaction, including not only those "good" ones such as *gemeinschaft*, but also some less attractive ones such as domination and control. Since the built environment not only reflects such social relations but helps to perpetuate them, does the defense of traditionalism in architecture actually entail a defense of the status quo or even a regression in forms of social relations?

For instance, the traditional Middle Eastern house was designed primarily to perpetuate and enforce spatial segregation between males and females.[6] Does our attempt to preserve this architecture support this system, even if it works to the detriment

of women? One must guard against the use (abuse?) of traditions that maintain traditional systems of domination.

It seems reasonable, then, to make distinctions among elements to be preserved, based on their past and present uses and their relevance to today's values. Clearly, monuments that once served archaic functions can be reused for other purposes today, so this problem does not usually arise in those cases. The palace of yesteryear's despot can become the museum of the present; the church or mosque whose vital religious functions have been displaced to more secular institutions can be restored, even though the structure may symbolize a former, more theocratic period. Ruins of ancient cultural epochs, especially those which predate the immediate progenitor of the most recent cultural tradition, can be preserved to provide a link in the succession of civilizations.

The case is more difficult when one turns to the preservation of nonmonumental residences, commercial zones, and even whole urban quarters. Here one must make distinctions based on current effects as well as past symbols. Urban quarters that were built to attain certain values and to facilitate certain forms of social interaction must be reevaluated for their contemporary relevance.[7] This is not intended to diminish or oppose the earlier Islamic pattern of constructing residential quarters; indeed, I have enormous respect for many of these designs. I am simply arguing that if they are to be maintained or replicated, this choice should be made not because of past functions but because they can contribute to contemporary ones. For example, one of the great contributions of the medieval Islamic city is its subdivision into small, humanscaled neighborhood cells that generate an invaluable form of semipublic space. Such goals are perhaps even more relevant today than they were in the past, and not only in the Middle

The entry portal to the old oval-shaped *medina* in Tunis was renamed Port de France; ca. 1900. (From *La Medina de Tunis*.)

East. The real question is how this form can be made compatible with the vehicular and infrastructural requirements of a modern city. To do that will require design solutions that do not mechanically reproduce the traditional form just because it is "authentic."

This brings us immediately to the other side of the dilemma, which is the need to make older cities function in the modern era. This set of goals is best captured by such words as efficiency, technical requirements, the dictates of science, and, if the truth were known, the hidden agenda of "progress," whose outlines are best perceived by studying those cases presumed to be higher on some evolutionary scale.

In this connection, it is important to point out that the most recent cities are not the most livable, that efficiency refers only

to the means toward an end (not the end itself), and that technology should imply increased choice rather than a narrowing of options. The old certitude that the new and modern would be Western, or even universal or convergent (*implying* that model), has begun to crumble. There is no longer full agreement that the ends are known, much less that the means worked out in one place can be applied in the next. Nor is there optimism any more that the ends are universally achievable.

The real challenge is to invent design solutions for modernization that do not simply mimic Western solutions but, rather, that use the "old" in creative ways to yield cities that are both culturally authentic and technically modern. This is exactly what planners in the Middle East have thus far failed to do. They have not invented urban solutions that would retain the good features associated with old patterns while making it possible to meet new needs.

The reason we are interested in building dwellings and settlements in "traditional" forms is that we believe such patterns might be able to satisfy human needs in a more sensitive way than contemporary and/or alien methods do. Our respect for these achievements and our dissatisfaction with current mechanisms for translating human needs into the built environment are the motivations behind our renewed interest in vernacular architecture and settlement plans. If we are to steer the hard path between merely using such knowledge in the pastiche of postmodernism or imposing it as a means for maintaining outmoded forms of social organization and control, we must work to discover creative applications of tradition.

One can point to some examples, not from the Middle East but from Japan and Italy, to illustrate how creative applications can grow organically out of local traditions. In the case of Tokyo, one must admit at the outset that very little of the "old" city survived World War II and that the

Tourist shop selling luggage, located just inside the main gate of the *medina* at the end of Boulevard Mohammed V in Rabat, Morocco. (From *Rabat*.)

Japanese in the postwar period were not committed to retaining the architectural heritage of Japan.[8] On the other hand, fragments of the older pattern of small houses on tiny lots have survived in the city. This is true even in areas that have been converted to expensive and modern commercial uses. The juxtaposition of these two forms, one old, the other new, yields a highly functional solution to modern life. The tall commercial structures are all located on the outside perimeters of superblocks where they abut major traffic thoroughfares. But in the interiors of many of these superblocks, small "quiet islands" consisting of older-style houses have been retained. One of the most impressive results of this creative juxtaposition is its control over noise pollution. Since sound travels up, the solid phalanx of modern buildings almost completely insulates the interior residential zones from the inevitable noise of the automobile.[9]

Another creative solution to the problem of combining old with new can be seen in Florence. Rather than establishing a new central business district elsewhere, the Renaissance downtown has been recycled. The massive stone facades have been retained while the interiors have been gutted and replaced with modernized offices and shops in which contemporary functions are performed and current-day commodities are merchandised. The result is very pleasing aesthetically. It contributes to the sense of continuity with the past that makes Florence so appealing to residents and tourists alike.

I am not suggesting that either of these approaches would work in Middle Eastern cities. First, except for Aleppo and possibly Jerusalem, both of which are constructed in stone, the Florentine system of changing interior uses while retaining older facades would not work. Furthermore, because of a past colonial history, most Middle Eastern cities have inherited dual central business districts, a legacy of the dual city structure. It is unlikely, then, that convergence into a single downtown is possible. Nor could the Tokyo "solution" be easily transferred to the older quarters of Middle Eastern cities. The reason for discussing these nonlocal examples is simply to demonstrate that,

with sufficient political will, resources, and imagination on the part of architects and planners, creative solutions to the problems of combining old forms with new needs could be found.

Some ideas that might be entertained in modernizing Middle Eastern cities would include the creation of walking, center-city commercial districts based on the time-proven and authentic tradition of the *suq*; the creation of nucleated, giant-block residential cells with many dead ends (following the old Islamic city pattern) in order to protect residents from unnecessarily intrusive foot or vehicular traffic; the preservation and even enhancement of semipublic space within these neighborhoods to provide parks, small shops, and community facilities; the redesign of older-style dwelling units to retain the family privacy so well maximized in traditional architecture, while still allowing the fuller integration of the sexes in more egalitarian ways; an emphasis on techniques for moving people and goods that do not depend on automobiles or trucks. Such designs might succeed in preserving the precious architectural heritage, not only visually but functionally.

There are no technical planning reasons why such imaginative and creative solutions to the redesign of traditional parts of Middle Eastern cities would not be possible. However, there are real problems in the lack of commitment to finding such solutions and real failures to embrace the goals that would make these solutions compelling. Unless such goals are made priorities, the historic heritage of Middle Eastern cities will continue to be destroyed in the interests of modernity and profit. By the time the third generation of Middle Easterners decides to reinvent tradition, there may be precious little left for them to preserve.

NOTES

1. Egypt is a particularly telling case because it contains so many layers of changing identity. I have noticed that Copts tend to stress the pharaonic heritage whereas Muslims favor residues from the high middle ages. These differences are not simply aesthetic preferences but political statements.

2. I refer here to Thomas Mann's fictional family epic by that name. It is interesting to note the parallel between this and Ibn Khaldun's three-generational cycle for the rise and fall of Islamic dynasties.

3. I have explored some of the parallels between Cairo and New York in my article, "New York and Cairo: A View from Street Level," *International Social Science Journal* 125 (August 1990): 307–318. This paper points to some parallel effects of laws for rent control and tenant protection on the distribution of residential space in the two cities.

4. See Janet Abu-Lughod, "Preserving the Living Heritage of Islamic Cities," in Renata Holod, ed., *Toward an Architecture in the Spirit of Islam* (Philadelphia: privately printed for the Aga Khan Foundation, 1978).

5. See, inter alia, the works of Amos Rapoport, especially his *House Form and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969) or his *Human Aspects of Urban Form* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977). For a set of sophisticated papers that deal with many of these issues, see Jean-Paul Bourdier and Nezar AlSayyad, eds., *Dwellings, Settlements and Tradition: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Lanham, MD: University Presses of America, 1989). Unfortunately, I examined this publication only after preparing this paper.

6. A variety of sources could be cited here. Some of them are discussed in my "The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Conceptual Essence, Contemporary Relevance," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (June 1987).

7. I have tried to outline some of these in my "Contemporary Relevance of Islamic Principles," in Aydin German, ed., *Islamic Architecture and Urbanism* (Dammam, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal University, 1983), pp. 64–70.

8. Preservation has been restricted instead to a small number of traditional towns, most notably Kyoto.

9. I have recently been thinking about what this design solution could contribute to the redevelopment of certain sections of Manhattan.

DANIEL BERTRAND MONK

Orientalism and the Ornament of Mediation

> As a discipline, as a profession, as specialized language or discourse, Orientalism is staked upon the permanence of the whole Orient, for without "the Orient" there can be no consistent, intelligible, and articulated knowledge called "Orientalism." Thus the Orient belongs to Orientalism . . .
>
> —Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1978

Nearly fifteen years after the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism*—a magisterial text that has since inspired a new form of engaged scholarship in academia—it has become apparent that Said's critique of Orientalism has itself become the pretext for the restructuring of the same archaic paradigms of knowledge which it sought to expose. Despite the explosion of investigations on manifest Orientalist techniques of representation that has occurred since the publication of *Orientalism*, and the fact that these same studies have, fortuitously, begun to displace those classic texts of the discipline originally analyzed by Said, a network of latent Orientalist epistemologies has remained relatively intact. *Orientalism* has seemingly become the pretext, or more precisely, the ornament, for the "new Orientalism."

One of the more innocuous examples of this useful misprision of *Orientalism* appears in Deborah Dash Moore's essay, "Studying America and the Holy Land: Prospects, Pitfalls, and Perspectives."[1] Focusing on the historiography of religious contacts between the United States and the Holy Land, Moore proposes the revivification of this field of academic scrutiny by invoking Said's name as a synecdoche for what she describes as the "new history." But in so doing, she reduces *Orientalism* to the status of ornament, altering its necessarily political polemic into a "kinder, gentler" history of mutual cultural "exchanges" that is strikingly incommensurate with Said's presentation of Orientalism as a disciplinary structure. Moore notes: "[A] discussion of what Edward Said calls the 'domestication of the exotic' potentially could defuse some of the polemics surrounding Orientalism by considering concrete examples of cultural exchange. The process of cultural borrowing and reciprocity deserves the attention of scholars."[2]

A similar sublimation of *Orientalism* into its innocuous, ornamental double is present in the work of the Jerusalem-based architectural historian, David Kroyanker. Having perhaps sensed the prominent status of the term Orientalism (if not that of the text) within current academic thinking in the United States and Europe, Kroyanker now speaks of Orientalism's enduring legacy in the "phases" of aesthetic modernism in Mandate-era Palestine (1917–1948) and present-day Israel. Divorced from what Said describes as the "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient," Kroyanker demotes Orientalism to typological architectural details, to an index of "formal symbols" which are intrinsic to an authentic Oriental architecture regardless of who employs it.[3] For Kroyanker, Orientalism's function as a lexicon of authenticity, even in the most sensitive political moments during the British Mandate over Palestine and in the tense period since then, has simply been to establish a "physical continuity between the past and the present."[4] Consequently, he presents even the most striking examples of a self-conscious and politically motivated manifest Orientalism as autonomous aesthetic developments. For example, in documenting what he describes as the "neo-Oriental" architecture that developed in Jerusalem following the Six-Day War in June 1967, Kroyanker recounts that the Israeli Minister of Urban Development "directed his office to convey the message of 'orientalism'" to the various planners involved in the extensions of Jewish Jerusalem to areas previously in Jordanian hands.[5] This effort was, in Kroyanker's words, intended "to harmonize with the local landscape."[6] What is particularly disconcerting here is not the bizarre history of this "Orientalist" imperative in 1967 so much as the manner in which Kroyanker appears to remain silent about—either concealing or oblivious to—the fact that it is precisely this type of aesthetic and nominal recuperation of historical "territory" that identifies Orientalism as a dominative practice; a practice, moreover, that cannot be dissociated from a desire to obtain real ground. In the context of colonial monuments and subsequent nationalist counter-interventions in stone and concrete that Kroyanker seeks to codify through Orientalism, it is precisely those efforts to establish an architectural "link" with historical termini in the Orient's past or with a timeless "local landscape" that have constituted and continue to define the conflation of aesthetic and political imperatives.

If these examples dissociate Orientalism from its status as a category of mediation by dissipating the legacy of Said's critique to the realm of harmless ornament, it is equally important to recognize that, paradoxically, within the realm of aesthetics, Oriental ornament has itself been elevated to a category of philosophic mediation with similar results. I am thinking in particular of the manner in which Oleg Grabar, the noted scholar of Islamic art, and author of *Mediation of Ornament* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), has recently sought to outline a "theory of intermediaries in art" through the resolution of Islamic artifacts into something like transcendental codes for aesthetic and semiotic reception. While Grabar's concept of "reception," framed and qualified as it is by his corresponding idea of the pleasurable, or Platonic *terpnopoietic*, dividend of ornament, appears at certain moments to approach art theorists Theodor Lipps' and Wilhelm Worringer's aesthetics of "empathy," his equation of ornament with a form of quasi-linguistic mediation reveals a preoccupation with the Orient as a malleable sign that is indicative of an "old" knowledge. In Grabar's *Mediation of Ornament*, the East, interpreted through its aesthetic production, appears as a kind of hieroglyph or historic rune through which a series of ambivalent but nevertheless essential truths may be divined, and then extrapolated, into a general theory of art.

This semiological reduction is sanctioned by a chain of deliberations intended to articulate the ambiguities of Grabar's "intermediaries," but which, at the same time, reestablish an old topos of Orientalist

knowledge through a categorical syllogism: at its best, ornament is Oriental; ornament is necessarily a supplement; the Orient is a supplement. Grabar presents ornament as a kind of "visual order" analogous to a semiotic regime. Paradoxically, this same visual order "appears to have no purpose but to enhance its carrier," and though it is a universal phenomenon, "it is generally acknowledged that, whatever is meant by the term, its most engaging and best-known examples belong to the arts developed in regions of predominantly Muslim culture."[7] The "sheer sensuality" and "range" of Oriental ornament (which I interpret to mean the same *worldliness* of these examples) is what, in Grabar's view, sanctions their elevation to transcendental categories of mediation. Having framed ornament in these broad terms, Grabar then seeks to explode what he describes as "European-centered" categorical oppositions between structure and ornament by appealing to a definition of ornament as a necessary form of "completion" that at times *supersedes* structure by making it the "subject of design." This is an interesting move. However, in bypassing the possibility of treating ornament as a "structural fetish"—that is to say, in failing to examine the possibility of employing the traditional ornament/structure opposition as a means of deconstructing what Mark Wigley has described as the "politically strategic illusion of structure"—Grabar's tactical inversion of the couplet assures that the traditional axiologies remain intact.[8] Whether elevated or demeaned, the Orient is associated with ornament and, by implication, the West with structure.

Paradoxically, the critical legacy of *Orientalism* (Grabar never explicitly refers to Said) is what the Orientalist must overcome in order to universalize ornament as a form of aesthetic mediation. The nearly ubiquitous contemporary examinations of the power/knowledge nexus in its geopolitical frame that Said's criticism has given rise to, are necessarily acknowledged by Grabar in a series of "while one could argue that" kinds of meditations on ideology, political correctness, historical relativism, and representations of sovereignty in the postcolonial

state. He transcends these issues by contextualizing them within the rubric of an unproductive politics of "resentment," or by subsuming them within the "paradoxes of form" absorbed by his "intermediaries": ornament itself overcomes a potential critique of Grabar's Orientalist presuppositions by accommodating within itself a series of contradictory interpretations whose ramifications he would otherwise have to contend with. Where they are not presented as either an opposition between relative and transcendental truths assimilated by ornament, or an ambivalent articulation of the intermediary's function as a motivated or unmotivated sign (i.e., its ability to either carry meaning or *be* meaningful), these potential contradictions are resolved in another manner. Grabar establishes a problematic division between the historical taxonomies of naming (which, for him, seemingly constitutes ideology as such) and the accessibility of ornament as something akin to the Kantian "thing in itself," the availability of the object (to Grabar, presumably) through pure aesthetic "reception" beyond symbolically mediated forms of false consciousness.

There probably is something silly in pursuing ghosts of past sins, as one condemns or mocks the "orientalist" terminology of so many manuals from the nineteenth century or issued from its ideologies. The problem, however, is

"Rapport de l'architecture à la face humaine," from *Grammaire des Arts du Dessin* by Charles Blanc; 1876.

only in part that some of these identifications like "moorish" or "Saracenic," which are ideologically charged in ways resented today, are still used. It is also that this kind of categorization has affected the contemporary arts of new nation-states and has been seen as reflecting modern national states and their ideologies rather than visual considerations.[9]

Grabar is correct to point out that the legacy of Orientalism has left its mark as an often productive, often venal, aesthetic auto-Orientalism in postcolonial situations.[10] It is precisely because of his thorough understanding of these developments (as well as from his brilliant analysis of the history of apotropaic uses of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem) that one would expect him to conclude that within the Orientalist legacy there has never been access to a purely "visual consideration" of art. There is no possibility of speaking about Orientalism from a position outside of the political circumstances within which it has always been imbricated. Nor, for that matter can the geopolitical forms of domination, represented by the constitution of Orientalism as knowledge per se, be reduced to a simple "I do it, you do it, everybody does it" game of mutual objectification on that polite, even, and universal playing field of interpretation and reception alluded to by Grabar.

It is the role of the mediator more than that of the "intermediaries" that has led me to question whether part of the critical legacy of *Orientalism* is now precisely the sublimated textual ornament of Grabar's theory, and, by extension, of that "Old-New land" of instrumental Orientalism that I have cited through the two previous examples. Even as it is contended with, seemingly mastered, and defused, *Orientalism* (or allusions to it) becomes that necessary form of "completion" that rearticulates the need for a *contemporary* mediator between a world that is perpetually represented as being "in reality, or perception, alien to the mainstream of the history or art and of the prevailing culture of the Western world."[11] Like Grabar's ornament itself, *Orientalism*, or the claim to an awareness of its position, seems to "enhance its carrier." And it is in this sense, tragically, that *Orientalism* ap-

pears to have become that sign of critical and political literacy that confirms the traditional position of the Orientalist-as-intermediary, while perhaps salvaging the same "intermediaries" from their potential relegation to the status of ornament in a postmodern world.

NOTES

1. Deborah Dash Moore, "Studying America and the Holy Land: Prospects, Pitfalls, and Perspectives," in *With Eyes Towards Zion III: Western Societies and the Holy Land*, Moshe Davis and Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1991).

2. Ibid., p. 42.

3 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), p. 3.

4. David Kroyanker, "Phases in the Orientalism of Modern Jerusalem Architecture," *Adrihalut Israelit* 11 (November: 1991): 4.

5. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

6. Ibid.

7. Oleg Grabar, *The Mediation of Ornament* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 5, 6.

8. See Mark Wigley, "Theoretical Slippage: The Architecture of the Fetish," in *Fetish: Princeton Architecture Journal*, vol. 4 (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), Sarah Whiting, Edward Mitchell, Greg Lynn, eds., pp. 88–129, for his articulation of the strategies of resistance which occupy the denigrated position of "surface" and have opened up to feminist criticism. This position would be of particular importance to the further development of Grabar's tenuous association of the intermediary of "geometry" with the aesthetic realm of the marginalized.

9. Grabar, *Mediation of Ornament*, p. 247, footnote 40.

10. I am also led to wonder why Grabar has not associated this auto-Orientalism with the fact that the same significant exemplars of aesthetic mediation which are so crucial to a theory of enlightened "reception" (like the decoration of Qasr al-Mshatta) are lying in Berlin museums as enduring testimony to the "old" Orientalism.

11. Grabar, *Mediation of Ornament*, p. 3.

FREDERICK M. ASHER

The Rise of Eurocentrism: Anatomy of Interpretation

Vassilis Lambropoulos

The prodigious amount of material that Vassilis Lambropoulos controls in his book, *The Rise of Eurocentrism*, is nothing short of extraordinary: he examines essentially all Western culture from the Reformation to the present day, skillfully and steadily weaving a recurrent theme into a postmodernist fabric that portrays the intellectual heritage of present-day Europe and America.

The book traces the tension between the spirit of Hellenism and that of Hebraism. Lambropoulos starts with Erich Auerbach's analysis of literature in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) based on the distinction he posits between the Homeric and Biblical systems of thought. Auerbach constructs what Lambropoulos characterizes as "a dichotomy of irreconcilable styles." The Hebraic he sees as the internal Other of the West, emerging as such at the time when the status of Jews in society was first debated, that is, when European society had to deal with Jews in its midst. Quoting Stephen Zwicker, Lambropoulos notes that while it remained unlikely for Englishmen to meet Arthurian Britons, they did begin to meet Jews in the 1650s. Despite a Hebraization of social life, there was nevertheless a Hellenization of culture that lasted through much of the 19th century. For the history of art, it was Johann Winkelmann whose impact was widely felt, but in other realms of culture, it was Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich von Schiller, Lord Byron, Gustave Flaubert, and others, many of whom never touched Greek soil, indeed intentionally so. Greece became a symbol of the revival of liberty. Thus, in opposition to the Jews, who were challenged to modernize a tradition and overcome ethnic differentiation by assimilating into the dominant European society, the Greeks were challenged to modernize a nation, define eth-

nic distinction, and create a national culture. In the post-Reformation West, the Other is always Hebraic, argues Lambropoulos: "The essential Other is the Jew who has to pass the test of proficiency in Hellenic culture in order to be emancipated into the civil society of interpretive rights."

As the first part of *The Rise of Eurocentrism* uses Auerbach's *Mimesis* as the starting point and a continuing leitmotiv, the second uses Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1972). The forces motivating anti-Semitism reveal and come to symbolize the bankruptcy of civilization "in which mind cannot always protect itself from its own constructs." Judaism is depicted as the creative and liberating force of the Enlightenment, which is threatened with extinction by present-day barbarity. Thus the Hellenic is depicted as vicious and sterile, a distinction that characterizes it as anti-Semitic. In this construction, the Greeks become protofascists. The antidote: Judaism, the religion of expectation, which would be capable of redeeming hopes of the past, a vision that would be articulated, though somewhat differently, by Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida.

For the Germans, the concept of *Bildung*, which Lambropoulos sees as "personal organic growth," was central to the Enlightenment. *Bildung*, however, was exclusively Hellenic—indeed, based on the adoration of the Hellenic. Where, then, do Jews fit in this? Assimilation must be the response. While excluded from one sphere of power—government—they were encouraged to excel in culture. Thus the Greeks were used to educate the Jews, "to educate the Other in order to legitimize the knowledge of the Same, the regime of aesthetic identity." The Jewish intellectual, from Heinrich Heine to Gyorgy Lukacs, from Adorno to Alan Bloom, by excelling in the exercises of *Bildung*, became its custodian. The result: anti-Semitism. The development is complex, but the case compelling. With the decline of the liberal ideal in the mid-19th century went the high culture it defended. As Horkheimer and Adorno note,

"liberalism meant capitalism and capitalism meant Jew." This follows Karl Marx, who was the first to write about the Jews as a historical construct exemplifying the spirit of capitalism.

Assimilation, Lambropoulos reminds us, was by definition, an issue of Hellenism, and so Jews are asked to "repent for the sin of emancipation and restore to their art its moral character." The answer to the dilemma of emancipation, he concludes, is a typically postmodern separatism. But in all positions—separatist and assimilationist, humanist and antihumanist—the adherents find "in Hebraism the postmodern universal that asserts the moral superiority of contemplation, the cultural ethics of atonement."

Eurocentrism is not a perspective balanced against an Oriental Other, but rather, an Other within.

In a related context, the Hellenic-Hebraic tension reveals itself in attitudes toward myth, constructed (though I might argue with Eurocentric myopia) as fundamentally Hellenic. Myth mediated the relationship between philosophy and history (as Lambropoulos notes, for Freud, Sartre, and Dali, among others) but it assigned to Greece two natures, one Hebraic, the other Hellenic. Scholars such as Aby Warburg thus argued that Athens had to be recovered from Alexandria, a variation of the Athens-Jerusalem dichotomy that others have seen. Benjamin, however, attacked the mythical as belief in progress, presence, and permanence. And Horkheimer and Adorno see as the ultimate project of mythology the total elimination of the Greek element from Western thought, that model of Greek thought which resulted in "thirty wretched centuries of Western civilization, from Odysseus to Hitler."

The last part of the book takes Derrida as its focus. He de-Hellenizes criticism but,

more than that, "Judaizes" it, making Judaization the properly critical method of de-Hellenization. Derrida's *différence* is a figure for the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition. To him, quite in opposition to Horkheimer and Adorno, Judaism has become a universal condition: "All of us, poets and rabbis, are Jews." It is, in part the messianic quality of Judaism that makes it attractive, unlike the Greek that Lambropoulos (following Hermann Cohen) characterizes as directed exclusively toward the past. Derrida's tone is thus neither about ending (as in Christianity) nor about fulfilling (as in Hebraic modernism), but about "coming," a state standing above history, language, and society.

Lambropoulos concludes that "Hebraism appropriated culture from Hellenism by identifying it with the aesthetic, specifically with masterpieces and their professional explication—a separate and autonomous realm with its own specialties, institutions, rituals, and passages. Modernism signaled the unqualified triumph of (Hebraic) High Art over (Hellenic) culture." What Hebraism failed to do morally, it achieved aesthetically. With powerful insight, the author argues that deconstruction, as a discipline of question, may occasionally seem to question authority, but in the end it inevitably sanctions it. "This discipline of reading endorses interpretation as control." In the end, "as continuing Hellenophobic alarms show, although the Hellenic allotropy is held hostage by its other, it has not been completely neutralized because it is not subject to the law, and therefore it may be expelled but cannot be arrested."

Where does Eurocentrism fit in all this? It is a theme, of course, but a word used explicitly only twice in the text. Eurocentrism is not a perspective balanced against an Oriental Other, but rather, an Other within. It is an Oriental Other only insofar that it is represented by the Hebraic and Orientalized Greek. That's a remarkable vision of European culture.

To me, however—a male, Jewish scholar—there is nevertheless something missing in the vision. I am an art historian, thus indirectly inheritor of Hegel's legacy; I

am a Jew with German roots, perhaps more directly inheritor of the legacy of Marx, Warburg, and the Frankfurt School. But I devote my scholarly expertise to the art of India and so, not surprisingly, I worry that Lambropoulos' perspective itself is too Eurocentric. We live in a world with new internal Others, those whose power is emerging very much like that of the Jews in the 17th century. In that sense, then, the Hellenic-Hebraic dialectic can be taken as exemplary, as symbolic, not exclusive. We live, furthermore, in a world linked by CNN, MTV, and Internet, a world more than ever profoundly affected by decisions in Tokyo and Damascus, Delhi, and Rio de Janeiro, a world in which the colonialist experience continues to shape the culture of colonist and colonialized. Intellectual thought is no longer a product of the Hebraic-Hellenic dialectic, and philosophy no longer can be viewed as an exclusively Greek mode of thought, to paraphrase Derrida. Thus, I prefer to think of a world system with overlapping centers and peripheries rather than one with a linear development running through a small segment of thinkers, even if they are those who have shaped the way I think.

BARBARA KNECHT

Representations of Turkey

Culture and architecture are represented by language and reinforced with drawings and photographs. Together they fix a work in time and place. Using language, an author constructs a theory by presenting information in a comprehensible relationship to something the reader knows or believes to be true. Visual representation appears as reality, but the view is selected based on what it symbolizes in the text. Although an image appears to have objectivity, it represents a point of view. The work is the object of the reader's gaze as the author wishes it to be seen, and is fixed in the terms of the author's analysis. The illusion of objectivity establishes another point of view, that is indistinguishable from truth. Several recent print and video representations of Turkish culture and architecture show how images are manipulated for consumption as truth by their audiences. There is a common belief that serves as the point of departure for these representations, which are so deeply ingrained in Western societies that their truth is barely questioned.

One of the arguments in Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978) is that devices of language are used systemically to convey the East only in terms of its relationship to the dominant West. While this phenomenon persists in commercial media, recent scholarship has challenged it in art and architectural history. The following two excerpts provide a comparison of changes in historical narrative in the span of fifteen years. Each describes the early Middle Ages when Islamic and Christian cultures first encountered one another. Through the choice of adjectives and qualifiers and limited stylistic comparison, the first, H. W. Janson's 1969 edition of *A History of Art* (revised, New York: Abrams, 1969), displays the attitude of Western superiority prevalent at the time:

How was it possible for a group of semi-civilized desert tribes suddenly to burst forth from the Arab peninsula and to impose their political and religions domi-nance on populations far superior to them in numbers, wealth, and cultural heritage? . . . [T]hey absorbed the conquered populations, along with their cultural heritage, which they skillfully adapted to the requirements of Islam.

In art, this heritage embraced the Early Christian-Byzantine style, with its echoes of Hellenistic and Roman forms, as well as the artistic traditions of Persia. . . . Pre-Islamic Arabia contributed nothing except the beautifully ornamental Arabic script; populated largely by nomadic tribes, it had no monumental architecture; and its sculptured images of local deities fell under Mohammed's ban against idolatry. . . . At the end of the seventh century, however, the Moslem rulers, now firmly established in the conquered domains, began to erect mosques and palaces on a large scale as visible symbols of their power, intended to outdo all pre-Islamic structures in size and splendor. . . . What we know of their design and decoration shows that they were produced by crafts-men gathered from Egypt, Syria, Persia, and even Byzantium, who continued to practice the styles in which they had been trained. A distinctive Islamic tradition crystallized only in the course of the eighth century.

Compare this passage with Spiro Kostof's discussion of a similar subject in *A History of Architecture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), which assumes equality and seeks to identify differences and give value to each:

[Samarra's] palaces expose the tremendous elaboration of courtly life since the early, simple days of the Muslim empire. Friday mosques in Kairawan, Tunisia and Cordoba, Spain attest to the high level of power and sophistication that architecture had gained in the century or so that corresponded to the Carolingian episode and also demonstrate how profoundly different was the Muslim's view of community devotion from that of his Christian contemporaries in Europe and Byzantium.

The land where Islam was born, the Hejaz or middle portion of Arabia, had no monumental buildings. The southern part of the peninsula, Yemen, was early imbued with Hellenism which reached it by way of the caravan trade. We have evidence of temples, palaces, and a conventional tall tower-house. Even so, nothing in the desert homeland could have quite prepared the conquering Muslims for the architectural spectacle of old Greco-Roman cities or the Sassanian court. And yet within three or four generations, a distinctive Muslim architecture began to materialize that borrowed native forms and talent, and applied them to its own specific programs, its own way of life.

The power of language places readers in relationship to the object of study. It suggests and persuades them to believe the history as described. As intellectual traditions are disseminated through language, Said argues, Orientalism's "truths, like any truths delivered by language, are embodied in language, and what is the truth of language, Nietzsche once said, but a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are the illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are."

In art and architectural history, facts and data are combined with visual evidence, and are all manipulated within the text. Images produce powerful memories, and facts have the ability to develop belief and carry "truth." Both Janson and Kostof are narrating the truth. In Janson's (revised) version written more than twenty years ago, the point of view is static, culturally systemic, and embodied in the language. Architectural history, as written by Kostof and others more recently, seeks to eradicate cultural bias by another choice of language and representation that enables the reader to view each society's history in its own terms. The point of view changes because each culture speaks for itself. The author is not absent, but he seeks to include rather than exclude, reshaping history into its own image of autonomous contemporary cultures.

In the case of Turkey, one need only mention its name and stereotypical images rise vividly, images which Westerners see as the common "truth" of the country. Although there is a shift in some academic representations of non-Western societies, the old bias continues in nonacademic books, films, magazines, and newspapers. A spate of publications on Turkey directed at

non-specialists has recently emerged, including two substantial architecture-related books and several travel books, videos, and articles. Their common trait appears to be an intent to increase the knowledge, pleasure, and quantity of travel to Turkey, and each represents the country in relation to what it presumes the audience knows or needs to know to support that goal.

Sinan, the 16th-century architect and engineer to the court of three sultans, is the subject of the stunning monograph by John Freely, Augusto Romano Burelli, and Ara Güler. Freely has lived many years in Turkey, taught and written extensively, including the indispensable walking-tour guide *Strolling through Istanbul* (Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1972). Burelli is an architect and engineer from Venice, and Güler is a widely published international photogra-

pher who lives and works in Istanbul. Their book, *Sinan: Architecture of Süleyman the Magnificent and the Ottoman Golden Age*, is organized into four parts: "Architect and Engineer" by Freely consists of a brief biography and description of major works; "A Testament in Stone" illustrates building exteriors and details with Güler's photographs; "Space and Light" does the same with interiors; and "Statics and Style" by Burelli is a structural analysis of selected buildings illustrated with plans and sections.

Although exact dates of Sinan's life are debated, no one disputes that he lived for nearly all of the 16th century. In 1538 he became architect to the court of Sultan Süleyman, known as "the Lawgiver" in Turkey and "the Magnificent" in Europe, and served as chief architect for fifty years. Nearly five hundred structures—mosques,

schools, bridges, baths, hospitals, palaces, tombs, soup kitchens—are ascribed to him in contemporary manuscripts. According to Aptullah Kuran, one hundred and ninety-six stand in their original form and style, and another seventy-five remain as ruins or substantial reconstructions.[1]

In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire stretched from the Balkans to North Africa and Persia. Sinan spent the twenty-five years prior to becoming court architect learning his art as an engineer in the elite Janissary corps, and, as part of the Ottoman military establishment, he built bridges, aqueducts, and other military structures throughout Anatolia and the empire. By the time he was appointed architect to the court of Süleyman, he had many years of experience and observation behind him; his work in the second half of the 16th century represents the zenith of ex-

In the mosque of Süleyman's daughter, Princess Mihrimah, Sinan eliminate corner piers, relegating them to the outside of the mosque. The dome rests on four pendentives, which seem to melt away in the light flooding from walls that no longer support any weight. The dome appears suspended, like the canopy of Heaven. (From *Sinan*.)

pression of the cultural magnificence of the Ottoman empire. Embodied within his buildings are the achievements of tilemakers, carpet weavers, stone and marble cutters, glass blowers, and calligraphers, not to mention the advancements in medicine, education, and charitable works.

Scholars of Sinan have analyzed the originality and achievement of his work as a synthesis of East and West. "For artists with the sensibility of Sinan, the millennium-long traditions of the eastern Islamic world and the Mediterranean could not be ignored. His domes are Central Asian and Roman; his unambiguous use of architectural elements is medieval Muslim, his concept of total unity of space advanced beyond that of Renaissance architects," writes architectural historian Doğan Kuban.[2] They have also demonstrated that, although his work has consistently been studied in formal and structural terms as isolated buildings, they were often components of larger urban complexes, called *külliyes*, which carried political, social, and economic symbols in the society. Gülru Necipoğlu has recently noted, "Although Sinan's creative genius and his role as an inventive synthesizer of architectural traditions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are undeniable, seeing his buildings only as modular structures based on a rational organization of abstract forms results in misconceptions about the cultural meanings they carried in their own time."[3] The *külliyes*, which include a mosque and related institutions such as schools, hospitals, soup kitchens, and the mausoleum of the endower, were the urban building blocks of Istanbul and under Sinan developed in highly sophisticated urban and topographical relationships.

Despite this, the following passages from

In the Sehzade [sic] Mehmet Camii, Sinan took the plan of Haghia Sophia to its logical conclusion. Instead of building two semidomes to support the central dome, he erected four, creating a perfect symmetry. (From *Sinan*.)

William Holden Hutton's 1925 history of Istanbul crystallizes the prevailing attitude about the Islamic architecture of the city where Sinan was the preeminent builder:

> The mosque of Constantinople, as one has already been shown, are very largely buildings which had been churches in past days.... More open and evident still is the fact that the architects of the mosques, built for Mohammedan worship since the Turks have ruled in the city of the Caesars, have done little more than copy the people whom they have conquered. In most of the great mosques of Stambul, S. Sophia is simply and directly imitated. In others the leading idea is developed with a variation or two. Of genuine originality the Turkish architects have shown not a trace.[4]

Hutton continues, several pages later:

> How little variety, we say; how tiresome this similarity of design! The Turks indeed have felt it themselves, but they have been unable to set themselves free. For indeed the lack is the hopeless one, the sheer absence of originality, in every feature. We may call one mosque more eastern than another, but it would puzzle us to find a single feature in any of them, except the Mihrab, which is not ultimately Christian. The feeling, it is true, differs; but that will be felt, by Westerners at least, to be a conspicuous defect.[5]

Here the description represents the East only in terms of its relationship to the (superior) West. According to this history, the Ottoman Turks, having no architectural heritage of their own, took the great church of the Holy Wisdom, Haghia Sophia in Constantinople, as their model, which they single-mindedly and competitively set out to surpass. Pursuing this simplistic analysis frees the historian from a structural and cultural analysis of Arab, Persian, Byzantine, and Seljuk Turkish building, from an examination of the distinction between the rituals and activities of the Christians and the Muslims within the respective buildings, and from viewing the mosque from within its natural and constructed urban context. The monocentric point of view focuses on a comparison with Haghia Sophia, with its magnificent central domed space, in purely formal terms. The image becomes the content, the structure is overlooked.

Both Freely and Burelli display a Eurocentric analysis of Sinan's work in their essays. His achievement appears diminished because it exists only in relationship to Christian buildings. Even though Freely discusses Sinan's early buildings as far east as

the Iranian border and as far west as Bulgaria, the text is illustrated with images of Haghia Sophia. One caption reads: "Sinan might never have realized his greatest accomplishments if not for the monumental presence of Haghia Sophia. Justinian's great basilica, erected in the sixth century in Constantinople, provided both a model and a challenge throughout Sinan's long career." This interpretation, a singular point of view, effectively cancels out evidence of additional influences. Evidence exists that Sinan felt challenged to build a dome of equal size to Haghia Sophia, but he was also heir to Islamic traditions eight centuries in development. His years in the Janissary corps had exposed him to buildings from one end of the empire to the other. His buildings have elements that can be traced to Christian, Roman, Arab, Persian, and Seljuk examples. He built almost every building type known at this time. But his mosques are his masterpieces, and the characteristic of covering spaces only with semispherical domes is uniquely Ottoman. It is highly plausible that Sinan was not the first engineer or architect in a millennium to be lured by the desire to build a dome larger than Haghia Sophia, but he was the first to accomplish it.

Freely's text continues this bias throughout, despite hints at a more complex heritage: "Haghia Sophia was always the archetype of the imperial Ottoman mosques of the classical period, though their plans in detail varied considerably from that of the great church." In the absence of other defining influences, attempts to imitate in order to surpass would suggest close similarity of plan types. Deviations in plan type result from the fact that domes in Ottoman architecture "express different views of the world,"[6] and evolved not from a plan organization but from the structural support system and a synthesis of religious and political symbolism. The plan of a mosque reflects an entirely different program of activities of worship from a church. The building section reflects a different conception of man's relationship to God.

Freely's opening essay confines itself to Sinan's most well-known individual mosques and külliyes: the Süleymaniye and

Sehzade külliye complexes, the Rüstem Pasa, and Mihrimah mosques, the hamam of Hasekki Hurrem, all in Istanbul, and the Selimiye complex in Edirne. There is a lot of interesting detail—facts about the size of domes and heights of buildings, the different building elements and what they were used for, descriptions of decoration, and a long list of less well-known buildings and their location. All of this detail and description, unfortunately, is given without accompanying illustrations. There is no correlation between the text and the accompanying photographs. The form of the narrative is comparable to a guidebook, Freely's preferred genre. Unfortunately the book's 12-by-17-inch format, which opens beautifully on a coffee table is not suitable for toting around Istanbul.

Its shortcomings notwithstanding, Freely's essay, coupled with Güler's spectacular photographs, provides sufficient material for appreciating the skill and beauty of Sinan's buildings. But it seems that Freely isn't convinced that an English-speaking audience will believe in the value of Sinan's work unless it can be connected to familiar work of accepted worth. The final section of Freely's essay, entitled "The Ottoman Renaissance," along with Burelli's closing essay, seek to relate Sinan and his work in a relationship to his Italian contemporaries. There is no discussion of cross-cultural communication here. Freely tells us that Sinan never studied the Italian treatises, never went to Italy, and had no knowledge of the theoretical concepts of Western architecture. But, he continues, Fatih (Mehmet the Conqueror), who lived a century before Sinan, studied Greek and Latin and invited Italian artists to work on the Topkapı Palace, and Beyazit II, who died when Sinan was an adolescent in the Janissary corps, "made unsuccessful overtures to both Leonardo da Vinci and Michaelangelo to design a bridge across the Golden Horn, indicating that he was aware of the stature of Italian artists and architects." Although the scholarship on the extent of cross-cultural exchanges is just emerging, evidence of parallel developments around the Mediterranean indicate mutual awareness. Theoretically, however, the mak-

ing of buildings and urban images in the Renaissance city was based on a search for the ideal through the rediscovery of antiquity. The very title of the section, "Ottoman Renaissance," is misleading; what was going on in Italy was rebirth and revival, and what Sinan was doing was original interpretation.

The photographs and their captions add a rich dimension to this book. They show a few building types that are not dealt with in the text, but their main strength is their ability to give the reader a hint of the extraordinary depth and breadth of Ottoman architectural and decorative arts. Details of intricately carved wooden doors, some with inlays of mother-of-pearl or tortoiseshell, tiles from the famous Iznik kilns, cut stone, carved marble, painted and carved calligraphy, leaded screens, and stained-glass windows are all shown in far superior detail, thanks to the camera lens, than it is often possible to see in the buildings themselves. If there can be a criticism, it is that such beautiful images are somewhat misrepresentative: they put light in places where it doesn't exist and frame views in a way that contradicts the experience of the spaces. Still, these photographs allow the work to speak for itself. The essence of light, the tactile quality of the materials, and the details of craft and construction shown by the camera combine in the eye and mind to produce an emotional image of the experience of the whole building.

Güler is also responsible, along with Samih Rıfat, for the photographs for another beautiful volume, Turkish Style, with text by Stéphane Yerasimos, illustrations by Kaya Dinçer, and translation by Daniel Wheeler. The domestic architecture of Turkey, primarily in Istanbul, is the book's subject; and Güler has again created luminous images that are the substantive worth of the book. The principal sections of the book are "History and Tradition" (which contains the entire text, interspersed with photographs) and three parts consisting solely of captioned photographs: "Ottoman Splendors," "Traditional Houses," and "Contemporary Residences." The book opens with a foreword written by Mica Ertegün, wife of the Turkish-born founder and owner of Atlantic

Records, Ahmet Ertegün, who owns a house in the coastal resort of Bodrum. And it concludes with two appendices containing renderings of selected houses and an "address book" of hotels and shopping sources in Istanbul, London, Paris, and New York, indicating that this book is aimed at an upscale traveler. Yerasimos, born in Istanbul, is an architect and a professor of urban history at the University of Paris VIII. Güler has photographed for *Time, Life, Paris Match,* and *Stern.* Dinçer, whose 1988 thesis focused on the traditional Turkish house, teaches at the University of Yildiz in Istanbul.

The Turkish house is a splendid subject. Although the oldest surviving houses are no more than two hundred years old, the uniformity of the elements that exist to some degree in every house suggests a long, developing history representative of a specific culture. More than one historian has undertaken the task of showing its conceptual development out of the functionally efficient use of multipurpose space in the tents of the Ottomans' nomadic ancestors. These large and multiroomed mansions, which developed between the 15th and 17th centuries contain vestiges of the close fit of form and function in the design of the individual rooms. The traditional house supported a patriarchal society where an extended family lived under one roof, where men went out into the public domain or received visitors in a room (*bas oda*) separate and apart from the family quarters, where the women passed the majority of their time. Each family unit had a private room that resembled a sitting room by day, and became a bedroom at night. These private rooms open directly to a common area (*sofa* or *hayat*) where the women of the household and their visitors would gather to work and pass the day. Typical two-story examples present only a door to the street, as service and storage space occupied the first floor. The first floor, irregular in plan to conform to winding streets, and the upper floor, overhanging the street, combine to create the characteristic urban context. Furnishings were limited to low banquettes (*sedir*) covered with cushions with woven covers and carpets. Embel-

lishment in the form of carved ceilings, colored glass, window screens, cupboards, carpets, and textiles provided richness and warmth to these interiors.

Regionally distinct examples incorporate formal similarities with climatic differences and local materials to produce distinct urban images. Istanbul, however, provides an entirely different sampling. As the diplomatic and political center of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul had many variations on the traditional house. The house maintained its characteristic planning and decorative elements until the early part of the 19th century when it was transformed along Western models. Extant grand mansions display eclectic combinations of all kinds of European styles.

Unfortunately, *Turkish Style* is not a very good source for an understanding of the form and transformation of the Turkish house. There are sparse and confusing descriptions of the elements of the house and the underlying rationale for its organization. Without prior knowledge of the subject, the text is difficult to follow and seems to contradict itself. Some of this may be attributed to the translation, but a historical superficiality remains nevertheless. Yerasimos define the Ottoman house as a creation that appeared in the 18th century in Istanbul as the result of multicultural influences from the provinces, the Balkans, and Anatolia. The "sphere of influence [of an Ottoman mode of living and dwelling] grew, notably in the 19th century, toward the northern Balkans, [and] central and northeastern Anatolia." There is, it seems, an attempt to appropriate the multiculturalism of the Ottoman Empire, and the skillful synthesis of East and West seen in Sinan's buildings, to the European-influenced application of painted decoration and addition of furniture seen in many of the houses throughout this book.

It seems that the "Ottoman" house that Yerasimos describes is not an emerging form, but the appearance of Westernizing decorative influence and furnishings that took hold in the time of Mahmut the II (1808–39). Unlike in previous centuries when the Ottoman Empire was integral to cross-cultural exchange and influence, the 19th century was the era of decline which

was marked by the beginning of a thorough social and political reorganization following Western models. This ideological shift codified the growing perception of Ottoman inferiority that had its roots in a series of 18th-century military defeats.[7] As a result, the Sultan and the upper classes imported the social, political, and material culture of European empires. This was less a time of appropriation and synthesis than it was affectation of colonial European cultures.

Representational devices used throughout this book display a distinctly European view of "Turkish style," a term that is never defined. "History and Tradition," the first chapter, discusses the origins of the house and is illustrated with an array of beautiful images: details of mosques, doors, public fountains, tiles, kilims, and some interiors. They seem intended to give a fuller picture of the arts and daily life, but the picturesque and selectively framed details accompanied by the imagery of the captions give an impression of a society frozen in a previous century. The following chapter, "Ottoman Splendors," opens with an uncaptioned photograph, which, as the view of the open Qur'an is framed, might be mistaken for a *sedir* in a house rather than the corner of a mosque. The introductory notes describe royal pleasure pavilions, which were subsequently "emulated and developed by the pashas and dignitaries of the Empire" and the houses of the Bosphorus, *yali,* and the 19th-century residences and palaces of the sultans. The first caption tells us the "disposition of spaces—still quite traditional—contrasts with the sudden appearance of new architectural and decorative elements." The confluence of the form, which is an idea about a plan, and the decoration are not shown much. We do see vestiges and details that are not helped by the confusing captions. Many of the images remain familiarly baroque, neoclassical, and Victorian. The Topkapı palace, dating from much earlier and embodying a conception markedly different from these examples, is absent.

The chapter "Traditional Houses" shows some of the variety of regional types, but the simple ones are nearly always shown from the exterior and the mansions only from the interior. The exterior views give us the only

In the principal room in the house of the Semaki, the decor fully reflects what has come to be called "Turkish Baroque." The most representative elements are the fireplace and the ceiling. The brazier at the center is for winter evenings. (From *Turkish Style*.)

turbans. The reader is immediately located in familiar territory: on one side is the ubiquitous "Mediterranean" house, on the other, all the cues that recall familiar images of the "Orient."

This device, juxtaposing the "exotic" with the ordinary, gains trust and creates belief. The images represent a point of view that is mapped throughout European and American society. Attempting to dispel stereotypical images by using them for the "set up" gives the images inherent legitimacy. The image constructed in these design books exists in other media, such as film, newspapers, and travel books, and each serves to reinforce the power of the representation. *Inside Turkey*, a video shown recently on local New York cable television stations, opens by promising to dispel "vague and stereotypical notions of Turkey . . . seen from the outside" by taking the viewer "on an incredible journey inside Turkey for a glimpse of the real thing." It does this by touring the pre-Christian and Christian sites of the country, and enticing the viewer with seaside resorts and discothèques. Seven hundred and fifty years of Seljuk and Ottoman Turkish life is relegated to urban panoramas and a folk festival. The images are real, they represent truth; but the culture is stripped of its complexity and reduced to images assumed to be familiar. As in the introduction to *Turkish Style*, once placed in a position where things are familiar—where Turkey is represented by familiar "exotic" images—the source becomes irrefutable and readers believe that what follows is true. Facts are not meant to be questioned because they exist within a trusted context, but factual errors occur in these media. For example, in *Turkish Style*, a rather famous and distinct row of houses along the river in Amasya, a north-central Anatolian town, is erroneously identified in the text as bordering the Bosphorous. It is a jarring error in that the text often refers to the characteristic use of wood for exterior finishes in Istanbul, and this row is uniformly finished in tinted stucco.

In "Dwelling à la Turque," a chapter heading evocative of the 19th century, Yerasimos mysteriously switches to the present tense. The reader becomes the ob-

glimpse of an urban context formed by the fabric of houses. The few interior views of the simple houses are limited to a display of china plates above a stair, and the only photograph of a human being is of a peasant woman by the fireplace in her kitchen. Despite the introductory claim of the final chapter, "Contemporary Residences," that "contemporary architecture in Turkey continues under the enchantment of the Ottoman house," the book shows that a few wealthy Turks still live in large houses, which are designed in wide array of styles, indistinguishable from houses in other world cities, although they sometimes contain culturally identifiable decoration and objects. Images remain pristine, devoid of the clashing of ur-

ban and rural life and of the range of housing types that fills the vast modern city and suburbs of Istanbul. The image of a sultan's opulent life remains intact.

The reader enters this panorama via a very specific pathway constructed in the first twenty pages. Ertegün's foreword is accompanied by an unidentified contemporary interior with marble floors and stucco walls. The pages that follow illustrate a late 19th-century neoclassical palace, romanticized 18th-century images of the Bosphorus by Antoine-Ignace Melling, followed by more 19th-century views of a Turkish bath and a teahouse, populated by barely clothed women, lounging men, tiled kiosks, carpets and cushions, narghiles, camels, fezzes, and

Even as their wood construction was jealously preserved, Turkish elites succumbed to influences from every source. Neoclassicism made its appearance in timid colonnades and discreet cornices, as did Indo-Mongolian architecture, by way of strange detours through British colonial styles. (From *Turkish Style*.)

The video voyage is a newcomer to a continuing heritage of travelers' descriptions of Turkey since the time of Herodotus. The 19th-century European travel accounts—for all their colonial, "Orientalist" bias—are filled with historical descriptions of buildings and urban life. A short examination of a recent travel account will show if representations have changed. *Looking for Osman: One Man's Travels through the Paradox of Modern Turkey* is a quest by Eric Lawlor in search of the exotic world depicted by 19th-century travel writers. "Theirs was the Turkey I was seeking. The Turkey of a century ago." This journey might have produced a comparative account of those writers' observations with his own impressions of the monuments of Turkey's complex history and the overlay of the 20th-century republic. Instead we have a compendium of people and events set in no particular place. There are sexually obsessed men, veiled women, and shabby hotels. He visits places in eastern Anatolia—Dogubeyazit, Kars, Trabzon, Kâhta, Adiyaman—and we learn only about his travel arrangements. He writes about people—fellow tourists as often as inhabitants—to the near exclusion of even narrative description of the places they inhabit. We know everything about his fellow travelers in Trabzon, and nothing at all about the places he (presumably) went to see.

In Lawlor's account, there are Turks who speak for themselves: Selim, who indiscriminately approves of everything American and modern; Ercuman, who equally undiscriminatingly condemns everything nontraditional and non-Islamic; Erek, the unreliable and double-crossing waiter; and, of course, the beautiful and exotic Meltem, with whom he falls in love. (Incidentally, "Ercuman" and "Erek" are such unusual, unheard of names that one can't help but suspect that they are either misspelled or made up.) And then there is Osman, the title's namesake, an elusive character for whom everyone is searching. "He's a legend in Istanbul. A great rogue. A scoundrel." The first Osman was the founder and namesake of the Ottoman dy-

server in a nostalgic scene, which, when juxtaposed with the surrounding text (past-tense narrative), creates the belief that this mysterious procession of people surrounded by servants and children, heading for a picnic in the suburban orchards, is a contemporary description. Narrative observation is the style of centuries of European travel accounts. Because the Ottomans were not in the habit of writing about their private lives, European impressions of daily life became the source of many studies of domestic life in the Ottoman Empire. The bibliography of this book shows that the authors rely nearly exclusively on these sources; less than 10 percent of the citations are by writers with Turkish

surnames. This silence on the part of the subject cannot easily be attributed only to historical circumstances because the scope of *Turkish Style* includes contemporary examples. It is hard to ignore the possibility of an ingrained bias which assumes the role of speech for the object. *Inside Turkey*, which promises a "real look at this enigmatic country" permits only one Turk to speak: a young girl who is questioned about her readiness for marriage. Besides the American narrator and the Turkish girl, only European tourists speak. They give their impressions, much as their ancestors did, and their opinions, based on observation of material objects, becomes the truth.

nasty. Let no other reader be lured by the title into thinking this book is a search for understanding of the cultural layers of Turkey's history since the first Osman lived in the 13th century.

There is a sloppiness in all these works on Turkey that symbolizes a devaluation of the subject matter and of a reader's expectation of accuracy. In *Sinan*, there is an inconsistent use of diacritical marks—only the ones familiar to Indo-European languages are included—and there is no explanation of pronunciations. It is as if the marks are used to give an image of authenticity, but correct representation is unimportant. In *Turkish Style*, the paucity of factual information accompanying the photographs, such as dates of construction and decoration or precise locations, coupled with the absence of any discussion of decorative arts, denies the existence of various transformations. The images become historically frozen and stand for centuries of history.

One would assume books crafted with such care for the visual quality of the photographs, graphics, typeface, and paper would represent the same quality in the content; one expects to find accurate representation. Criticism of a point of view is itself a point of view and therefore subject to discussion and disagreement, but conclusions based on inaccurate information remove the possibility of informed dissent. Are the inaccuracies noted above simple oversight, or do they indicate the point of view? Would a book on Italian palazzos confuse the Farnese palace in Rome with the Ca' d'Oro in Venice?

"Coffee-table" architecture books, travel journals, and videos are a measure of the value a society places on their subject. To delight, to amuse and to educate, to make accessible familiar and unfamiliar subjects, to introduce, to entice and to nurture curiosity, as well as to promote tourism and to sell artifacts—these seem to be roles assigned to these books. To write for a general audience on an unfamiliar subject is a particular challenge and responsibility. Collectively these books and the video help reiterate a representation of Turkey constructed in the 19th century. Given the scope and accessibility of new scholarship on Ottoman Turkey, it is

reasonable to expect the authors of these works to be informed of the recent discourse and to present revised readings rather than reiterations of dated images.

NOTES

1. Aptullah Kuran, *Sinan: The Grand Old Master of Ottoman Architecture* (Washington, D. C.: Institute of Turkish Studies, 1987), pp. 29–30.
2. Doğan Kuban, "The Style of Sinan's Domed Structures," in *Muqarnas: An Annual on Islamic Art and Architecture*, vol. 4, edited by Oleg Grabar (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 96.
3. Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar, "The Süleymaniye Complex in Istanbul: An Interpretation," *Muqarnas: An Annual on Islamic Art and Architecture*, vol. 3, edited by Oleg Grabar (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), p. 92.
4. William Holden Hutton, *Constantinople: The Story of the Old Capital of the Empire* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1925), p. 291. Despite the impression given by the title, this book chronicles the city under the Byzantines and the Turks who changed the name to Istanbul in 1453. Old habits die hard.
5. Ibid., p. 308.
6. "The Style of Sinan's Domed Structures," p. 96.
7. Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), p. 32.

SINAN: ARCHITECTURE OF SULEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT AND THE OTTOMAN GOLDEN AGE, John Freely and Augusto Romano Burelli, photographs by Ara Güler, Thames and Hudson, 1992, 143 pp., illus., $95.00.

TURKISH STYLE, by Stéphane Yerasimos, photographs Ara Güler and Samih Rıfat, Vendôme Press, 1992 (distributed in the U.S. by Rizzoli), 223 pp., illus., $45.00.

INSIDE TURKEY: A CULTURAL JOURNEY, Terminal Television, 1993, 48 min.

LOOKING FOR OSMAN: ONE MAN'S TRAVELS THROUGH THE PARADOX OF MODERN TURKEY, Eric Lawlor, Vintage Books, 1993, 213 pp., $11.00.

PARINAZ ZIAI BAHADORI

Life and Demise of MIMAR: Architecture in Development

The first issue of the magazine *MIMAR: Architecture in Development* appeared in 1981, with the mission "to encourage the unification of building know-how with basic cultural traditions, especially those of Islam, in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. This re-combining of building knowledge with cultural expression is what is necessary for a modern architecture if it is to be rooted in its own society. . . . We also need to develop a new theory of architecture from within our societies, to create viable directions for culturally rooted building."

Funded primarily by His Highness the Aga Khan (spiritual leader of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims) and edited by Hasan-Uddin Khan and Brian Brace Taylor, the quarterly publication sought to improve the quality of the architecture in the developing world by reporting on notable efforts and raising questions that would promote a culturally sensitive application of technological innovation. *MIMAR* was born a year after the well-received first cycle of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, inaugurated in 1980 to recognize architectural accomplishments in Muslim countries. The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, initiated in 1985 at Harvard and MIT, created yet another means of grappling with the dilemma of maintaining cultural identity in the face of the homogenizing influence of industrialization on the built environment. Of these three ventures, *MIMAR* is the only one to have folded.

Without question *MIMAR* was a pioneer—the first architectural magazine to primarily address issues of the developing world on an international level. A number of other magazines, such as *Architecture and Design* from India or *Al Benaa* from Saudi Arabia, cover the architecture of an individual third-world nation but *MIMAR* was the first to report on the common ground between these worlds. The new magazine was notable not only for the wide

variety of themes and building types covered from many corners of the world, but also for its format. The consistently high-quality color photography printed on heavy paper set *MIMAR* apart from many other magazines and guaranteed it a spot on the bookshelves of most specialized bookstores and university architecture libraries.

The enthusiastic response to *MIMAR* proved that the time was ripe for an international publication focusing on the developing world. Even its critics lauded the magazine for filling a void in architectural publishing. Why then did the magazine cease publication in 1992? It may have been that the void was simply too large for any single publication to fill. But the fatal problem was financial: the publication, circulation, and distribution of a magazine with such a broad audience grew to be inordinately expensive and complex. The life of *MIMAR* was ultimately tied to the continually generous support of one individual—the Aga Khan. After nine years of publication, the board of *MIMAR* alerted the Aga Khan that costs were soaring while circulation was remaining constant. A number of measures were adopted, such as bringing other publishing venues under the umbrella organization of *MIMAR*'s publisher, Concept Media, and increasing advertising revenues. Advertisements were placed on the inside front cover, thereby eliminating the rather precious, but unique cutout "windows" that had been a hallmark of the front cover. Yet none of these solutions were effective in reducing the cost of the magazine.

MIMAR's staff moved from Singapore to London in order to capitalize on publishing and distribution opportunities for the expanded publications program. Due to exorbitant costs of operating out of London, this move raised the subscription costs of the magazine almost threefold, increasing pressure on circulation. What the board did not know at the time, however, was that official circulation numbers were by no means an accurate measure of the magazine's readership. In countries like Bangladesh, for example, many readers did not subscribe to *MIMAR* because they did not trust their postal service to deliver a copy of this expensive magazine to them. Yet every copy purchased at the newsstands passed through at least a dozen hands.[1]

Considering the role *MIMAR* played in disseminating news, photos, and thought-provoking essays to those regions of the world which do not suffer from the information saturation prevalent in the West, it is no wonder that the outcry over the decision to close the magazine was overwhelming. Some readers even felt betrayed, claiming that *MIMAR* had no right to cease publication—that the dialogue it had opened up was too crucial and unfinished to terminate.

During its eleven-year life span *MIMAR* may have fallen short of some critics' ideals, yet the magazine made significant accomplishments: it placed the non-Western world on the map of architectural journalism; it became a vehicle for introducing the concepts of regionalism and the relationship of architecture to climate, place, and local culture without renouncing technology and "progress"; and it presented a large number and variety of projects.

The richness and diversity of the complex, multilayered, and dynamic projects featured in *MIMAR* raised a host of questions that ultimately betrayed the neatness of its original intentions. While the magazine's goals may have been noble, one weakness lay in the fact that the issue of "cultural rootedness" is difficult, almost impossible, to define. Indeed, a narrow definition of culture and nationalism, all in the name of "cultural rootedness" can lead to ethnocentrism and a reactionary dogma. For example, the Malaysian architect Fawizah Kamal, profiled in the special issue of "Women in Design," was quoted as saying: "I believe that an essentially Western thinking creates a code of practice which will not yield a truly Malaysian architecture." The inherent paradox faced by educators such as Kamal, who was the dean of the School of Housing, Building, and Planning at the University Sains Malaysia in Penang, is that education and global communication seek to broaden awareness and inevitably lead to cross-cultural fertilization. The end results may fall short of a pure and traditional national "style" of architecture, yet it may also ensure the survival of an *authentic* culture—one that is dynamic and represents its place in time.

The main strength of *MIMAR* lay in the wide variety of issues that it tackled, ranging from design to technology and reflecting a multiplicity of approaches. For example, Balkrishna Doshi's romanticization of the village well as "a sort of club for [women] in the morning and evening" (*MIMAR* 2, December 1981) was a marked contrast to Fred Langford's most fascinating technical report issued to Louis Kahn regarding the use of concrete in Dhaka, Bangladesh (*MIMAR* 6, December 1982). Although the report dates back to 1966, prior to the construction of the National Assembly Hall in Dhaka, Langford's recommendations regarding the use and adaptation of imported technologies are relevant even today and the editors' assessment of this megaproject is equally provocative.

MIMAR tried to publicize the efforts of groups and individuals who were trying to work at many levels of society to improve the quality of the built environment in the third world. On occasion, its pages introduced the reader to noteworthy architects whose work had received little attention in the United States, Europe, or Japan. Yasmeen Lari of Pakistan and Charles Boccara of Morocco, for example, are both architects whose work deserves the close examination it received in *MIMAR*. Aside from being sensitive designers, they became involved in the critical stages of the architectural program. *MIMAR* 21 describes a commission Boccara received for a soccer stadium in Marrakesh. Realizing the importance of small stadiums for local communities, the architect questioned the program and offered instead to distribute the allocated funds into five stadiums—four small and one large. Boccara's willingness to forfeit the *grand projet* is exemplary on several levels: the architect's appreciation of the actual patterns of use and the importance of soccer to people's daily lives enabled him to offer an alternative with confidence, and his designs (although modest) respect both the budget and local contexts.

Although it was not a regular feature of

Sample page-spread from *MIMAR* magazine, featuring the home of architect Geoffrey Bawa, in Colombo, Sri Lanka. (From *MIMAR Houses*.)

the magazine, the Basic Technology department was one of the most useful contributions *MIMAR* made to architects practicing in countries with limited resources and facing rapidly growing building needs. A series of topics written by Alvaro Ortega covered the use of stone, gypsum, and lime as low-cost building materials. The construction of simple domes using bent bamboo rings, described by Yona Friedman, could also become a classic text for transferring information to the world's poverty-stricken. For these reasons, *MIMAR* was received with great enthusiasm and showed signs of growth and change throughout its life. There were, however, a number of unresolved and uncomfortable issues that *MIMAR* never addressed, or did so ambiguously.

MIMAR initially purported to address the contemporary architecture of nations that are predominantly Muslim, and covered a geographical area from Morocco to Indonesia. However, on occasion it also featured the architecture of India and China—nations which are not predominantly Muslim but do contain sizable Muslim populations. Because the architectural projects and issues featured in the magazine were often secular in nature, they actually appealed to a broader readership and *MIMAR* came to be associated primarily with the architecture of the non-Western or "developing" world.

Three factors, however, encouraged the perception that the magazine dealt primarily with the architecture of the Islamic world, despite its broader geographical focus. First, although its subtitle, *Architecture in Development*, suggested a broader focus and embraced all cultural and religious groups in the "developing world," many readers may have assumed that the magazine dealt mainly with the architecture of Islam because its title, *Mimar*, means "master builder" in several languages (Urdu, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic), which are all spoken in predominantly Muslim countries. Second, the Aga Khan's personal support of the magazine may have been associated with the notable contributions of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the Aga Khan Foundation to education, social causes, health care, and architecture in the Islamic world. And third, the Islamicized graphic borders of the magazine's pages, originally conceived by Emilio Ambasz, reinforced the perception that *MIMAR* focused on the Muslim world. Taking its inspiration from the rich history of Islamic manuscripts, this graphic element in fact never transcended its decorative role.

The results of a readership survey published in *MIMAR* 20 (June 1986) confirms the ambiguity in *MIMAR*'s coverage. The editors report: "One of the major items of interest is how the magazine is perceived by our readers. *MIMAR* is seen as a 'magazine covering the Third World by 45 percent whereas 42 percent view it as covering the Islamic World.' This split reflects the editors' and the Board of Advisors' intentions—something we are pleased to have affirmed." This editorial statement did little to clarify the ambiguous nature of *MIMAR*'s coverage and may have led to the mismanagement of readers' expectations.

The September 1991 issue of *MIMAR* heralded a new era for the magazine. The signs of change were clearly visible: the managing editor was replaced, the Islamicized graphic borders disappeared, a new post was established for a Latin American correspondent, and, most importantly, the stated intention of the magazine was broadened to include "the built environments of people regardless of political, religious, or ideological beliefs." The magazine's purpose was finally clear: to "encourage communication between the architects of the developed and developing world and between the East and the West." As the geographical focus of *MIMAR* was officially broadened, the magazine had to face the growing expectations of its readership.

Despite the changes after September 1991, *MIMAR* essentially retained the high-quality photography, paper, and printing that had generally been a source of tremendous pride for both the editors and the third-world architectural community. However, not everyone approved of the magazine's format. In 1983 the magazine published a letter from the Community Design Collaborative in Oakland, California, which stated: "Does *MIMAR* really need to be so glossy and sleek? Are you intentionally trying to reach only a certain class of readers through this format? . . . The form is contradictory to what is professed to be the goal, i.e., 'the task of freeing ourselves from the preoccupations of the past or from outside undesirable pressures.'" Indeed, *MIMAR* was very expensive to produce and its rates rivaled those of the American and European magazines. Were the cutouts in the cover, lavish color photography, and heavy paper intended to impress a readership accustomed to the high-quality printing of the Western architectural press?

The editors' response to this letter is revealing:

> Yes, we believe that *MIMAR* has to be "glossy and sleek." Perhaps a little of our history will explain why. When *MIMAR* was conceived, it was to be a newsletter format in black and white. However, the response from developing countries was interesting, we paraphrase: "There is no other international architectural journal dealing with issues important to us. . . . Therefore, if you are going to publish something on us we should be able to re-

fer back to it—the newsletter is associated with a throwaway—we need a magazine." Then came the next set of comments: "If you are going to produce a magazine it must be the best and compare favorably with American, European and Japanese journals—for too long has the Third World had the stigma of producing only the "second best/second class." After much debate we decided that only the best in presentation and image would do—something that we could all be proud of.

There is no doubt that the desire to produce "the best" in format and presentation helped the magazine get noticed and imparted prestige to the work featured in its pages. But many readers, particularly those from the West and those who favored "grass-roots" planning and design, found the magazine to be too lavish—too *Architectural-Digest*-visits-the-third-world. Indeed, there were occasions when the superb photography seemed to upstage the writing.

What should *MIMAR* have done differently? Should it have been printed on cheaper paper with fewer color photographs, to reduce the magazine's production costs and make it more affordable to readers? Criticism of the appearance of the magazine takes on a greater significance when one considers the socioeconomic and political agendas *MIMAR* was expected to address. For some readers, the format worked against the "idea" of architecture in development because it seemed to be promoting a glossy, finished "product" to be marketed across the world.

Indeed, the very format of *MIMAR* could have constituted an alternative form of publication stemming from those unique concerns and questions that demand attention in the developing world. A contrast between a section printed on newsprint and one printed on heavy paper with glossy photos would have been interesting. Although the magazine's Gallery section—perhaps its most consistently beautiful regular department, which featured subjects as varied as the houses of the Upper

Wind catcher on the west facade of the Al Sulaiman Palace, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Abdel Wahed El-Wakil. (From *MIMAR Houses*.)

Volta (West Africa) to the Ta'zia of India—relied on this high-quality photography for its success; essays, news items, and debates did not need to be printed on the same heavy paper.

More important than form, *MIMAR*'s content could have set a journalistic standard for all architectural magazines by exploring issues such as the relationship of power, politics, patronage, and wealth to design in general and in the third world in particular. Although *MIMAR* covered themes ranging from megaprojects to adaptive reuse, low-income urban housing to leisure spaces, the relationship between architecture and social class was not always made explicit. In those instances where contemporary residences, five-star hotels, or country clubs were featured, the reader had to acknowledge the socioeconomic disparity between the privileged few and the general population in the third world.

Ironically, by featuring a number of beautiful, "culturally rooted" hotels such as the Club Villa Hotel in Bentota, Sri Lanka, designed by Geoffrey Bawa, or the Hotel Tichka in Marrakesh by Charles Boccara, *MIMAR* may have been inadvertently reinforcing the Western fantasy of an "exotic" tourist destination. Fortunately, the pages of *MIMAR* also offered glimpses into more common hotel types. For example, the Basrah Sheraton Hotel in Iraq, designed by The Architects' Collaborative, although reviewed in an all-too-generous manner, was probably more typical of the kind of hotel most tourists would encounter on their excursions to the "developing world."

Perhaps because the theme of hotels was explored rather frequently (three separate issues were dedicated to this topic over eleven years), *MIMAR* was able to provide a critical framework for the assessment of the relationship and importance of a tourist economy to a host country. Contributor Rhomi Khosla wrote in the September 1990 issue that, particularly where the hotel industry has contributed to rising costs, pollution, and atrocious architecture, "there is still a long way to go to create a hotel that is indeed giving more to its location than it is taking out of it." In another issue dedicated

to hotel architecture the same author wrote: "Many of these hotels have recreated living examples of the most spectacular feudal aesthetics of their cultures," and that "even we as architects need to re-examine the premise of the client's brief that lists starred comforts at the individual level as the most important consideration of design."

As the hotel issues illustrate, the themes covered in *MIMAR* were complex, requiring historical introductions and a substantial number of projects to illustrate the variety of possible solutions. Some of the special issues of *MIMAR*, with titles such as "Approaches to Health Care," "Ways of Shopping," "Public Sector Mass Housing," and "Rethinking Colonial Architecture," were so fascinating that more supporting material (like the excellent bibliography that accompanied the health care issue) would have been useful. Had an entire issue been dedicated to the particular topic, including all the supporting departments (Gallery, Book Review, Profile, Education, Technology, and Portfolio), the magazine might have done justice to the themes. The lack of supporting material on the thematic issues was particularly disappointing because both editors (Khan and Taylor) wrote thought-provoking introductions to all the projects. However, the consistent editorial reliance on architects' descriptions of their own work reduced the magazine's critical position.

This dearth of critical writing on the projects published in *MIMAR* concerned its editors as well. But there were too few architectural critics who were truly familiar with the published projects, and the magazine's restricted budget did not allow for staff writers to survey the material directly. Often *MIMAR* had to rely on the information gathered by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, and secondary sources were frequently used for general articles. These field reports and articles were immensely valuable as they brought together a wealth of information, images, and attitudes under one cover. However, the building descriptions were rarely complemented by critical discussions about the design of these projects.

An exciting and probably controversial feature, which ran only in the first few is-

sues of *MIMAR*, was a sidebar "critique" of the projects appearing in the magazine. For example, Abdullah Bokhari's intelligent and none-too-gentle critique of Abdel Wahed El Wakil's designs for the Al Sulaiman Palace and the Datsun complex was refreshingly honest. Why this particular feature was removed may have had to do with the desire to appear supportive of the best of intentions—culturally rooted, if not perfect. By engaging in high-quality criticism, *MIMAR* could have instilled a new critical attitude and verbal aptitude in architectural education in the third world. The role of criticism in the cultural and political history of many third-world nations leaves much to be desired; this may be related to political conditions where censorship reduces freedom of speech, and both architect and critic adopt an apolitical stance *vis-à-vis* their work and cultural milieu.

This apolitical attitude characterized much of *MIMAR*, although the material often called for political analysis. Perhaps the fear of risking distribution rights in countries with a history of censorship kept the editors and writers from being overtly political. But there were missed opportunities for delineating the political impetus behind a project and its program, such as the competition for the state mosque in Baghdad (*MIMAR* 11, March 1984) or the King Khaled Airport Mosque (*MIMAR* 12, June 1984), two projects where it was difficult to separate their sociopolitical context from the end results. Regarding the latter project, the editors write: "The mosque is a good example of what can be achieved given a large budget. . . . Whether the mosque interior achieves these high ideals in expressing a new direction for design may be questioned—but the richness and care taken in their execution is not." Although their comments may have been filled with subtle irony, the editors found it difficult to openly question the appropriateness of designing one of the world's largest mosques in the middle of an airport!

One notable exception to the apolitical nature of *MIMAR* is found in an article by Mohammed Arkoun (December 1990). About political influences on education, he

writes: "The responsibility of political regimes—whatever their ideological and economic options—has not been evaluated with all the necessary information and objectivity. It can be stated nevertheless that they did not encourage democratic experiences, they did not praise the function of intellectuals, they relied rather on the police, the army and the Party to impose decisions inspired by foreign experts."

Arkoun's words describe a phenomenon all too familiar to educators and reformers in the countries of the third world. It is not surprising that a large number of contributors and readers of *MIMAR* represented an expatriate community that had gone abroad for higher education. A Western education had two primary benefits: the relatively freer university environment allowed students to question established authority, and Western diplomas were considered more prestigious in terms of social and political advancement in their native countries. Yet upon completion of their studies, many of the foreign-trained architects did not return to their homelands. This "brain drain" offered both the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and countless other universities and institutions in Europe and North America with a unique group of practitioners and intellectuals—educated at the best universities in the West yet intimately familiar with non-Western cultures. At times *MIMAR* acted as a forum for this network of expatriates to communicate their concerns with their native colleagues and with other expatriates, and to forge a multicultural approach to architectural design.

Many of the architects who returned to the third world and whose work was published in *MIMAR* shared a similar educational and social background with their expatriate colleagues. By primarily featuring the work of the Western-educated elite, *MIMAR* fell victim to the very system it may have been trying to avoid, reinforcing the premium placed on the American or European education and promoting a "star sys-

Plan of a Kassena compound in Tangassoko, Upper Volta. (From *MIMAR Houses.*)

tem" of architects common in the Western press. Ironically, the title *MIMAR* had suggested a nostalgia for an altogether different practitioner, the master builder who is "trained on the site" rather than in an "academy." In an interview with Ahmet Gulgonen, a Turkish architect practicing in Paris, the academy-trained architect draws this distinction, and laments the intellectual distance that exists between the two forms of practice (*MIMAR* 5, September 1982).

The desire to create an intellectual framework that would embrace the "barefoot" architect, doctor, or teacher—professionals who live and practice in the communities where their basic services are most needed—is not a novel idea. In the non-Western world, Hassan Fathy was one of the first champions of self-built construction. Throughout its life, *MIMAR* featured the work of a number of Fathy's followers as well as that of other groups such as the Development Workshop in Iran and Angola, Self-Built Urban Housing in Tunis and Rabat, or efforts by UNESCO or the Million Houses Program. By introducing the "suitable alternative building processes within a specific cultural framework of

preindustrial society," writes editor Brian Brace Taylor (January 1981), to the "academy-trained" architects, *MIMAR* performed the valuable service of lending credibility to the former groups' noble efforts. Most importantly, since *MIMAR* was often used as one of the primary sources in school curricula, many students read about alternative models of architectural practice in both the developed and developing world, finding inspiration for their own career goals.

Indeed, many enthusiastic readers finally found in *MIMAR* international coverage that extended beyond the very limited definition adopted by Western magazines. Except for the regular press releases on the Aga Khan Award for Architecture (once every three years), and the occasional book review, most architectural magazines ignore the world beyond their own borders. A cursory glance at the indices of *Progressive Architecture*, *Architectural Record*, and *Architecture*, the three primary journals produced in the United States, reveals that their coverage of international architecture lacks breadth and depth. For example, in an issue devoted to world architecture (September 1989), *Architecture* magazine included only two third-world countries: India and Colombia.

The European press has perhaps made a few more gestures toward the architecture of non-Western cultures, although the relationship between the nationality of the magazines and their coverage is generally tied to some historical/colonial relationship. For example, for years the British publication *Architectural Review* featured a regular column by Charles Correa, the Indian architect who was also honored with a RIBA medal. The cultural, economic, and educational ties between India and England had paved the way for the recognition of this remarkable architect's contributions.

Since *MIMAR* proved that there are a vast number of readers who have a serious interest in the developing world and that the contemporary architecture of the non-West-

ern world was worthy of display to the profession on an international scale, one would like to think that the Western press would follow with in-depth coverage of third-world architects. Since February 1993 *Progressive Architecture* has made a concerted effort to adopt a more inclusive world view of the profession, giving more editorial space to the Aga Khan Award for Architecture winners, and publishing a museum in Jaipur by Charles Correa, and the work of the Argentine architect Miguel Angel Roca in Bolivia. It remains to be seen if the magazine will continue to feature the work of third-world architects, particularly lesser-known practitioners.

The success of monographs by *MIMAR*'s publisher, Concept Media, on architects such as Geoffrey Bawa, Sedad Eldem, Hassan Fathy, and Correa, as well as theme publications such as *Architecture in Pakistan*, *MIMAR Houses*, and *Tropical Urban Regionalism*, also point to an optimistic future for non-Western topics. Although high-quality Indian magazines such as *Architecture and Design* continue to be published, magazine publishing on third-world subjects does not promise to expand. Two existing magazines have the potential to fill the void left by *MIMAR*'s demise: *Environmental Design: The Journal of the Islamic Environmental Research Center in Rome*, which is more historical and academic in nature than *MIMAR*), and *World Architecture*, an independent magazine of the International Academy of Architecture primarily concerned with Western architecture despite its misleadingly inclusive title.

What then can be learned from *MIMAR* to safeguard future endeavors in this field? According to the former editor, Hasan Uddin Khan, it is critical that any future incarnation of *MIMAR* be affordable for the "target audience: young architects from the third world," and that its distribution and marketing problems be ironed out. The magazine's focus must be clear, and it must be adequately staffed to achieve quality and balance in reporting. It would be valuable if the magazine would, for example, juxtapose the generic, speculative office and apartment buildings cropping up in third-world

cities with the exquisitely detailed work of architects like Geoffrey Bawa, where landscape, architecture, and furnishings form a unified whole. It would be heartening to see the work of women featured regularly, and it would be exciting to hear a variety of voices on sociopolitical as well as architectural issues.

By the year 2000 thirteen of the fifteen largest cities in the world will be in the third world; their growth rate is three to four times that of Western cities.[2] This, combined with the history of *MIMAR*—the enthusiasm with which it was received and the disappointment of its closing—would seem to indicate that architectural journals covering the building programs of the third world are an absolute necessity.

NOTES

1. Information based on an interview with Hasan Uddin Khan, former editor of *MIMAR*. I am grateful to Mr. Khan for taking the time to speak with me regarding the history of *MIMAR* as well as his own assessment of the magazine's strengths and weaknesses.

2. John D. Kasarda, Allan M. Parnell, eds., *Third World Cities, Problems, Policies, and Prospects* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 35.

MIMAR HOUSES, Brian Brace Taylor, editor, Concept Media Ltd. (distributed by Butterworth Architecture), 1987, 220 pp., illus., $35.00. (MIMAR monographs on individual architects, including Charles Correa, Geoffrey Bawa, and Sedad Eldem, are also available through Butterworth Architecture; each about 175 pp., illus., $49.95.)

MIMAR: ARCHITECTURE IN DEVELOPMENT, back issues available through Rizzoli; about 88 pp. per issue, illus., $22.00.

PAT MORTON

Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs

Zeynep Çelik

Zeynep Çelik's work belongs to a growing body of scholarship, criticism, and theory that gives the "other" side of the encounter between East and West: not what Walter Benjamin called history from the viewpoint of the victors, but history from the perspective of the vanquished—the colonized and dominated cultures of the Orient. *Displaying the Orient* draws on the ground-breaking theses of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978), the book that defined and critiqued the long tradition of Oriental history as written by the victors. *Displaying the Orient* adds an impressive study of the Islamic sections at 19th-century world's fairs to this group of work.

Like Timothy Mitchell in *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and Janet Abu-Lughod in *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), among others, Çelik describes and analyzes the mutual exchanges and influences between Islamic countries and the Western world. The importance of this shift in position lies in the fact that it breaks down the false opposition posed by the terms "West" and "Orient" and the fallacious stereotypes that accompany them. Çelik's cross-cultural approach allows her to portray the efforts of self-definition by Islamic intellectuals and leaders as well as the representations of the "exotic East" by the colonial powers at the 19th-century world's fairs. Her intention is to extend "the theme of the ordered world of the expositions, analyzed by historians and anthropologists" to the study of architecture. That she successfully brings this method to the architectural history of world's fairs is one of the principal contributions of this excellent volume.

The conventional, hackneyed account of colonization (the legacy of an ideology that

The Egyptian section of L'Esposizione Universale di Viena, 1873. (From *Displaying the Orient*.)

dates back to the Crusades) characterizes the colonized countries as poor, desolate lands under the sway of political despotism and cultural decadence to which the West brings scientific and moral salvation. Although they may have at one time achieved considerable cultural heights, these benighted countries are believed to have fallen into ethical and social stagnation, to the point that they can be considered "throwbacks" to a past condition from which European culture has advanced. Thus, as Said has brilliantly illustrated, the Orient is "unchanging" and "timeless"—in other words, not progressing.

Çelik's work helps explode this myth. She demonstrates that, in the 19th century, the Islamic countries of the Ottoman Empire and North Africa were led by rulers and intellectuals who were well aware of the benefits and pitfalls of modernization and who devised strategies for accommodating both Western "progress" and Islamic tradition. The search for a cultural identity that would encompass both Islamic law and tradition and Western technology and science is the book's central theme. In her introduction, Çelik outlines the theories of three

Islamic thinkers—Ibrahim Sinasi, Rifa a al-Tahtawi, and Khayr al-Din—whose views give a sense of Muslim thought at the time. Although she gives them rather short summaries that might have been expanded further in other chapters, Çelik uses these intellectuals to demonstrate the depth and scope of their theories on how best to meld Western civilization with Islamic law and tradition.

Far from being the passive, silent barbarians usually depicted in Orientalist accounts,

The Golden Gateway (fronting the Transportation Building) at the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago; Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler. (From *Displaying the Orient*.)

Islamic intellectuals and rulers portrayed their countries at world's fairs as the sophisticated societies they were. These representations were often mimicked in the displays later organized by the colonial powers that had taken political control over the Islamic nations. Çelik's concentration on the universal expositions allows her to paint a more complex picture of the interrelations between the Orient and the West through the unique meeting between the two at the world's fairs.

The book focuses on the specific role played by architecture in the search for a modern Islamic cultural identity and in the representation of the Islamic nations, before and after colonization. The pavilions at the world's fairs brought the Orient to Europe and America, enabling people to experience Oriental culture without leaving their own milieu. Thus, Islamic architectural forms could be studied and copied from built examples rather than drawings and photographs.

In addition to the pavilions, the sights and sounds of the Orient were recreated with displays of people, animals, and artifacts brought from the appropriate country. Donkeys, belly dancers, and artisans populated the rue du Caire, cafes, restaurants, and shops—"authentic" reconstitutions of the exotic East. As Çelik points out, Europeans and Americans considered these exhibits to be even more authentic than the real thing because they were untouched by vulgar, modern "improvements," thus reinforcing the fiction of a "timeless" Muslim culture.

The Islamic countries mounted impressive exhibits, notably the Ottoman section at the 1867 Universal Exposition in Paris. Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Morocco also built their own pavilions before they were subjected to colonial dominance. Çelik shows that, although these pavilions were designed by French architects, they accurately reflected the intentions of the governments and rulers who commissioned them. These buildings were also a means for differentiating among the disparate na-

tions within the Islamic world. As Çelik illustrates, the world's fairs were prominent venues in which Islamic nations could distinguish their identities and present an alternative to the European image of a unified, homogeneous Islam. They set a precedent that was often followed by the colonial powers in subsequent expositions when the former sovereign state was presented as part of a colonial empire. For example, the Moroccan sections built by the French imitated the palace architecture introduced at the 1887 Universal Exposition by the Tunisian bey.

Çelik uses the world's fairs to show how, in unexpected ways, the architectural representations of Islamic countries were at the same time reinterpreted in Muslim nations as a neo-Islamic style and adopted by Western architects. She describes the fairs planned by the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in which events modeled after the universal expositions were staged. The impact of the world's fair pavilions reached more permanent structures as well, particularly public architecture in the neo-Islamic style that housed modern functions such as post offices and railway stations. Western architects "learned from Islam," as Çelik puts it, when the world's fairs provided them with the opportunity to experiment with exotic styles in ephemeral buildings as well as concrete examples of Islamic architecture. Owen Jones, Frank Furness, Louis Sullivan, and Eugene Henard derived formal and theoretical inspiration from Islamic architecture, as Çelik shows by examining their exposition buildings.

There is much to praise in *Displaying the Orient*. The abundant illustrations are well labeled and the design skillfully integrates them with the text; however, illustrations of the Islamic buildings to which the exposition architecture referred would have been useful. The clear definition of purpose in the book's introduction serves the reader well when the mass of information threatens to overwhelm the overall themes. This book is filled with material not available in English, and it provides a valuable synthesis of myriad sources and images of the Islamic sections at the universal expositions.

What is missing from this admirable study is a sense of what Timothy Mitchell calls the "strangeness" of these exhibitions—the sense felt by Arabs when they visited the fairs that the European world was so permeated by an excessive concern with exhibition that it was bizarre by their standards. Çelik fulfills her ambition to correlate Islamic thought with the architecture of 19th-century world's fairs, but, despite her critical, nuanced approach, her study does not include an account of Islamic resistance to and criticism of Western modernization. She makes it clear that the "Oriental" world was thoroughly imbricated in the project of Western modernity—not just as the necessary Other to the West, but as the necessary condition for modernity, as Frantz Fanon declared it. In architectural terms, the two worlds are clearly intertwined in the complex pattern of borrowing and reinterpretation that the universal expositions sponsored. Çelik makes a distinct contribution to opening architectural history to non-Western perspectives and achievements. But the price paid by the colonized and their resistance to imperialism is not recorded here. Far from being beyond the scope of architectural history, an account of this struggle would illuminate the real stakes of cultural representation from the "other" side.

DISPLAYING THE ORIENT: ARCHITECTURE OF ISLAM AT NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD'S FAIRS, Zeynep Çelik, University of California Press, 1992, 245 pages, illus., $40.00.

KATHLEEN JAMES

Women's Orients: English Women and the Middle East, 1718–1918

Billie Melman

The frequent intersection of two constructions of the Other, the Orient and femininity, in the work of many scholars has prompted the examination of the writings of English-women about their travels in Africa and Asia from the 18th century through the 1930s. Such exploits, almost by definition, challenged the era's view of proper feminine behavior. The challenge at times was recounted in a quite brazen manner, but it was more typically moderated by an adherence within the narrative to literary and social convention. Could closer analysis of these writings also yield examples of resistance within Western culture to Orientalism, of sympathetic identification with the peoples of Africa and Asia, particularly with other women? Or did these writers carry with them the often imperialist assumptions of their own society, which accorded them a sense of superiority abroad as Europeans that they were not granted at home as women?

In her book, *Women's Orients: English Women and the Middle East, 1718–1918, Sexuality, Religion and Work*, Billie Melman argues for the first question, but undercuts her case by providing convincing evidence of the second. Melman, who teaches history at Tel Aviv University, examines two centuries of British women's writing about the Ottoman Empire. The book spans a diverse array of topics, from the social class of the travelers to their changing views of the harem and their engagement in evangelical and scholarly activity, and concludes with case studies devoted to English travelers Harriet Martineau, Amelia Edwards, and Anne Blunt.

Melman offers especial insight into who these women were and why they ventured abroad. She begins with two 18th-century aristocrats, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Elisabeth Craven, Margravine of Anspach, both of whom separated from their

husbands and both of whom concluded that the veils worn by Turkish women offered a coveted opportunity for "liberty," or sexual license. Most 19th-century travelers, on the other hand, were members of the middle class, and determinedly moral. Many were inspired by their piety to visit or even settle as missionaries and philanthropists in the Holy Land. Others, especially in the late Victorian and Edwardian years, found opportunities for scholarship in the not yet entirely institutionalized disciplines of biblical scholarship, archaeology, and Egyptology.

Victorian women's attitudes toward the harem posed contradictions typical of the tension in these women's activities between adventure and propriety, tensions that the author at times fails to satisfactorily resolve. Recognizing that "travel is an emancipatory activity," Melman nonetheless argues convincingly that it was precisely the domestic orientation of these women that enabled them to view the harem "as a bourgeois home." Too often, however, she fails to explain the distinctions between the feminism that left some travelers impressed by Ottoman women's right to own property and apparently to refuse the sexual attentions of their husbands, and the femininity that made many of the same British women comfortable with Ottoman seclusion. And she has a simplistic view of the constraints placed upon British women by 19th-century mores. She argues, for example, that for British women eating was gendered as a masculine activity, private and asocial, while for women in Ottoman harems it was a public one, thus ignoring the inherently segregated location of the harem in comparison with the teas, dinner parties, and banquets essential to middle- and upper-class British entertaining. (Elsewhere, she finds it "significant" that "women who, throughout the nineteenth century had been excluded from the places of knowledge and power, could and did marry into the groups which manipulated knowledge" and describes Anne Blunt as "a wife, rather than a mother" because her child was not male.) Indeed, privacy is a confusing notion throughout the discussion, for Melman never completely distinguishes between the

As governess to the children of Ismail Pasha (Ottoman ruler in Egypt), British citizen Emmeline Lott lived within his harem and wrote primarily on the life of the elite; 1865. (From *Women's Orients*.)

privacy from men, which many of her observers seemed to welcome, and the privacy from other women, particularly of different classes and races, which Emmeline Lott and Ellen Chennels sorely missed when, as governesses to the children of Ismail Pasha (the Ottoman ruler in Egypt), they lived within his harem.

Almost entirely unrelated to the discussion of the harem is Melman's account of women whose evangelical faith brought them to the Middle East. These women, she writes, were less interested in the lives of Muslim women than they were in converting Jews and touring sacred landscapes. Rather than being uniformly oppressive, women's spheres could be manipulated in Palestine, as they were in Britain, to include the public as well as the private, enabling women to found schools, proselytize among the Jews, and engage in philanthropy without fear of censure. These chapters define the ways in which faith conditioned these women's activities and experiences without entirely supporting Melman's critique of Orientalism. Although evangelical accounts of the Holy Land are certainly asexual, the

degree to which women regarded their surrounding society and scenery as providing a continuity with the biblical past unchallenged by two millennia of historical events, for instance, confirms rather than challenges the conclusions of Edward Said and others, that Europeans interpreted Arab and other foreign cultures as "timeless."

The book suffers from a confusing lack of focus. In the chapter entitled "Feminizing the Landscape," for example, Melman mixes arguments for women's domestication of the landscape and for their relinquishment of gender-specific observations—indeed of any authority whatsoever—in describing this public sphere. (This chapter also suffers from her lack of understanding that describing, painting, and otherwise admiring the landscape was an extension of, rather than a rebellion against, genteel behavior.) Elsewhere she states that her topic is the writing of women travelers, rather than the social conditions and landscapes they describe, but at times she seems more interested in defending Ottoman social conditions, particularly slavery, than in understanding her subjects' attitudes toward them. Profoundly uncomfortable with women who tackle "political" issues, which she identifies as exclusively male terrain, she writes:

> Ironically, the observers who are the least capable of developing empathy and solidarity with Middle Eastern women, indeed with Middle Eastern culture as such, are liberal feminists like Martineau and Edwards and reformers with special interest in the "women's question" in the West, like [Frances] Power-Cobbe and [Florence] Nightingale. Martineau's analogy between the master of the Turkish-Circassian harem and the slave-owner in South Carolina, between the *haremlik* and the plantation, is but one example of the myopic vision of a progressive liberal.

Women's Orients is also marred by an appalling lack of editing. Sentences are frequently fragmentary phrases ("And in a sense more literal than Trollope's" and "Woman's *privacy* within her own sphere and her control on [sic] her own body" are typical examples), statistics are misquoted, and words are occasionally misspelled or misused ("factional" for "fictional" and "ba-

sis" for "base"). The lengthy text is often repetitive and confusing: most discussions of texts and their authors seemingly take place in passing, while the author's overriding self-consciousness of methodology, laudable in its own right, frequently distracts the reader from the point Melman is trying to make.

For this reason, readers who are not specialists in the Ottoman Empire or travel literature about it are likely to prefer Sara Mills' more sophisticated use of theory in *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1991), Dea Birkett's lively *Spinsters Abroad: Victorian Lady Explorers* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), and, although it does not address travel to the Ottoman Empire, Shirley Foster's *Across New Worlds: Nineteenth-Century Women Travelers and Their Writings* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990). Mills in particular is far more careful than Melman in distinguishing her own observations from those of the women she studies, and, like Birkett, more sensitive to the variety and nuance of the traveler's rebellion against and internalization of Victorian codes of conduct. Foster also demonstrates that the very extent of British women's travel undermines attempts to exaggerate the restrictions their society placed upon them, while Birkett makes clear the privileges they enjoyed abroad.

The points raised by Melman and these others writers challenge any monolithic understanding of Orientalism by illustrating the ways in which issues of gender, class, and even religious denomination modulated its analyses of peoples and landscapes. British women, less apt to be directly engaged in imperialism and largely unable to participate in metaphors of sexual conquest, were certainly seldom capable of deploying the power wielded by male politicians, explorers, and scholars. Indeed, as Mills in particular makes clear, they were unable at times even to seize narrative authority and write "powerful" prose. Melman's major contribution to this argument is her convincing demonstration of the significant difference between women's typically chaste and often sympathetic descriptions of harems, and the emphasis on sensuality and tyranny that

characterizes European men's largely secondhand accounts of the same spaces.

At the same time, however, many of these accounts are infused with a tone of racial superiority that subverts Melman's efforts to find in them ties of universal sisterhood. Although Britain ostensibly did not directly control any of the territory described until after 1918, the dangers of travel in less remote areas were substantially offset by the political advantages enjoyed by British citizens, especially in Egypt. While an acceptance of Victorian notions of femininity muted the ability of many women to participate in some aspects of Orientalist discourse, most derived very real authority from their social position both at home and abroad. This is particularly apparent in Melman's account of the British community in Palestine and their attitudes toward the local Jews they hoped to convert. Nurse and hospital reformer Emily Beaufort, for example, describes the women of this community as "idle, dirty, [and] ignorant" before the intervention of British philanthropy, while Melman's own analysis of the attempt to "educate" these women downplays the strong cultural bias involved. In the final analysis, traveling abroad and writing about it was, despite the demure apologies for bringing themselves to public attention which characterize the prefaces and introductions to their books, an accepted path for British women who wished to explore and seek out adventures unavailable to them at home, and even to reap economic benefit in the form of royalties from such activities. Rather than challenging within their own communities the authority of fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons, these women typically asserted their independence far from home, within the domains of peoples, from Italians and Indians to Turks and Tibetans, whom they clearly considered, despite many examples of empathy and insight, culturally and politically subordinate.

ZEYNEP ÇELIK

French Colonial Cities

In a review of recent French publications on the Algerian War, Tony Smith expressed his reservations about the work undertaken on the topic by French writers. Underlining the "repression of guilt and pain" still dominant in French society, he argued that "the best analytical work on French Algeria may, for some time to come, not be done by anyone French."[1]

Whether stemming from similar causes or not, Smith's argument extends to the history of French colonial urbanism. During the past decade, a number of articles and a few books have been published in France on colonial urbanism and architecture, but the French writing stands out as much for its focus on forms and styles as for its reluctance to interweave into analyses of cities and buildings the political, economic, and cultural issues that underlie the colonial system.[2] In contrast, a critical and interdisciplinary approach to French colonial urbanism, one that links politics to built forms, has evolved in this country. The pioneering work is Janet Abu-Lughod's masterful study, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), which portrays one city shaped by the interplay of precolonial history and political, economic, and cultural colonial policies. Ten years later, in his book, *French Modern* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), Paul Rabinow devoted a large section to the urban policies of Resident General Hubert Lyautey in Morocco. David Prochaska's *Making Algeria French* and Gwendolyn Wright's *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* follow this new trend.

Making Algeria French is the story of one town, Bône (Annaba) from 1830 to 1920, studied in terms of its plural society, internal colonialism, and the effects of settler colonialism. Prochaska argues at the outset that the plural society in the settler colonial city was residentially segregated according to race and ethnicity, and that ethnic and racial factors determined social stratification more than class. Therefore,

constructing and preserving a "social distance" between ethnic and racial groups was of extreme importance for the colonial order. Prochaska focuses on European settlers, a deliberate choice in response to their relative neglect by historiography. However, this is not a book with one voice; both native Algerians and metropolitan French are frequently brought in to tell their stories.

Part one prepares the background, starting with a discussion of the city then known as Annaba, before the 1832 French conquest. Small and fortified, it was divided into three sections, the Muslim quarter, the Jewish quarter, and the commercial center with a jumble of markets. The next chapter surveys the transformations during the first four decades of French rule, when the main efforts were geared toward subduing the native residents, seizing the land, taking control of natural resources (forests and copper, lead, and iron mines), and displacing Algerians in order to settle Europeans. By the 1870s, colonial Bône was a "textbook case of a dependent economy oriented towards export": everything produced in Bône was exported.

Part two, the core of the book, concerns the development of Bône between 1870 and 1920. Prochaska first discusses the urban and regional economy, which was characterized by an imbalance between commerce and industry in favor of the former and the growth of the service sector. Dualism dominated the economic scene, with separate sectors for Europeans and Algerians. While the European economy could be characterized as capitalist, the Algerian economy was precapitalist. This economic dualism was reflected in the divided spatial order, symbolized best by the European covered market distinctly apart from, although in the proximity of, the Algerian *funduq* (market). Yet, on another level and invisible to Europeans, the large informal economy of Bône dominated the lives of a great number of Algerians and kept them in an "all-encompassing

Mozabite quarter in Bône, Algeria; turn of the century. (From *Making Algeria French*.)

poverty." Prochaska brings life to his hardcore economic analyses by engaging the reader in the daily life of Bône's residents. He thus takes us on an excursion through different commercial spaces of Bône, from the *funduq*, crowded with Algerians, to the all-European Cours Bertagna, the center of the colonial town with its government buildings, banks, company headquarters, fancy shops, theaters, and cafes.

The chapter on the people of Bône examines the pluralist society in terms of political rights and privileges, demographic factors (birth and death rates, household structures, places of birth, etc.), and social stratification with specific reference to residential segregation. From this finely tuned analysis Prochaska draws two conclusions. First, Algerians, Europeans, and Jews lived in separate quarters and, while the separation between Algerians and Europeans widened over time, the position of the Jews improved. Second, there was segregation between European subgroups (French, Italian, and Maltese). Local politics reflected the growing power of European settlers and a dual system emerged with French representatives from the metropole in charge of the official bureaucracy and European settlers handling the unofficial patronage network—the topic of the next chapter.

One of the most intriguing sections of the book is the chapter on the creation of a colonial culture. Prochaska maintains that a specifically Algerian colonial society, one that included all Europeans and excluded Jews and Muslims, was formed between 1890 and 1914. He argues that the "perception" and the "interpretation" of the city were at least as important as its form for the newly constructed Algerian (colonial) identity. It was therefore necessary to create layers of meanings that would enhance the identity of the colonial society.

To analyze "perceptions" of the cityscape, Prochaska depicts two media: street names and postcards. Street names in colonial Bône constructed a selective and biased history, a history that highlighted colonial military achievements and that completely overlooked the city's non-European past. Similarly, the representation of Bône on postcards hid much of the town, but featured the European quarters, with Cours Bertagna, its central spine, as the city's hallmark. Language and literature were also instrumental in defining the colonial society. The composite European community in Algeria developed a dialect, *Pataouète*, which borrowed extensively from other European languages and Arabic. *Pataouète*, together with *pied noir* literature, helped express the Algerian settler's distinct identity.

The conclusion briefly recounts a reverse process, that of "unmaking French Algeria." Here, Prochaska traces the history of local resistance to French rule from the beginning of the century to 1962, ending with the con-

Cours Bertagna, the center of colonial Bône, Algeria; early 20th century. (From *Making Algeria French*.)

version of Bône into a city of independent Algeria. Hence the Sainte Anne church was turned into a mosque, the main church at the top of Cours Bertagna bulldozed, and Cours Bertagna renamed Cours de la Révolution.

Making Algeria French is an important book for many reasons. Prochaska's arguments are complex and raise multilayered questions about the colonial situation. He brings into his discussion many voices representative of the plural but racially segregated society he portrays. The city is analyzed effectively as the setting for the creation of a colonial society and its culture. Every point is thoroughly discussed on the basis of careful and comprehensive research carried out in Algerian and French archives. The author's account of the making of the book in the epilogue is invaluable not only in terms of its survey of Bône's historiography from both French and Arabic sources, but also in weaving the work and lives of familiar cultural figures into the city's chronology. We are thus reminded of Gustave Flaubert and Pierre Loti's sojourns, of Isabelle Eberhardt's sad and curious life, and of Camille Saint-Saëns' compositions completed while he wintered in Bône.

This finely crafted book prompts the reader to rethink how history is written. Prochaska takes many risks and goes against many conventions. He breaks the linearity of the text by jumping ahead and moving backward in time and by inserting personal accounts and family stories of settlers and native Algerians into his arguments based on archival documents. The academic style is deliberately disrupted by this human touch, which helps the reader understand the colonial system from an individual's point of view. Moreover, Prochaska freely introduces his own presence, his political and intellectual background, and his subjective experience in researching and writing this book. The result is a book that provokes and engages the reader. It also makes excellent reading.

For this reviewer, the main weakness of *Making Algeria French* is the limited analysis given to urban form. Bône was a small town and Prochaska provides us with only skeletal information on city form. But there

New headquarters of the Banque de l'Indochine, Saigon; Georges Trouve, 1930. (From *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism.*)

is not enough discussion on the street fabric, the juxtaposition of the new town with the old one, their junctures, the buildings that define the main avenues as well as the secondary streets, and the urban images of the settler town and the Arab town. While I am sympathetic to the author's focus on "perceptions" of the cityscape, I believe that the built form itself also reveals multiple meanings about colonialism. This weakness extends to the visual material, which is sparse. A wider collection of photographs would have helped the reader's understanding of the physical structure and image of Bône. The maps, on the other hand, are sufficient and complement the text effectively.

The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism is a very different book. If *Making Algeria French* benefits from providing a specific focus and exploring it in depth from shifting perspectives, *The Politics of Design* is stretched thinly over a large surface. Gwendolyn Wright attempts to cover a vast territory—geographically as well as intellectually. With case studies drawn from Morocco, Indochina, and Madagascar, introductory and concluding chapters aimed at situating French colonial experiments within a broader sociopolitical context, and sporadic references to current postcolonial discourse, the book claims to be a work of synthesis. Such an ambitious scope requires the kind of scholar who has long worked in the field, and Wright, a spe-

cialist in American urbanism, is an unlikely candidate for the undertaking. However, given Wright's theoretical sophistication and astute scholarship demonstrated in her earlier books (especially her *Moralism and the Model Home* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980]), I had hoped her outsider's vision would bring a new perspective to the growing literature on French colonial architecture and urbanism. Unfortunately, Wright does not rise to the level of competence evident in her earlier studies, and the result is troubling on many levels, ranging from broad theoretical premises to her use of sources.

The first two chapters of *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* describe the background against which colonial urbanistic policies were devised: a general discussion of urban issues and design proposals in France from the turn of the century to the 1930s is followed by an exploration of "colonial opportunities" offered to urbanists. The next three chapters constitute the core of the book and focus on Morocco, Indochina, and Madagascar respectively. Morocco is the most familiar topic to American audiences, due to previous publications by Abu-Lughod and Rabinow. Like Abu-Lughod and Rabinow, Wright focuses on Marshal Lyautey's policies and their application by teams of architects and urbanists under the leadership of Henri Prost. For Wright, "modernization and preservation"

are the key words to summarize French experiments in Morocco. The chapters on Indochina and Madagascar deal with material little known in this country. In Indochina, Ernest Hébrard is the main protagonist, and Wright maintains that an architecture of grandeur dominated French urbanistic interventions in Saigon and Hanoi, as well as smaller towns. Madagascar, Marshal Lyautey's training ground as an urbanist in his youth, is discussed in terms of French "rational urbanism" and in particular reference to the capital, Antananarivo. In her last chapter, Wright attempts to address a set of postcolonial issues, among them modernity, tradition, and cultural identity, and draws lessons for contemporary urban design practice.

A major problem is Wright's ambivalent treatment of colonialism and its implications for cities. This emerges from the book's first pages where she essentializes colonialism as a phenomenon that extends uniformly from classical Greece to 16th-century Latin America to 20th-century Japan, with an "ideal" to create "good environments." The failure to recognize the historic specificities of an advanced capitalism and its companion imperialism and to overlook the complex process of empire building in the late 19th and early 20th centuries underlies the tone of the entire book. The result reads almost like a justification for colonialism—a position I doubt Wright would desire to be associated with but one that seems to have found a popular revival among conservative writers these days.[3]

As is symptomatic of many arguments in this book, the author's disjointed attempts to define late 19th- and early 20th-century colonialism are clouded with ambiguities. While Wright mentions the "almost autocratic authority" of colonial administrations, the "economic benefits [that] provided an important rationale for colonial expansion," and the "authoritarian, discriminatory, and debilitating" character of colonial power, these references remain unqualified and fade away in the broader picture drawn here.

If anything, Wright presents colonialism as benevolent paternalism. Racial segregation thus becomes a tool to preserve "cultural and aesthetic differences" and offers "benign protection, often well-meaning and even positive." In a rather bizarre interpretation of colonial policies, Wright argues that the French architectural experiments in Morocco exemplify "the claim that the French preserved the best of Moroccan culture while preparing its leaders for positions of authority in a cosmopolitan world." She brings an equally unusual interpretation to the *raison d'être* of colonialism when she assigns a central role to the French administration in supporting the independence struggles. Thus, the educational policies in Morocco or Vietnam were meant "in the interest of preparing the country for independence" and Moroccan nationalism owed its essence to Islam and the Sultan, "two institutions protected by the French through their preservation of mosques, medersas, and royal palaces." Such a naive understanding of colonialism can only stem from the author's uncritical acceptance of her sources, i.e., official documents and the writings of colonial administrators. A reconsideration of these records based on a more comprehensive understanding of colonial history would have led to very different interpretations.

An outstanding characteristic of French colonial urbanism is the segregation of European and native populations—analyzed scrupulously by Prochaska and Abu-Lughod, who labeled it provocatively "urban apartheid." Wright does not deny the fact that there was segregation in colonial urban interventions, but muddles the implications of racial discrimination by associating colonized subjects with French peasants and with poorer working-class Europeans living in the colonies, hence positing class as the main factor of segregation. This premise, however, is not argued with reference to the residential patterns in the cities that serve as her case studies. Instead, Wright makes a case for segregation by a parallel to the "ancient roots" of "separation of foreigners" in North Africa, confusing again the historical specificities of the two very different sociopolitical systems.

The all-powerful image of the colonizer is juxtaposed with a deafening silence in *The Politics of Design.* The colonized people are given no voice, their "repressed histories" are overlooked, and their cultural and political "speaking back" are ignored. If a "native" response is mentioned at all, it is presented through French sources, hence through the filter of the colonizer. The result conforms to a familiar bipolar formula: static, "traditional" societies that have no choice but to yield to the dynamic, "modern" ones. The omission of the voice of the colonized leads the author to ignore their "overlapping experience" with the colonizers, as well as "the interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives, and histories," which, Edward Said argues, is an essential issue for the history of the last one hundred years.[4]

The recurrent generalizations and clichés frustrate the reader further. The text is dotted with concepts that homogenize cultures and societies into abstract entities, such as "traditional Islamic architecture," "traditional Vietnamese political culture," and "characteristic French manner." The problems become especially acute in Wright's attempts to examine the precolonial contexts onto which French policies are enforced. My personal

The Square Jean Laborde (formerly the Andohalo), Antananarivo, Madagascar; relandscaped under Joseph-Simon Gallieni, c. 1905. (From *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism.*)

knowledge allows me to comment only on the material pertinent to Morocco, which is spotted with errors mainly originating in an essentializing and uniform understanding of "Islamic city" and "Islamic architecture." I believe this derives in part from Wright's choice and indiscriminate use of secondary sources. Experts on Indochina and Madagascar would be in a better position to evaluate the background information on those places.

The most disappointing sections of the book are those on the form of cities—an unexpected weakness coming from a seasoned urban historian. Wright's fragmented text clouds any clear discussion on the structure of the cities she covers; the reader is lost without a sense of the physical urban framework, without a sense of orientation. Instead, the author devotes long sections to architectural styles, describing the facades of randomly selected buildings. Yet it is hard to take even these passages seriously, when Wright's "Corinthian" capitals adorning the main facade of the Palace of the Governor of Cochinchina in Saigon stare at you very Ionically from a photograph on the previous page. The effect is so credulous that one wonders whether Wright knows the cities she is dealing with or whether she got entangled in trying to present too much material too fast. It is this seeming rush in which Wright assembled her material, without refining and focusing it, without sufficiently reading and absorbing the contextual and theoretical literature, that ultimately led her to be unfair to her own research and to the topic.

The authoritative and synthetic tone of the book becomes even more disturbing in light of its many errors, both qualitative and technical, in its broader discussions. Kemal Atatürk is not an "Islamic nationalist leader," neither did he show the slightest interest in the planning of Istanbul; Diocletian's Palace at Split pre-dates the Byzantine Empire and thus is not influenced by Byzantine precedence; many footnotes do not relate to the points made in the text (e.g., the writings of Kuban, Khoury, Laroui), while more relevant sources are omitted; and finally, the footnotes to the conclusion are jumbled and spelling mistakes abound.

While *The Politics of Design* is a problematic book and should be read with a great deal of caution, it makes several contributions to the writing of urban and architectural history. To begin with, a comparative analysis of three very different colonies is a challenging and intriguing topic. Even if Wright fails to explore them in a satisfactory manner, she raises many heady questions, which help broaden the discourse on colonial architecture and urbanism. I believe these questions will remain in the discourse and will be triangulated from different perspectives. I would argue that Wright's main contribution is her widening scope on the history of colonial urbanism and architecture by including cities in Madagascar and Vietnam. In spite of its fragmentary nature, the data presented here is extremely suggestive and opens promising vistas for further research and interpretation.

NOTES

1. Tony Smith, "The Deafening Silence: France Remembers the Algerian War," *French Politics and Society*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 94.
2. Typical is the most recent publication by the Institut Français d'Architecture, *Architectures françaises outre-mer* (Paris: Pierre Mardaga, 1992), which consists of articles on various cities submitted to French dominance at one point or other. Lushly illustrated and beautifully produced, this book is overwhelmingly descriptive. It is telling that in one of the better articles, Jean-Louis Cohen simply refers the readers to American publications for Lyautey's "*politique urbaine.*"
3. See, for example, Paul Johnson, "Colonialism's Back—and Not a Moment Too Soon," *New York Times Magazine* (April 18, 1993): 22, 43–44.
4. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. xx.

MAKING ALGERIA FRENCH, David Prochaska, Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (Paris), 1990, 328 pp., illus., $54.95.

THE POLITICS OF DESIGN IN FRENCH COLONIAL URBANISM, Gwendolyn Wright, University of Chicago Press, 1991, 389 pp., illus., $45.00 (cloth); $22.50 (paper).

ANTHONY WELCH

Building for Paradise

Long before the advent of Islam in 7th-century Arabia, India sustained a rich assortment of ethnic groups, religions, and languages. Much of this diversity was due to the influx of immigrants, some driven from their homelands by religious or social persecution or invasion, others attracted to the opportunities offered by India's great wealth in people, agriculture, and resources. Still more came in the armies of conquerors who sometimes looted and left, and sometimes stayed to found dynasties, and be absorbed into the indigenous culture. Arab and Iranian merchants traded across the Arabian Sea with western India, and many settled along the coast, just as Indian merchants resided in eastern Arabia and in the trading communities of the Red Sea and Persian (Arab) Gulf. With the spread of Islam into Iran in the 7th century, hundreds of thousands of Zoroastrian Iranians migrated to western India and maintained their Parsee traditions, while newly converted Arab and Iranian merchants in the coastal trading communities enjoyed patronage from Hindu rulers who gave them religious freedom and even built their mosques. The new Islamic world and India were abundantly aware of each other, and when Arab armies conquered Sind (southern Pakistan) in the early 8th century, the religions and social structures they encountered could not have been a total surprise. Muslim scholars and evangelists traveled to India over subsequent centuries; most notable among them was al-Biruni who accompanied the Afghan sultan Mahmud of Ghazna on several of his invasions of northern India in the first part of the 11th century and stayed to learn Sanskrit and write a masterful study of India that is one of the masterpieces of medieval scholarship.

In 1192 an army under the authority of the Ghurid sultan of Afghanistan invaded northern India, defeated the Hindu raja, and seized the city of Delhi. By 1206 an independent sultanate had been created in Delhi and it gradually expanded its dominion until the

14th century, when it encompassed most of northern India. Periodically, Muslim sultans of great ambition attempted to conquer more and exhausted their armies and resources by trying to bring the southern part of the subcontinent under their rule, but the productive and relatively secure heartland of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1858) remained in the north. Islamic rulers remained in Delhi until the last Mughal emperor was exiled to Burma by the British in 1858, though in the 19th century the emperor governed little more than the citadel of Delhi.

Despite the cultural and symbolic preeminence of Delhi, there were other Islamic sultanates and, at various times, powerful Muslim rulers in Ahmadnagar, Bengal, Bihar, Bijapur, Golconda, Gujarat, Kashmir, Oudh, the Punjab, and elsewhere, who were patrons of art and culture on a grand scale and attracted educated and talented people from all over the Islamic world. Through much of this period, Muslim theologians were fascinated with the relationship of Hindustan (land of the Hindus) to the rest of Islam. India's religious diversity was probably greater than any other region of the world at the time, and Muslims were only one of many faiths. Was their domain then part of the *dar al-Islam* (the domain of Islam), along with North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, where the majority of the population was Muslim, or, was it part of the *dar al-harb* (domain of war), where Muslims could lawfully use organized force and violence to acquire the territory of nonbelievers? Buildings erected by early Delhi sultans were designed to deal with this question: they were decorated with monumental inscriptions that proclaimed Qur'anic warnings about the dreadful fate awaiting polytheists and idolaters (terms overtly directed at Hindus) and that emphasized the rewards due to those who accepted Islam and built and maintained mosques. It was a puzzle to rulers and theologians that

Islam moved so slowly in India while it succeeded so quickly to the west (by the middle of the 9th century most of the Middle East and North Africa's Christian population had converted to Islam, as had most of the Zoroastrians of Iran). Even though it was the faith of the ruling class during various sultanates, Islam nevertheless persuaded only a minority of Hindus to abandon their religion, and much of Islam's increase in the subcontinent was due to the immigration of Muslims from elsewhere. Driven by a need to make the landscape at least "look" Islamic and provided with enormous funds by India's productivity and resources, Muslim patrons were frantically active as builders on a grand scale for more than six centuries. Hundreds of extant structures in brick, stone, tiles, and marble—mosques, forts, tombs, palaces, theological colleges, caravan inns, palace and city gates, bridges, battlemented walls, and gardens—testify to the region's great architectural richness. Even if India belonged to the *dar al-harb*, powerful Muslims were determined to make it look like *dar al-Islam*.

Immigration from Muslim lands to the west remained a powerful economic, social,

and cultural force in India for centuries. Merchants, physicians, teachers, clerics, poets, painters, builders, historians, mystics, and artisans of all sorts moved east to reap the benefits of a vast patronage network in India's Muslim courts. Some of the emigrants were fleeing persecution or political troubles at home, and they were attracted to India for its reputation as a land that welcomed refugees. Many of them did very well in their adopted country. For example, there is Rukna Kashi, who was a calligrapher, poet, and personal physician to the Iranian shah Abbas I (1588–1629). When the shah suffered a bout of bad health, he fired Rukna and told him to repay all the salary he had received since his initial appointment. The doctor was forced to sell all his property to settle the royal malpractice charge. After trying in vain to win back the shah's favor, Rukna moved with his family to India in 1598, where his many talents were appreciated. He became court physician to the Mughal emperor Jahangir (1605–1627), and his brother Nasìra married Satti al-Nisa Khanam, the sister of the great Mughal poet Abu'l-Talib Amuli and the chief lady-in-waiting of Queen Mumtaz Mahal, for whom her husband, the emperor Shah Jahan (1628–1658) built the Taj Mahal.

The Taj Mahal was designed to be the supreme achievement of Islamic architecture in India, and it was a tour de force that succeeded. Many consider it one of the most beautiful buildings ever constructed. But architectural marvels do not arise from nothing, and this building, known to its builders and chroniclers as the "Illumined Tomb," rests on the deep historic foundations of Indian culture and Islam in India. To present these foundations and the wealth of Mughal architecture (both before and after the Taj Mahal) is a formidable task, and those interested in architecture in both India and Islam owe a debt of gratitude to Catherine B. Asher for her book, *Architecture of Mughal India*, published as the fourth volume of the

Plan of Humayun's Timurid-inspired tomb, Delhi; completed 1571. (From *Architecture of Mughal India*.)

first part of the New Cambridge History of India series. Not a discussion of engineering methods or construction techniques, it is a study of architectural style, patronage, and meaning, of the appearance and function of buildings as they evolved under three centuries of attentive and enthusiastic Mughal patronage. It is more than a survey, for while the author discusses all the well-known monuments, she also presents less familiar—in some cases, virtually unknown—structures far outside the usual confines of the imperial cities of Agra, Delhi, and Lahore, the terrain tramped over and over by most writers on Mughal architecture. The fact that great Mughal buildings were constructed in Nakodar, Merta, and Murshidabad will surprise most Western readers. Asher's intent is set out on the dust jacket, which sports a photograph not of the Taj Mahal or the Red Fort at Delhi but of the *jami'* (central) mosque of Gwalior.

This book required many years of research and travel to distant parts of the vast country in order to photograph and measure buildings, many of which had never been seriously studied before. The author brings to the material a thorough command of primary textual sources (in Persian and Urdu) that provide valuable new evidence and insights. Her book has over two hundred illustrations, almost all of which are photographs of buildings or building details; the remaining few are ground plans of structures that serve as exemplars of basic building types. Most of the photographs are taken by the author, and are excellent. Each chapter has a detailed bibliographic essay, and these essays are extraordinarily careful and thorough in their critical discussion of primary and secondary sources. They are a mine of information. *Architecture of Mughal India* is a remarkable achievement, brilliantly demonstrating that Mughal monuments, patronage, and aesthetic developments are every bit as diverse and impressive as their counterparts in 16th through 19th century Europe. Asher has essentially redefined a field and has done so in a way that will make her book a basic resource for generations of scholars.

Most previous books on the subject have focused on the three Mughal capitals—

Central mosque in Gwalior; 1664–65. (From *Architecture of Mughal India.*)

Lahore, Delhi, and Agra—and on the emperors Akbar and Shah Jahan, only two of the six "great Mughals." Asher gives prominence to all six of the great Mughal rulers, and to their predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. She defines "Mughal" not so much as a dynastic house but as a period, style, and cultural context that, to a large but not exclusive extent, emanates from the aesthetic decisions of imperial patrons. In doing so, she emphasizes the powerful role that other patrons and other regions played in the evolution of Mughal architecture. Thus, the achievements of non-Mughal patrons like Sher Shah (1542–1555), who overthrew the second Mughal emperor, Humayun, loom large, as do those of highly placed Muslim and Hindu nobles at the imperial court and in the provinces.

Architecture of Mughal India focuses on several key concepts: the power of India's indigenous, non-Muslim, architectural culture; the lure of the Mughal's Timurid past that at times seems to move beyond nostalgia and into obsession; the imposition of imperial presence and power through architectural style; and the centrality of "paradise," or images of it.

India did not cease being India when the Mughals arrived, even if the first Mughal emperor, Babur (1526–1530), often peevishly denounced everything in Hindustan

that he thought inferior to his Afghan homeland, and made a determined effort to create in his gardens intimations of his origins. Asher emphasizes that there was not a rigid separation between Islamic and non-Islamic aesthetic forms, whether in literature or the visual arts. Domestic and utilitarian architecture, poetry, and manuscript illustrations all testify to the existence of an elite Indian culture that flourished under Muslim and Hindu patrons. This mixing of cultures was vital for politics and for the continuity of regime, and several Mughal emperors were careful to demonstrate their interest in India's non-Muslim religions and traditions. Hindu rajas often held high appointments at court and in the army, and functioned as significant patrons of architecture. Raja Man Singh, a Hindu and one of the most powerful officials at the court of the emperor Akbar (1556–1605), served as governor of Bengal and established a new capital city, Rajmahal, where he was the patron of a small Hindu temple and an enormous Muslim mosque that was fashioned in the imperial rather than the local Bengali architectural idiom. "Rank and royal favor," writes Asher, "played a much larger role than sectarian affiliation in determining who built major structures." Despite the power of imperial styles, local building traditions survived and Mughal rulers made extensive

Taj Mahal, view of tomb, mosque, and assembly hall, facing north; 1632–36. (From *Taj Mahal: The Illumined Tomb*.)

use of Hindu styles, particularly in their palaces and administrative centers. They also appropriated Hindu sites like Sambhol, Ayodha, and Indraprashtha for their buildings. Like his sultanate predecessors, Akbar's son Jahangir (1605–1627) even erected an ancient stone pillar in his fort at Allahabad; it is inscribed with edicts of emperor Ashoka of the third century B.C., as well as a lengthy text about his own distinguished ancestry, thus linking Timurid traditions with those of pre-Islamic India.

In the second half of the 14th century, Timur (Tamerlane) created an empire in Iran and Central Asia, and in 1398 invaded the Delhi Sultanate, sacking the capital city. Among his descendants were the Mughals who considered this conquest the legal basis for their own rule in India. Babur's *Memoirs* are replete with descriptions of the artistic and architectural glories of Herat and Samarqand that he had experienced before he invaded India in 1526 and deposed the last of the Delhi sultans. Reference to this Timurid legacy appears in the earliest Mughal mosques and endures throughout the Mughal period: the 1754 tomb of Safdar Jang in Delhi determinedly recalls the domed tombs of 15th-century Samarqand. While Mughal patrons made use of techniques, types, motifs, and styles originating

in the architecture of both the Delhi Sultanate and the Hindu states, they prided themselves on being the heirs and descendants of Timur, and held up this tradition as a mirror in which to create, view, and understand their own achievements. Responsive to the Indian cultural environment and responsible for achieving a remarkable synthesis of India's many traditions, Babur's descendants made the first Mughal's memoirs their favorite bedtime reading and genuflected before splendid buildings that they had never seen in distant Central Asia. In his regnal titles, Shah Jahan made calculated use of Timur's nomenclature, and Jahangir avidly collected the art of manuscript painter Bihzad, who had worked for the last Timurid sultan of eastern Iran in the late 15th century. Timurid calligraphy was the most admired model for the splendid inscriptions that grace so many Mughal buildings, such as the Taj Mahal, and present the visual splendor of Islam's scripture, the Qur'an.

Akbar made good use of a forty-nine-year reign to gather together Hindus, Muslims, Jains, and Parsees under the canopy of tolerance, justice, and, above all, obedience to Mughal authority, as it expanded throughout northern India. The emperor longed to create pan-Indian styles in archi-

tecture, as in other things, and he saw to the dissemination of Mughal architectural aesthetics by insisting that architectural creation on Mughal principles was one of the most important duties of provincial nobles and governors of distant provinces. His example made good sense to his successors, who gave time and money to architecture. "Uniformity in design for imperially sponsored mosques was intentional," writes Asher about the stylistic policies of Shah Jahan, who followed his grandfather's example and considered architecture to be the supreme symbol of Mughal power and presence. Even Aurangzeb (1658–1707), often belittled as a religious fanatic with no taste for art, emerges from the author's fair-minded study as a sensitive patron who simply gave more time and resources to expanding his empire than to building in it. Mughal queens and princesses had as strong an inclination for power and art as their male family members, and Asher presents a number of remarkable women who helped shape Mughal architectural culture: "While [Shah Jahan] provided palace buildings and forts, [the high-ranking women of his court] and the nobility assumed responsibility for embellishing the city." And embellish them they did with tombs, mosques, bazaars, and gardens that testify not only to their energy and taste but also to their independence and to the ample treasuries under their command. As elsewhere in her book, the author plants seeds that other scholars can nurture.

Babur was immensely fond of gardens laid out in careful geometric patterns that intimated Timurid order in the midst of what he saw as India's chaos and also suggested the bliss of paradise. The Qur'an abounds with promises of paradise, and references to this eternal garden—its waters, flowers, foods, and joys—course through the prose and poetry of Muslim authors and are the central imagery of much of Islam's visual culture. The Mughals were certainly not the first to structure buildings around this image, but no other patrons were more determined, more imaginative, or more resourceful in creating earthly metaphors of heavenly promise. Asher traces the elaboration of this powerful conceit from its ap-

pearance in Babur's garden designs to its first great architectural manifestation, the tomb of Babur's son Humayun (1530–1556), designed in the Timurid tradition by a brilliant Iranian architect, Mirak Mirza Ghiyas, and subsequently through dozens of other architectural creations, including the Taj Mahal, rightly the most celebrated of all Mughal buildings and the greatest legacy of the Timurid tradition.

There have been many books written about the Taj Mahal, and all too many of them have been filled with nonsense or near-nonsense, posturings of ill-informed writers dispensing mixtures of romance, "Oriental mystery," bad history, and authors' rhapsodies. This popularization started early, for descriptions of the Taj started being published soon after the building was completed in 1643, and they have proliferated ever since then, making the myths, lies, and misrepresentations difficult to dislodge. Most of what has been written has focused on the building itself and on its patron, Shah Jahan, but has made little or no use of the abundant contemporary records about it. Thus inscriptions have been misinterpreted, datings have been wrong, estimates of costs have been inaccurate, and the patron's motives and the building's complex functions have been misunderstood. Thus, the appearance of W. E. Begley and Z. A. Desai's *Taj Mahal: The Illumined Tomb* is a major event. It is a marvelous book, worthy of the great building that inspired it and to which the two authors have devoted much of their scholarly careers. With generosity and respect they have dedicated it to the great Muslim scholar, M. A. Chaghatai, who first uncovered much of the 17th-century documentation about the Taj, and he would have undoubtedly been honored to see his name associated with this beautiful book. It is, as its subtitle declares, "an anthology of 17th-century Mughal and

European sources" about the building, and it offers for the first time in one publication, the available and extensive documentary evidence for the patron's thoughts and feelings and for the subsequent bureaucratic workings and design process behind the greatest of India's Islamic buildings. Where Asher presents the range, wealth, and pervasive ideas in Mughal architecture, Begley and Desai focus on a single structure, and their findings about the complex process of creating the Taj Mahal will necessarily affect how we view and understand every other architectural creation in the Mughal state and other parts of India and Islam.

Begley's lucid and informative introduction is a major contribution to architectural history and our knowledge of the Mughals. Begley provides a carefully constructed and appropriately critical context for understanding and using the documentation, as well as a detailed chronology for the reign of Shah Jahan and the construction of the

Qur'anic inscriptions on the west arch of the tomb; calligrapher, Amanat Khan. (From *Taj Mahal: The Illumined Tomb*.)

tomb. The documentation itself provides the translation of all the known references from Mughal histories; the scanty official Mughal documents about the building; all the many inscriptions on the Taj; references to the calligrapher Amanat Khan and his other monumental works; material about the architect, Master Ahmad of Lahore, and the supervisors of construction; and, finally, the accounts of European travelers like Peter Mundy, François Bernier, and the nasty Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, which amount to some nine pages. It is a pity that for so long they have been considered so significant when the Mughal sources, almost certainly sadly depleted over the centuries, are still so very rich.

Persian was the language of record at the Mughal court, and we have this documentation now in the authors' astute and sensitive translations, whether official chronicles, government prose, or poetry. It is a significant accomplishment to have rendered in English the fulsome and elaborate Persian of Shah Jahan's court. Though his son, Aurangzeb, usurped the Mughal throne in 1658, Shah Jahan lived until 1668 as a prisoner in the Agra fort, and the description of the onset of his fatal illness gives a good sense of the "extravagantly effusive" prose of the *Shah Jahan Nama*, a history of his regime completed by Muhammad Salih Kambo in 1666:

This pathetic story and painful tale—which has been inked on the page of description with the smoke of the extinguished candle of the heart, and not with the soot of the lamp of rose: from whose every burning word, smoke of grief emanates and sets ablaze the heart of the Water of Life; from whose every word, comprising the entire stock of the heart's grief, the blood of remorse trickles; . . . whose lines you may say are the hyacinth-bed of the garden of remorse, with their tresses spread like mourners; and whose letters are the violet-garden on the bank of the river of calamity, having manifested itself to the gaze of people in the garb of mourners—is an ac-

count of the inevitable predestined event and irreparable incident, [i.e., the death] of His Majesty.

So that the building does not get lost in the words, Begley and Desai also provide a stunning photographic record: twenty-two magnificent color illustrations, almost two hundred black-and-white figures, and several plans, sections, and elevations that include remarkable reconstructions of the grid system used for architectural design. While the greatest part of this wealth presents the Taj itself, the book also offers photographs of key Persian-language texts and abundant visual documentation on the other notable achievements of the great calligrapher of the Taj, Abd al-Haqq Shirazi, more widely known by his honorific title, Amanat Khan ("Lord of Trust").

Begley has previously published important material about this great artist, and, with *The Illumined Tomb*, adds considerably to the history of the life and career of Amanat Khan, about whom more is known than any other Mughal architectural calligrapher. The full photographic record of the huge inscriptional program at the Taj Mahal, along with their translations, gives readers a sense of both the artistic achievement of Amanat Khan and the significance of the inscriptions themselves. They are principally selections from the Qur'an, dealing with the promise of salvation and the bliss of paradise. Similarly, the Taj's geometric garden is an image of paradise, while the tomb itself, as Begley has demonstrated before, is a metaphor for the throne of God. (Both Queen Mumtaz Mahal and Shah Jahan were buried under its marble dome.) For the king, whose regnal name means Emperor of the World and whose artists regularly created images that cast him in semi-divine status, the metaphor was appealing. The building was designed to absorb and radiate light, a similitude of God and of the relationship to the divine aspired to by the Mughals.

The book also presents the achievements of the architect, Ustad Ahmad Lahori, as well as the roles played by the two supervisors of construction and major government officials. Their work encompassed much

more than just the great marble tome. Flanking it on the west and east sides were a mosque and an assembly hall, and to the south were tombs of lesser individuals (both relatives and retainers) and an elaborate entrance complex. It was clearly a major social center, where important court ceremonies and festivals took place, most notably the *Urs*, or annual memorial service on the anniversary of the deceased's death which involved hundreds of people, from members of the Mughal family to courtiers and servitors. Deeply concerned with the smooth operation of his government and his state, Shah Jahan also indulged his passion for order, for color, for jewelry, and for stone; his aesthetic, as evident in his patronage of painting as of architecture, is nowhere more lavishly displayed than in this tomb. He deserves to be better known through the words of those who were near him, and this book goes a long way toward bringing him closer to a contemporary audience.

ARCHITECTURE OF MUGHAL INDIA, Catherine B. Asher, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 368 pp., illus., $84.95.

TAJ MAHAL: THE ILLUMINED TOMB, W. E. Begley and Z. A. Desai, The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture (distributed by University of Washington Press), 1989, 374 pp., illus., $45.00 (cloth); $29.95 (paper).

LISA GOLOMBEK

Mughal Architecture: An Outline

Ebba Koch

Mughal Architecture, a slim, modest volume purporting to be a "ready reference" to one of the world's most remarkable traditions, deceives the reader by its scale, both in terms of its extraordinary subject matter and its author's depth of knowledge and insight. While it can serve as a handbook to the architecture of the great Mughals, the Indo-Muslim dynasty that ruled India between 1526 and 1858, it does much more. Ebba Koch has spent ten years in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and Central Asia researching the architecture and cities of the Mughals, who ruled India between 1526 and 1858. The volume contains 162 photographs (twenty in color) and plans of many little-known or unknown buildings and new views of old favorites. Seven chapters corresponding to the Mughal emperors from Babur to Aurangzib, present a "history" of their works in which the buildings are grouped according to function. The decision to deal with buildings as types results from Koch's chosen focus in this "outline," namely, the history of the architecture of the Mughals. In this respect it differs from Catherine B. Asher's new monograph, *Architecture of Mughal India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; reviewed in this issue of *DBR* on page 57), which concentrates on the context of the architecture. Asher re-creates the building as an "individual" through contextualizing but also by walking her reader through its separate parts. Koch's precise language confidently abstracts the essence of a building, which becomes an example of a type. This must have been a conscious choice as Koch has dealt admirably well with contextual issues in her other writings. Because it is essentially a history of forms, this book should be of interest to most architectural historians, and there is enough new information and insight to please specialists in eastern Islamic architecture, as well as suffi-

cient background material to persuade social historians of the importance of the role played by architecture in Mughal culture.

Some hundred and twenty buildings are illustrated and many others mentioned with references. Each chapter begins with general remarks about the phase under consideration. Koch's book is a first step toward rectifying the picture of Mughal architecture of India, which, until now, has been distorted through the overemphasis of certain monuments and the underplaying of others, due in part to lack of information. What is exciting about this publication, however, is not the welcome detail it adds to our knowledge about the Mughals in India, but rather the questions it asks and begins to answer.

No architecture develops in a vacuum, but with the Mughals the problem of sources is complicated by their own origins and the complexities of Indian building traditions. Koch states in her introduction that one of her main reasons for writing the book was to evaluate the "Timurid connection" since recent publications have made Timurid architecture more accessible. The Timurid dynasty, named for the notorious warlord Timur (i.e., Timerlane), ruled much of Central Asia and Iran between 1370 and 1505; Samarqand in Asia was its earliest center. The founder of the Mughal dynasty, Babur, was a Timurid prince, raised in the Timurid heartlands and familiar with the great cities of the empire, which he described in detail in his memoirs. Babur left the Timurid realms for India when he failed to capture Samarqand, and established the Mughal dynasty with its great urban centers in Lahore, Agra, and Delhi. His descendants would continue to revere the memory of their ancestor, the notorious warlord Timur, who is shown in a painting made for Shah Jahan (the fourth Mughal ruler after Babur) in 1630–31; in it, Shah Jahan is receiving the "Crown of Timur" from his grandfather Akbar the Great, the most powerful Mughal emperor (1555–1605). Scholarship has generally assumed that, for both political and aesthetic reasons, the Mughals sought to perpetuate Timurid traditions in architecture. In some cases, architects trained in the

Lahore, Tomb of Anarkali: elaboration of the ninefold (*hasht bihisht*) plan, derived from Timurid architecture; Lahore (ancient city now part of India and Pakistan); 1615. (From *Mughal Architecture*.)

Timurid tradition in Khurasan and Central Asia were brought to India (for example, to build the Tomb of Humayun at Delhi, 1562–71). The Timurid dynasty no longer existed after 1505, but their successors, the Uzbeks, clung to Timurid ideals, both in architecture and painting. Koch demonstrates that the Timurid style penetrated the psyche of Mughal India far more deeply than has been previously suggested. The Tomb of Humayun was not the first building to use the ninefold plan (*hasht bihisht*, or "eight paradises," referring to a square divided into nine sections, the central section forming a dome-chamber, while the arms of the cross-axes are usually open halls or verandas, and

the corners generally contain two stories of rooms). This was a favorite plan in late Timurid times for both secular and religious purposes (garden pavilions, mausoleums, *khanaqahs*, i.e., institutions for the teaching and practice of mysticism). Babur built a *hasht bihisht* pavilion at Agra, which has not survived, but sources indicate that "Khurasani" models (those associated with the Timurid lands of northeast Iran, particularly the latter-day capital of Herat) were chosen specifically to please the Khurasanis and Samarqandis in Babur's retinue. The author presents a succession of little-known mausoleums in Delhi based on the ninefold plan, culminating in the tomb of Humayun. As she points out, this was the first monumentalization of the ninefold theme, and its builder, Akbar, used it extensively in his new city at Fatehpur Sikri. The plan demonstrates tremendous resilience in Mughal tradition, again appearing in the Taj Mahal in 1632–43. Each new incarnation of the plan reinforced its symbolic meaning and its legitimizing association with the Timurid dynasty. It is only through the amassing of such examples that the true meaning of this form to Mughal society finally emerges.

Other Timurid features accompanied the ideal Timurid plan. Two types of vaults, which originated in Khurasan and evolved further in post-Timurid Central Asia, also appear in Mughal India, the arch-netting

Tomb of Jahangir, Lahore, Shahdara (Pakistan); 1628–38. (From *Mughal Architecture*.)

Tomb of Mumtaz Mahal, built by her husband, Shah Jahan, otherwise known as the Taj Mahal, Agra (former province, now a portion of Uttar Pradesh, India); 1632–43. Section shows its "Timurid" double dome. (From *Mughal Architecture*.)

(intersecting plaster arched ribs filling spherical/corbelled surfaces) and intersecting supporting arches. The arch-net appeared as early as 1528 in Babur's mosque at Panipat and continued in use for the next two centuries. It was distinctively Persian. Its persistence in Mughal architecture suggests that, like other features noted by Koch, it signified lineage. Less common because it was difficult to construct, the intersecting supporting-arch system also carried Timurid associations. It appears in the tomb of the Barber (1590–91) in the garden of Humayun's tomb, and its curious appearance in a Hindu temple (Govind Deva, Vrindavan, 1590) caused Koch to remark that even the Rajputs recognized the "imperial" signification of these devices. She might also have noted the spread of these devices to Bahmanid architecture in the Deccan in the 16th century.

Just how these Timurid features arrived in Mughal India could be a subject of lively debate. Did they come as a bundle, along with the "platform tomb," tile mosaic, and multiple minarets (as in the Mosque of Samarqand)? Or did they come sporadically, some with the masters invited from Central Asia, others with those from Khurasan (such as the Khurasani supervisor of Jahangir working at Burhanpur in 1607)? Or are we dealing with a generic tradition, specified by the Mughal patrons in a generic way ("Make it look Timurid!")? The Khurasani engineer also built an Iranian *qanat* (underground canal network) irrigation system for his patron, the noble Abd al-Rahim Khan-i Khanan. Was this patron interested in promoting Timurid ideology, or did he wish to be associated with yet another facet of Persian culture? Many of the later, borrowed features are traced by Koch to Safavid Iran. Just to show how complex these relationships can be, see Koch's reference to Shah Jahan's wish to reproduce in Shahjahanabad (Delhi) a Persian-built covered bazaar that he had seen in Peshawar. A drawing was made and sent to the capital. In this second- or third-hand manner Safavid ideas could arrive in Delhi. These are issues which I hope Dr. Koch will return to in a more extensive monograph.

While Babur's architectural legacy is too small too evaluate, Humayun's begins with "pure imports" from the Timurid world and concludes with a revival of the Delhi Sultanate ornamental sandstone style. Alongside buildings of Timurid type appear flat-roofed post-and-beam constructions. With the expansion of the empire under Akbar, conscious efforts were made to draw in new features, which Koch attributes to "earlier Timurid, Transoxanian, Indian, and Persian styles." Of these the Timurid still dominates, but the details are often Gujarati. Humayun placed the tomb for his father in the middle of a fourfold garden (*chhar bagh*), setting the standards for his successors. Jahangir's period was one of "transition, reflection, and experimentation," and through careful study of the examples Koch presents, we arrive quite naturally at the Taj Mahal, built by Shah Jahan as a tomb for his wife and, eventually, for himself.

Shah Jahan's architecture stresses bilateral symmetry and uniformity. A court bureau of architects ensured the consistent application of established canons, such as the baluster column, the curious *bangla* (curved roof or cornice, derived from Bengal, from which the bungalow is derived, according to the book's glossary), bulbous domes, naturalistic plant decoration, and so on. Shah Jahan's penchant for organizing large urban units in space according to the laws of symmetry is seen to be the basic principle underlying the design of the Taj Mahal complex. This famous white marble (revetted) mausoleum, with its fabled bulbous dome, framed by four minarets placed in the corners of its raised platform, sits at the far end of a *char bagh*. Differing from some of her colleagues (including Asher), Koch does not see any of these features as unusual, requiring cosmological interpretation (as proposed by W. E. Begley). "In its layout, the garden is a typical Agra riverside garden on a monumental scale, with a raised terrace (on which are placed the main buildings) combined with a lower *char bagh*." The author views it as a secular/residential plan in the service of commemorative architecture. Given the many examples presented in this book, Koch's stance—that all of the features can be accounted for in earlier Mughal buildings—is convincing: the fourfold garden, criss-crossed by raised pathways and canals, with pavilion at the far end facing the river; the two oblong pavilions flanking a central feature on a raised

platform (Ram Bagh, Agra); the garden as tomb setting (Tomb of Humayun, Tomb of Akbar); minarets in the four corners of a tomb platform (Lahore, Tomb of Jahangir), and so forth. Even the internal organization of the mausoleum follows the ninefold plan, so ingrained was this Timurid tradition. Did it still have Timurid connotations? Perhaps the adoption of the bulbous dome at this time, which Koch attributes to the Deccan, can be seen as a reinforcement of the Timurid connection, relating the tomb to that of Timur himself in Samarqand (the Gur-i Amir). Koch gives us very little information about the construction of Shah Jahan's new bulbous domes. Were they mere shells sitting on top of a hollow drum that concealed the spherical dome below, as her section on the Taj Mahal suggests? Yet, Elizabeth Merklinger says that most of the Deccani bulbous domes are single shell, with two possible exceptions. Thus, while the profile of the Taj dome may have been influenced by Deccan style, the dome is technically related to Timurid double-domes. It is, in fact, the high circular drum beneath it that gives the Taj its soaring majesty. We might now recall the painting noted above, showing Shah Jahan receiving the crown of Timur, to bring to mind the enduring prestige of Timur's lineage.

One of the disappointing features of this book is the small scale at which large urban complexes such as the palace-forts of Lahore, Agra, and Delhi are reproduced. It is nearly impossible to read the individual building plans, and the variations in shading to indicate periods are lost in the reduction. Koch has some very interesting points to make about these complexes, like the fact that before Shah Jahan rebuilt them they were not organized according to principles of symmetry. The city Shahjahanabad (the "Red Fort" at Delhi) is extraordinary in that it was laid out entirely on a geometric grid. The lack of organization of the larger units in a complex like Fatehpur Sikri was more typical.

Both Koch's and Asher's volumes will be significant not only for the study of Mughal architecture but also for that of other contemporary regions of the Muslim

world. Just as Mughal architecture did not grow in a vacuum, its multifaceted achievements did not remain hidden from the world. Emphasis has been on the contribution of Iran to this melting pot, but to what extent did India send back new ideas? The movement of painters and calligraphers between the two courts has frequently been discussed, but little is known about Mughal architects in Iran. Is the *hasht bihisht* palace of Isfahan derived from Timurid forms or might it have been "anticipated" by the Pavilion at Ajmer, as Koch timidly suggests? If only someone with comparable knowledge and insight would write such a book on Safavid architecture!

As Asher points out, it has been just over fifty years since the last survey of Mughal architecture was published by Percy Brown. Now, within one year, two attempts have been made to update the field and incorporate original research and interpretations. While both specialists treat the same major monuments, they emphasize different facets and often provide variant perspectives. Their selection of lesser-known monuments is not identical and is based on their respective focus. Patronage, particularly at the "sub-imperial" level, is one of Asher's chief concerns and strongest contributions. As Asher herself says in an addendum in her book noting that Koch's book appeared too late to be included in her bibliography, it should "serve as an excellent companion" to her volume. Yes, there is room for both books on the scholar's shelf (would we ever question the multiplicity of studies on Renaissance palaces?). These two important works are counterparts indeed, allowing the reader to judge the issues.

MUGHAL ARCHITECTURE: AN OUTLINE, Ebba Koch, Prestel (Munich; distributed in the U.S. by te Neues), 1991, 160 pp., illus., $24.95.

MIRIAM GUSEVICH

Drawing (on) Other Cultures

Klaus Herdeg's elegant and informative books, *Formal Structure in Indian Architecture* and *Formal Structure in Islamic Architecture of Iran and Turkistan*, invite readers to journey to the East, to lands remote and yet, now thanks to films and television, uncannily familiar. The products of the author's scholarly journeys to India (1965), and to Iran and Turkistan (1975 and 1981), the two books differ from the tradition of the travel narrative to the East, which dates back to Marco Polo and includes Le Corbusier. Herdeg's travel is not a sentimental journey—it provides no travel anecdotes, few personal impressions of peoples and places, of smells, sights and sounds, of sensual pleasures. Except for the evocative color photographs, the books underplay the sense of mystery usually associated with the Orient.

Yet this quiet, proper academic tone conceals a passion, a sense of personal mission to reveal the "formal structure" of a monumental architecture that, because of its location, is still relatively unknown in the West. The unstated yet implicit goal of Herdeg's analyses is to transform the status of this architecture from a marginal curiosity to a major participant in the canon, and as such, to a new role as significant precedent for contemporary practice. The books represent a quest of knowledge, a journey of the mind.

Without firsthand knowledge of the cities or building, I prefer to comment instead on the epistemological premises of this study and the information this formal analysis yields.

These books consist of a series of plates originally shown as an exhibition; they are mainly drawings and black-and-white photographs, with a few color photos added to the book edition. The text is limited to captions and background notes.

In general, the quality of the drawings is very high. The books are a delight to those of us who share a taste for figure/ground

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and Choisy or earthworm-view drawings—a taste cultivated by a select number of architecture schools, most notably Herdeg's and my alma mater, Cornell University, and promoted by our teacher, Colin Rowe. The simple graphic means of such drawings are used to beautifully portray formal organizations of great spatial complexity. Particularly compelling are the two drawings selected for the book covers (and reproduced here).

The beauty of the drawings compensates for their occasional small size. (One small complaint however: I found the text and maps too small to read comfortably—an unfortunate result of reducing the plates from the exhibition without reediting them.) Because the books are mainly visual, they are ideal for browsing. The clear and succinct text provides a refreshing change from the currently fashionable books on architec-

tural theory with dense prose and obscure textual references.

The intelligent use of a variety of graphic means to portray the spatial complexity of this architecture is admirable. Yet the Spartan use of text and the dominance of drawings and photographs can make the books somewhat inaccessible to a general educated audience, and unnecessarily limit these beautiful books to the architectural cognoscenti.

Drawings are not self-evident, transparent ways of portraying architecture; understanding them requires knowledge of architectural conventions and the ability to read drawings spatially. While the books do not address a general audience, they could be fruitful in a studio setting because the tutoring system allows teachers to demonstrate how to interpret the drawings and, by assigning similar types of analysis, could

provide students with access to the knowledge revealed through these drawings.

The purpose of these drawings is to represent formal structure. According to Herdeg, "Formal structure is the underlying order and its effects on any natural or man-made object or phenomenon based on inherent formal properties such as symmetry (axiality), hierarchy (progression), climax, repetition and others, to which may be ascribed analogous functional and symbolic attributes and values" (from the introduction to *Iran and Turkistan*).

As Oleg Grabar points out in the preface, "The primary value . . . lie[s] rather in the choices of interpretation suggested or implied by the drawings and the often unexpected sections and axonometric views. Several drawings with different emphases of the same monument, cuts through buildings that suddenly emphasize one section

Cut axonometric through sequence of spaces from mosque to fountain, the Isfahan bazaar, Iran. (From *Formal Structure in Islamic Architecture of Iran and Turkistan*.)

Figure-ground of the city and citadel of Fatehpur Sikr, India. (From *Formal Structure in Indian Architecture*.)

over others, visions that are only available to birds or to angel, these are exciting ways of looking; they all illuminate a monument or compel a focus not normally available or expected."

And, as Grabar perceptively recognized, the choice of representation does raise further questions about the relation of drawing to the practice of building, and about the act of drawing as a practice. What is the relation between Herdeg's descriptive and analytic drawings and those done by the builders? Did the builders do measure drawings? If so, what conventions did they use? Did they use plans, sections, and elevations like we do in the West, following Renaissance practices? Did they use other systems of representation? What about construction drawings? Perhaps that is the subject of another book.

Implicit in Herdeg's approach is the conviction that drawings and photographs can go beyond simply conveying information and actually *reveal* knowledge. In particular, the very abstract type of drawings used—the figure/ground and the "Choisy"—are seen as functioning like "x rays," showing spatial structure in ways that would remain hidden otherwise. The drawings are understood as portraits of formal features, such as spatial definition, spatial sequence, axiality, rotation—in other words, the organization of space as an artistic system.

I share Herdeg's enthusiasm and conviction. Yet there is a question of the adequacy of these means in relation to the phenomena under investigation. Do we know what these spaces "mean" in the context of a different time and especially different cultures? The implication of his method is to emphasize the similarity of spatial concept in this monumental architecture both across these various places and with the Western tradition of monumentality. The use of the same method in the two books implies a profound cultural similarity across India, Iran, and Turkistan. If there is a similarity in spatial concept between "East" and "West," how does one account for it?

India alone is a vast subcontinent with a multiplicity of cultures; adding Iran and Turkistan further expands the area's cultural

complexity. Fortunately, Herdeg does not collapse this diversity into an exotic Orientalism, to be treated as the radical "Other" to the West. Yet the issue of cultural difference haunts both books.

What is the meaning of these spaces, and to whom? Because Herdeg is concerned with spatial structure, he does not provide a traditional iconographic analysis of the symbols in the extensive decorative programs of these buildings. Nevertheless, if spatial organization is a carrier of cultural meaning, there is a need to interpret the organization of space in terms of culture. How are these spaces used and in what context, and what is the relation of spatial practices to rituals and their cultural meaning? What is the relation of the sacred to the profane in these buildings?

The author acknowledges but does not explore the issue of gender. What is the difference in meaning of spatial sequence to men and to women and children, who were secluded and restricted from specific areas, and who had to follow different spatial trajectories? It would have been interesting to have contrasting diagrams of spatial sequences as sanctioned by gender. If space is transcribed differently by gender, how does that affect the meaning of public and private in Islamic and other cultures?

These questions and limits are not meant as a major criticism of Herdeg's two excellent books. By bringing attention to the monumental architecture of India, Iran, and Turkistan, they help to broaden the boundaries of the canon and, in the questions they raise, encourage further research and discussion of our common architectural heritage. In addition, as an appreciative and informed tourist/scholar, a detached yet curious *flâneur*, Herdeg invites us to cities in India, Iran, and Turkistan as both "real" places and places of contemplation.

FORMAL STRUCTURE IN INDIAN ARCHITECTURE, Klaus Herdeg, Rizzoli, New York, 1990, 60 pp., illus., $35.00.

FORMAL STRUCTURE IN ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE OF IRAN AND TURKISTAN, Klaus Herdeg, Rizzoli, 1990, 72 pp., illus., $35.00.

JAY A. WARONKER

After the Masters: Contemporary Indian Architecture

Vikram Bhatt and Peter Scriver

The last five years have seen a relative flurry of publications on Indian architecture, planning, and design during its colonial and postcolonial periods, including, recently, *After the Masters: Contemporary Indian Architects*, a glossy, somewhat stodgy, hardbound picture book on contemporary Indian architecture and relevant social issues. It is a collaborative project by architects Vikram Bhatt, an Indian who has taught at McGill University's School of Architecture in Montreal for several years, and Peter Scriver, who has worked and traveled extensively in India and has studied 19th- and 20th-century Indian architecture.

After the Masters, the first in a general series about Indian architecture by the Indian publisher Mapin, is a profusely illustrated who's-who of 1970s and early 1980s Indian architecture supplemented with five concise essays on various theoretical and historical architectural topics. With a general introductory statement, the book is divided into four sections, each of which opens with an essay followed by several pages illustrating architectural projects representative of the ideas featured in the writings. Bhatt and Scriver selected these projects, which were all either built or under construction at the time of the book's 1991 publication, based on their belief that they broadly represent the current state of architecture in India. Yet, while a sizable fifty-two projects are included, only the work of some twenty architects is featured; even after the usual acknowledgments of space restrictions, it seems a pity that the work of more designers is not included. Given the book's recent publication date, it is also unfortunate that there is no work from the mid-to-late 1980s.

The first section of the book centers on the notion of an Indian architecture and the search for an indigenously inspired modern

Permanent exhibition complex (Pragate Maidan) for the National Trade Fair Authority of India, New Delhi; Raj Rewal, 1972. (From *After the Masters.*)

design tradition (if there can be such a thing). Here, the authors discuss the colonial beginnings of modern architectural practice in India. They also write about the profound and lasting influence over the past three decades of the two "master" architects so inseparable from India's early postcolonial era: Le Corbusier and Louis Kahn. In their essay, Bhatt and Scriver assert that contemporary Indian architecture has no formal roots in its own context, and that the effort to adapt an alien modern idiom to India has been the driving force in the evolution of architectural design since the British Raj. In India, a nation that continues to be overwhelmingly rural and agricultural, a modern architectural tradition devised in the West is literally foreign, even paradoxical. As with many newly independent nations thirsty for quick sociopolitical change, there was initial hope that modern architecture would be a panacea in India's search for a new identity, now that Indians were free to control their own destiny. But this wish proved to be both naive and unrealistic.

The second essay tackles the complex, seemingly cumbersome issues facing the architectural profession within a developing nation.[1] Here, the authors assess the role of Indian architects with regard to such topics as low-income housing and urban planning. They write interestingly about the responsibilities of polarized groups, whether architects who align themselves with technological progress and quick modernization, or more traditional practitioners who remain loyal to the ideals of Gandhi, who tried to steer India away from rapid industrialization and toward a "salvage paradigm" (the desire to hold on to the ways of the past before they are lost to progress and greed).[2] Bhatt and Scriver point out that while this philosophical debate of words lingers, India's contemporary architects are ignoring their primary duty: to design and build responsible and appropriate projects. But to imply that architects can single-handedly solve the world's problems (or, in this case, India's), and then to blame or criticize them when they don't try or when they fail in their efforts, is an anachronistic sentiment. Bhatt and Scriver probably realize this, but they nevertheless need to remind themselves and their readers that architects, while undoubtedly able to better respond to pressing social and environmental needs, are not superhuman.

The book's third discussion describes a burgeoning middle class in India, and their special needs. With the rise of this segment of contemporary population came the demand for buildings long familiar in the West but relatively new in India, such as high-rise office buildings, resort hotels, and upscale housing projects. How these projects compare to their Western counterparts and how they've altered the Indian landscape are two of the issues raised in this section. Bhatt and Scriver make interesting claims about the marked influences of glamorous, material-conscious movies and other media on the emerging middle class and their lifestyles. This inevitably results in the changing character of architecture.

The final essay is devoted to the newest generation of Indian architects and architecture. The recent easing of India's infamous bureaucracy, which often stymied architects' creativity and vision on aesthetic, social, economical, as well as environmental levels, has led to some relatively invigorating and enlightened design work. Bhatt and Scriver relate how contemporary practitioners are responding to fundamental changes within the Indian economy, to cultural globalization, to overpopulation, and how they are

Indian Institue of Forest Management, Bhopal; Anant Raje, 1989. (From *After the Masters.*)

reconciling the country's colonial past in their architecture.

While the overall composition of the book is clear and well organized, there are problems with both the content of the essays and the illustrative layouts of the architecture. First, while the general design of this overwhelmingly pictorial publication is competent, it lacks inspiration. Second, despite the book's welcomed balance of descriptive and analytical text, color and black-and-white photographs, and architectural drawings, the quality of the photographs is poor, therefore diluting the overall impact of not only the book but, more importantly, the architecture. Thankfully, only a few of the photographs, which are documentary in their intent rather than creative, are contrived, dishonest, or romanticized by the use of enhanced or filtered lighting, cropping, or other such manipulation, but many are grainy, over- or underexposed, skewed, or simply do not adequately convey the architecture. Another minor criticism of the book is that each featured project is numbered in a illegible and distracting font. Why the projects are sequenced in this manner is a mystery since the individual numbers do not appear in the table of contents. The quality of printing is also a problem, appearing blurry or splotchy in some places.

The book's essays can be faulted for squeezing too many tidbits of history and theory in too limited a space. This overload of information is problematic because important issues are raised but not adequately explained. One example involves a discussion of the evolution of Indian colonial architecture and its eventual impact on contemporary Indian architecture. Here, Bhatt and Scriver mention that early British architecture in India tended toward the neoclassic of Georgian England before switching to Gothic revival and then, in the authors' words, "Hindu-Gothic." While their account possesses elements of truth, this brief history lesson is either grossly oversimplified or, according to locale, in error. This is not a matter of accusing Bhatt and Scriver of not knowing their history, but rather, of condensing it too indiscriminately.

Food Crafts Institute, Students' Hostel, Bhopal; Sen Kapadia, 1985. (From *After the Masters*.)

While the writing is sometimes dense and wordy, this book is successful in its general treatment of the progression of 20th-century Indian architecture, from the British Raj to early postcolonial work, from the significant influences of Le Corbusier and Louis Kahn and the work of their respective disciples to the architecture of the latest generation. The authors carefully examine the components of each case in the context of social and political reality. And the diversity of the projects included in both the essays and illustrations is commendable, ranging from the curvilinear, funky orange forms of Roger Anger's Sanskrit School in Auroville to the interpretive vernacular work of Laurie Baker, the Kahn-inspired projects by Anant Raje and Raj Rewal to the white-vaulted work of Balkrishna Doshi, the serpentined hostels of the Food Crafts Institute in Bhopal by Sen Kapadia, to the housing projects by Ralino de Sousa and Charles Correa.

Like many architects and historians interested in late 20th-century Indian architecture, I welcome a book such as this that focuses a theme that is, after all, not particularly sexy, romantic, or popular. While most of the projects included in the book pale in comparison to the extraordinary works of Edwin Lutyens, Herbert Baker, Kahn, and Le Corbusier, they represent the brightest architectural talent in India today. Also worth mentioning is Bhatt's and Scriver's cautious, fair tone, and their care not to impose idle, unwarranted opinions. This does not mean that they never express their own views, yet ultimately, the book is balanced in its coverage of ideas and architecture. The authors competently accomplish their purpose, to interpret the trends and intentions behind current Indian architecture, although they do so without tremendous style.

NOTES

1. Many of the issues are eloquently discussed in Charles Correa's *The New Landscape: Urbanization in the Third World* (London: Concept Media Ltd./Mimar, with Butterworth Architecture, 1989).
2. See Virginia Dominguez's "Of Other Peoples: Beyond the 'Salvage' Paradigm" in Dia's Foundation's *Discussions in Contemporary Culture*, No. 1., for her insight on the use of the term.

PETER SCRIVER

Building in a Global Garden

Far from being mere buzzwords of electoral politics in the 1990s, the allied notions of "sustainable development" and a "new world order" have been perennial concerns in architectural thought and practice throughout much of this century. Take, for example, the career of Joseph Allen Stein. In this moment of widespread rethinking of values and strategies in all areas of social policy, when the Clinton administration is actively attempting to reorient the economics and ethics of America to a more sustainable course, the appearance of an extensive monograph on the work of this respected, if little-known expatriate American, is both timely and inspiring.

Stein will need some introduction to most architects today. In the California of the 1940s he was a visible and rising member of the socially and environmentally committed second generation of modernist architects, landscape architects, and planners that emerged from the cataclysmic experiences of the Great Depression and World War II. Individually and in various fruitful collaborations with allied professionals, including Gregory Ain in Los Angeles and John Funk, Lawrence Halprin, and Garrett Eckbo in San Francisco, Stein engaged enthusiastically in projects of broad social and environmental implications. Professionally, he contributed significantly to the legacy of regionally sensitive modernist housing in the San Francisco Bay Area; politically, through his engagement in the local action group Telesis, among other avenues, he was one of the early proponents of environmental management and conservation through regional planning.

However, it was Stein's move to India in the early 1950s, where he has practiced steadily for the remainder of his long and still-active career, that makes the 81-year-old architect a particularly interesting and revealing exemplar of his generation. In India, distanced from the affluence and narcissism that eventually undermined the modern move-

ment in the West, Stein has managed to sustain his belief in a functionalist architecture of simplicity and purpose. Those tenets have answered to the wide range of institutional and industrial buildings he has been commissioned to build, and to the broader issues in environmental design and management in northern India and the fragile alpine ecology of the vast Himalayan region, to which he has addressed himself with an increasing sense of urgency over the past forty years.

Stephen White's assessment of Stein and his accomplishment, *Building in the Garden: The Architecture of Joseph Allen Stein in India and California*, can be summarized in the word "stewardship." In tone and message, White's book will strike some for its almost religious appreciation for the antiheroic stance of an architect who, in his own words, has consciously approached design since the early part of his career as "a means towards balance," moving personally toward an ideal of "voluntary simplicity." White contrasts Stein's work in India with the extraordinary hubris of the buildings that Le Corbusier and Louis Kahn built for that "Other" cultural context during the same period. Stein has personified an alternative atti-

tude, in the author's view—one that responds to the material and technical constraints of a particular region, but which expressly avoids the form-giver's tendency to "aesthetisize," and thereby emphasize the ontological significance of cultural difference. In a genuine, workmanlike search for universals, Stein has consistently perceived his role to be a designer and planner, working in the much larger framework of a global ecology of natural and human habitats striving for better integration. In this regard, India has been a particularly challenging patch of the global "garden" in which to work. It has also held particular spiritual affinities for Stein, which White makes a sympathetic effort to evince in his study through a correlation of the "Eastern" ideals of an ecological middle path for human development articulated by Mohandas Gandhi and the Bengali humanist Rabindranath Tagore, with Stein's "Western" inheritance from the regionalist ethics of Frank Lloyd Wright and Lewis Mumford.

At close to four hundred pages, *Building in the Garden* is far more than a simple monograph. White has conceived the book, he explains, as a "gathering of sympathies."

Plan of the Appert residence, which has an entry garden and enclosed courtyard, Atherton, California; Joseph Allen Stein, with landscape architect Robert Royston, 1951. (From *Building in the Garden*.)

This amounts to a dense, sometimes busy, but well-marshaled interleaving of the author's own text with extensive commentaries on projects and intentions by Stein himself (largely culled from interviews and previously unpublished manuscripts), and the additional reflections of friends and colleagues. The text is complemented by copious original photos and drawings from Stein's archives, in addition to recent photos the author has taken in his admirable effort to survey the complete works of Stein in India and America.

The book designer has done a capable job with a very wide range of typographic and visual material of varying quality. With a handful of exceptions, the predominantly black-and-white photos and line drawings are well reproduced. *Building in the Garden* is a promising first venture into architectural publishing by the Indian branch of Oxford University Press (although, at Rs 1500, close to a month's salary for a junior architect, it is regrettable that few in India will be able to afford it).

White extends and historically grounds his synthesis of collective affinities with a gleaning of the theory and ideals of major figures such as Wright, Mumford, and Gandhi, whom he regards as important influences on Stein's professional and ethical development. But this polyphonic synthesis does not really amount to critical history, constrained as it is by the form of a monographic overview. White's analysis of Stein's career in the cultural and political context of his times remains tentative and largely inferential. He is most successful, in this regard, in using the account of Stein's early career as a vehicle for reconsidering the functionalist idealism in the architectural and planning thought of the mid-20th century, which has been lost from sight in recent years. Stein and his past collaborators, in California and India, are presented as the voices of a generation of designers, planners, and social thinkers empowered initially by a supreme optimism. As Fran

The India International Centre in New Delhi is virtually a hand-made building: individual elements (rough-cut stone for walls, precast vaulting, floor, and dome sections, etc.) were all made and assembled on site, with little or no heavy machinery; Joseph Allen Stein and Associates, 1953–62. (From *Building in the Garden*.)

Viollich, former chair of the Department of City Planning at UC Berkeley, describes their collective sense of engagement in the modernist project at the end of World War II, "We were all impregnated with the opportunities that lay ahead, and with the idea that you not only could shape the form of the physical environment, but also influence social life."

In a series of five chapters conceived as thematic layers of a career's work, White chronicles the cyclical progression of Stein's professional concerns: from the promise of an integrated social and environmental development in postwar California, through the focused, singular efforts to build an architecture of technical and environmental rationality in his middle years of practice in India, to his overarching concern in his later years with macroenvironmental issues in the development of urban India and its northern mountain regions, and in the theoretical realm of "metapolis"—Stein's frankly utopian object for his meditations on sustainable patterns for interdependent human and natural development within the limits to growth of the global biosphere. Each of these themes is illustrated by a selection of appropriate projects, each documented in detail in

a separate mini-essay.

The core chapters of the book are framed by an extended introduction and an appendix comprising a conventional chronological list of buildings, projects, and publications, as well as several extended examples of Stein's textual erudition in the form of important lectures he has delivered over the years. Revealingly, White has also included the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949. (Although permanently established in New York a few years after its founding, the U.N. was created in San Francisco in 1945, a significant historical coincidence in Stein's early career, the author implies.)

White has made no pretense to be Stein's biographer and confines the few personal details of Stein's professional history to the book's introduction. This is perhaps understandable, but disappointing nevertheless as several intriguing questions are left unanswered. Stein was originally from the Midwest, born in 1912 in Omaha, Nebraska. But, regrettably, we are told nothing of his childhood, family background, or preprofessional life and education. Stein's architectural training began at the University of Illinois, where he received his master's degree in architecture in 1935. Along the way, he spent time in France at the Ecole des Beaux Arts at Fontainebleau, and followed up in 1935–36 with a fellowship at the Cranbrook Academy of Art in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. There, Stein studied under Eliel Saarinen and the Swedish sculptor Carl Milles, the first important individual influences on his emerging ideals of total design from an organic approach.

Stein's practical training after leaving Cranbrook was similarly influential. In the final years of the Depression, he managed to find work first in New York in the office of Ely Jacques Kahn, and then with Richard Neutra in Los Angeles in 1939. Stein had begun to practice independently in Los Angeles by the time the Americans entered World

School building proposed for India; Joseph Allen Stein and Stanley van Vliet White, 1951. (From *Building in the Garden*.)

War II, but was subsequently compelled to move to San Francisco where he worked for the duration of the war as a designer of structural and marine systems at a navy shipyard. During those years he was to become a close friend of Erich Mendelsohn who had also recently moved to San Francisco.

In 1945 Stein started a new practice in the San Francisco Bay Area. The heady years of postwar demographic and economic growth in America were to be the seminal period of development for Stein's professional and ethical beliefs. Concentrating in those early years on an integrated landscape approach to both individual houses and collective housing schemes, he often worked in close partnership with similarly committed professionals such as architect John Funk and landscape architects Robert Royston and Garrett Eckbo.

Stein's initial enchantment with his first adopted home and "region" of professional endeavor began to wane toward the end of the decade, precipitating his permanent departure from the United States in 1951. The decisive factor, White suggests, was the failure of Ladera, a large cooperative-housing development south of San Francisco, in which Stein, Funk, and Eckbo had been enthusiastically engaged as planners and de-

signers since 1944. As White explains, "initial optimism for creating cooperative communities often ended in disappointment, due to reasons involving both their modern design and the controversial nature of cooperative living in the United States." The Ladera scheme had the somewhat radical aim to level not only the formal and spatial profiles of the community under a single harmonious regime of functionalist architecture and integrated landscape, but to homogenize the demographic profile of the community as well. Evidently, federal financing was ultimately denied, as in other contemporary instances in California, because the cooperative community proposed to be racially integrated. This contravened Regulation X of the Federal Housing Authority's guidelines for housing loan guarantees. (The infamous regulation was finally revoked as unconstitutional in 1980.)

Stein's disillusionment over the insidious resistance of the American financial and political establishment to the socially equitable architecture and planning he was trying to promote was deepened, one imagines, by the cold war. Without a specific explanation, White allows the reader to draw several intriguing conclusions from his account of this crucial point in Stein's career.

In 1951, at the age of forty, he closed his office in San Francisco and departed for Europe, surfacing toward the end of that year in Switzerland. There, in the winter of 1951–52, he collaborated with the sociologist Stanley van Vliet White on one of the more telling projects of his career—a series of ideal types for housing and community in different generic regions of the globe. Unbridled by the mundane constraints of an actual commission, Stein extrapolated from the various principles of social equity and integrated human and natural landscapes which he had been developing tentatively in the Ladera scheme and his various small-scale residential commissions of the preceding decade. In these schemes, he envisaged a total landscape in which all facets of a viable modern community—commercial, cultural, educational, agricultural, industrial—could be incorporated harmoniously. The scheme overlapped with conceptions of a distributed "sub-urbanism" that Wright had been promoting in his idyllic plans for Broadacre City (1934–58). It also anticipated the neoanarchistic proposals of the economist E. F. Schumacher, whose argument for a return to a simpler, more sustainable arcadia of distributed and largely self-sufficient small-scale communities and means of production (as articulated in his book, *Small Is Beautiful* [New York: Harper & Row, 1973]) was adopted by many as a credo in the first popular awakening of the environmental movement of the 1970s. White underlines the anarchistic affinities in Stein's and van Vliet White's proposals with an extended excerpt from Peter Kropotkin's seminal text of 1894, *Fields, Factories, and Workshops* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1899), which reads as a virtual program for the plans Stein produced. Again, however, this provocative inference is not backed up by any direct discussion of what Stein's politics or intentions might actually have been.

The author does not reveal whether Stein had intended to return to the increasingly paranoid America of the early 1950s. But opportunity interceded at that point in his career to draw him further still from the consumerism and the new formalism that had begun to derail the social commitment

of his generation of architects and planners. Stein's former mentor, Richard Neutra, had evidently kept track of his career, recognizing the continuing concern they shared for a broad environmental application of functionalist design and planning principles as a tool for social development. Neutra's own efforts at the time, to develop prototypical designs and buildings systems applicable to the tropics, had taken him to India. Government officials had subsequently consulted him for suggestions on who might fill the post of director for a new school of architecture to be established at the Bengal Engineering College in Calcutta. Neutra proposed Stein, who moved to Calcutta with his wife and two sons in 1952.

The renewed optimism with which Stein took up his teaching post was reflected in his inaugural address to the student body, entitled "Architecture and Democracy." "Science under the pressure of war," he stated, "has already demonstrated the immense potential of organized, determined, and united action in the field of destruction. Upon architecture then, in the service of democracy of the common people, rests the responsibility of pioneering with equal determination in the field of construction—the field of life." Stein was later to recount that arriving in 1952 to the India of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, just five years after the country had gained its independence from Britain, was "like coming to the United States when Thomas Jefferson was alive." In his second career in India, first through teaching and research, and later in full-fledged practice as an architect and planning consultant, Stein saw himself contributing to an unofficial "Marshall Plan" for the East: "Victory over fascism would be followed by victory over poverty and ignorance."

These sentiments have stayed with Stein over the years, though today he tends to express them more as a lament for how he had hoped India's development would take off. The sluggishness and the human and environmental trauma of the country's development process as it has actually progressed have, meanwhile, only hardened his commitment to the principles of a simple, ecologically sound architecture.

If this was a more critical study, White might have attempted to scrutinize Stein's presuppositions about working in India in the light of the postcolonial international aid and development process, its institutional mechanisms and ideology. He does not tell us, for instance, what agency subsidized Stein's teaching position, or why they sought an American for the job, though he does tell us that two Americans later succeeded Stein in that post. A somewhat different book would be valuable—one which might consider such questions and others from a cognitive historical perspective, examining Stein's intentions and achievements, along with those of other expatriate architects who have undertaken major works or substantial portions of their careers on the Indian subcontinent in the postcolonial era. These would include American Christopher Benninger and the much-revered English champion of low-cost architecture, Laurie Baker, as well as the more celebrated engagements of Louis Kahn, Le Corbusier, Buckminster Fuller, and Charles Eames, among others. As it is, White expressly discounts the third-world frame of analysis for reasons consistent with the overriding theme of modernist humanism in his interpretation of his subject. However, he thereby conveniently evades the issues of neocolonial cultural and economic domination through "modern tropical architecture" and of Orientalism, which should surely have been addressed, if only to refute.[1]

With the "idealistic and dedicated" participation of his students at the Bengal Engineering College, as he recalls them, Stein applied and extended the hypothetical designs for tropical housing that he had begun to develop in Switzerland to the development of several experimental low-cost dwelling types intended as models for government housing agencies. Stein was stimulated by the paradoxical parameters of development in India in this period—the Gandhian frugality of means and the Promethean potential of industrial development which Nehru was ambitiously pursuing—and, upon completing his tenure at the Bengal Engineering College in 1955, he began to develop and implement his ideas for housing and community on a comparatively vast scale. This came in the form of design commissions for three different industrial townships for India's burgeoning steel industry, towns ranging from 50,000 to 250,000 residents. The partnership Stein formed for that purpose in New Delhi with fellow American Benjamin Polk and the Indian engineer Benoy Chatterjee attracted commissions for other major industrial complexes and several prestigious institutional buildings in the capital city.

Stein's rapid rise to prominence in the relative void of professional architects in India at the time apparently convinced him to establish a permanent practice of his own. With a steady stream of important cultural, institutional, and industrial commissions, the 1960s were the zenith of his architectural career. Although as principal he played the senior role, Stein's firm was a forum for continuing a collaborative approach to design between technical and architectural associates. A particularly creative relationship with the firm's structural engineer, Vishnu Joshi, led to many innovative and expressive solutions to the problem of spanning and lighting large industrial spaces and auditoriums. Joseph Allen Stein and Associates also became a sought-after training ground for young architects emerging from the Indian schools of architecture.

In the 1970s the principle of collaborative design was extended, and Stein's commitment to a broader strategy of environmental design was renewed through several joint ventures with the similarly inclined firm of Balkrishna V. Doshi. This culminated in 1977 with the merger of the two offices.

During the middle years of the practice, Stein derived and developed a vocabulary of elements with which he has realized a distinctive, if characteristically understated, regionalist architecture for India. Despite the determined modernity of this idiom, it incorporates many devices and principles of traditional building practices in northern India. White suggests that Stein was one of the first architects working in India after its independence to refer back to the technical knowledge "codified" in the traditions of

Indian building. Yet his intentions have been essentially pragmatic rather than romantic, an attitude that differentiated him from purist modernists among Indian architects of the 1950s and 1960s, and again from the many adherents to an ardently expressive "authentic regionalism" in Indian architecture of the 1970s and 1980s.[2] Stein has thus always remained something of an island in India.

While the gaze of architectural criticism has begun in recent years to seek out and define the emerging architectures of the third world, Stein's important contributions to the architecture of India has been hard to place in the discourse—in terms of both style and authorship, one suspects—and therefore has received less attention than it deserves. Indian architects have been preoccupied with evoking the identity of India "in terms of . . . nostalgic value," as Balkrishna Doshi explains, but Stein's intrinsic identity as an outsider in his adopted country has freed him to interpret the very concerted principle of regionalism in his work from quite a different angle. "With Joe, it is as if you planted a tree in a different land and then it grows, but it grows in a very different way. Eventually it becomes of that land, but it is unique." (Laurie Baker's unique idiom of low-cost brick-and-tile construction, which has evolved in the very different region of southwestern India, could be described in much the same metaphorical terms.)

The latter years of Stein's career are still in course, and the corresponding chapters of White's book have an according open-endedness. Independently, and through various architectural and regional planning commissions carried out with his Indian partners, Doshi and Jai Rattan Bhalla, in Kashmir and Bhutan, Stein has become acutely attuned to the environmental peril of the Himalayan mountain regions. He is credited by many for bringing the seriousness of Himalayan deforestation to the world's attention, and in 1973 he was responsible for coorganizing a key UNESCO conference on the condition of mountain environments. However, the enormity of the problem and the general inadequacy of legislation, law enforcement, and political will in India and neighboring nations to enforce sustainable development and conservation policies have been cause for more despair than optimism.

White interprets Stein's environmental activism in the Himalayan region as one front in his larger concept of "total landscape" planning—the means toward the ideal of a sustainable democratic society beyond the city, which Stein envisages in the conceptual landscape he calls "metapolis."

In his final chapter, White attempts—without complete conviction—to tackle this most enigmatic, if not surreal, proposition of a man whose built work and other unbuilt projects have been, by contrast, so reasonable and concrete on the whole. The distillation of his many projects over the years for real and ideal patterns for landscape-integrated settlements, metapolis is evoked in Stein's scattered writings as a rather utopian notion of an environmentally sustained and moderated polity, characterized by a multilevel concept of democracy that will strike many readers as puzzling. White addresses this utopian paradox by tracing the thread of Stein's idealism back to the predominant inspirations of his earlier career. He points out (after Ada Louise Huxtable) that Mumford, in fact, "never learned that society did not necessarily share his view of the good life of simplicity, self-sufficiency and community: an attachment to abstinence, higher ideals and the greater good are not the basic American dream." White suggests that Stein's vision, like Mumford's and Wright's, cannot obviously accomplish a revolution as prescribed. But, "like a seed, such examples may take hold if truly appropriate to their particular time and place, and their gathering together may prove synergetic."

In the final analysis, which he offers in a concise and eloquent epilogue, White concludes that values, more than the individual visions they support, offer valid guidance. In an era of profound skepticism, Stein's career is a model of a value-system in action that our wars and hatred-torn global community might well aspire to if we hope to embark upon the next millennium. Standing outside the unhappy saga of modern architecture in this century, White nominates Stein to a select pantheon of "singular points" in the professional spectrum, past and present, whose stewardship "has gone beyond individual building forms, and sometimes beyond architecture to settlement and planning scale issues, the ultimate impact of which is regional and ecological." Among these he includes Ralph Erskine with Hermann Hertzberger and other members of Team Ten, Richard Neutra, Serge

Low-rise, low-cost housing with plaza and park, Durgapur Steel Township; Joseph Allen Stein and Benjamin Polk, 1955–59. (From *Building in the Garden*.)

Chermayeff, Steen Eiler Rasmussen, Buckminster Fuller, Balkrishna Doshi, Laurie Baker, Patrick Geddes, and Ian McHarg. Stein and these others have, in White's estimation, "striven to build humbly for the place while speaking to the larger humanity.... All have, upon contact with the wider world, been enlarged, and have reached out in their various ways toward a multifaceted consciousness."

White ultimately portrays Stein as a member of an endangered species in an age ravaged by the relentless deconstruction of the synthetic view of human culture; he posits him as a role model that he and other young architects in search of new relevance and purpose might emulate. However, White cautions that proper emulation is only possible when we come to value not the Old World, New World, or Third World toward which Stein gravitated, but the One World for which he and those other "singular points" have striven.

NOTES

1. Architectural criticism on contemporary issues in design in India has hardly begun to develop. A concise general critique of modern tropical architecture is outlined in Shanti Jayawardene, "Reflections on Design in the Context of Development," *Mimar* 27 (March 1988): 70–75. The problem and cultural product of Orientalism in Western thought about India over the past two centuries has been examined in depth (though not in architectural discourse) by Ronald Inden in his recent book, *Imagining India* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). See also Inden, "Orientalist Constructions of India," *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 401–46.

2. William Curtis, "Modernism and the Search for Indian Identity," *Architectural Review* 182, no. 1086 (August 1987): 33–38. See also Vikram Bhatt and Peter Scriver, *After the Masters: Contemporary Indian Architecture* (Ahmedabad and New York: Mapin, 1990).

BUILDING IN THE GARDEN: THE ARCHITECTURE OF JOSEPH ALLEN STEIN IN INDIA AND CALIFORNIA, Stephen White, Oxford University Press, 1993, 383 pp., illus., $55.00.

SARAH KSIAZEK

Architecture, Power, and National Identity

Lawrence J. Vale

It is a common practice in studies of monumental building complexes to evince the deepest values of a civilization. One comprehends Egyptian veneration of the afterlife from studies of the pyramids and what went inside them, just as the *grand palais* of the 17th century projects the aspirations of absolutist rule. Often, these proclamations in stone reveal more than the documents historians consult, as they embody unspoken contradictions and paradoxes in their builders' highest ideals. What better way, then, to study the modern era than through a wide-ranging analysis of its capitol buildings? Since the early 19th century, capitols—more than churches, more than palaces or tombs—have been the locus of monumental building activity. With the rise in the West of the belief that the nation is the main organizational unit of culture, the building of capitols to house a nation's machinations has become common, if not commonplace. The analysis of such buildings, and of the often newly planned cities in which a capitol building stands, is the subject of Lawrence Vale's welcome study, *Architecture, Power, and National Identity*.

It is a very ambitious work. Vale defines his topic broadly: he covers not only capitol complexes built in the third world by Western architects—complexes such as Le Corbusier's in Chandigarh, India and Louis Kahn's in Dhaka, Bangladesh—but many major capitol building enterprises from the 18th century to the present day. He begins with Charles Pierre L'Enfant's plan of Washington, D.C., moves to Australia's development of Canberra (under both Walter Burley Griffin at the turn of this century and Romaldo Giurgola more recently), to Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker's plans for New Delhi, to Austrian architect Clemens Holzmeister's plans for Ankara, Turkey, to Hitler and Albert Speer's plans for Berlin.

Vale makes no claims to comprehensiveness; rather than researching a *history* of capitol complexes in the modern era, he is interested in tracing *themes*, "power and national identity," through a series of selected projects. While the first half of the book covers capitol complexes before 1960, the second half is in a case-study format,

"Spearhead flying toward the future?" reads the caption for this aerial view of Papua New Guinea's Parliament House, Waigani; Cecil Hogan, 1984. (From *Architecture, Power, and National Identity*.)

National Assembly, Dhaka, Bangladesh; Louis I. Kahn, 1983. Writes Vale: "That the building complex is in fact perceived by some as an *alternative* to Dhaka rather than a part of it may be judged from the persistence of references to it in Western architectural shorthand as "the Dhaka building," as if this city of five million had no other." (From *Architecture, Power, and National Identity.*)

covering "four postcolonial capitol complexes in search of national identity." Each of the chapters in this section is an extended analysis of one recent building or building complex. Included are Cecil Hogan's capitol for Papua New Guinea, Geoffrey Bawa's for Sri Lanka, Jørn Utzon's for Kuwait, and Louis Kahn's for Bangladesh.

Vale is fully aware of the complexity of his endeavor, and takes control of this broad topic by giving it a theoretical frame. The spirit of Eric Hobsbawm hovers over the pages of the book, particularly Hobsbawm's edited collection of essays, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and his book, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Vale reminds us that a nation is an artificial construct, born of an ideology suited to industrial capitalism and "an increasingly global economy." A nation may be necessary as a form of social organization best accommodated to these changing social conditions, but it is certainly not the organic community its myth-makers portray. "Most historians and theorists agree, it has been nationalism that has brought about the existence of nations, and not vice versa," the author writes. In this continuing enterprise of nation-forming, the practice of

architecture (capitols) and city planning (capitals) is "above all, a demonstration of power and a search for legitimacy."

Vale is as interested in what has been excluded as he is in what has been symbolized in this study of nation-shaping through architectural means. He categorizes the intersecting forces that shape capitol and capital: the first is the "subnational group allegiances and preferences of the sponsoring regime"; the second, the aesthetic agendas of the architects or planners involved. The last force Vale discusses is that of the sponsoring government's interest in projecting a specific identity to the international community, often in the hopes of international economic investment or aid. This last issue is particularly relevant when a third-world country is building a modern complex, often with an architect imported from the West—as, for example, in the case of Chandigarh or Papua New Guinea.

Hung on this theoretical frame is a project-by-project analysis. It makes for interesting reading; no place else could one easily find synopses of capitol-building projects from Pretoria to Brasilia, from Abuja, Nigeria, to Dhaka, Bangladesh. Governmental systems from incipient democracies to socialist states to colonial au-

tocracies are covered; architectural styles from neoclassicism to modernist expressionism to regionalism are arrayed. For this reason alone Vale's book is extremely useful; it is a veritable catalog of capitol building in the 20th century.

But the breadth of Vale's reach has demerits. He has undertaken virtually no archival research, except on Kahn's complex in Bangladesh, and his research here is spotty at best. The National Assembly Building at Dhaka is a chance for Vale to explore in depth the issue of a first-world architect imposing ideals tailored to his own country's political situation onto that of a third-world religious state. Yet Vale entirely misses the cold war web Kahn weaves in Bangladesh. For example, Vale takes Kahn to task for adding a mosque to the National Assembly, pointing out that it symbolically excludes Bangladesh's large Hindu population, as if Kahn were somehow pandering to the wishes of his Muslim clients. Kahn was obliged to incorporate some kind of prayer hall into the National Assembly, because the rituals of the Muslims using the building demand that they pray five times a day. He could have made do by setting off one room within the National Assembly, and assigning it this purpose. But Kahn's numerous schemes for the "prayer hall," or mosque, at Dhaka suggest that he could not bring himself to incorporate a religious space into the National Assembly without making a strong visual separation between it and the space of government. Kahn was less engaged in any partisanship, Hindu or Muslim, than he was in articulating the good old American ideal of the separation of church and state.

For Vale's coverage of the other complexes he discusses, he relies entirely on published governmental sources, critiques in the local press, and whatever longer studies he can find. He is constantly (and rightly) suspicious of government claims in the often English-language public relations tracts he consults. But he does not apply the same skepticism to criticisms of the complexes he approvingly cites. Every capitol building project is controversial, if only because such endeavors are extremely expensive. Some people—some of whom write very well—

will always believe there are better ways for government money to be spent.

There is a disconcerting homogeneity in the interpretations Vale proposes, no matter the time or place of the project he discusses: the impoverished are always excluded from the nexus of power; minorities rarely given symbolic voice; swank living circumstances house only those at the top. Certainly, this is often the case. Vale alerts us to the complexities of embodying pluralism through urban planning, and representing it in architectural form. But at times he seems to bend over backward to champion the disenfranchised. Mitchell/Giurgola & Thorp, for example, in their new capitol for Canberra, open the entry sequence through the building with a monumental forecourt of red gravel. Inscribed in the pavement is a large aboriginal-inspired mosaic symbolizing the gathering of "large groups of tribes." Yet for Vale, this forecourt only underscores the Australian *exclusion* of the aboriginal tribes from the voices of power, because the forecourt "is located *outside*" the capitol building itself. It seems to this reader that a prominent forecourt dedicated to a minority group gives it symbolic recognition aplenty.

Vale recognizes that permitting full public access in capitol buildings is often a tricky proposition. This is especially the case with fledgling, unstable governments, no matter how democratic their ultimate aspirations. Still, in capitol buildings from Brazil to Sri Lanka, Vale indicts those who exclude their public, as if this were somehow a betrayal of democratic aspirations. In governments where the threat of uprisings is all too often present, is it really so necessary that those in power make themselves physically accessible? Different political situations demand different solutions; to apply the ideals of a Western democracy to every conceivable political circumstance seems unrealistic at best.

In spite of such flaws, in many cases Vale is adept at reading political meaning into urban form. Broad planning decisions often do embody hidden contradictions in the assumptions of those in power. For example, the prominence that Le Corbusier gives to the Governor's Palace in his scheme for the capitol complex at Chandigarh betrays his faith in quasi-authoritarian rule. Architecture is more difficult than urban planning to analyze in these terms, partly because architecture's means of representation are often more oblique. Vale's interpretations of buildings are less subtle than his interpretations of urban plans. He is not aided by his use of philosopher Nelson Goodman's essay, "How Buildings Mean," to develop a typology for analyzing an architectural means of communication. This is simply because many of the categories Goodman proposes (exemplification, for example, and mediated reference) do not easily make the transition from abstraction to application.

Finally, one theme is conspicuously absent in Vale's analyses of his various selected projects, and that is idealism. Yes, poor people are excluded, minorities stifled, politicians sometimes specious in representing their governments' cause. But even if this is often the case, clients are often genuinely trying to build a building or a city that will express their vision of the world as they think it should work—as they hope that perhaps, someday, it might work. In his eagerness to find the "power" in national identity, Vale neglects to consider that people's motivations are often contradictory. What is the point of all these costly, excessive, modern building campaigns? Very often, it is the embodiment of the vision of a world improved.

AVANI PARIKH

Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad 1900–1965

Ron Robin

Throughout history, civilizations have dominated other civilizations. Whatever the origin of the urge to dominate, it has existed since the start of civilization, though its means and methods have changed considerably through time. Ron Robin's *Enclaves of America* tells the story of the means and methods chosen by America to assert its growing strength and power over the rest of the world in the first half of the 20th century.

Since the industrial revolution, domination has been exercised more or less by the Western world. Conventional colonization involved infiltration and the use of force at various levels of economic, political, and social life. Typically, this entailed the continuous presence of troops on colonized soils, and the direct rule of the country's affairs by a colonial bureaucracy. American imperial practices, on the other hand, were strategically different from these, and reflected fundamentally different goals.

Robin's work is a painstaking account of America's quest for a dominance on foreign soil. The book outlines the ways in which architecture has been used for political purposes, and reveals that Americans apparently believed that they could rule by example and through symbols of power instead of relying on despotic colonial bureaucracies and permanent military garrisons. America was a young country unburdened by a reliance on past strategies. Therefore, throughout the first sixty-five years of this century, the U.S. planted changing architectural statements of its power in its growing areas of influence—in short, it created "enclaves of America." While on the surface these exercises in political architecture resembled those of their French and British predecessors, some crucial differences in both style and content suggest a different agenda behind the American projects.

Robin examines three topics: first, he substantiates that American architecture abroad was symbolic; second, he establishes that its intent was markedly different from that of earlier colonial architecture because the symbolism always responded to both the nation and the international community; and third, he explains what these variable architectural symbols actually stood for.

To carry out his project he uses a method that he calls archaeological, which he attributes to Jules Prown. Essentially, Prown has interpreted artistic style as a valid form of historical evidence of the assumptions, attitudes, and values that are so deeply embedded in the minds of human beings that they remain unstated. As such, they are most clearly discerned, not in what a society *says,* but rather in the *way* something is done, produced, or expressed. Robin adds to this the predictable conservatism of societies and individuals which adopt different architectural strategies only when faced with strong cultural, social, or political pressure. These two methodological assumptions implicitly frame Robin's discussion.

At the outset, it would seem that Robin's first goal—to show the symbolic nature of American architecture abroad—is a *fait accompli.* He considers two sets of monuments: war monuments and diplomatic structures such as embassies. Interestingly, these two groups of structures do not share any common functions, which is where Robin's archaeological approach comes in, enabling him to dismiss the functions of these two diverse sets of monuments. What remains—their style and the content educed from that style—is where the monuments and diplomatic structures come together.

The first phase of American architecture abroad begins with World War I war memorials from and progresses to the Depression era. Prior to this phase, American-backed building abroad was sponsored by humanitarian foundations, missionary movements, commercial organizations, and the occasional wealthy individual. Such diverse sources led to the uncoordinated effects that comprised America's image abroad. The two world wars and their consequences for the United States—the primary beneficiary of the new world order—catalyzed the country's eventual exercise in propaganda through architecture.

The war memorials include cemeteries with victory columns, chapels, or other such commemorative monuments. The cemeteries are fields of graves arranged in a formal grid; their formality represents the common causes of war and nationhood more than any sort of individualism or leadership. Their design conveys, above all, an image of abstract commonality. The architecture of the victory columns, chapels, and memorials might, on the one hand, be called pseudo-classical, purposely *not* different from European architecture and monuments. On the other hand, the United States wanted to dramatize its wartime suffering by constructing large monumental complexes that dominated the landscape and served as an everlasting testimony to the country's "bloody sacrifice" in the Allied victory. The unspoken logic was that America's unselfish sacrifices called for some form of retribution. By choosing classical forms, it simultaneously displayed proximity to British and French architecture, and, via their imposing scale, a magnification of its own sacrifice .

Having said this, however, Robin adds that the symbolism isn't quite so direct and straightforward. There were occasional exceptions to this idea of abstract commonality, such as the valorization of individualism and leadership. For example, in the amount of space allocated to each grave, each soldier appears to have a "privacy" of sorts. Robin calls this indeterminacy, for example, of commonality and privacy, "irresolute symbolism."

As with cemeteries, the other main category of architecture abroad—diplomatic structures, primarily embassies—displays a symbolism which is Eurocentric in its motivation. Thus we see variations of earlier colonial models that include palatial, classical, and other historical forms, like the British country manor. For example, the Southern plantation manor, reminiscent of Edwin Lutyens' work for Britain, was a widely used embassy prototype in Latin America and Asia. It was intended as a symbol, by the United States, of "a white master class guiding the deeds of natives." This political symbolism was quite different from the benign British connotations of a landed gentry ruling the land. Instead, the forms represented, for most Americans, a connection with their own past, including memories of the Civil War that had almost ripped the nation apart a century before. The colonial architecture of the embassies symbolized, as before, nationhood and a certain obliteration of individualism, as well as a historical connection with the Western world order. At the same time, it added to the nation's power (expressed through its extravagance) and its evolving definition of itself.

In the postwar years, America entered its second phase of building monuments abroad and the architecture follows an interesting array of styles. It now relies increasingly upon its technological prowess to make its symbolic statements. While the styles range from modernist expressionist and sculptural (as exemplified in the work of Eero Saarinen and Le Corbusier) to eclectic historicism (with forms taken from the host country, as seen in Edward Stone's "modern Taj Mahal" embassy building in New Delhi), the buildings all have in common the use of modern American materials and techniques. Precast vaulted roofs, aluminum sunscreens, and

Memorial chapel at Ardennes Military Cemetery, Ardennes, Belgium; Reinhard, Hofmeister, and Walquist. (From *Enclaves of America.*)

prestressed concrete beams are the building blocks of the new symbolism. The basic formula is to show how "modern technology" can benefit "native tradition."

As the nation's confidence grew, it moved from an exogenous dependence on Europe to an inward reliance, which allowed it to define its own forms. During these years, America's image abroad was derived from its progress at home because it wanted to rule by example.Often, these structures, which were explicitly meant to be "oases of American soil on foreign lands," were the only representations of American culture that the developing world would see.

The American strategy was to divide the world into two distinct symbolic areas, each of which had a different set of styles. For the "civilized" world, American architecture abroad would follow styles that symbolized allegiance and friendship, while also conveying an image of a powerful, enlightened nation marked by a united and common philosophy. For the "developing" world, it chose images that would communicate the many strengths of Western traditions, and more subtly, the superiority of American institutions.

Though the reaction of people in host countries to American monuments was essential to the exercise of how to build them, they also reflected the internal cultural turmoil in the United States. Accordingly, American monuments end up reflecting issues not necessarily tied to the motive of furthering the country's international status.

Robin concludes that there is a connection between the cultural fabric of a nation, its foreign policy, and its diplomatic statements and artifacts. He also demonstrates that American efforts to create a common, united, national image abroad failed, noting the contradiction inherent in democratic societies permitting imperial practices and monumental symbols of power. No consistent ideological position is possible, and, accordingly, neither is consistent symbolic representation. Lastly, the architectural evolution of various structures cannot be seen in terms of architectural history alone.

While interesting, Robin's book is unsatisfying in several ways. The archaeological

framework the author himself cites at the outset isn't adequately used. The book contains a maze of interconnected facts—perhaps its greatest problem. The resulting empiricism has some virtues, but in the end it fails to discriminate between what is relevant and what is not. Given that he borrows from many disciplines (international relations, foreign policy, history, art, and architecture), he could have used any of the many theoretical frameworks from these disciplines.

There are two dimensions to Robin's argument: the impact of internal factors and external factors on American architecture abroad. Robin deals mostly with internal factors, which have to do with issues within America. He explains that American architecture abroad was influenced by a range of concerns: the voice of an overbearing architect and the demands of a federal client; political pressures from diverse groups; varying concepts of nationhood; contradictory views on the role of America abroad; 19th-century cultural mores that discouraged national interests within the global context; a strong, inward-directed agrarian tradition that made it difficult for the country to articulate its position as a member of the world community; and so on. Robin does not tell us much about external factors, which have to do with host countries' reactions. Despite the variable and self-contradictory nature of the symbols produced by the American democracy, the dynamics of the host countries, many of which were newly independent, surely played some role in stultifying America's efforts at self-aggrandizement.

In all, Robin's is an ambitious book that covers many disciplines and will likely fill in some gaps in the area of colonial architecture. Although its illustrations could have been better chosen, it does have its rewards and is worth plodding through. In short, "the rhetoric of American architecture abroad" ended up convincing its own people of America's greatness rather than the people it was supposed to convince.

NASSER RABBAT

The Other Sides of Paradise

Juan Eduardo Campo

Juan Eduardo Campo, a historian of religions at the University of California in Santa Barbara, has written an ambitious book, *The Other Sides of Paradise: Explorations into the Religious Meanings of Domestic Space in Islam.* Campo examines houses in Islam, focusing not on the architecture or urban functions of dwellings but on the conceptions of sacredness in domestic space. As such, the book is not directly concerned with design. Almost inadvertently, however, it opens up new ways to think about houses in society that an architectural study alone would not be able to offer. The book accomplishes this through three main programs of inquiry that more or less constitute independent themes. The first collects the verses of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad in which houses and their metaphors are mentioned, and analyzes the original Islamic terminology and dictums about the formulation of sacred space. The second reviews a number of early and medieval examples of houses, cities, and ecumenical notions of space, from both formal and symbolic perspectives. The third, using the case of modern Egypt and the methods of cultural anthropology and semiotics, probes several discourses on the religious domestication of space.

The first part of the book is very systematic in its approach, and very detailed in its exploration of the numerous pronouncements on real and metaphysical spaces in the Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions, or Hadith, the formative texts of Islam. The second part reviews the house of the Prophet in Medina, the early Arab/Islamic town of Kufa and the imperial capital of Baghdad, the concepts of *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (abode of war), sectarian and mystical views on domestic space, and the mansions of premodern Cairo. It is the most architectural section in the book, and as such, it unfortu-

nately does not add much to what we already know about any of its subjects. In fact, the author sometimes overlooks or misinterprets the architectural evidence in favor of a more transcendental interpretation; for example, he gives the orientation of reception halls in Cairene houses a religious and magical interpretation when they most probably followed an environmental requirement, a point emphasized even in Campo's own cited sources. Moreover, Campo's lumping together of applied and theoretical discourses on houses is problematic and confusing on both conceptual and organizational levels. For instance, the connections implied between real planning issues, such as those tackled when the first Islamic cities were built, and metaphorical images of these cities that relate them to paradise seem forced at best. Additionally, the selection of the examples discussed and the exclusion of other similar cases, such as the cities of Wasit and Fustat, cannot be explained from within a historical or structural framework. These choices may have been a consequence of the dearth of sources for the early periods, but the same applies to the assessment of Mamluk and Ottoman houses in Cairo, which are thoroughly documented from the beginning of the 19th century on. Campo's treatment of the subject is no more

Early Baghdad was known as "Round Medina"; founded by the Caliph Mansur in 145–762. B.C. (From *The Other Sides of Paradise*.)

than an overview of Cairene residential architecture that borrows its findings from 20th-century architectural historians and adds to them selected remarks from 19th-century ethnographers.

The third part of the book is its most original and suggestive section. It is based on Campo's own fieldwork in Egypt and encompasses examinations of texts, songs, idioms, attitudes, and modes of behavior related to contemporary Cairene dwellings, in addition to a thorough study of representations of pilgrimage (*hajj*) on the walls of Egyptian rural houses. Campo's passion for

and familiarity with his material is evident throughout this section. He begins with a study of the terms for homes among the popular strata of Cairene society (*baladi*), which he considers the carriers of the culture's traditional conceptions and values. An entire chapter follows in which Campo interprets social attitudes in situations of initiation of domestic spaces through marriage and the founding of a family, their destruction through divorce, and their ordering and reordering through death, political confrontation, and social mobility. In the last chapter of the book, he shifts the analysis from texts and behavior to iconic and epigraphic representations of pilgrimage in the form of vernacular murals that are still being painted on the walls of houses of those who successfully made the pilgrimage to Mecca. This chapter is a compact semantic, historical, and hermeneutical analysis of this peculiar Egyptian phenomenon that stands on its own as a paradigm of the complex relationships between religion, history, and society. For designers and artists, it is probably the most interesting contribution of the book, and it is supplemented by two appendices that provide a wealth of material for further inquiries, which the author promises to pursue in the future.

The title of the book may be a little misleading, implying as it does a study of the religious meanings of space in Islam as a cultural and historical force, when in fact the book centers on Egyptian case studies with some forays into general theoretical formulations. The choice of the title may well have been an editorial or marketing decision, since the author seems wary of the tendency to generalize about "Islamic" architecture—in fact, he criticizes a book whose title promises it to be about Islam's architecture but instead only deals with one Islamic city. Campo's own occasional, casual use of the word Islam and his postulation that the Qur'an and Hadith have guided the conduct of Muslims for centuries, without noting the transformations affected by generations of scholars and interpreters, seem to reflect an essentialist stance on the part of the author. This is all the more perplexing because, one page earlier, he conveys an awareness of the

Those who have successfully made the pilgrimage to Mecca continue to paint murals on the walls of their houses. This *hajj* mural on a house in al-Ballas, Upper Egypt, depicts soldiers, modes of transportation, the Prophet's tomb-mosque, and the lions-with-swords-versus-serpent figure. (From *The Other Sides of Paradise*.)

multidimensional definitions of Islam, not only historically and geographically, but also politically and socially.

Ultimately, the book's strength lies in three spheres. The first is in pointing out the complex roles played by domestic spaces in shaping social behavior, spiritual aspirations, and universal conceptions of communities and nations. The book does this less successfully with the direct architectural analysis than with semantic and semiotic evaluation and ethnographic observations. The second is the emphasis on etymological dissection of terms for houses—the practices related to their occupation and their alterations following social changes—which expose new or obscure links between architectural objects and perceptions of their social or historical meanings through their linguistic affinities. The author sometimes pursues this exercise too zealously, proposing connections where none could exist phonetically or semantically. This is the case, for example, with his comparison between the word *salq*, "chard," and the word *salak*, "to pass through," and his explanation of the word *qarafa* as conveying the notion of loathing, when the word, used to designate the cemeteries around Cairo, most probably derived from the name of the Arabic tribe whose allotments were located there.[1]

The third contribution of the book is conceptual. Throughout the text, especially in the epilogue, Campo offers novel perspectives for looking at old materials and raises numerous issues that open new vistas for specialized and interdisciplinary studies of history, society, culture, and the ways in which meaning is usually imparted to spaces and architecture.

NOTES

1. Wladyslaw Kubiak, *Al-Fustat, Its Foundation and Early Urban Development* (Cairo: American University Press, 1987), pp. 108–9.

THE OTHER SIDES OF PARADISE: EXPLORATIONS INTO THE RELIGIOUS MEANINGS OF DOMESTIC SPACE IN ISLAM, Juan Eduardo Campo, University of South Carolina Press, 1991, 246 pp., illus., $49.95.

MICHAEL J. WATTS
Liberation Ecology?

One of the striking paradoxes of the late 20th century is the coexistence of two diametrically opposed discourses, both rooted in the debate over history, progress, and the new world Order. On one side stands Francis Fukuyama, whose influential book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992) speaks the language of capitalist triumphalism and ideological closure. Socialism's departure from the world stage, captured in the popular dismantling of the Berlin Wall, marks the final, irrevocable victory of liberal democracy, what Fukuyama dramatically entitles "the end point of man's ideological evolution." One version of this triumphalist narrative is what Robin Broad and John Cavanagh refer to in their book, *Plundering Paradise*, as the "Washington consensus on development," in other words, the hegemony of free-market thinking and the smug belief that "the world knows much better now what policies work and what policies do not." The world court has met and the verdict is in. As a World Bank official cited in *Plundering Paradise* put it, "Now we almost never hear calls for alternative strategies based on hare-brained schemes."

On the other side stands the apocalypse. The rejection of the Olympian virtues of the market is, in this case, not simply to herald a "new world disorder" encapsulated by the resurgence of ferocious nationalisms, racisms, and ethnic genocide (witness Sarajevo), but rather to acknowledge the exhaustion and bankruptcy of the very model of development that the Washington consensus seeks to promote. One face of the apocalypse is the appalling reality of a bimodal world blandly detailed for us every year in the World Bank Development Report. According to the United Nations Development Program—an organization hardly in the business of revolutionary activism—the polarization of wealth doubled between 1960 and 1989. In the *fin-de-siècle* world economy, 82.7 percent of global income is accounted for by the wealthiest 20 percent,

while the poorest fifth received a paltry 1.4 percent. In 1960 the top fifth of the world's population made thirty times more than the bottom fifth; by 1989 the disparity had grown to sixty times. This obscenely growing polarity not only describes the terrifying state of North-South relations but, as Broad and Cavanagh convincingly show for the Philippines, it also captures the serious deterioration in conditions *within* many third-world societies during the high tide of structural adjustment, privatization, and laissez-faire economics in the 1980s. Against this backdrop, development appears as a cruel hoax, what Wolfgang Sachs calls "a blunder of planetary proportions." Notes Mexican activist Gustavo Esteva, "You must be either very dumb or very rich if you fail to notice that 'development' stinks." In this sense, Fukuyama's end of history and Washington's victorious consensus are tarnished by unprecedented social inequalities, and by the small problem of environmental "externalities"—what French Green economist Alain Lipietz sees as the contemporary equivalent of the Great Plague.[1] What is at stake, then, is the very survival of modernity on a planetary scale, and of the West as the transcendental point of analytical reflection.

In keeping with this apocalyptic view, one of the aims of *Plundering Paradise* is precisely to document the organic connections between the systematic plundering and degradation of "one of the world's most bountiful paradises" and the grinding poverty and inequality of the contemporary Philippines. The book begins and ends with a meditation on the condition of Filipino children, detailing the ravages of undernutrition, prostitution, and urban exploitation, as a way of both linking environment and poverty and of reflecting upon the prospects for an ecologically sustainable future. Broad and Cavanagh undertook most of their research in the Philippines between 1988 and 1991 during the presidential term of Corazon Aquino. Traveling extensively throughout the archipelago (the authors are forever jumping in and out of "jeepneys" and bemoaning the state of Filipino roads), talking to politicians, activists, peasants, fishers, and miners, they provide a compelling account of how the populist eu-

phoria of the "snap revolution" that toppled Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 was quickly curtailed. Under Aquino's leadership, the pious claims for equality and justice were substituted by untrammeled resource extraction, militarization, state terrorism, and a deepening economic crisis. *Plundering Paradise* provides a massive indictment of the political economy of export-oriented resource extraction in the Philippines—and in this regard complements substantial literature on third-world environmental problems—and of the political cronyism and bankruptcy of a regime that rode into office on the backs of "people's power."

In a jaunty, journalistic style, Broad and Cavanagh take the reader on a swift tour through the Philippine archipelago, from Manila to Bataan, Benguet to Mindanao, and Midoro to Palawan, documenting as they go the plunder of paradise by the rapacious forces of modernization. They focus almost wholly on extraction—logging, mining, and fishing in particular, primarily at the hands of local and foreign capital—and its ecological consequences. The authors avoid the knotty question of how paradisiacal—and ecologically sustainable—precolonial Philippines actually was, and instead draw together stories of corruption, big business, and U.S. imperialism with local accounts of environmental catastrophes. Without disputing their argument, it needs to be said that much of the evidence on degradation provided in *Plundering Paradise* is not exactly scientific (there are no charts, diagrams, or tables presenting credible environmental data), and terms such as "ecological fragility" are employed in a way that does not suggest a profound understanding of ecosystem dynamics in the tropics. Whether discussing prawn production in Bataan, pocket mining in the Cordillera, logging in Palawan, or the impact of export-processing zones on Subic Bay, the picture is not terribly pretty. As the authors see it, the Philippines lethally combines "environmental devastation" with "the only declining average standard of living" in Southeast Asia.

Millions of people in Manila live in makeshift homes that lack running water and sewers. In this squatter settlement on the edge of one of Manila's rivers, raw waste runs into a biologically dead river and eventually ends up in Manila Bay. (From *Plundering Paradise*.)

Plundering Paradise is not solely, or indeed primarily, a litany of ecological war stories. Rather, Broad and Cavanagh seek to emphasize how it is precisely poor and marginal communities that are mobilizing to restore and sustain the ecosystems of which they are part. Unlike those commentators who emphasize the causal connections between poverty and environmental degradation—how, for example, poor peasants are compelled to exploit their environment in order to survive (something about which the authors actually have very little to say)—Broad and Cavanagh's case is based on the twofold intersection of poverty and environmental rationality. First, the conjunction of an economic and ecological crisis has given rise to a "new citizens' movement for sustainable development." And second, these "environmental movements" are best understood not as narrowly environmental but rather as emblems of a new politics of livelihood and popular justice. As they see it, the purported shift from plunder to sustainability is driven by the five to six million Filipinos enrolled in a variety of nongovernment organizations, what Broad and Cavanagh call "mass-based organizations." Through a panoply of institutions growing within civil society in the post-Marcos period, "the building blocks of equitable and sustainable development . . . are being forged." Paradoxically, from the wreckage of ecological destruction emerges

an *alternative to development* rooted in human rights, participation, equity, and community-based control of local resources; in short, a model of environmental politics from which, according to Broad and Cavanagh, the United States can learn a great deal.[2] At this point *Plundering Paradise* meets up with a body of writing on so-called new social movements and the rise of grass-roots organizations in the third world, a phenomenon that, for some, contains a new way of doing politics, new forms of fragmented subjectivities, and popular mass action that redefines political and economic democracy (see, for example, the development journal *Alternatives*).

In a book that is almost two hundred pages long, it is surprising to find that so little space is devoted to a serious—one might say ethnographic—analysis of the Filipino mass-based "environmental" movement. As a result, it is almost impossible to gauge from *Plundering Paradise* whether and how a unified strategy can be constructed among the smorgasbord of movements. What sorts of coalitions are being constructed? What sorts of relations exist between populist and class-based politics? What sorts of extractive resource strategies are emerging from Filipino "liberation ecology"? Broad and Cavanagh are relatively silent on these questions, which, coupled with the dearth of information on specific movements—their histories, their contradictions, their trajectories—leaves this skeptical old-school socialist totally unconvinced of whether the citizens' movements represent, to employ their own language, "a concrete alternative to contemporary development models."

Plundering Paradise comes close to an uncritical celebration of civil society and the power of community—something which incidentally saturates the 1992 World Bank Development Report on the environment and development. Like other populisms, *Plundering Paradise* runs aground on the question of how nongovernment organizations can offer an alternative to capitalism in the late 20th century. How, as Karl Marx

once put it, can one have all the benefits of the market without the costs of competition?

In the foreword to the book, Barbara Ehrenreich writes that *Plundering Paradise* is one of the first and most engaging books on environment and resistance in the third world. Actually, it isn't. Alex Cockburn and Susanna Hecht's *The Fate of the Forest* (London: Verso, 1989), Ram Guha's *Unquiet Woods* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), and Nancy Peluso's *Rich Forests, Poor People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), to cite but a trio of case studies, are more engaging, more compelling, and one might add more sophisticated in their theorization of what they all call "political ecology." Like these authors, however, Broad and Cavanagh have signaled the importance of a second wave of environmental activism rooted in the hideous consequences of export-led development in the third world in the last two decades. At a time when there is so much disillusionment with old-class politics, and indeed with public action of any sort, it remains unclear whether the popular energies documented in *Plundering Paradise* can provide an alternative—in short, whether the citizens' movements represent a liberation ecology. One of the grave failings of *Plundering Paradise* is that the reader is not given sufficient depth, detail, and analysis to appraise this most pressing of questions.

NOTES

1. See Alain Lipietz's book, *Mirager and Miracles* (London: Verso, 1988).
2. The implication that U.S. environmentalism has somehow not made the link with communities, equity, and justice represents, in my opinion, a complete misreading of ecological politics in North America. See *Socialist Review* vol. 92, no. 4 (1992).

PLUNDERING PARADISE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, Robin Broad with John Cavanagh, foreword by Barbara Ehrenreich, University of California Press, 1993, 197 pp., illus., $25.00.

DON CHOI

Japanism and the Work of Ralph Adams Cram, Greene & Greene, and Frank Lloyd Wright

"Truth against the world," declared Frank Lloyd Wright, but when the Orient is involved, "truth" is never quite so true. Knowledge about Oriental architecture, like knowledge of the Orient in general, is often presented through stereotypes, and architectural images can easily fall into such a one-dimensional realm. For instance, what kinds of characteristics will be inferred about the Japanese when "facts" such as those found in Ripley's "Believe It or Not"—reporting that "log cabins are so popular in Japan that even Buddhist temples are built from logs!"—are to be believed? (It should be noted that the drawing looks more like a Shinto shrine than a Buddhist temple.)

Wright and his contemporaries matured during an unparalleled period of American Japanophilia, when images of Japan invaded Victorian homes as well as avant-garde movements. Ralph Adams Cram, four years Wright's senior, was America's foremost gothic architect and author of the 1905 book, *Impressions of Japanese Architecture and the Allied Arts* (reprinted in 1981 by the Charles Tuttle Co.), the first general American book on Japanese architecture. Charles and Henry Greene, born in 1869 and 1871 respectively, derived inspiration from Japanese joinery techniques and created perhaps the most memorable architecture of the American Arts and Crafts movement. Wright himself made his first trip abroad, not to Europe but to Japan, where he spent almost six years, working on the Imperial Hotel and other projects; he also amassed one of the finest Japanese woodblock print collections in the world. For this

generation of architects perhaps more than any other, Japanese architecture seemed to be relevant to American needs.

American perceptions of Japanese architecture prompt two questions about Orientalism. To what extent was there an American "Japanism" parallel to the primarily European Orientalism? How does architecture, in contrast to literature, operate as Orientalist representation?

Four broad aspects of Orientalist thought can be distinguished. First, the root of Orientalist thought is what Edward Said, author of *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978), calls the "ontological and epistemological" division into East and West, and, in this dichotomy, the Orient is assumed to be opposite and inferior to the Occident. Second, Orientalism is a *textual* project: Orientalists tend to confuse texts about the Orient with the Orient itself. When the Orient is treated as a text, it is rendered passive, static, and homogeneous. Third, the Orient is defined in Western terms for Western use. As Said puts it, "Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its

Ripley's Believe It or Not (syndicated comic) from the *Houston Post*, May 21, 1991.

mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as a first cause of what he says." Finally, Orientalism is a creation of Western political and cultural hegemony. Even nominally apolitical information about the arts is partially determined by political events, and no individual is free of this political context.

Although the published writings of Charles and Henry Greene make few references to the Orient, the copious writings of Cram and Wright leave little doubt that Orientalism was alive and thriving in American images of Japan. The dominant image of Japan in the United States during the late 1900s was that of a fairyland, a view widely propagated by Lafcadio Hearn and echoed by Wright and Cram. As Hearn writes in his 1904 book, *Japan: An Interpretation*, "Really, you are happy because you have entered bodily into Fairyland—into a world that is not, and never could be, your own. . . . That is the secret of the strangeness and beauty of things, the secret of the thrill they give, the secret of the elfish charm of the people and their ways."

This type of image clearly affirms the division between Japan and the United States and the relative inferiority of the former. At the time, a general belief in the hierarchy of races often prevented non-European peoples from being taken seriously.

Fairyland presents one dominant image to represent the entire country, suggesting an undifferentiated, timeless, and ancient Japan in the Orientalist manner. Many observers found this textual vision more appealing than contemporary reality. Wright, for instance, preferred the old Japan of his beloved woodblock prints to the one he saw in person.

Needless to say, fairyland was an image invented purely for and by the West. Japan was defined entirely by its contrast to the West, a romantic reaction against Western industrialization. Cram writes in *Impressions of Japanese Architecture*, "Then Commodore Perry opened the ports, and like a house of cards the marvelous dream-fabric crumbled into ruin." The irony of course is that the "dream-fabric" of Japan could hardly have existed without the presence of the West.

The ability of the United States to invent mythical images of Japan was a direct result of its political, technological, and economic strength. Japan sent scholars to the West to learn; the West sent scholars to Japan to teach. For the most part, Japan lacked the political strength or cultural prestige to create its own reputation abroad. Images of Japan also depended on contemporary political events. For Wright, Japanese military expansion in the 1930s prompted his conversion from fairyland idealization to Yellow Peril paranoia. As he wrote late in his career, "The fanaticism and cruelty of Orientals is something we can stay away from but that we can't change by fear of us or of our power any more than we can level their eyelids to a perpendicular with their noses."[1]

Because the Greene brothers published so little, it is difficult to gauge their understanding of Japanese architecture. Neither Charles nor Henry ever visited Japan, and their knowledge of it was derived from books, photographs, and visits to the Japanese exhibits at the Chicago and San Francisco expositions in the late nineteenth century. While Wright's intimate and prolonged relationship with Japan begs the question of Japanese influence, with Greene and Greene, the issue seems both less relevant and less resolvable.

The Greenes' most explicitly Japanesque design is the Tichenor House of 1904, built in Long Beach, California, which has tile roofs, Japanesque railings, and an arched garden bridge. Critics have generally claimed that the Greenes used materials in a Japanese fashion, especially in the interior woodwork and expressed wooden structure.

However, overall, Greene and Greene's work, both inside and out, is far from Japanese. The somber, heavily carved wooden interiors owe a great deal to Arts and Crafts ideas, and do not resemble Japanese interiors of any kind. On the exterior, the basic elements of wall, window, roof, and chimney are modified in the Greene fashion, but remain distinctively Western and residential. Nonetheless, contemporary critics insisted on the overwhelmingly Japanese qualities of their houses, claiming, for instance, that "the Tichenor House at Long Beach, California, and the [Irwin] residence in Pasadena . . . seem like the utmost limits to which Japanese architecture could be stretched, and still meet American requirements."[2]

Rather than reflecting the Greenes' perceptions of Japan, the Tichenor and other houses provided a forum for the attitudes of architectural writers. From their reactions, several points can be inferred. First, architectural critics of the time had little knowledge about Japanese architecture. References are usually made only to Japanese architecture in general, and specific examples are all but nonexistent. For instance, the Japanese use of materials was often mentioned, but rarely substantiated with direct comparisons.

Second, because of this lack of knowledge, many elements could be construed as Japanese, or at least Oriental. The eclecticism and originality of the Greenes' work led critics to exaggerate the influences of exotic traditions. Third, knowledge about Japanese architecture was couched in stereotypes. At some point, the salient characteristics of Japanese architecture became implicitly understood. Like Orientalist beliefs about the Orient, ideas about Japanese architecture seemed to gain a factual status that provided

Reverend Arthur Knapp House, Fall River, Massachusetts, as it appeared in the article "An Architectural Experiment," in *Architectural Record*, July 1898; Ralph Adams Cram.

Plan and elevation of the Hōō-den (Phoenix Villa) of the 1893 Chicago Columbian Exposition. (From *The Japanese Influence in America*.)

them with longevity and freedom from re-evaluation. In a 1906 issue of *The Craftsman* magazine, a reviewer of Cram's *Impressions of Japanese Architecture* noted that what was most important about the book was that it revealed the universality of the Arts and Crafts principles of "a return to honesty and simplicity in construction, rejection of all false ornamentation, and the meeting of all actual requirements in the simplest and most direct way."[3] However complimentary these attributes are, they remain stereotypical and limit knowledge about Japan.

Fourth, Japanese elements were thought to be exotic and generally incompatible with American life. As *The Craftsman* warned in a 1907 article, "Charming and interesting as is the Japanese tradition in architecture, it is so for Japan and not for us, and it would be foolish indeed to attempt to naturalize in this country many of their local idiosyncrasies."[4] Ultimately, knowledge about Japanese architecture, like knowledge of the Orient in general, seemed to be superficial and bound up in stereotypes.

Two houses from the early 1890s, Cram's Knapp House in Fall River, Massachusetts, and Wright's Winslow House in River Forest, Illinois, provide examples of how architecture can assume Orientalist attitudes. The commission for Reverend Arthur Knapp precipitated Cram's involvement with Japanese architecture: in 1898, at Knapp's urging, Cram prepared a proposal for the new Japanese Houses of Parliament and sailed for Japan. His four-month stay provided the material for his 1905 book on Japanese architecture.

While the plan and massing of the Knapp House were unexceptionally American, its details were "studied faithfully" from Japanese models, and a replica of a Japanese teahouse was even appended to a rear corner of the main house. There is no real attempt at a synthesis: in spite of their presence in the same building, the Japanese and Western elements remain separate, a cogent architectural statement of the division between East and West.

Cram's textual approach to Japanese architecture becomes apparent in his treatment of the teahouse. He calls it only a "Japanese teahouse," without time, place, or any specificity at all. Similarly, the Japanese details are simple Japanese details, not Kamakura period Zen temple bracketing details or Momoyama castle details. Cram makes no mention of the sources of his details but, like Orientalist knowledge in general, his knowledge must have been based on texts.

"The 'tea house' was built more or less as an amusement; no one ever expected it could be used except in summer, and then only as a tea house, or garden shelter," wrote Cram in "An Architectural Experiment," an essay that appeared in *Architectural Record* in 1898. In other words, it was conceived through a preexisting Western equivalent—a garden shelter—one which reinforced the fairyland image of Japan.

The small scale and light construction of Cram's teahouse were not the only reasons behind prevailing condenscension toward Japanese architecture. Would it have been possible to imagine the teahouse as a trivial garden folly if it had been derived from the architecture of an international power? The perceived subordinance of Japan was frequently extended to its other cultural aspects, preventing Western observers from taking Japanese art or architecture seriously.

In his writings, Wright, like Cram, asserted the gulf between East and West, claiming, "For once, it can't copy very well. The ethnic eccentricity is too great. The

West can copy nearly everything easier than it can copy the Japanese house or Japanese things for domestic uses. "[5] Combined with his egotism, Wright's goal of an original, organic Usonian (American) architecture made the admission of exterior influences impossible. It is often difficult to take Wright at his word, though, and Japan proved to be an especially problematic topic for the egocentric, Usonian architect.

A pivotal year in Wright's career was 1893: the year of the Chicago Columbian Exposition, the opening of his own office, and his first truly exceptional work, the Winslow House. Wright's previous work had been fairly conservative and, in his own defense, he commented in his autobiography, "At that time there was nothing in sight that might be helpful. I had no Sullivanian models, even, for any of these things." The nature and timing of the innovations of the Winslow House suggest that Wright finally found a model in the Japanese Hōō-den, or Phoenix Villa, of the 1893 Columbian Exposition. In the stables behind the main house, the influence of the Hōō-den becomes apparent. At the center of both buildings is a high roof with lower wings to each side. A lower roof connects forward-projecting end pavilions to the central element, although in the stables the pavilions are placed closer to the center. The pavilion elevations share a horizontally divided composition: a low base, a broad, lower wall-band, a narrow upper band, and a wide, shallow roof. The dominant horizontality of the wall and roof would later become a hallmark of Wright's Prairie houses.

The reliance on texts in place of the actual Orient is characteristic of Orientalism, but in the case of the Hōō-den, this tendency is slightly twisted. When he designed the Winslow House, Wright's knowledge of Japanese architecture was indeed derived from a text, but this text, the Hōō-den, was a genuine product of Japan. Because it was designed and built by the Japanese, the Hoo-den is generally assumed to be a com-

Perspective the Winslow House stables, River Forest, Illjnois; Frank Lloyd Wright, 1893. (From *Studies and Executed Buildings by Frank Lloyd Wright*.)

pletely authentic Japanese building. It should be remembered, though, that the Hōō-den was built in Chicago to represent Japan to the United States, and in this sense, it was a text about Japan, a kind of 19th-century advertisement.

Wright often uses Japanese examples in his writing to support general arguments, but in his architecture he avoids explicitly formal references.[6] In the Winslow House the Japanese influences are digested to the point that the stables can no longer be considered a simple, visual representation of the Orient. Unlike the Knapp teahouse, the Winslow stables no longer claim to be Japanese. Rather than making the Orient speak to and for the West, as the typical Orientalist does, Wright makes the Orient speak first to and for himself, and then indirectly and invisibly to the rest of the West.

"On the Midway at the World's Columbian Exposition, evolution, ethnology, and popular amusements interlocked as active agents and bulwarks of hegemonic assertion of ruling class authority," writes Robert Rydell, author of *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). The Japanese were well aware of the propaganda value of the exhibits, and the Hōō-den was a conscious effort to portray Japan as an artistic, capable nation. It was thus an attempt at a kind of reversed Orientalism,

with the Orient producing its own texts for political purposes.

The writings of Wright, Cram, and critics of the Greenes suggest that American perceptions of Japan were indeed based on Orientalist assumptions. Fairyland, the most popular stereotype, is quintessentially Orientalist. However, Japan proved to be a special case, as it industrialized and westernized with surprising speed. Japan aggressively promoted itself at the world's fairs and invited foreign architects to design major projects in Japan, all part of its effort to present itself as a progressive, "non-Oriental" nation. To some extent these efforts were effective, but Japanese modernization found critics in Cram, Wright, and other Westerners who preferred to imagine the country as an idyllic, preindustrial paradise.

Japanese architecture was considered to be charming, picturesque, and appropriate only for Japanese living. Its relevant characteristics became so codified that Japanese architecture came to signify expressed structure, simple decoration, exploitation of natural materials, and a few other easily summarized points. In other words, it became quite thoroughly Orientalized.

The use of architecture as a medium for examining Orientalism brings up the question of whether architecture can represent the Orient the way that literature does. Writing has a specificity that indicates a greater capability to create and perpetuate images. For instance, a pagoda may be almost unanimously received as an Oriental element, but what of particulars such as the roofs of the Winslow House, or the railings of the Tichenor House? At what point does a Japanese-inspired element cease to become a representation of Japan? Does Orientalist architecture simply fade away as each generation moves further from the ostensible source?

There is clearly some point where even the slightest representation of Japan can be found in the formal elements of a building. Conversely, architecture can also simulate the Orient to a high degree. For example,

Cram's Knapp teahouse masquerades as a part of the true Orient, pretending to be an objective reality even though it only an interpretation. Impressions of Japan based on this building are likely to be considered as impressions of true Japan.

The examination of architecture as an Orientalist text also suggests that certain attitudes cannot be inferred from writings alone. In this regard, two related aspects of Orientalist representation may be distinguished. The most literal type of representation might be called pictorial representation, exemplified by a literary description of the Near East or by a garden pavilion derived from a Chinese pagoda. The extent to which this type of representation can be considered Orientalist depends on its imagined correspondence with an assumed "true" Orient. It is assumed that Orientalist attitudes are exhibited explicitly in the literal imitation of the Orient.

More generally, works of art are Orientalist representations insofar as they are the products of Orientalist learning. Said assumes that a writer's Orientalist knowledge is displayed when he creates an Oriental tableau. Yet knowledge of the Orient surely exceeds what is revealed in the literal subject, and it is dangerous, especially in works of art, to assume that the author is ingenuously representing his own beliefs.

An argument can be made that Wright was, like most of his peers, a racist and a Japanist. Surely that is a minor price to pay for the aesthetic achievements of the Winslow House or the Imperial Hotel. After all, we can hardly be expected to cease borrowing from other cultures simply because we don't want to engage in Orientalist practices. But however appealing this kind of argument may be, it is in some ways irrelevant. The issue is not whether the artistic end justifies the means—which seems a wholly and rightfully unresolvable argument—but rather, whether the manner in which these architects interpreted Japan makes it sufficiently clear that their works and writings do *not* allow for the cultural complexity of the Orient, and only represent a narrow and stereotyped view of it. With the understanding that a great deal of

knowledge about Japan was derived from a limiting set of assumptions, Japanist architecture takes on a different reading.

For example, is a picturesque garden pavilion based on a Japanese teahouse a trivializing copy or is it a sincere attempt at flattery? The observer whose knowledge of Japanese architecture begins and ends with this kind of representation will no doubt infer that Japanese architecture is charming, whimsical, and not to be taken seriously. The observer who knows that the garden gazebo is not the sum of Japanese architecture, that it is only a text about Japanese architecture, will find the quaintness more in the architect's mind than in Japan itself.

Orientalism was an attitude cultivated by Western political hegemony, but the West can no longer exert this kind of political control over Japan. Other motives will create other types of representation, and, with an awareness of Japanist attitudes, attempts at more expansive representations will be made. However, in the form of photographs, architectural texts have become increasingly influential, and photographs may carry their own Japanist content. The analysis of Orientalism and architecture is far from complete, but at least it can be safely said that the understanding of a text as a text, rather than as objective information about its purported subject, must be at the root of attempts to de-Orientalize Japanese architecture.

NOTES

1. Frank Lloyd Wright, *An Autobiography* (New York: Horizon Press, 1977), p. 560.
2. Aymar Embury II, *One Hundred Country Houses: Modern American Examples* (New York: The Century Co., 1909), p. 218.
3. "Japanese Architecture and Its Relation to the Coming American Style," *The Craftsman* (May 1906): 192.
4. Henrietta P. Keith, "The Trail of Japanese Influence in American Architecture," *The Craftsman* (July 1907): 446.
5. Frank Lloyd Wright, *An Autobiography* (New York: Horizon Press, 1977), p. 223.
6. The Judge Foster House and several other of Wright's houses from about 1900 display more superficial, picturesque Japanese elements, but these designs seem to be largely irrelevant to the further development of his work.

LAURENCE MICHALAK

Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures

Russell Ferguson, et al., editors

Out There is a collection of essays loosely organized around the theme of "marginalization," by authors who are, in most cases, from socially marginalized groups: African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, gays, lesbians, and so on. The essays are strikingly diverse in tone and style—personal, impersonal, angry, playful, academic, detached, insulting, ironic, jargony, straightforward, indifferent, argumentative, and various combinations of the above.

The book's foreword defines "marginalization" as "the process by which certain people and ideas are privileged over others at any given time." A short introduction goes on to define the "margin" mainly by what it is not—not the normative center, not "white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure." The initial essay by Cornel West traces the rise of European-American cultural hegemony and the emergence after World War II of a "new cultural politics of difference."

The rest of the twenty-seven essays give examples of different kinds of marginalization, cases of different specific groups or individuals. The essays offer much to agree with, disagree with, and debate. Some examples may give an idea of this diversity.

In "Complexion," Richard Rodriguez traces his changing feelings about his dark skin, beginning with a working-class boyhood in which his mother associated dark skin with poverty, continuing up to his current situation as a thirty-something, self-described "dandy," moving in circles that associate dark skin with leisure and wealth. Rodriguez goes from shame to pride, accompanied by upward mobility, but rather than an ethnic Horatio Alger story, he gives us a nuanced personal itinerary. Rodriguez ends his essay on an ambivalent note, recalling silences between himself and less-advantaged Mexicans with whom he once

worked, reminding readers that race and ethnicity are complicated by class.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes what it was like to be a feminist, deconstructivist, Anglo-Indian woman on an otherwise male panel. In the panel, she objects to the generalizations of the "intelligent and conscientious moderator," disagrees with all her "pleasant and gifted" fellow panelists, calls attention to her marginalism, accuses one of the panelists of "cheap derision," and generally describes the panel as an "acting out [of] the scenario of tokenism." This celebration of confrontation is her starting point for a discussion of the importance of remaining on the margin, of refusing to be co-opted.

Douglas Crimp writes of his experience of attending funerals for friends who have died of AIDS, often in situations in which the deceased's family will not allow acknowledgment of the cause of death or the special grief of gay lovers and friends. Crimp relates this to Freud's warning that interference with mourning can be harmful, and he argues that gays should move from mourning to militancy. Crimp takes sharp issue with a number of fellow gay activists, especially Randy Shilts, whom he accuses of "moralizing self-abasement."

John Yau shows how art historians classify artists, canonizing some and marginalizing others. Through the example of Chinese-Afro-Cuban artist Wilfredo Lam, Yau shows how an artist can be intellectually marginalized in a mainstream art history textbook—and spatially marginalized at New York's Museum of Modern Art, where Lam's work now hangs in the cloakroom!

Audrey Lords writes of multiple marginality. She tells us that she is a "forty-nine-year-old black lesbian feminist socialist mother of two, including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple." She points out that not just her identity, but all identities are multiple, although she is "constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of [her]self and to present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of [her]self."

In "On Collecting Art and Culture," James Clifford presents the anthropologist

The Homeless Vehicle Project, an exhibit at the Clocktower, a city-owned artspace, featured a vehicle aimed at facilitating the survival activities of the homeless; New York City, 1988. (From *Out There*.)

as someone who appropriates and classifies the cultural property of others, engaging in a process of selection, privileging some objects as art or artifact, and ignoring others. Clifford describes how Claude Lévi-Strauss in the 1940s viewed New York as a gigantic chronotope, a "configuration of spatial and temporal indicators," an assemblage of artifacts within artifacts, at a time when "native art" was not yet granted aesthetic status.

Rosalyn Deutsche's essay on public art in New York City discusses the Homeless Vehicle Project, which includes a rolling metal and plastic box designed for use by the homeless for sleeping, scavenging, and so forth. Deutsche sees the Project as a commentary on New York's efforts to delegitimate the homeless. She gives the example of former mayor Edward Koch's attempt to expel the homeless from the city's train stations on the grounds that "you can't stay here unless you're here for transportation." Deutsche relates this to an urban theory of "spatial organization as a terrain for political struggle."

Edward Said's "Reflections on Exile" considers the question of why exile has been such a "potent, even enriching leitmotif of modern culture." He begins by deromanticizing exile through accounts of

the troubled lives of fellow exiles. Said recognizes the exile that Zionist Jews experienced before the founding of Israel, and he juxtaposes this with the exile Israel has inflicted upon the Palestinians. "It is," he writes, "as if the reconstructed Jewish collective experience, as represented by Israel and modern Zionism, could not tolerate another story of dispossession and loss to exist alongside it." Said's essay is a reminder that, when victims from the social margin take over the center, they are sometimes capable of changing with frightening rapidity from victims to oppressors.

Homi Bhabba's essay on colonial discourse includes a reinterpretation of some of Said's ideas from *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978). Several other essays also relate to issues that Said has raised in this volume and elsewhere—especially the problem of "representation." Said's discussion of authors in exile reads nicely alongside Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guettari's analysis of Franz Kafka's work as "marginal literature"; even in his native Prague, Kafka appears to have lived in a kind of exile, so that the alienations of Said's authors in exile and of Kafka "at home" in Prague appear as parallel forms of marginalization.

Taken as a whole, this volume is a rite of

reversal of sorts—a centralizing of the marginal and a marginalizing of the central. In the process, marginalization seems in a way inevitable. For example, Spivak represents and rebuts voices we have not heard and papers we have not read; in so doing, she unavoidably centralizes her views and marginalizes those she disagrees with, because we must rely on her representations of their work.

Some of the authors seem to demonize the center, ironically, in the same ways that they accuse the center of demonizing the margin. The title of Monique Wittig's essay, "The Straight Mind," is intended as a dig at Lévi-Strauss's study, "The Savage Mind." But her choice of title reminded me instead of Raphael Patai's racist book, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Scribner, 1973). Like Patai, Wittig uses linguistic arguments: Patai argues that Arabs are incapable of thinking about the future because they have no inflected future tense; Wittig argues that language itself (English? French? All languages?) discriminates against and oppresses gay men and lesbians. But is there such a thing as "the straight mind"? Do all "straights" think the same? Do all gays and lesbians think the same? We should be wary of pejorative generalizations about whole categories of people, be they of the margin or of the center.

Gloria Anzaldùa also slips into demonizing the center in "How To Tame a Wild Tongue." Actually, her essay is, for the most part, a convincing analysis of some of the dialects and patois spoken by Chicanos, spiced with personal autobiography and well-chosen examples from Chicano music and literature. But in her conclusion she reduces things to an apocalyptic binary opposition between a single Chicano culture and an undifferentiated, centrist, Anglo culture, anticipating the day when the "dominant *norteamericano* culture" will "rot in the deserts they've created," while the *mexicanos-Chicanos* "walk by the crumbling ashes as we go about our business."

There are a few disagreements among the volume's authors. Wittig's treatment of Lévi-Strauss is highly negative (and in my view oversimplified), in contrast to Clifford's acknowledgment of Lévi-Strauss' insights about New York and about native art. Wittig's condemnation of "pornography" (which she does not define) contrasts with Richard Dyer's celebration of gay pornographic cinema. And West's description of Margaret Mead as a "towering cultural critic" contrasts with Clifford's portrayal of Mead as the dominant outsider anthropologist, "doing" and naming the "Mountain Arapesh" (although here I think that both West and Clifford are probably right).

However, there are many more convergences than contradictions among these essays. The authors share a general concern with language and power, with how social categories are created and maintained, with the affirmation of the margin, and with how artistic and literary canons are constituted. They place a positive value on questioning intellectual systems of the social center, breaking silences, speaking out, taking issue, taking exception, opting out of consensus.

Each of these essays seems to address different audiences in different ways. Some of the essays seemingly address narrow audiences of fellow marginals. For example, Crimp writes that "this paper is written for my fellow activists and friends," and that, because of the "specific and often unique difficulties" gay men face, "I address them here exclusively." Thus Crimp marginalizes readers who are not gay—as well as gays who do not share Crimp's activism—casting them in the role of eavesdroppers. This rhetorical tactic precludes disagreement from such people by saying, "If you don't agree with me, your opinion is irrelevant because I wasn't talking to you anyway."

Other essays seem to address the center from the margin, acknowledging that, after all, most of the readers of these essays will be of the social center—that most of the readers of the essays by gays will not be gay, for example. But in so doing, they carefully avoid tones of apologia, of appearing to explain themselves to nonmarginals. For example, Toni Morrison describes 18th- and 19th-century slave narratives written to "persuade other people—you, the reader who is probably not black—that we are human beings worthy of God's grace and the immediate abandonment of slavery." These ex-slaves were concerned "not to offend the reader by being too angry, or by showing too much outrage, or by calling the reader names." However, Morrison disavows this: these ex-slaves "were silent about many things," but she will not be silent. She writes instead "to fill in the blanks that the slave narratives left." She succeeds at avoiding both "writing up" and "writing down" to the center.

Felix Gonzàlez-Torres provides numerous photographs that play upon the themes of the volume, sometimes obviously, more often subtly. There are baby and childhood pictures of twenty-two of the authors, perhaps echoing the intimacy and biographical nature of many of the essays. Ten photographs of inscriptions in stone ("author," "humanitarian," "historian") perhaps call attention to the process of the creating of social categories.

In this provocative collection there are several excellent articles, of which I have been able to discuss only a few. I recommend the book to anyone—marginal or otherwise—who is interested in the important processes of social and intellectual inclusion and exclusion.

HAYDEN WHITE

The Production of Space

Henri Lefebvre

Henri Lefebvre is one of the last representatives of the fading social class of "intellectuals." He was born in 1901, and has witnessed most of the historically significant events of this century. And, like a true intellectual, he has made a profession of providing social and political commentary on these events. His bibliography lists no fewer than sixty-seven books, on topics ranging from Rabelais, Pascal, Spinoza, Musset, and Marx through "mountains," "rural sociology," "language and society," and "the state" (in four volumes), to such arcane subjects as "the end of history," "metaphilosophy," and "cybernanthropy."

In France, Lefebvre enjoys a reputation as one of the great interpreters of Marx's thought, on par with Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Aron, and Louis Althusser. His approach to social criticism is relentlessly dialectical, which is to say that he believes Marxism requires ceaseless revision in the light of changing historical circumstances. He argues that after World War II, Western society underwent a major transformation, as disruptive as that wrought by the transition from agrarian to industrial society during the 19th century. He calls this change the "urban revolution," and it signals, not so much the triumph of the "city" over the countryside, but the advent of a post-industrial, generally "urban" mode of production.[1] Since the early 1960s, Lefebvre has applied his version of dialectical materialism to the analysis of the social, political, and ideological effects of this change in the mode of production.[2] *The Production of Space* represents a synthesis of Lefebvre's thought on these topics as of 1974, the date of its original publication in French.[3]

Lefebvre views space as a dimension of human practice, which is experienced in so many different ways that it resists analysis. In this respect, space resembles that other dimension of human existence—time—similarly difficult to contemplate without anomaly. Yet, according to Lefebvre, space is ultimately more important than time, because it is spatial arrangements that determine the rhythms and periodicities of time. Indeed, he argues, space rather than time provides a basis for the understanding of human history. The notion that the "content" or deep meaning of history is time or temporality (as Paul Ricoeur, author of *Time and Narrative*, has recently argued) is, in Lefebvre's view, a typically idealist mystification.[4] The fundamental subject-matter of history is space, the different ways space can be organized, and the different kinds of experiences of it (practical, cognitive, and artistic), met with in the course of human history. Indeed, in the last analysis, *The Production of Space* is a philosophy of history, Marxist in its mode of analysis, to be sure, but also post-Marxist insofar as it posits space as the principal "content" of history and "the production of space" as the secret of history's meaning.

It is immediately apparent that the space that interests Lefebvre is not the "abstract" space of astronomers, physicists, and mathematicians, or the "practical" space of architects, city planners, landscape painters, surveyors, and real-estate developers. It is rather what he calls "social" space, the space created by human groups in specific locales, using specific modes of production, and engaging in collective exertions of an economic, social, and political kind, to achieve purposes more or less human. Social space—portions of "nature" occupied by human groups, symbolically ordered and hierarchically arranged, endowed with distinct "value" and effectively commodified—is the only space we can "experience" and, accordingly, the only space about which we can hope to have concrete, as opposed to abstract and purely theoretical, "knowledge." The succession of kinds of spaces and the relations among them provide the content of history up to the "modern" era. Sometime after 1950, all of these local spaces—those of ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, the European Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the 18th century, and so on—were transcended and assimilated to a new, ecumenical and homogenizing space produced by the fully "urbanized" mode of production. The historical significance of our time is to be found in the conflict between this new hegemonic social space, on the one hand, and the residual, local social spaces of nations, regions, neighborhoods, and such, on the other. The question that most interests Lefebvre is whether we can find a utopian alternative to the dystopian prospects offered by this impersonal, inhuman, and antinatural space that has emerged in the wake of the "urban revolution."

Space, then, does not, in Lefebvre's view, precede nature or society, as either a basis or a container. Space is *produced* by human thought, imagination, and labor, which means that space—the only

Anomalous space in William Hogarth's print, *Perspectival Absurdities*, for a 1754 textbook. (From *Art and Illusion*.)

In Saul Steinberg's 1954 drawing for *The New Yorker*, a single line changes function and meaning in a series of spaces. (From *Art and Illusion*.)

"space" we humans can experience or know—is a *commodity*. Therefore, space, human space, *our* space, can be treated as merely a commodity, to be bought and sold, valued or debased, fetishized or junked; or it can be sublimated, elevated, and spiritualized, which is to say, turned into and treated as a work of art. Space, Lefebvre holds, is not to be confused with either the universe of material objects or that great abstraction, "nature." For, unlike material objects and nature, space is an experience of socially produced entities and the socially organized relations among them. Therefore, experiences of space are experiences of qualities as well as of quantities. We can have a concrete knowledge of space, because, unlike the "physical universe," the space in which social action is performed is a product of human imagination, cognition, and labor. This is why the experience of space should be more like the experience of a work of art than like that of a natural entity. And unlike the various "models" of spatial relationships produced by geometricians, physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers, social space is "real" space, a structure of relationships, to be sure, but inhabited by living beings, responsive to human praxis, and capable of being turned to productive (as well as destructive) human uses.

It is on the basis of his analysis of space as a distinctively social phenomenon that Lefebvre is able to explain the origin of belief in an "absolute" (or "natural") space, on the one hand, and the "abstract" space of mathematicians and philosophers, on the other. The bodily experience of the entities in and relationships among such local natural sites as caves, mountains, forests, and deserts, plus the experience in conscious-

ness of the differences between these natural sites and such socially organized spaces as settlements, villages, towns, cities, farms, and ranches, must have inspired the confusion of space with "nature," as well as with abstract "structures of relationships." But, like Marx, who derived from his study of history the principle that the later form (of a society, a style, an organism) "explains" the earlier, rather than the reverse, Lefebvre takes what is putatively the most recent form of space—namely, the social space based on the mode of production of advanced industrial capitalism—to explain both the existentially derived notion of "natural" space and the theoretically derived notion of space as "mathematical" or "abstract." The concept of "nature" is thus interpreted as a reduction from the experience of socially organized space, just as the concept of space that informs physics and mathematics is interpreted as a product of an abstraction from apprehended differences between "natural" and "social" space.

"History," then, is a process in which societies based on different modes of production produce distinctive spaces within which different kinds of social practices take on material forms. From the first investments of natural spaces (clearings, plains, valleys, caves, copses, or whatever) through the archaic temple cities, fortresses, and harbor towns, to the Greek *polis*, Roman Empire, modern nation, multinational market, and international military and political alliance, history displays the human capacity to substitute "culture"—products of its own labor power—for "nature." Rather than conceptualizing history as a sequence of eras or epochs, it would be more realistic, Lefebvre maintains, to conceptual-

ize it as a sedimentation of different kinds of socially organized space. This yields something like Mikhail Bakhtin's conception of the "chronotope" or socially produced section of time-space as a fundamental unit of historical existence.[5] But unlike Bakhtin, Lefebvre views the different kinds of social spaces produced over the course of history as products of the different modes of production and the social relations of production determined by these as Marx theorized them. Social spaces are products of our relationships with nature, mediated by different modes of production. And it is because the older industrial mode of production has been supplanted by a new, "urban" mode of production that a new social space has taken shape since about 1950.

The "space" to which Lefebvre refers is "global social space," space that is produced by human society only in the 20th century as the basis for whatever praxis remains possible for human beings once the earth has been transformed by modern technology into a "world." This "worldwide" space is distinguished from the various kinds of spaces produced within limited domains at other times and diverse places, on the bases of different modes of production, prior to our own century. "Formerly," Lefebvre argues, "each society to which history gave rise within the framework of a particular mode of production . . . shaped its own space. . . by violence, by political and diplomatic cunning, and, lastly, by labor." Indeed, what used to be called "history" was, in its widest sense, little more than the story of the production of these different social spaces, the kinds of praxis they reflected and rendered possible, and the conflicts among them. In our age, however,

Worm's-eye axonometric of the Nofamily House; Lars Lerup, 1978–82. (From *Planned Assaults*.)

a new mode of production has produced a single, new, "worldwide" social space, so that, henceforth, "history" must be conceived as a story of a conflict between this new social space and the residues of the older social spaces (such as the countryside and forest, the older forms of city life, the nation-state, the multinational corporation or political combine, and so on). Indeed, Lefebvre writes: "Today our concern must be with space on a world scale (and indeed—beyond the surface of the earth—on the scale of interplanetary space), as well as with all the spaces subsidiary to it, at every possible level." This is because the forces that shape this space—the market of commodities, labor, and capital, technology and science, and demographic trends—are of a power, scope, and effectiveness hitherto unknown and unimaginable, even by Marx. At the same time, these forces cannot be referred to any particular agency. No individual or group claims responsibility for them. They appear to elude all control. Meanwhile, residual forms of the older (more local and regional) social systems

continue to contend with one another *within* this new social space for what can only be short-term and merely strategic advantages; the older social systems play political, economic, and social games that have long since lost their relevance to the real forces shaping history on a global scale. So irrelevant are the older (even early 20th-century) rules of political maneuver to the real forces shaping the new social space that the older notions of "history, historicity, and the determinisms associated with these *temporal notions* lose their meaning."

Lefebvre dubs this new mode of production the "urban" mode. Its process is "urbanization," and its product is "urbanized" social space. By "urban" Lefebvre appears to mean something like an exaggeration of one aspect of "town" life, which is to say, the emphasis on the "public" and "utilitarian" aspects of social life after the founding of towns, and the exaggeration of the depersonalizing effects of life in the "city." Indeed, Lefebvre appears to idealize the late Western European medieval or Renaissance town—Venice and Florence are paradig-

matic—as the very model of what an "organic" relationship between nature and culture, the public and private spheres of family and individual life, and the political and economic dimensions of social life *should* be. In his view, the new "urban" space of the postindustrial era stresses all of those aspects of town life that mark the distinction between life lived as art and life lived as mere commodity. What he sees as the distinctive attribute of our own era is the triumph of "city" values over those of the "town." But he sees in the town itself an ideal of "organicism" on the basis of which to oppose the "urbanization" of nature, society, and culture that is currently occurring worldwide. The "urban" mode of production represents the triumph of the "center" (state power, terrorism, violence, and domination) over the "periphery," where, in an earlier time, "town" and "country" lived in happy symbiosis. The triumph of the "city" over the "town" is the triumph of the "commodity" over the "work of art." And it seems to follow that our escape from the baneful effects of urbanistic commodification must lead, by way of a return to the values of town life and the restoration of social space, to the status of an artwork.

Lefebvre's book is not a history of the city or of urbanization; it is rather a philosophy of the history of the city and of urbanization. Indeed, while reading it I was often reminded of Lewis Mumford's *Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938) and *The City in History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), although Lefebvre mentions neither these works nor Mumford. Sigfried Giedions' *Space, Time, and Architecture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941) is cited as "the first initiative taken towards the development of a history of space" and Bruno Zevi's *Architecture as Space* (New York: Horizon Press, 1957) is praised for the idea that space is intimately associated with the experience of the human body. But in Lefebvre's estimation, these works do not "tackle the tasks that still await the history of space proper." This task, he insists, falls to "historical materialism," revised so as to "come to bear no longer solely upon the production

of things and works, and upon the (dual) history of that production," but also "take in space and time and, using nature as its 'raw material'" encompassing "the concept of production so as to include the production of space as a process whose product—space—itself embraces both things (goods, objects) and works." A historical materialist consideration of the history of space will provide an answer, Lefebvre promises, to the question of the "mode of existence of social relationships," by showing how:

> the social relations of production have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project themselves into space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that space itself. Failing this, these relations would remain in the realm of "pure" abstraction—that is to say, in the realm of representations and hence of ideology: the realm of verbalism, verbiage and empty words.

As one can see from a passage such as this, Lefebvre's book is an example of what our British colleagues disparagingly call "grand theory." It operates on a very high plane of abstraction, and indeed, Lefebvre calls what he does not merely "philosophy" but "metaphilosophy" (which presumes to legislate the relation between philosophy and practice).

As I wrote this review, I tried to imagine what I could say about *The Production of Space* that might interest the readers of *DBR*. I kept asking, what are the *practical* implications of this revisionist-Marxist theory of postindustrial space for anyone having to *work* with what are essentially spatial forms and relationships? And the only answer I could come up with was one that Lefebvre himself suggests in answer to a question that he raises early on in his book: Why is it that architectural and urbanistic criticism appears to be less powerful, less pertinent, less commanding, more derivative than art, literary, and philosophical criticism? His answer to this question is that architectural and urbanistic criticism have not properly identified their object of study, which is space rather than the material objects and the relations between them that appear to "inhabit" space. Having con-

fused architectural and urbanistic "space" with either the space of the physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers or that of buildings, cities, and other kinds of sites, architectural and urbanistic theorists, Lefebvre suggests, inevitably remain locked within merely "formal" methods of analysis, on the one hand, or purely "practical" considerations, on the other. Having failed to theorize "space" in a manner adequate to its status as a "product" of human labor, they have been unable to see beyond its "commodity" form to the "value" that is contained within it. Consequently, they have been unable to imagine "social space" as the possible artwork it *might* yet become.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre's *La revolution urbaine* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).
2. See especially *La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968); and *Le droit à la ville* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1968).
3. It might be thought that a revision of a Marxist's thought on anything prior to 1989, which marks the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, would require substantial revision or at least a significant amount of second thought. Lefebvre's Marxism has always been "revisionist" in the sense of maintaining that Marx was limited to consideration of the experiences of his time and could not have anticipated in any significant way the emergence of new forces of production, such as electronics, cybernetics, and computerization, which have made possible the transcendence of the older, industrial capitalist mode of production. His deviationism goes back to his love-hate relationship with the Surrealists in the early 1920s.
4. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984–88), three volumes.
5. See Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, edited by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
6. Ibid.

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE, Henri Lefebvre, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Blackwell Publishers, 1991, 454 pp., $19.95.

TREVOR BODDY

Architecture in Europe Since 1968: Memory and Invention

Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre

There has never been a more wonderful time for architectural publishing, nor a more dismal time for architectural criticism. To understand the simultaneity of these two conditions is to begin to know the true state of contemporary architectural culture.

Monographs appear like spring flowers in every architectural bookshop, theory-laden new magazines, slick quarterlies, bilingual journals rife with splendid photography, and funky quick-printed 'zines pile every table and shelf. To spend more than half an hour in a well-stocked architectural bookstore is to invite catharsis of imagery, numbing information-overload prompted by the variety and extent of contemporary architectural production. Never have the great buildings, plans, and writings of every historical generation of architects been so available, often in splendidly printed and relatively inexpensive paperback. Yet for all of this—indeed in part *because* of all of this—the focused, learned, critical interpretation of contemporary buildings has never been so marginal, so unimportant to architectural culture.

The situation is most acute in North America, where meaningful criticism of buildings has all but disappeared from the major journals. Innocuous reviews, cozy reportage, earnest talking around a project, these are present in spades, criticism hardly at all. Indicative of the times is the development over the past decade of "authorial control" by which a featured architect can go beyond a contract for first publication with a glossy to actually maintain veto power over the selection of a writer. Such infringements on free speech and its necessary correlative, unfettered, sometimes disturbing critical analysis of the particulars of design decisions, should come as no surprise; criticism is simply too messy, too generative of conflict, too prone to litigation or argument

over dinner, too disruptive of personal allegiances in a tiny and cloistered profession, and most of all, too unlikely to generate a profit and too likely to disturb the advertorial ethos that structures the glossies and their info-conglomerate owners.

The situation is scarcely better for newspaper-based architectural criticism. Allen Temko at the *San Francisco Chronicle* and Robert Campbell are lingering exceptions which prove the rule, thundering dinosaurs of pungent, sometimes strident opinion in an era dominated by the fuzzy mammals of mellow. The critic of the 1980s—note the oxymoron—was no doubt king fuzz himself, the prince of prevarication, Paul "Perhaps" Goldberger, master of the "on the other hand," the neutered quip, the toadying reference, the editorial board-pleasing gloss. Now that Goldberger has left his column for a well-deserved Valhalla-home in the higher reaches of *New York Times* management, Herbert Muschamp brings stronger opinions to the architecture beat, but he must watch a tendency to maudlin reverie and generalized (and thus pointless) philippic.

This situation in the most prominent of media outlets would be tolerated if criticism of buildings was to be found in books, journals, or activist street rags, but such is not the case. First, for books: while all guiltily acknowledge that independent criticism is probably good for architecture and architects, there are many powerful forces, mainly economic, which mitigate against its appearance in books, especially those devoted to the work of one architect. The publishing of books on contemporary architecture has come to mean the production of lavish monographs depicting work in color photography and redrawn-for-publication documentation, with a celebratory preface from a friendly cohort, as forgettable as the inevitable jacket blurb from the glibly compliant critic-of-the-moment.

The economics of architectural publishing is such that in order to be published these monographs need implicit or explicit subsidy by their subjects. The former often takes the form of a guaranteed advance sale of large numbers of books to the featured architect, and almost always, the very real costs of having staff prepare drawings and documentation for the book, plus the cost of photography, which can run over $100,000 for a specialist commissioned to cover a significant opus. Given this type of investment, it is little wonder that monographs increasingly resemble pretentious brochures, doorstops never read but stored for quick access to a needed plan or detail, or used to line the walls of salons of the upwardly mobile.

Even more insidious are direct subsidies by architects for books on their work or for the "writers" who compile them, costs which mount easily into six figures.

All of this means that architects have enormous say in books about them, and few, no matter how they protest their belief in criticism, are willing to subsidize intellectual inquiry into the core assumptions of their work. Monographs are by design and intention superficial, covering the entire opus one inch deep, or as deep as the rectified photography and cleaned-up drawings permit. Whether it is because there are so few examples of independent architectural publishing to serve as models, or because of some broader disinterest in criticism of this field, in the end there is very small market for cogent criticism about even the most famous and controversial architects, and hence no publishers willing to risk substantial sums to test the endurance of this indifference.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy is the failed promise of the revolution in critical theory and practice which percolated from its French sources to permeate the farthest reaches of architectural culture over the past two decades. The shift was first seen in architecture school reviews or "crits" which came to resemble "my precedent is better than your precedent" comparative architectural history lessons in the 1970s, and then "my philosopher is better than your philosopher" graduate seminars in critical theory in the 1980s. Needless to say, buildings and their design got left in the breach. Intellectual writing on architecture, and the avalanche of university, museum, or foundation-based learned journals is now all-but completely dominated by shallowly appropriated discourse from contemporary philosophy, critical theory, and cultural studies. While some of the most important architectural writing and theorizing comes out of this tradition, too much that is published is unstructured philosophizing by assistant professors facing tenure committees or muddled phenomenology by gallery- and library-based architects who are linked by a livid hatred of actual buildings and those who make or inhabit them. The powerful new critical techniques are almost never de-

Medical Faculty of the University of Louvain in Belgium; Lucien Kroll; 1968–72. (From *Architecture in Europe Since 1968*.)

ployed against the assumptions, forms, and modes of construction—both intellectual and material—of actual, individual buildings or city plans. Many argue that the energy once spent on criticism of individual buildings is now expended at the theoretical level, the criticism of criticism itself.

There is a place for metatheory and megatheory, but why must it proceed in journals and conferences bereft of discussion of buildings? Why have we traded particular insight for generalized theorizing? Ironically, philosophers such as Cornel West are calling for the return of the public intellectual, often modeled on Lewis Mumford, even while most architectural writers have left for the Elysian fields of hypertheory (see any *Any* product—*Anyone, Anywhere, Any* magazine). Architectural criticism resonant with insight, balance and unfettered questioning is as rare in architectural publishing as it is in schools of architecture, that is to say, virtually nonexistent. The disappearance of criticism from architectural culture—especially in North America—is an essential but seldom acknowledged trend, with enormous impact on the development of both the profession and education. In these conservative times, it would seem the focused, critical analysis of buildings understood in their social, economic, technological, aesthetic, and intellectual variety is simply too dangerous a territory for books, journals, or schools.

There is no time more dangerous in architectural culture than the recent past, and none so important. It is the nature of architecture to be caught between the promise of futures proposed and the verities of pasts recalled. An agenda, a theory, a bold plan can rhetorically propel a building, a promise of more and a better, all changed, all possible. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre have undertaken a courageous sortie into that most dangerous of architectural terrains, the shifting, quixotic, frontierless recent past. *Architecture in Europe Since 1968* is an ambitious book, combining theorizing about the current state of architectural culture with a pointed and particular critique of nearly eighty of the key European constructions since the turmoil of the late 1960s. At

first, the tethering of their study to the political and cultural crises of *les événements de mai* seems arbitrary, safe, journalese; why not commence with the death of Le Corbusier in 1965, the publication of Aldo Rossi's *The Architecture of the City* the same year, the completion of James Stirling's Leicester University Engineering Building a year later?

It becomes quickly evident in the book's entries that the precise qualities of 1968 (and its overexposed American cousin born of the Time-Life take on the world, "The Sixties") are crucial to the arguments of the book, the sense of those times as broad-based but unfocused transformation, and the subsequent sense of failed or chimerical revolution devolving into independent eddies of experimentation. The authors chart these eddies expertly, combining a sense of the general drift of these architectural waters with a sure knowledge of the shoals and slippages that made and ended architectural careers. As it works its way through the detritus of the 1970s, the book recalls European films produced during that decade more than its architectural texts. Jean-Luc Godard's roving cycle of films picking up the social, sexual, and political aftermath of 1968 is similar to the hard-edged and highly intellectualized romanticism of the Tzonis and Lefaivre text, while Alain Tanner's film, *For Jonah Who Will be 25 in the Year 2000*, has a generosity similar to the tone of their critical judgments.

The first building in the generally historical sequence of *Architecture in Europe Since 1968* is Lucien Kroll's Medical Faculty at the University of Louvain in Belgium. Tzonis and Lefaivre point out that this building is a direct legacy of 1968—when students insisted on choosing the architect. In that year of change there was widespread support for a radically different design approach—with Kroll employing an "ethnographic" philosophy born of his experiences in East Africa as well as applying Nicolaas Habraken's notions of dissociated structure and infill/support. Initial users were permitted to choose facade elements for their rooms from an architect-designed kit of parts. Seeing these a quarter century

later, unchanged, earnest symbols, but symbols nonetheless of a moment's desire for involvement, begs questions about "user's aesthetic," a kind of radical chic, like any good style holding itself out to be an anti-style. The authors point out that the aesthetic in plan, section, and elevation at Louvain is actually organic—seldom recognized when it was widely published in the 1970s because architectural culture was not ready to talk about the organic then (but is now, perhaps too much so). Their point is born out in Kroll's later design for the adjacent light-rail transit station, an undulating Gaudíesque confection not included in their book. The book brims with this kind of incidental insight about familiar buildings, possibilities of interpretation found and lost in the difficult middle ground of memory.

Memory is crucial to their treatment of the work and legacy of Rossi, who cast a long De Chirican shadow over the architecture of the 1970s, particularly on continental Europe. After acknowledging the enormous and positive impact of his writings and drawings, just what does one now make of Rossi's buildings as buildings, and not just exemplars of rationalism or three-dimensionalized melancholy? In their account of the San Cataldo Cemetery of 1973, Tzonis and Lefaivre make some suggestions:

> The theme of the cemetery gave Rossi an excellent opportunity to demonstrate his ideas about architecture without major difficulties. His credo, using elementary volumes undisturbed by functional requirements, could easily be put into practice in the world of the dead whose everyday needs were nonexistent. . . . Thus memory, history, orderliness, the values cherished by Rossi, expressions of collective will which had been expelled from the contemporary city, could find a home again in the *luogo architettonico*, the "architectonic place" of the cemetery. Following the bankruptcy of any other means, according to Rossi, this negative city built by negative architecture could act as the base for a different kind of assault against the anti-values of the functionalist and populist "Babylon."

The next entry is for the 1973 Gallaratese Housing project near Milan, whose "geometrical formulas" Tzonis and Lefaivre find unduly constraining of everyday life, despite

their undeniable power as "symbolic collective representations." The last paragraph of the Gallaratese entry is also worth quoting at length, as it represents some of the most lyrical, insightful critical writing ever offered about Rossi, and his huge impact on other architects:

> Whatever the effect of Rossi's architecture on the comfort of the users of Gallaratese, he became a hero to grateful architects who embraced him for having almost single-handedly restored their confidence in the profession. The simplicity of his toy-like forms and his domino-like rule system was seductively, even exhilaratingly, easy to follow. His slogan-recipes were memorable, hypnotic, charismatic, like Le Corbusier's. And, as in the case of Le Corbusier, their adoption was the result of an act of faith rather than a rational decision. In the misty Milan dusk, the Gallaratese housing with its neo-Platonist, arcane composition rises as if to exorcise the evil spirit of contemporary Babylon rather than as a cry of protest, or a constructive vision.

As is the case for the huge and largely unwarranted influence of John Hejduk on architecture and architecture schools a decade later, powerful graphics, easily imitable "toy-like forms," and a fuzzy poetic combined to give Rossi an immense influence on global architecture through the 1970s, but now surprisingly little seems likely to endure. Never underestimate the power of readily consumable imagery and ambiguous profundity in shaping architectural history. Never underestimate it, but never give into it, and Tzonis and Lefaivre bravely haven't.

A rare and unpopular stand in contemporary architectural culture, but crucial to the success of their book, the authors refuse to locate their critique in a single axis of interpretation. They brilliantly weave social, technological, urbanistic, philosophical, tectonic, aesthetic issues all invoked in the interpretation and evaluation of the buildings, each adapted to its particular character and pretensions. At times this leads to disjunctive reading, a paragraph on structural silicone inadvertently serving as a conclusion to a sermon on Proust and Kropotkin. But I think that the essence of architecture is located at some point equidistant from struc-

tural silicone, Proust and Kropotkin, and came to revel in these derailments, an awakening from overly simplistic readings of buildings. A useful Vitruvian stool can be fashioned from the tree legs of technology (but not technophilia), aesthetics (but not aestheticism), and the social (but not anarcho-socialism).

The density of the brief texts that accompany each project and the time needed for scrutiny of the exquisitely selected and positioned plans and photographs do not lend this book to quick consumption; few readers are likely to finish it from cover to cover in one sitting. After working through a few entries it becomes evident that a sort of literary form structures the writing within each set piece; a brief paragraph of introduction locates the building in the work of its designer or in the evolution of the issue at hand. Then follows a deft description of the building, a crucially important rendering into words of its primary assumptions and theoretical orientation. Then a critique of the implications of these assumptions and orientations, often dwelling on the particulars of siting, plan organization, sectional development or material, and structural choices to bring home the reconciliation of intention and realization. Finally, there comes a paragraph or two of conclusions (such as those quoted above for the two Rossi buildings), which serve simultaneously as primary critique and lyrical excursus into another domain of interpretation, so as to prevent too-easy closure or pat readings.

A credible condensed history of recent European architecture could be constructed out of Tzonis and Lefaivre's first paragraphs for each entry. A useful teaching manual for middle-years architectural students could be compiled from a ferreting-out of the middle sections, with their focused discussions of means and ends. I was personally drawn to reading the punchlines of the last paragraphs first, then working back through each building entry. The more or less historical sequence of the entries makes sense, especially given problems with the taxonomy of critical terms proposed in their introduction. Rather than weigh each section down in extraneous in-

formation, architects' biographies and bibliographies as well as project specifications are assembled in an appendix.

Each entry is interesting in the degree to which it attempts to position the building with reference to its own generating idea, as well as within the broader constellations of ideas which these serve to illuminate. The treatment of Norman Foster's notions of skin and environmental control for the Willis, Faber & Dumas office in Ipswich, England, is a masterful and lengthy inquiry into the significance of one of the more influential buildings of the era; the entry for the same architect's Renault Parts Centre in Swindon, England, is brief and pointed, proposing that its yellow masts "have an emblematic character, half resembling machine parts, half totemic, anthropomorphic figures that appear to hover in the open landscape." The brief essay on the symbiosis of French and American technology and public relations that produced I. M. Pei's pyramid at the Louvre is compelling, even if its brevity begs questions about the disappointing spaces and airport planning contained within. In treating the other end of the *grand axe* of the *grands projets*, Tzonis and Lefaivre state, quoting Spanish architectural historian Juan Ramirez, that "this axis is also an allegorical representation of the 'political evolution of mankind from the absolutism of the monarch (the Louvre) to the heroism of the Revolution (Concorde, Tuileries) then the grandeur of empire and the 19th century (up the Champs Elysées) winding up at La Défense with the gradual silencing of the state and the triumph of capital.'" The point is brought home with the reminder that after being selected by President Mitterand in 1982, Otto von Sprekelsen's arch only got built after the 1986 election of right-wing Prime Minister Jacques Chirac forced a privatization of this supposed emblem of the state. Lost-wax nodal connections of white glass for Pei's pyramid, the intertwining of physical and financial structure for Sprekelsen's Grand Arche—telling detail is crucial to the richness of *Architecture in Europe Since 1968*.

At times their critical assessments can be overwrought, such as their claim that another

Perspective view of the San Cataldo Cemetery, Modena Italy; Aldo Rossi, 1971–73. (From *Architecture in Europe Since 1968*.)

of the Parisian *grands travaux*, the Georges Pompidou Centre, is "the last building which reflects the optimism of the Enlightenment." Even if it were possible for buildings to demonstrably encapsulate eras of thought (admittedly a widely popular notion in this End of History era when puerile philosophism passes widely for architectural theory and history), how could one possibly establish the notion that this is the last to be ever built, the omega point of rational instrumentality, the swan song of the hope of modernity? More interesting and reliable is the genealogy of the architectural ideas in the Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers building which they say "can be traced to the planning ideas of Serge Chermayeff; the zoning, at least partly, to Louis Kahn; and the general space concept to Albert Kahn. Archigram provides the inspiration for its gigantic, visceral exhibitionism, and Yona Friedman the vision of total flexibility. To Fuller and to the Constructivists one can credit its technological spirit and to Marshall McLuhan the belief that information is ultimately the building block of any product, including buildings." Whew!

As any history must, *Architecture in Europe Since 1968* has its biases. By choosing to include only constructed buildings (or nearly constructed, as some are shown in progress), there is an underrepresentation of much of the most experimental European architecture: Archigram, Superstudio, Art Net and early OMA, the Kriers and the English neoclassicists, the punkish paper architects of the 1980s. Josef Kleihues' curating of the architectural zoo which was the

IBA (Internationale Bau Ausstellung) in Berlin in 1987 is all but ignored, but Matthias Sauerbruch and Elias Zenghelis' sublime apartment building at Checkpoint Charlie is included, taking the space that might have gone to Eisenman's formalist conniptions nearby, a vastly overpublished and overexplicated project. Big buildings, big names, and the 1980s as a decade are all overrepresented. Paul Chemetov's ghastly 1982 Seine-side Ministry of Economy Finance and Budget gets an entry and the following evaluation—"the indecisive, and to some extent unenthusiastic, and somewhat banal character of the project"—evidently generates some indecisive, unenthusiastic, and banal writing from Tzonis and Lefaivre.

This said, the authors are to be commended for the strength of their conviction to avoid a safe concentration on boutique practices and small and tasty buildings by "architects' architects," and instead risk the issues which come bundled with large public office buildings, housing projects, and structures such as bridges and sports stadiums. As American architects recover from the virtual cessation of public building and nonprofit housing during the Reagan-Bush era, this book is an essential purchase if only to serve as a gazetteer of the possibilities of construction in the public realm, a testament to the continuity of social convictions by a generation of European architects. The same social, political, and economic forces that prompted both *Architectural Record* and *Progressive Architecture* to feature cover stories on social housing the very same month last summer should have work-hungry practitioners

reaching for the Rizzoli catalog to order this book.

Given the scope of the book and the resources it had at its disposal, a greater commitment to innovative young architects might have been in order. For example, I would have gladly traded the four pages given to Vittorio Gregotti's hulking University of Palermo for some excellent documentation of a project or two from Wiel Arets, MacDonald & Salter, or Michel Kagan. British architects not of the high-tech persuasion are almost entirely absent; Spaniards of varying quality make up nearly a fifth of all entries; predictably and sadly, there is only one project from the Nordic countries (the Tampere library by Raili and Reima Pietilla). There is no project included by Gottfried Bohm—understandable—but also none by Günther Behnisch—baffling. The Zollhof Media Centre in Berlin is the only project of the eighty collected that is solely attributed to a woman—Zaha Hadid—and this is likely to be one of the last contemporary architectural histories to be published where this is the case. Geopolitically, the eastern boundary of the Tzonis and Lefaivre book is Vienna. While this made sense when the project was begun in the mid-1980s, it is to be questioned for a book that appeared in 1992, especially for border cases—in every sense—such as Imre Markovetz of Hungary, surely destined for a major and wide-ranging late career.

These objections could be raised about any selection—no matter how Solomonic—which attempts to survey the architectural production of a quarter-century amongst 300 million people set amidst a baffling variety of cultural and architectural traditions. Rather than quibble about the inclusions and exclusions of their book, one must congratulate Tzonis and Lefaivre for their superb effort, a major breech in the void which is comparative architectural discourse. The importance of this book is evident when it enters the most dangerous zone of all, the past five years. The dozen or so projects collected here describe the direction of contemporary architectural culture. There is a surprising convergence here, with

Zollhof 3 Media Centre, Düsseldorf, Germany; Zaha Hadid; 1989–92. (From *Architecture in Europe Since 1968.*)

of—the quality and importance of their own writing Venturi and Scott Brown have never received the architectural criticism they deserve, with the notable exception of Stanislaus von Moos' excellent monograph. According to Tzonis and Lefaivre, their "demanding credo of truth as opposed to moralism, made Venturi and Scott Brown's work difficult to understand. Their work did not fit into the simplistic "blackboard diagrams' of postwar architectural history." Only works as sustained and committed as *Architecture in Europe Since 1968* will allow the critical culture of contemporary architecture to pass from its current malaise of "blackboard diagrams." The greatest power of cogent, committed criticism is to change opinion, to render an architectural subject more real, limpid, to cross-hatch a landscape of ideas, delineated in deft, rich prose. This happened for me with the final entry of the book, Tzonis and Lefaivre's lyrical interpretation of Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Department Extension to the Berlin Museum. Linking the formal, the moral, and the tectonic, their interpretation of Libeskind's plan might serve as final word about a demanding and important book:

> No architect before Libeskind has ever attempted such an extreme identification of an entire building with the broken figure. And in no period other than ours could the broken line seem more appropriate as an image of an epoch, a reflection on and questioning of the intractability and incoherence of a world which is characterized not only by the failure to understand, but by the still greater failure to uphold moral responsibility towards the "Other."

both the high-tech tendencies and the metaphysically oriented, former paper architects sharing an interest in amorphous geometries and radically new spatial and structural strategies. The flexibilities of CAD and the blossoming of new enclosure and structural devices have removed whatever lingering justification there might have once been for boxy, orthogonal spatial strategies—PoMo is almost certainly the last style with so conservative a spatial tectonic.

There is a detailed analysis of Renzo Piano's Bercy II Shopping Centre in Paris, whose rich amorphous form is achieved, amazingly, using wooden structure. While technological means vary and there is little in common in terms of style, it joins Santiago Calatrava's train stations (Lyon-Satolas and Zurich-Stadelhofen are included in this book), Frank Gehry's Vitra Museum, Hadid's Zollhof Media Centre, even to some degree Foster's Stansted Air-

port—testaments to the bold investigations of form that emerged in the 1980s. By grouping them together and taking them all seriously and on their own terms, the authors may be subtly proposing a convergence, a new synthesis of avant-garde and technologically advanced architecture. The late Peter Rice always insisted that there was little contradiction in his working with architects/engineers/artists as different as Foster and Hadid, Jean Nouvel and Frank Stella. His excellent essay—one of four that, with the authors' introduction, constitute the book's opening section—proposes this, and the authors agree, and the generosity of his spirit animates these recent projects.

Revisionist to the end, Tzonis and Lefaivre include a lively defense of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown's much-maligned Sainsbury Wing at London's National Gallery. Despite—or perhaps because

LUIS FERNANDEZ-GALIANO
Caveat Lector!

Caveat lector: "Reader beware." Resorting to a play on the ancient mercantile adage *caveat emptor* (buyer beware), the philosopher Jacques Derrida refused to be responsible for the transcription of his intervention at the first "Anyone" conference, a forum for reflection organized by Peter Eisenman in Los Angeles in 1991. Such conferences will be held once a year until the end of the millennium, always with a title composed out of the generic prefix "any" attached to a privileged noun. Derrida's cautionary advice could well be extended to the texts gathered in the volume, as well as to most of the current production of architectural theory in North America.

Anyone is a transcription of lectures and debates given during a weekend by architects, critics, historians, and philosophers. The book—if it can be called that—is a collection of arcane or trivial digressions that do not permit a very optimistic diagnosis of contemporary architectural thought. The result is a discouraging display of the absentmindedness and scholastic obscurantism of many architectural stars and many competent intellectuals who would never dare exhibit such negligence in their own fields. *Anyone* is an extreme case of both hermeticism and confusion, but perhaps because of this it is an accurate reflection of the disorientation of the intellectual circles that surround architecture.

Anyone was edited by Eisenman's wife, Cynthia Davidson, and designed by Massimo Vignelli on rose-colored paper with a "poor" aesthetic reminiscent of Cuban graphics of the 1960s. The only salvageable item in the volume is Rem Koolhaas' presentation. Koolhaas ignored the cryptic theme of "anyone" and took the opportunity to show his brilliant, but not winning, project for the Bibliothèque de France, a work that was also discussed by Rosalind

Krauss in her text, which was read in her absence by Sylvia Lavin. Despite her absence, the New York critic succeeded in focusing on the subject of architecture more than most of those present at the conference. The prolix and disjointed contributions of the others were transcribed from tapes: perhaps the absence of all the authors would have led to a better book! In a skeptical postscript, Rafael Moneo expressed his frustration and disenchantment with a meeting that was only a pretext for an eventual publication. This self-consciousness transformed the event into a passive encounter with affected dialogues. Of course, readers are likely to find the resulting publication no less frustrating and affected.

If *Anyone* represents the theoretical interests of consecrated architects and critics, *Strategies in Architectural Thinking*, edited by John Whiteman, Jeffrey Kipnis, and Richard Burdett, a group that might be referred to as "sons of Eisenman," proposes to assess the debate among the younger generation of architects and critics. It was also the product of a weekend conference (held in Chicago in 1988), but with the significant

Bibliothèque de France, section 3; Rem Koolhaas–OMA, 1989. (From *Anyone*.)

difference that the papers were carefully edited and supplied with a formidable bibliography, so that the book acquires a certain academic credibility. While Rizzoli allowed their publication of *Anyone* to be issued only six months after the conference, MIT Press required four years to bring their volume into print.

For the most part, the texts of the latter volume are insufferably pedantic for a group of critics that would like to be described as "emerging"; although the articles are, without a doubt, more articulate and readable than those written by the older generation, they fall back on the same conceptual obsessions and same enthusiasm for obscure expositions. The Chicago conference was organized by Kipnis, who was also at the Los Angeles "Any" conference. Most of the participants of *Strategies* are currently members of the editorial board of *Assemblage*, a publication that has attempted to pick up the torch of *Oppositions*, and that has served as an editorial nesting place for Eisenman and Derrida to vent their differences.

In fact, Derrida, joined by Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche, appears to be the philosophical axis of the debate. The critique and exegesis made by Peter (*Pater*) Eisenman serves as filial sustenance and nourishes many of the authors, more than the political and feminist radicalism that informs some of the contributions. Eisenman's verbal, graphic, and media talent has converted him into the father of this younger generation, which no doubt appreciates his acrobatic talent and his passion for intellectual play and risk-taking. Who else but Eisenman, in the midst of North American leftism, would attempt to realize a housing project in Frankfurt with Albert Speer (the son of Hitler's architect of the same name) and then publish a book with their names printed in ostentatious symmetry?

One cannot forget the profound connection between the thought and

the person of Heidegger and the Nazi regime, or that it was Paul de Man, whose sympathies for fascism have been recently exposed, who introduced Derrida to America, or that the pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic Philip Johnson was the godfather of Eisenman. Perhaps it is only by chance that, on the board of directors of the two organizing institutions for these published conferences (Anyone Corporation and the Chicago Institute for Architecture), only two names coincide: Eisenman and Frank Gehry, both initially ashamed of their Jewishness (Gehry changed his name from Goldberger), and today both ready to recover their cultural identity. (Incidentally, these are indeed strange times when the ultraconservative curator for the American pavilion at the Venice Biennale selects two progressive Jews to represent his country.) In the long run, only Johnson has a greater love of paradox, prestidigitation, and play than Eisenman.

The disciples gathered in *Strategies* inherited Eisenman's disturbing taste for puns and obscurantism. If anyone wants to penetrate these pages, they can't say they haven't been warned: *Caveat lector*!

CHARLES BURROUGHS

Distance Points: Essays in Theory and Renaissance Art and Architecture

James S. Ackerman

Distance Points is a collection of essays written over five decades by James S. Ackerman, the leading American architectural historian of his or perhaps any generation. Each essay is republished in its original form and contains a short postscript reviewing relevant subsequent literature and situating the discussion in relation to shifting intellectual fashions and paradigms. Ackerman also intersperses fascinating references to the sometimes accidental circumstances and/or the personal concerns and responses to wider events that affected or even occasioned his scholarly projects.

As the editors point out in a lucid introduction to the major themes of the essays, Ackerman's work has always been characterized by a firm sense of the moral aspect of scholarly production; this aspect of his work emerges especially in the postscripts. The volume does not aim at the celebratory closure of an important career; instead, much of its interest lies in the forthrightness and forcefulness with which Ackerman takes up critical positions, even in relation to his own earlier work. We encounter repeatedly his characteristic openness to ideas and generosity with regard to other scholars (I myself have been a beneficiary of this, though never his student), as well as a certain gruffness in dealing with those who, in Ackerman's view, shrink from a sufficiently serious and self-aware struggle to make sense of the material involved. This applies no less to "theoretically innocent" art historians than to the frivolous use by contemporary architects of historical elements.

Most scholars know Ackerman best for his writings on Renaissance architecture, notably his celebrated monographs on Michelangelo and Palladio, his early work on Bramante's Belvedere Courtyard, and his recent synthetic volume on the traditions of villa architecture. Many of his articles on

architecture also have attained status as classics, but this material occupies the third and final section in *Distance Points*. The essays in the earlier sections are less well known, even to specialists, and it is clearly Ackerman's object to remind or, more often, inform readers about his wider scholarly concerns—notably with questions of method and "critical theory" in contemporary historical explanation, an interest that is related, in interesting ways, to the study of theoretical reflection in Renaissance culture itself. The book's structure raises important

Leonardo da Vinci's sketch-studies of the reception of light rays by the eye (top) and by the *camera obscura* (middle); c. 1483–85. (From *Distance Points*.)

questions about the relationship of such material to the history of architecture.

The first section, concerned with theory, begins with an essay on style, a topic of particular moment at a time when the framework of the discipline of art history was just beginning to be shaken by such scholars as Meyer Schapiro (1953) and George Kubler (1962), whose famous discussions of the notion of style bracketed Ackerman's essay (written in 1963 but without knowledge of Kubler's book); it was also a time when the formalist art criticism of Clement Greenberg and others was at its most influential. Ackerman's opposition to any autonomous history of art, with all that it implies, is by now fairly standard in the discipline. He calls also for a flexible system of nomenclature, including the traditional stylistic labels, to make sense of the common features of objects produced in chronological and temporal contiguity. He makes the fascinating suggestion that Western art as a whole could be described as a megastyle, marked by diverse, often overlapping inflections and transitions between equilibrium and experimentation. Ackerman links these to types of patronage and other societal factors, though the relationship is not, in my view, so predictable and uniform as he claims. He identifies periods of experimentation and "creativity" with the freedom of artists from social control and pressure; it is also important to register episodes of social and even institutional interest in dense and elaborate artistic expression, without falling into the trap of determinism. An implication of Ackerman's position, furthermore, is that since Western art is marked by extraordinary diversity and artistic individualism, it eludes social historical explanation, even as practiced in some of his own writings!

In the book's second section, Ackerman directs attention to Leon Battista Alberti and Leonardo da Vinci, both leading Renaissance theorists of art who were also practitioners. The focus is mainly on their views on the mechanisms of perception and the protocols of illusionistic representation and projection in relation to the emergence of scientific method. Particularly important to Ackerman here is the rejection of teleo-

Plan and elevation drawing of the Milan cathedral, redrawn after Antonio di Vincenzo; 1390 (From *Distance Points*.)

logical and totalizing explanatory models, especially those transferred from the historiography of science. Ackerman's justified impatience with positivist and, as he puts it, determinist models falls short, however, of engaging poststructuralist models of writing about scientific discourse, even Michel Foucault's fundamental examination of early modern natural science (see especially *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* [New York: Random House, 1970]) and the range of work variously indebted to this. Ackerman's evasion of Foucauldian paradigms is especially unfortunate since these are clearly relevant to his recurrent concern with the identification of categories of diverse character, through which human subjects understand and intervene in their environment.

Certain of such categories are introduced in the essays on architecture in the third part of the book. Many of these—especially those unrelated, at least directly, to the material of Ackerman's many books—have long been celebrated for their originality and impact on subsequent scholarship. Two pieces deal with Lombardy, Italy, a region of particular interest to Ackerman in part because its architecture evades traditional

art historical modes of classification and hierarchization. He studies the stubborn survival and recrudescence of local traditions and competences, and the transition from the unconscious use of certain forms to their investment with particular ideological significance and semiotic character (e.g., the nationalist use of indigenous craftsmen and built forms at the Certosa of Pavia), though he does not use such terminology or appear receptive to its theoretical implications.

The essay on revivalism in Lombard Renaissance architecture ends with the appeal to an abstract law of cultural primacy, in terms of development from the restricted and local to the general. This neglects the various socioeconomic and geopolitical factors operative in the absorption of Lombardy into larger political and cultural units, as well as the continued persistence of local traditions that would, in the 17th and 18th centuries, leave an important imprint on metropolitan visual culture (one has only to think of Michangelo da Caravaggio, Carlo Maderno, or Francesco Borromini). The postscript abjures any theoretical or methodological comment, confining itself to philological updating; this is rather typical of the third part of the volume, but is perhaps more symptomatic of the character of

current work on Renaissance architecture than of Ackerman's own position.

The other essay on Lombardy, Ackerman's well-known article on art and science at the Milan cathedral, takes up the issue of the professionalization of the practice of architecture in relation to the development of theoretically grounded norms. This theme is discussed at a higher level of generality in the seminal essay, "The Architectural Profession in the Italian Renaissance," which deals largely with papal Rome. Again, Ackerman moves from stylistic analysis to the institutional aspect of architectural production. The milieu under review is studied further, with the lapse of a few decades, in an article on church architecture of the mid-to-late 16th century; in it, Ackerman studies the relationship between liturgical changes and the emergence of new forms of spatial organization and facade articulation in a changing religious and institutional climate. What is important is the lack of fit between contemporaries' and modern categories as exemplified by the capacity of 16th-century Jesuits to see homogeneity in buildings that to our eyes appear highly distinct.

Several of the articles on architecture explore themes related to Ackerman's books. Two are concerned with villa architecture, one with the Belvedere Courtyard, one with Michelangelo, and one with Palladio, though the architects' names are absent from the titles. This is significant in view of Ackerman's call for modes of historical investigation concerned with the "social, economic, and political forces motivating the evolution of design," rather than the traditional focus, represented in part by his own books, on individual artists of genius. He contrasts, however, his Michelangelo monograph with the later book on Palladio, approving of the shift in the latter to a focus on synchronic aspects of the history, not just of design but also the built environment in general.

Ackerman discusses examples of the Tuscan order in Renaissance architecture; one early case is the atrium of the Palazzo Thiene, Vicenza; Andrea Palladio, ca. 1549. (From *Distance Points*.)

Such an approach is extended in the essay, "The Geopolitics of Venetan Architecture in the Time of Titian." Buried in the footnotes is a brief account of differences between Ackerman's work and that of the leading Italian architectural historian, Manfredo Tafuri, whose interests, like Ackerman's, have focused on the Renaissance Veneto and papal Rome. One of the most striking features of current American architectural history concerned with the early modern period has been its failure to engage critically the rigorous and exhaustively documented discussions of Tafuri. In the postscript Ackerman characterizes an important recent hypothesis of Tafuri's as startling, but expresses no opinion about its validity. In one footnote, however, he presents the issue between Tafuri and himself as the level on which Palladio's villas relate to their sociocultural milieu: the emphasis in Ackerman's work, as he claims, on specific architectural responses to patron and site opposes Tafuri's insistence on common features, a regime of taste inextricably related to a regime of

power. But Ackerman's own stress, especially in the Palladio book, on the common functional character of the villas in the context of an emerging culture of agricultural improvement also entails a homogenizing approach to the villa architecture. Ackerman rather coyly refers to the ongoing debate about the relationship of milieu, ideology, and architecture in the work of Palladio.[1] Much is at stake, notably the relation of different constituents of the triad of social, economic, and political factors, and the degree of autonomy and social effectivity ascribable to a sphere of culture, but largely rejected by Tafuri. There's a missed opportunity here for an authoritative, extended comment on the extraordinarily interesting recent historiography on Venetian and Venetan architecture and visual culture.

The concluding essay, "Tuscan/Rustic Order," includes an extremely valuable account of Renaissance registration and analysis of the extant examples, but lacks extended discussion of the semiotic aspect of the often extraordinary employment of the forms concerned (this may come later, in his work in progress on the classical architectural system). This is typical: though interested in critical interpretation, Ackerman is primarily concerned as a historian with the production of the built environment and the constitution of the relevant competences. He discounts reception theory, which he memorably describes as "soggy." And he avoids the theoretical models and classificatory vocabulary of semiotics; when he cites Roland Barthes, for example, it is to justify the abstention from grand theory.

Furthermore, Ackerman eschews any reference to what is now generally referred to as "critical theory," the strategies and modes of explanation that have become especially important in literary studies. He uses the term "culture" on occasion but not in his more theoretical pronouncements; he seems uninterested in the work on public ritual and ceremony, associated notably

with Clifford Geertz and his followers, that has so influenced Renaissance studies, particularly those dealing with the built environment. Ackerman's criticism of the discipline involves, to a degree, a restoration of disciplinary boundaries that I find problematic, as well as a most valuable insistence on received standards of evaluating evidence and on the researcher's systematic constitution of his or her archive.

These essays are part of an extraordinarily rich body of work. I have found myself regularly in the position of a glossator of Ackerman's arguments and observations, for he so often seems to get there first. Yet I somewhat regret the paths traced in this book, away from the earlier, unexcelled formal and contextual analysis and toward a later concern with issues of ideology and the social constitution of culture. This very contrast suggests the possibility, within an appropriate theoretical framework, of a reconciliation of these moments. But I perhaps only anticipate the content of Ackerman's next book.

NOTES

1. For my own contribution, see "Palladio and Fortune: Notes on the Source and Meaning of the Villa Rotunda," *Architectura* 18 (1988): 59–91.

DISTANCE POINTS: ESSAYS IN THEORY AND RENAISSANCE ART AND ARCHITECTURE, James S. Ackerman, with an introduction by Richard Krautheimer and Kathleen Wel-Garris Brandt, MIT Press, 1991, 561 pp., illus., $50.00.

LAWRENCE RICHARD FURNIVAL

The Triumph of Calculation

Claude-Nicolas Ledoux's Rotunda de la Villette in Paris is on my walk home. I usually cross the swing bridge on rue Dieu and parallel the Canal St.-Martin toward the Bassin de la Villette, passing the gently arched iron footbridges, and following the shade of the great horse-chestnut and plane trees along the canal. Ledoux's Rotunda commands the busy intersection of the elevated *métro*, the Canal St.-Martin, several Paris streets, and overlooks the Bassin and the Canal de l'Ourcq, which stretches eastward away from the city. Ledoux's buildings filled my notebooks in architecture school: in my eyes he was the first of the revolutionaries. I still make sketches as I pass, but the more often I pass, the more I admire the canals that join in front of the Rotunda—not a reflecting pool for a famous building, but part of a three-centuries-old machine built "to sew together the tattered shreds of a territory." And as I travel more in France, for instance, on the flat plain near Dijon, where the canals are straight and lined with trees that stabilize the banks, where each lock is punctuated by a stone cottage with an oval attic window, I find a regularity, calmness, and steadiness of purpose that is deeply impressive.

I suspect that Antoine Picon, French architect, engineer, and scholar, would agree. Documenting the origin of the split between the architect and engineer during the turmoil of the Enlightenment in France, his recently translated book, *French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment*, is thoughtful and provocative—and a must-read for students of the revolutionary architects.

Ledoux, Etienne-Louis Boullée, and Jean-Jacques Lequeu. Picon wisely concentrates on material that has not been covered elsewhere. The volume systematically describes the breakdown of architectural classicism and the emergence of a distinct and disciplined cadre of engineers who came to dominate design during the Enlightenment.

Theory and pedagogy dominate the first few chapters of the book, prompting me to impatiently recall Emile Durkheim's observation on French intellectuals—that they have a "common temperamental aversion to the concrete." But I found Picon's insights into historical issues penetrating and useful for the present. For example, Picon's discussion of the "balance between form and technical reasoning" is beautifully brought to earth by an engineer's ink wash and watercolor presentation drawing of a bridge in the many stages of construction. Busy design professionals, perhaps concerned about

Like conventional representations of academies, this imaginary depiction of the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées shows a range of interests—artistic, technical, and scientific; L.-J. Desprez, late 18th century. (From *French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment*.)

Picon writes, "The cartography of the Age of Englightenment endlessly oscillated between the need for conventions and the desire to imitate nature." *Studies of Woods for Maps*; 1793. (From *French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment*.)

the role of computers in the profession, may find common cause with the 18th-century classicist architect, "being afflicted by nostalgia for the luminous origins of Greek art and by an apprehension at the boundless future of technology."

Researchers working in related fields will find some materials in English for the first time. And specialists will note the remarkable selection of drawings and essays from the archives of what was the civil engineers' *grande école*—the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées. Picon, a graduate of the Ecole d'Architecture (at Paris Villemin), the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, and the Ecole Polytechnique, who also holds a doctorate in history from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, draws together much of his earlier work on Sainte-Geneviève (the Panthéon), the colonnade of the Louvre, the innovative bridges of the 18th-century engineer Jean-Rodolphe Perronet, and the history of the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, to

form a comprehensive account of the decline of classicism in France. The resulting book is an account of how engineers found their path forward, and how, Picon explains, architects lost theirs.

While avoiding the well-trodden path of defining classicism, Picon provides fresh insight: classicism was as much sensual as historical; as much inventive as regulative. The attempts to rationalize classicism—to classify and codify its sensuality and inventiveness—failed because they were overly ambitious. The "reasoning of art" was to solidify architecture's foundations in the same way that rationalism was transforming the sciences. Jacques François Blondel's efforts, as director and founder of the Ecole des Arts, were so determined that they provoked Ledoux to accuse his former teacher of being "circumscribed by the five Orders." Clearly Ledoux was right: the intended effect of Blondel's efforts was to limit the scope of architecture. But Blon-

del's dream—that a rigorous rationalism would validate classicism and not undermine it—reflects an intellectual tradition reaching back at least to Leon Battista Alberti. The loss of this dream represents a casting off of long-trusted moorings for architecture. Picon argues that this is an important turning point: after Ledoux and Boullée, he explains, architecture "enters fully into the modern dramaturgy of the avant-gardes. Truth and lies, Utopias and betrayals constitute a new kind of theater." A theater, he suggests, of endless conflict.

As Picon sets the stage for architecture's crisis, however, he also provides an important subtext for its continuity: urbanism and planning. Many readers who are familiar with Blondel's beautiful plans will wish for more information on his dramatic urban proposals for Metz and Strasbourg. But they will nonetheless be more than satisfied with the attention given to Pierre Patte's ideal city. Le Corbusier started his studies at the

Bibliothèque Nationale with this nearly forgotten classical theorist, according to Picon, and the reader should find the fine machine-like engravings of ideal street sections as interesting as Le Corbusier did. Picon points out that Patte's proposals for flat roofs with roof terraces—which were to protect against the fire hazard of gabled roofs—may have caught Le Corbusier's interest as well. Picon intriguingly describes Patte's city as "a theater of machines," emphasizing that it was a collection, not a system.

However, a system was the object of the engineer's ambition: if the emulation of the scientist served the architect poorly; it served the engineer perfectly. "The engineers . . . were organized and inspired by a common ambition to transform the world," Picon writes; and furthermore, for the engineer "to diverge from the prescribed rules constituted, as far as they were concerned, a degree of risk, but was in no sense heretical." Thus the engineer, freed from orthodoxy, developed a common belief with scientists in experimentation and disinterestedness. Yet despite the advances made in 19th-century physics (e.g., motion, force at a distance, thermodynamics, optics, and ideal fluids), engineering calculation, in the practical sense, had not progressed significantly beyond that known to the Renaissance. For example, the justification by an Enlightenment engineer for the angle of a canal lock gate would have been logical to a Renaissance architect: halfway (45 degrees) between the weak extremes (0 and 90 degrees).

The culture of engineers, their belief in precision and calculation—considered their primary characteristic—actually predates the "mathematization" of engineering. It predates the ability to calculate much of anything more than volumes, weights, distances, angles, and time. Even as halting advances were made in the application of calculation to structural problems, engineering practice was, Picon relates, "a whole series of gropings and compromises:

to calculate but to distrust calculation, to innovate but to rely upon tradition."

Thus calculation was used in its simplest form. A road or canal might involve six hundred workers with shovels and buckets—addition and subtraction on a large scale. The rationalization of the building of roads, bridges, and canals was the result of the government's push for development, and the engineer's attempts to minimize effort and mistakes. Picon compares this to the architect's world, which deals with guilds, specialists, fewer workers, and owners/clients. The world of an architect reflected the structure of prerevolutionary society, not the world of the military. In the end, in France the engineer's authority over the work force rested on the authority of the state. This gave them the power to homogenize the work—and the work force—in a way that the architect never would.

Cartography is analyzed as the reflection of this fact: a means of homogenizing the

"Hydraulic architecture, defined as the 'art of directing, raising, and managing waters for the various needs of life,' is naturally concerned with the art of gardens"; B.-F. de Bélidor, 1737–39. (From *French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment*.)

landscape, work, and resources. Thus, mapping was a tool of calculation of some importance. "A forest was a potential warship or merchant vessel, and all contouring therefore represented a possible source of energy," explains Picon. "Canals at summit level provide a good illustration of the energy aspect of the relief, since their layout was dictated by two major preoccupations, namely, that the summit level should be located at a sufficient height and power, and that at the same time, it should be able to collect waters available at a still higher altitude." Thus the accuracy of their maps reflected not only a sensitivity for the landscape and a preoccupation with the magnitude of nature, but also reflected the requirements of an inventory. For Picon, the countryside was the "engineers' garden," not only because engineers' designs resembled garden designs of the time, but also because engineers recognized territory—not the city—as being the source of wealth, and it was their responsibility to organize it.

Thus, one of Picon's most important contributions is that he shows the birth and development of the engineer's spirit through their maps. Ponts et Chaussées students competed each year in making maps of fictional landscapes, producing delicate watercolor and India-ink drawings that are reproduced in the book only in monochrome. Even so, the renderings are striking. "A plan or a map is a copy of nature from the perspective of a bird in flight" intoned a pamphlet for students, "and one must therefore copy everything as exactly as possible."

Judging from the student essay competitions at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, neither calculation nor the state, but a sense of heroic challenge should animate the engineer. The "engineers' garden" was vast and sometimes violent. But, as Picon points out, engineers did not see themselves in conflict with nature. "One wonders how the punctilious

work done on maps could be reconciled with the often brutal decisions required in planning," he writes. But it would be interesting to know exactly what kind of "brutal decisions" needed to be made because of "the despotic dictates of necessity." Violence against nature (exploitation of resources) or violence against materials (construction) are at best a theoretical, disembodied violence. I recall the story of English prisoners from the Napoleonic wars being forced to dig the Pouilly Canal Tunnel. Their captors sealed them inside and promised them liberty when they had dug their way to the end. Food is said to have been delivered by rope and "the corpses of many were buried behind the stone lining."[1] Assuming this story is true, real violence certainly gives "the disinterestedness of the engineer" a different meaning. One suspects that the essays of the engineering students might be more illuminating if compared to those of the military academy students.

In contrast, one must admire the way Picon, in his concluding words, goes right to the heart of the modern architects' dilemma, in terms quite vigorous:

> With the collapse of classicism, there actually began the cycle of hope and disillusionment, truth and lies, that of the avant-gardes and the reactions to them, and that of an architectural "debate" marked with the seal of a kind of impotence. We have yet to emerge from this cycle, for is not architecture still, when all is said and done, the art which Diderot, in his *Prospectus de l'Encyclopédie*, had already ranged under the heading "Imagination"?

We should conclude then that architecture is a Sisyphean task and that "imagination" is literally the last word. Perhaps this is so, but the question arises, Where is the dangling thread of continuity—urbanism—which has been so carefully traced through the trials of classicism when it had scarcely a word in the treatises? Certainly calculation triumphed. The Ecole des Arts was closed and another school of architecture (the Ecole des Beaux Arts) was not established for almost thirty years. The architect seemed to slip into a period, as Picon says, of "neglect." Their "role being simply to il-

lustrate the lofty deeds of the Republic" with "triumphal arches and temples to Equality." But even in neglect, architecture followed its tradition. The facade was a wall on the all-important street, and the public monument was an important object in it. I would argue that architecture did not become superficial, but returned to its roots.

Understandably, engineers may be skeptical. Compared to the regularity, calmness, and disinterested work of the engineer, the succession of styles—this self-reinvention by architects every few generations—must seem wasteful. But Picon would agree, I think, that regeneration of people's ideas and cities, of their hopes and aspiration, "of avant-gardes and the reactions to them," is, in fact, what architecture is all about.

Perhaps this is why architecture seems to have eluded the march of progress. Its strength and weakness both derive from its refusal—or inability—to submit to calculation. Ironically, the consequence is that architecture often appears calculated and artificial, while engineering does not. I suspect that I. M. Pei's pyramids at the Louvre will never be widely loved, will not be true monuments, will not be symbols of our hopes and aspirations. Instead, I recognize, with resigned admiration, that the work of engineers, the ugly, crinkled lunar excursion module, for instance, like the canals of France, probably will.

NOTES

1. Hugh McKnight, *Cruising French Canals and Rivers* (Seven Seas Press, 1985; distributed by Simon & Schuster).

FRENCH ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT, Antoine Picon, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 437 pp., illus., $140.00.

LOUIS ROCAH

Spiritual Space: The Religious Architecture of Pietro Belluschi

Meredith L. Clausen

Pietro Belluschi is celebrating his ninety-fourth birthday this year. His long and distinguished career began with his 1930 design for a new wing for the Portland Art Museum and extends to the Trinity Lutheran Church in Sheridan, Oregon, completed in 1990. He was the dean of architecture and urban planning at MIT from 1951 to 1965 and received the AIA Gold Medal Award in 1972. His career may well be the embodiment of the second, or triumphal, phase of American modernism (the first being the heroic phase of Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright).

Belluschi's work was published extensively when it was built, but until now, no major publications has dealt comprehensively with his entire career.[1] Meredith Clausen's book, *Spiritual Space: The Religious Architecture of Pietro Belluschi*, is a major first step in filling this void. In the preface to the book, we learn that the next step will be the imminent publication of the same author's *Pietro Belluschi: Modern American Architect*, which will be a monograph on his entire life and career, "far larger in scope and more analytic in approach" than *Spiritual Space*.

The present volume begins with a long introductory essay by Clausen, which admirably describes and characterizes Belluschi's ecclesiastical work, placing it in the context of both his career and of the developments in American architecture at that time. She clearly shows that Belluschi's churches were deeply rooted in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the theology of Paul Tillich. Belluschi's ideas about architecture and religion are presented in a selection of six brief essays in an appendix to the book. Between the introductory essay and the appendix is the main part of the book: a detailed presentation and description of forty-three churches and synagogues, all but seven of them completed new buildings or

large additions. The astonishing scope of this body of work is even more impressive in that it cuts across denominational lines. Belluschi, born a Catholic but infused with a broad humanistic, somewhat pantheistic attitude toward religion, designed eleven Lutheran churches, ten churches of various other Protestant denominations, nine nonsectarian churches, eight Catholic churches (including one cathedral), and five synagogues.

The presentation of the forty-three projects is all the more illuminating because the author benefits from writing at a particularly advantageous point in time. There are obvious limitations to architectural history that deals with work so distant in time that first-hand contact is impossible. Similarly, architectural history that deals with very recent work faces the danger of insufficient perspective or of resembling promotional material for an architect's contemporary career (i.e., Vincent Scully on Robert Stern).

Clausen's vantage point in this book is optimal, and she makes good use of it. Most of the projects date back more than twenty-five years, yet the author had access not only to the architect, but also to clients, collaborators, builders, and other contributors. As a result, the discussion of each building is extremely complete and accurate. Moreover, the book provides a wonderfully rich, probing, almost intimate insight into the process by which most of these buildings came into being, with all their twists, trials, triumphs, and tribulations.

It is quite interesting to learn, for example, that, in 1948 the new pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Cottage Grove, Oregon, "fresh from Princeton and the Union Seminary in New York, thought a Gothic building most appropriate; others leaned toward the colonial style of red brick and white trim. They all agreed that the church should have gabled roofs and a steeple." The way in which Belluschi led this congregation to enthusiastic acceptance of his design is described in detail and makes fascinating reading.

However, there are some drawbacks inherent in the fact that this book, which deals exclusively with one (albeit major) segment of Belluschi's work, is published before the

First Presbyterian Church, Cottage Grove; Pietro Belluschi, 1955–57. Belluschi succeeding in swaying the congregation away from its initial intentions, to build a gothic or colonial-styled church. Visitors entered the church through a wooden gateway and past an enclosed garden. (From *Spiritual Space*.)

more comprehensive monograph. For one thing, it is somewhat disconcerting to come across no fewer than six notes that refer to an as-yet-unpublished book. Moreover, the book's narrow focus precludes comparisons to be drawn to Belluschi's non-church work. Take for instance Clausen's description of how Belluschi handled the entry to the First Lutheran Church in Boston (1955–57): "Following a by-now-characteristic progression of spaces, the visitor approaches through a trellised gateway on one side leading into a private, landscaped courtyard, then turns at an angle . . . and enters." The author could have made reference here to the way Belluschi handled the entrance to the Moore or Burkes houses (both in Portland, 1949), which have similar entrances. For that matter, comparisons could have been made to the houses built by Belluschi's colleagues, John Yeou (Portland), John Funk (Berkeley), Harwell Hamilton Harris (Pasadena), and others who also often used this kind of entry.

If it's true that Belluschi stands as a paradigmatic figure for the triumphal phase of American modernism, then it is not surprising to hear in this book echoes of old, fiercely fought battles. The canonical view is that, in this phase of American modernism, from the 1930s to the 1970s, there were two opposing camps: the "soft," native-grown, Wright-influenced approach, imbued with humanism, exemplified by the Bay Region or Bay Area style (of Northern California); and the disciplined, European-derived, modular, cerebral, stark—in short, the International style.

This dichotomy is more apparent than real. Even the nomenclature is wrong. The term International style was indignantly rejected by Walter Gropius and all others whose work was so labeled.[2] If an International style ever existed, surely it was the academic classicism that made a public building in Buenos Aires indistinguishable from its counterpart in Brussels or Bucharest. Bay Region style is also a misnomer. Belluschi, who built in Portland, Harris of Pasadena, and many others were not from the San Francisco Bay Area, and all the architects involved denied that they were working in a "style." In 1949 Lewis Mumford had the good grace to voice regret that he had earlier, "by some unfortunate slip," coined the Bay Region style tag.[3] The

Church of the Christian Union, Rockford, Illinois; Pietro Belluschi, 1962–66. (From *Spiritual Space*.)

European architects acknowledged their debt to Wright; Mies van der Rohe was particularly effusive. The West Coast houses of Joe Esherick and John Yeon in the 1940s show a rigorously disciplined modularity not to be found in the contemporaneous houses of Gropius or Marcel Breuer on the East Coast. And so on. From a post-postmodernist perspective, it is perhaps all too easy to see, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the two supposedly warring factions were in essential agreement on certain basic principles about integrity, clarity, rejection of historical mimesis, and other ideas harking back to Eugène-Emanuel Viollet-le-Duc. Nevertheless, at the time, the battles were really fought, fueled perhaps in part by personal jealousies and resentment. To some who had struggled for a long time to find acceptance as modern architects in the United States, it may have been galling to see newcomers from Europe in the 1930s given quick recognition and academic appointments.

Belluschi's career perfectly illustrates the problems and difficulties of categorizing. *Spiritual Space* intimates that Belluschi's churches don't exactly fit under the International style label. If so, then what would be the appropriate label for his 1948 Equitable building (Portland), with its clearly expressed skeletal structure sheathed in aluminum and glass? The answer might simply be "modern architecture," which serves just as well for his churches. Writes Clausen in her introduction: "Belluschi's modernist principles were clear: . . . Rather than blindly copying the anachronistic forms of the past, the architect should try to recapture the essence of the type with a simple, straightforward solution in tune with life as it is, in sympathy with local materials, the people, and the existing landscape."

She sums up as follows: "Belluschi's churches are more than architectural experiments, more too than simply a moving aesthetic experience. His controlled geometries and lucid structures suggest the power of reason, the presence of a comprehensible system; his darkened ambiguous spaces evoke a sense of mystery arousing . . . but not fully satisfying one's search for basic answers. What mattered to Belluschi was not just architecture's external form but the full experience of its presence and space. He sought a reticent exterior that bespoke both a symbolic function as a communal place of worship and a quiet meditative interior with a profoundly sacred space." Clausen's examination of Belluschi's religious architecture has depth and scholarship, and heightens anticipation for her forthcoming book on the architect's entire career.

NOTES

1. *The Northwest Architecture of Pietro Belluschi* (New York: F. W. Dodge, 1953), edited by Jo Stubblebine, is a slender volume with pictures of the architect's work up to 1951. *Pietro Belluschi: Edifici e Progetti* (Rome: Oficina Edizioni, 1974) is a bilingual photographic catalog of an exhibition of Belluschi's work held in Rome in 1974. Both are out of print.
2. See the introduction of Walter Gropius' *Scope of Total Architecture* (New York: Collins Books, 1962).
3. *Domestic Architecture of the San Francisco Bay Region*, catalog of exhibition held at the San Francisco Museum of Art, Sept. 16–Oct. 30, 1949.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

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
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
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
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
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Anyone

Anyway

The multidisciplinary and crosscultural **Any**way conference met in June 1993 in Barcelona to consider the multiplicity of processes that bear on the thinking and making of architecture at the end of the millennium. This volume, the third in a series of 11, documents the conference proceedings with articles, transcripts, and photographs. The participants are architects Elizabeth Diller, Peter Eisenman, Jacques Herzog, Arata Isozaki, Rem Koolhaas, Daniel Libeskind, Rafael Moneo, and Bernard Tschumi; critics Roger Connah, Akira Asada, Kojin Karatani, Fredric Jameson, Sanford Kwinter, Pierluigi Nicolin, Ignasi de Solà-Morales; philosophers André Glucksmann, John Rajchman, Josep Ramoneda, Giulia Sissa, and Mark C. Taylor; artist Silvia Kolbowski; political theorist Xavier Rubert de Ventos. Available February 1994. 272 pp., $45.

Also Available:
Anyone, documenting the 1991 Los Angeles conference, with articles by Jacques Derrida, Roberto Unger, Anthony Vidler, William Gibson, and others. 272 pp., $45.
Anywhere, documenting the 1992 conference at Yufuin, Japan, with articles by Toyo Ito, Tadao Ando, Ingo Günther, Jeffrey Kipnis, Jacques Derrida, and others. 280 pp., $45.

ANY

This new bimonthly architecture tabloid, a k a Architecture New York, explores the ways architecture both influences and is influenced by film, painting, philosophy, literature, science, technology, video, and other contemporary cultural practices. Edited by Cynthia Davidson, **ANY** is thematic in nature. Issues also include the editor's Dear Reader column; Not the Last Word, a critical summary of the issue theme written each time by a different critic; letters written from global architectural hot spots; and critical profiles on architects such as Gwathmey/Siegel, Rem Koolhaas, and Tadao Ando.

Forthcoming issues include "Electrotecture," guest edited by Mark C. Taylor, with articles by Michael Benedikt, William Mitchell, Avital Ronell, Bernard Stiegler, Allucquere Stone, and Bernard Tschumi; "Architecture and the Feminine," guest edited by Jennifer Bloomer and including essays by Diana Agrest, Karen Bermann, Elizabeth Grosz, George Hersey, and Ann Bergren; and "Lightness and Gravity," guest edited by John Rajchman and Greg Lynn, and featuring Paul Virilio, Bernard Cache, Toyo Ito, and others. Subscriptions are $45 U.S./ $65 Foreign.

N E Writings

This new book series, edited by Michael Speaks, redefines interdisciplinary and experimental writing from within the strong discipline of architecture. Situated between theory and practice, architecture is uniquely positioned to address the many emergent debates concerning space, cities, gender, ethnicity, and the environment. **N E Writings** will address these and other issues by publishing approximately 30 books over the next 10 years.

Coming in Fall 1994

Architecture as Metaphor by Kojin Karatani, translated by Sabu Kohso. In a style that is uniquely his own, Karatani, professor of Literature at Hosei University in Tokyo, examines the relationships between architecture and philosophy, literature, linguistics, city planning, anthropology, political economy, psychoanalysis, and mathematics. *Architecture as Metaphor* is also an important example of a popular genre of Japanese theoretical writing which is virtually unknown in the West. *Architecture as Metaphor* will be a significant book for architects and for those interested in non-Western theory and writing practices.

Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories by Bernard Cache, translated by Anne Boyman. Developing a classification of images, Cache, an independent architect and furniture designer, redefines architecture as the art of the frame, extending architecture beyond building to include cinematic, pictorial, and other framings. Cache focuses on furniture-images, because, as he suggests, furniture is both an interior replication of architecture and the primary territory of the body. These furniture-images are perhaps the most exciting extension to date of the work of philosopher Gilles Deleuze, whose concepts have become important for a new generation of architects and theorists.